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vIn 2013, the Institut de hautes études en administration publique 
(IDHEAP) at the University of Lausanne published the first handbook on 
Swiss public administrations both in German and in French. This hand-
book became quite a success within the civil service and proved to be very 
useful for teaching. This completely rewritten and much shorter volume 
concentrates on the main characteristics of public administrations in 
Switzerland and makes the content of the handbook accessible to a broader 
English-speaking public. It responds to an increasing interest in Swiss 
political and administrative institutions and policy solutions.
The book was written to be presented at the 2018 Conference of the 
European Group of Public Administration (EGPA) organized at the 
IDHEAP in Lausanne. One of the goals was to give our colleagues some 
ideas about the organization and the functioning of Swiss public adminis-
tration. We hope it gives answers to questions which usually come up 
while considering another country and provides insights into an adminis-
trative system which is quite different and complex but rather successful.
To write such a volume in a relatively short lapse of time was quite a 
challenge, and we would like to say thank you to all those who contributed 
to it, especially all the authors for their significant contributions. Our 
thanks also go to the University of Lausanne, the Faculty of Law, Criminal 
Justice and Public Administration, and the Graduate School of Public 
Administration (IDHEAP) for their financial support.
A very special thank-you goes to John Bendix, who not only translated 
the French and German texts into English, and corrected our attempts to 
use the language of Shakespeare, but also shared with us his huge 
Preface
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 knowledge of the topic and prevented us from being unclear or incorrect. 
A special thank-you also goes to Merita Buzuku, who brought all the 
numerous documents in the form requested by the editor.
Lausanne, Switzerland Andreas Ladner
 Nils Soguel
 Yves Emery
 Sophie Weerts
 Stéphane Nahrath
April 2018
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Swiss citizens approve of their government and the way democracy is prac-
ticed in the country. They trust their authorities and are satisfied with the 
range of services Swiss governments provide. This seems to be quite a 
contrast to many other countries which find it increasingly difficult to 
form stable governments and witness growing disenchantment with poli-
tics among their citizens. This goes hand in hand with complaints about a 
too rigid and not very effective and efficient bureaucracy, and the political 
and administrative difficulties in finding solutions for the pending chal-
lenges to old-age pension schemes, education, energy supply, health, 
unemployment, and other public policy issues.
We do not claim throughout this book that Switzerland has solved 
these problems or that political institutions, politics, and public adminis-
tration make all the difference. Government certainly matters, but there 
are other things which also make a country successful. We nevertheless 
believe that Switzerland is an interesting case to look at from a theoretical 
as well as from a more practice-oriented perspective. Though confronted 
with the same problems that exist in other countries, Switzerland occa-
sionally offers different solutions; some of them seem to work particularly 
well.
We begin with the history and formation of Swiss political institutions 
and describe the horizontal and vertical organization of the state, the role 
of the different levels of government, the territorial units, and other actors 
who provide public services. We also provide information about the num-
ber of employees working in the public sector and compare Swiss public 
administration to public administration in other countries. The second 
introduction: swiss PubLic 
administration—Key characteristics 
and chaLLenges
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part is devoted to the legal system, mainly focused on the federal level. It 
introduces classic legal concepts, as understood in the country, and pres-
ents some of the legal mechanisms and institutions. The Swiss legal sys-
tem, like many others, is confronted with structural transformations and 
has its debates about the loss of legitimacy and the lack of efficiency of 
legal instruments in addressing issues of governing. Part 3 looks at mana-
gerial aspects of the Swiss administrative system and examines the princi-
ples on which it is based as well as its most recent reforms. We also look at 
aspects related to human resource management and at public employees 
who are no longer career civil servants. Following this, part 4 takes up the 
question of public financing. It stresses the distinctive features of the 
financial process and how taxing power, tax competition, and financial 
equalization are organized, as well as how they affect the financial situa-
tion of the different levels of Swiss government. The final part looks at 
select public policies such as social security, health, climate, and telecom-
munication, and highlights interesting findings of how politico- 
administrative arrangements are designed in these policy domains. It also 
explains how and why policy evaluation has been institutionalized in 
Switzerland. The sections which follow summarize key aspects discussed 
in each of these five parts.
Part 1: “bottom-uP state organization, diversity, 
and new forms of PoLicy coordination”
It is helpful to briefly look at the foundation of the modern Swiss state to 
better understand its political institutions and the genesis of Swiss public 
administration. That the entire Swiss territory was never part of a strong 
monarchy but was instead a loose confederation of more or less indepen-
dent territorial subunits (cantons) led almost inevitably to creating a fed-
eralist structure. This seemed the only practicable solution for uniting a 
religiously and linguistically heterogeneous territory. With residual power 
in the hands of the cantons, the price for the transfer of competencies to 
the national government was to introduce direct democratic mechanisms 
and to integrate the various political forces by having them share in the 
responsibility for governing. Each transfer of tasks to the national govern-
ment needs the consent of the majority of the citizens and the majority of 
the cantons. This bottom-up type of state-building is also why the federal 
(national) government was long limited in its powers and saw an expan-
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sion of these powers relatively late, comparatively speaking. The execution 
of many tasks still remains in the hands of cantons and municipalities, and 
widespread cooperation with private and semi-private actors has also con-
tributed to the country having an only modest state sector.
Swiss federalism is based on cooperation between the different levels of 
government, and competition between them is considered positive. Unity 
explicitly allows for diversity, and the cantons still fiercely defend their 
autonomy; the principle of subsidiarity is also upheld. Most civil servants 
work for cantonal governments, and cantonal expenditures, taken as a 
whole, are much higher than those at local and national levels. This is not 
only due to the relatively high number of cantons (26) for such a small 
country but also of the increasing importance of policymaking in the 
domains of education and health, both of which are largely cantonal 
responsibilities. Despite attempts to more strictly follow the principle of 
fiscal equivalence and to concentrate the regulation, funding, and execu-
tion of specific tasks at only one level of government, various forms of 
cooperation between different levels of government are still the rule. In 
some areas, they have even increased, and there is extensive cooperation 
between cantons whose aim is to better coordinate autonomous policy-
making—and to increase their collective influence on the higher, national 
level of government.
The complexity of political arrangements has also increased through a 
partial outsourcing of activities formerly organized by public authorities. 
This is very much in line with the international debates about administra-
tive reform in the context of new public management, and is in line with 
the existing Swiss tendency of intense cooperation between social and eco-
nomic actors. Switzerland thus has all the characteristics of what is often 
called multi-level governance. Even with this, there are many attempts to 
introduce new forms of policy coordination which are less hierarchical, to 
reach across the different levels of government, and to involve the private 
sector in fulfilling public tasks.
Part 2: “strengthening the Legitimacy 
and efficiency of swiss Law”
As in neighboring France or Germany, the Swiss legal system is part of the 
civil law family that originated in the Roman Empire. There is a written 
(and frequently amended) constitution, which contains fundamental 
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rights, separates the legislative, executive, and judicial organs of the federal 
state, and fixes the distribution of powers between cantons and federal 
authorities. Its judiciary is federally and hierarchically organized, with a 
Supreme Court at the top. In terms of the relationship between interna-
tional and national law, Switzerland follows the ‘monist’ tradition, mean-
ing that international law is part of the Swiss legal order. The Swiss legal 
system is also unique owing to its many instruments of direct democracy 
at both federal and cantonal levels.
Yet structural changes have strongly influenced both legal systems and 
public administrations. Laws are more and more frequently produced in 
international forums. Executive branches today play an increasingly 
important role in developing legal norms. New forms of normativity have 
emerged which employ informal mechanisms and involve private actors, 
thereby circumventing legal rigor and increasing the flexibility of public 
action. Within the classic conception of the separation of powers, the judi-
ciary plays an increasing role in expanding constitutional review. All these 
developments generate questions about the continued legitimacy and effi-
ciency of the law, including in Switzerland.
One issue is that the growing diversity in legal norms seems to be lead-
ing to a loss of legitimacy of the existing legal system. The proliferation 
comes in part through the development of international law, but arises as 
well from the technicality of enacted laws and the sheer complexity of the 
legal system. The instruments of direct democracy have the potential both 
of supporting and of undermining lawmaking processes, so various rules 
and practices have been developed to help build political consensus. This 
is done in part by identifying different forms of law and specifying the 
competent actors but also through a legislative process that is cautiously 
organized. That process includes a very elaborate consultation procedure 
that brings together public administrations with political and private actors 
and covers both domestic and international law. The organization of the 
judiciary and a (formally) limited degree of constitutional review of federal 
laws on the part of the Federal Supreme Court support the separation of 
powers notion.
Another issue, one which also affects legitimacy, is the desire for greater 
efficiency in politics and administration. The criticisms are well known: the 
lawmaking process is too slow, legal language is too abstract and technical, 
there are too many regulations, legislative instruments are inadequate for 
managing contemporary social issues, and so forth. This section addresses 
the efforts by lawmakers to address such problems, while also discussing 
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the openness of the Swiss public law to other forms of normativity. Even if 
the acts of ‘soft law’ are not part of the sources of law, they are used by the 
public authorities and circumvent existing formal constraints.
Part 3: “an outcome-oriented and oPen civiL 
service”
From the perspective of management and human resources, Swiss public 
administration is a particularly interesting case of what the literature calls 
‘post-bureaucracy’. This is a hybrid universe which combines the values 
and methods employed in traditional management with those of private 
management. Politicians and public managers in Switzerland have always 
been open to the private sector, which helps explain the success in intro-
ducing ‘new public management’ methods in Switzerland. But rather than 
privatizing the public sector, these new methods complement more con-
ventional public administration principles which include legality and the 
equality of treatment. These remain very present and have been joined to 
more entrepreneurial principles, including cost control, efficiency, atten-
tion to the quality of services provided to the population, and evaluating 
the effectiveness of administrative acts. Similarly, human resource manage-
ment in public administration today combines private sector practices such 
as performance-based pay and the facilitated termination of employment 
with traditional safeguards that include guarantees under public law for 
such work relationships. This is in the context of often quite favorable 
working conditions: the levels of remuneration in public sector employ-
ment are often higher than those found in the private sector, as the statis-
tics regularly show. Such a marriage of public and private elements is not 
self-evident and may represent a unique ‘Swiss way’ of management.
Part 4: “a sound fiscaL PoLicy thanKs to strong 
fiscaL institutions”
Swiss fiscal institutions have distinctive features. Parliaments, whether at 
federal or cantonal levels, are not under the thumb of their executive 
councils. For many years now, the federal constitution and the constitu-
tions of the cantons have set hard budget constraints on spendthrift gov-
ernments. Switzerland’s instruments for direct democracy—popular 
referenda and initiatives—also apply to legislation involving tax and expen-
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ditures. These elements build systems of checks and balances that have led, 
particularly in the last two decades, to sound public budgets with relatively 
low debt levels.
The strongly decentralized and federalist structure of the country has 
also contributed to this outcome. It enables effective competition between 
local governments. Tax competition is part of the picture, with direct taxes 
the main source of financing for the cantons and the municipalities. Local 
governments have also implemented high-quality financial and manage-
ment accounting systems; these governments are the main providers of 
public services which are financed according to a ‘user-pays’ principle. 
Thanks to these rather technical characteristics, the financial statements 
prepared by Swiss federal, cantonal, and local governments have high lev-
els of accountability and transparency.
Perhaps surprisingly, the governments’ favorable financial situation is 
not due to high taxes. Even though Switzerland makes extensive use of 
direct taxation, the tax burden in Switzerland is lighter than elsewhere for 
both households and companies. A repeated criticism is that indirect taxa-
tion, notably value-added tax (VAT), should be used more. True, VAT 
engenders fewer fiscal distortions compared to other taxes. However, the 
fact that income tax dominates compared to VAT makes it one of the driv-
ers of fiscal federalism and tax competition. To reduce its predominance 
would weaken both of these advantages of Swiss institutions.
The existence of tax competition in a highly decentralized context in 
which local and cantonal governments are fiscally extremely autonomous 
raises the specter of a ‘race to the bottom’ which would exacerbate the 
inequalities between financially strong and weak governments. However, 
the financial equalization schemes that have been implemented at both 
national and cantonal levels mitigate this risk. Indirectly, they guarantee 
that tax competition can continue to exist, just within acceptable and 
accepted boundaries.
Part 5: “PubLic administration as PoLicy broKer”
Particular aspects of the Swiss political system—notably (cooperative) fed-
eralism, (neo-) liberalism, and subsidiarity—affect the organization and 
operation of politico-administrative arrangements in the course of policy 
formulation and implementation. These arrangements are characterized 
both by great heterogeneity (involvement and responsibility of private 
actors) and high fragmentation (extent and complexity of policy net-
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works), which allows for competition between cantons, between munici-
palities, and, in some cases, between private and public organizations. 
Both heterogeneity and fragmentation are magnified by the substantial 
cantonal and local autonomy in designing politico-administrative 
arrangements.
Private actors in Switzerland also may be rule-makers and rule-takers. 
Thus, one often finds professional organizations strongly influencing pol-
icy decisions or even issuing guidelines, norms, and standards which can 
become part of the policy design. In terms of implementation, significant 
elements of federal laws or cantonal tasks may be delegated, through vari-
ous contractual instruments, to private actors. Thus, a non-trivial part of 
public service delivery is provided in Switzerland by professional, non- 
profit (NGOs, foundations, associations, cooperatives), or even for-profit 
(companies) organizations.
Policy brokering and coordination also play a crucial role in limiting 
certain negative outcomes of cooperative federalism. Cantonal autonomy 
is an efficient way of adapting policy designs to regional specificities, but it 
can lead to negative side effects such as the unequal treatment of citizens 
or an uncoordinated implementation. Inter-cantonal associations play an 
important role in countering this by coordination efforts during the 
implementation stage (e.g., in health and social security policies), or in 
limiting (but not entirely removing) the unequal treatments of citizens.
Yet social network analysis also shows that policy brokering on the part 
of public administration units can help find solutions to conflicts which 
arise in the policy formulation or implementation phases. Their high ‘rep-
utational power’ allows them to substantially influence policy formulation 
(and the choice of policy instruments) in acting as a policy broker or as a 
member of an advocacy coalition. Still, nowadays public administrations 
need to share their power with private actors—paradoxically, it appears, by 
renouncing their previous role as the dominant actor.
ProbLems and chaLLenges
Political systems and public administration in Switzerland are, of course, 
far from perfect. Some of the more fundamental questions turn on the 
territorial organization of the state. Although decentralization and a high 
degree of autonomy of the lower units are seen as rather positive features, 
there seem to be by far too many municipalities and cantons for such a 
small country. Through mergers, the number of municipalities has shrunk 
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by about one-fourth since the 1990s, but many are still very small and the 
entire population of certain cantons does not even reach the size of a sin-
gle larger city. It is even more problematic that the political units no lon-
ger coincide with the actual territory people live and work in, which 
challenges not only a territorially based taxation system but also the way 
democratic decisions are reached.
A country with both fast-growing and less-dynamic areas raises ques-
tions about how competencies and resources can be symmetrically distrib-
uted. Metropolitan areas are the drivers of economic growth but have 
different needs than more remote rural areas, so how far should equaliza-
tion schemes go and with what aim? The Swiss system allows for diversity, 
but there are very large differences in individual tax burdens (based on 
local and cantonal residence) which are difficult to justify.
Cooperation between the different municipalities and between cantons 
as well as across the different levels of government makes politics much 
more complicated and—despite the many elements of direct democracy—
tends to move political influence away from citizens and even parliaments. 
Top-level civil servants and executive bodies have gained importance, and 
technocratic solutions increasingly replace political decisions. One of the 
challenges is to find efficient and democratically legitimate forms of coop-
eration in public decision-making.
While the mechanisms of direct democracy help reinforce the legiti-
macy of legal rules domestically, they create difficulties in the application 
of international law to Swiss political decisions, and lead to tensions 
between domestic and international law. This puts Switzerland, in turn, 
under strong internal and external pressure, as it can make it appear a too 
mercurial political and economic partner.
The ever-present threat of a popular referendum pushes political actors 
to cooperate and negotiate already in the pre-parliamentary phase of leg-
islation, but that also has the effect of slowing the process of lawmaking. 
Moreover, despite very well-organized lawmaking procedures, 
 non- obligatory acts (soft law) have also developed. If some view this as a 
good sign, it also shows that classic legal acts and processes cannot cover 
all state activities, and there is a need to imagine alternative procedures 
and new mechanisms to guarantee classic obligations will also be fulfilled.
With respect to the courts, and especially the Federal Supreme Court, 
the re-election of justices and the limited constitutional review the 
Supreme Court can exercise over federal laws underline the importance of 
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the Federal Assembly. At the same time, such rules mean the judiciary can-
not play the role of a countervailing power at the federal level.
The hybrid nature of the Swiss administration, as well as the institu-
tional characteristics described above, makes managing public administra-
tion difficult. There is resistance of various kinds, not least because of 
claims that a kind of ‘reform mania’ is at work—leading to discrediting the 
reforms initiated as well as wearing out the civil servants. The methods 
introduced have not always taken the specificities of public administration 
sufficiently into account and lead to a clash of values between those who 
support a classical vision of administration, one far removed from the 
managerial requirements of efficiency and effectiveness, and those who 
promote a more pragmatic view of an administration that is seen as a pro-
vider of (quality) services to the population. There is the suggestion that 
the enacted reforms have led to an excessive ‘managerialization’ of public 
administration and thus to having economic objectives overtake political 
objectives. Some political authorities even had the impression they were 
losing control of their own administrations, while others skillfully used the 
new management tools to increase their power. All this was against a back-
drop of a Swiss administration perceived, even before the advent of new 
public management, as having too much power (or expertise) relative to 
the political institutions.
In terms of public finance, the schemes which guaranteed success in the 
past may not necessarily be conducive to future successes. Economic cri-
ses, international competition over business taxation, migration, and the 
aging of the population are all factors which cast shadows over public 
budgets, in Switzerland as elsewhere. Switzerland’s strong institutions will 
no doubt be able to meet these socio-economic challenges but will prob-
ably also need to be adapted. And while the tools of direct democracy have 
their advantages, they can also be a brake on the rapid reform of institu-
tions and laws. This is particularly the case when changes mean that the 
current generation of citizens and voters must give something up. This 
often leads voters to refuse projects which they perceive as having a nega-
tive outcome for them personally.
The large difference in tax burdens, while tolerated until now, may not 
be accepted in the future. The differences themselves can be explained by 
citizen preferences to receive better or costlier public services. But these 
differences can also, or even mostly, be explained by a non-uniform distri-
bution of economic activities (and thus of the tax base) over the entire 
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country. Geography and topography are partly responsible, but so is the 
tax competition between cantons and municipalities.
One solution here would involve strengthening financial equalization. 
At the same time, the tyranny of the majority (by jurisdictions benefitting 
from transfers compared to jurisdictions financing the transfers) has 
already reached its limit. Another solution would be to unify tax deduc-
tions and tax rates, though in the past, Switzerland’s federalist instinct 
pushed voters to refuse this kind of solution. A more extreme solution 
could be to withdraw all or part of the taxing power cantons and munici-
palities have thus far enjoyed, but this would undermine a key element of 
Switzerland’s success.
As in other countries, we can also find the typical ‘principal-agent 
dilemma’ in Switzerland. It is difficult for the federal government and its 
administration to control cantonal and local authorities, and there are 
contradictions between the interests of (private) implementing actors and 
of those who benefit from various policies. There are also tensions, or even 
contradictions, between the principles of cantonal autonomy and the 
equal treatment of citizens. And there is a continuing, and perhaps increas-
ing, need for strengthening inter-policy coordination in a context of an 
increasing trans-territoriality in public problems.
switzerLand: a modeL case?
In a contextualist understanding, every country is different and has to be 
treated as a particular case. Quite often, this is used to justify that some-
thing which works in one country could never work in other countries. 
Such a position is often defended when it comes to the Swiss political and 
administrative system. Direct democracy, or a multiparty federal (or can-
tonal) government on a voluntary basis whose majorities shift from case to 
case, a high degree of decentralization and diversity, and a far-reaching 
fiscal autonomy are possible in Switzerland—but could this work any-
where else?
There are less controversial lessons that can be drawn from the Swiss 
case. To find good and lasting policy and managerial solutions takes time, 
especially if the solutions are to be supported by employees, citizens, and 
a majority of the parties alike. More inclusive policymaking, by the same 
token, increases the legitimacy of the decisions and helps guarantee com-
pliance. To be close to citizens, owing to strong and effective decentraliza-
tion, allows for a more direct orientation to the needs, wants, and thoughts 
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of citizens. Smaller governmental units are also easier to manage, at least 
in principle, and it brings the public sector closer to the people. In the 
current political climate, this is also what many people around the globe 
say they want.
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CHAPTER 1
Society, Government, and the Political 
System
Andreas Ladner
1.1  IntroductIon
Switzerland, at least by the commonly used measures (GDP, competition, 
and innovation rankings), is a very successful and prosperous country. Its 
residents esteem Swiss political institutions and trust the authorities, and 
they are content with the range of services Swiss governments provide. In 
Europe, along with the Scandinavians, the Swiss are among the most satis-
fied with their national government and with the functioning of their 
democracy.1 An important contribution to this esteem comes from an 
effective and well-functioning public administration.
The organization, functioning, and performance of public administra-
tive bodies are directly linked to government configurations, political 
institutions, and the key values which undergird them. These frameworks 
set the conditions under which public administration works, along with 
1 See the European Social Survey (ESS5–2010, ed.2.0; own calculations), and Denters 
et al. (2016).
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the goals or directions, pursued. Knowledge of the basic principles of a 
political system, the institutional configuration, and the values underlying 
the system and the institutions are key to understanding, and analysing, a 
public administration.
Without meaning to invoke historical determinism, the genesis of the 
governmental structures in the country gives insights into the reasons for 
its current organization and reveals the principles and ideas guiding it. 
This helps to understand the limits or prospects for making administrative 
adjustments or carrying out reforms. Of particular interest is the question 
of how malleable governmental institutions are. To what extent is the 
organization of a government determined by the past (path dependency)? 
To what extent do structural and cultural factors (such as small size or the 
differences between language regions or religious faiths) play a role? To 
what extent might changes and adjustments be the result of conscious 
agenda-setting and political decisions taken (for more on this, see Ladner 
2011)?2
We begin by briefly looking at the foundation of governmental struc-
tures in Switzerland and their subsequent expansion. We then turn to its 
most important structural and cultural characteristic and the basic ele-
ments of the political system. In doing so, we refer to the effects this insti-
tutional, political, and historical framework has, and has had, on how 
Swiss public administration functions.
1.2  From conFederatIon to Federal State: 
Bottom-up natIon-BuIldIng
The key to understanding the Swiss state and its institutions is the fact that 
it developed from the bottom up. Unlike in countries with a monarchical 
past, a strong, centralized government never existed on Swiss soil, or at 
least not prior to the founding of the modern Swiss state in 1848. The 
history of the country as an independent political entity instead began 
with a loose alliance between a few rural cantons gradually joined by other 
cantons. This alliance acquired, controlled, and exploited various territo-
ries which now form modern Switzerland.
It was only with Napoleon’s occupation and the subsequent creation of 
the Helvetic Republic (1798–1802) that cantons were put on an equal 
footing and a national, centralized administration was introduced. 
2 These are precisely the questions raised by various ‘neo-institutionalist’ approaches.
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However, the re-organization of the country on the French model was 
only a brief historical interlude, and the country soon reverted to earlier 
habits, though with the difference that the sovereignty of the individual 
cantons was now no longer questioned. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 
set the territorial boundaries of the country. This Congress also ensured 
Switzerland would be neutral, a status desired not just by the Swiss. The 
Great Powers wanted to prevent one another from trying to exert influ-
ence on what was a geopolitically significant area at the heart of Europe. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, the forces arguing for democrati-
zation and a modernization of government gradually gained influence.
One consequence—and one can certainly draw parallels here to the 
later development of the EU—was the introduction of conditions creating 
a unified economic area. Tolls and tariffs between cantons were repealed,3 
and a common national currency was introduced. Efforts to create a mod-
ern, centrally organized national government led to a very brief civil war 
in 1847 (Sonderbundskrieg) which pitted liberal, business-friendly circles 
interested in modernizing government and society against Catholic- 
dominated cantons and conservative forces antagonistic to centralization.
The liberal forces triumphed, and after a successful constitutional plebi-
scite, the modern Swiss federal state was founded in 1848. However, 
though the proposed constitution made concessions to the Catholic los-
ers—who had argued for more independence for the cantons—they were 
not persuaded. The 1848 Constitution was turned down by clear margins 
in the Catholic cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden and Nidwalden, Zug, 
Wallis, Ticino, and Appenzell Innerrhoden. Approval of the proposed 
constitution was also helped along by more questionable means. To 
achieve the needed majority of cantons, the positive decision by Fribourg’s 
then liberal government was counted, though it was a Catholic canton, 
and in the case of Lucerne, also Catholic, it was decided to count non- 
voters as having voted in favour. The new constitution was therefore 
accepted.
Because individual cantons were reluctant to see their former compe-
tencies centralized, many powers remained reserved to the cantons, 
including much of the administration of justice, tax law, police, and trans-
portation, along with control over education and the churches (Maissen 
3 According to the federal customs inspectorate, as of 1844 there were still about 370 
customs stations at cantonal borders, of which 147 stood at the country’s external borders 
and more than 180 were found inside the cantons (see Polli-Schönborn 2006).
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2010: 200 et seq.). Moreover, it was important to guarantee the cantons 
appropriate political influence at the national level. Institutionally, this was 
ensured by creating a territory-based upper house (Ständerat), to which 
each canton sent two representatives; its powers were equal to those exer-
cised by the population-based lower house (Nationalrat). The cantons 
with small populations, many of which had been on the losing side of the 
1847 Sonderbund civil war, were over-represented in this upper house. 
Still, when the 1848 Constitution came into force, the prior loose confed-
eration of cantons was transformed into a federal state, and some of the 
competencies cantons previously had were transferred to the national 
level.
The new national government pursued goals which included creating 
an entity capable, over the longer term, of acting in a uniform manner vis- 
à- vis other nation-states, articulating and pursuing Swiss interests abroad, 
taking responsibility for external security, and asserting both indepen-
dence and neutrality. To this were added guarantees given to promote 
public order and ensure domestic security, as well as a broadly formulated 
goal to ‘promote the common welfare’; there was also a general mandate 
to erect ‘public works’ (see Maissen 2010: 202). The creation of a benefits- 
disbursing welfare state at the national level, and the creation of a national 
consciousness, came later. But in comparative terms, Switzerland devel-
oped into a democratically organized country relatively early.
The price of unity, however, was a pronounced federalism and a weak 
national government. Residual competencies, meaning everything not 
explicitly defined as within the power of the national government, remain 
even today in the hands of the cantons. Every additional competence the 
national government is to acquire, or every new task it is to carry out, 
requires the approval of both voters and cantons. The Catholic and con-
servative opponents of a federal state thereby received a high degree of 
protection; with respect to the future development of the national govern-
ment, it was necessary to take their concerns into account.
1.3  Structural and cultural HeterogeneIty
Which tasks can and should a state assume? Despite many commonalities, 
there are differences with respect to the tasks and challenges a state faces 
which depend on its size, its social and cultural composition, and its geo-
graphic circumstances. Of course, what needs to be coordinated among 
eight million residents is decidedly less than what it takes to coordinate a 
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nation of a billion people, but it is also true that a country heterogeneous 
in language and religion requires greater efforts to integrate than does a 
more homogeneous society. And there is also the question to what degree 
a government wants to regulate and redistribute. Every additional regula-
tion means more involvement and greater responsibility. This not just calls 
for a willingness to implement but also requires mobilizing the needed 
resources for the task. Political attitudes differ about social justice, along 
with the degree of redistribution and its consequences.
In terms of territory and population, Switzerland belongs to the smaller 
countries. About 8.3 million people inhabit a territory which is about 
42,000 km2 in area, though the largest part is uninhabitable due to the Alps. 
Most of the population is concentrated in the lower-lying areas called the 
Mittelland. About 25 per cent of the population is foreign, even though more 
than half of those without a Swiss passport were either born in Switzerland or 
have lived in the country for at least a decade. The foreign population largely 
comes either from European Union (EU) or from European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries (e.g., Italy, Germany, Portugal).
The density of political units in the territory is striking, and includes 26 
largely sovereign cantons and 2255 (as of 1 January 2017) relatively 
autonomous communities (for more on this, see Chap. 2). The large num-
ber of territorial sub-units means most of them are quite small, and that 
there is considerable variation in their population size. The smallest Swiss 
communities have less than 100 inhabitants; the largest cities hold several 
hundred thousand. The largest canton (Zurich) has more than a million 
inhabitants, while the smallest cantons (Appenzell Innerrhoden, Uri, 
Obwalden, and Glarus) are in the low ten thousands. In spite of these 
large differences, no asymmetries exist under public law, and all communi-
ties are formally equal to one another, as are all cantons. Pronounced 
decentralization and the large independence accorded to decentralized 
political units is a distinctive characteristic of Swiss political culture.
Also characteristic is Swiss cultural heterogeneity, particularly in terms 
of religion and language. About 70 per cent of the inhabitants belong to 
a Christian faith. Catholics form a majority of the permanent resident pop-
ulation in 11 cantons, while in seven others, they are less than 30 per cent. 
The proportions in the remaining eight cantons are less clear.4 Switzerland 
is also a multilingual country with four national languages: 63 per cent 
4 See Bundesamt für Statistik: Strukturerhebung der eidgenössischen Volkszählung 2015: 
Sprachen und Religionen.
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speak (Swiss-) German, 23 per cent speak French, 8 per cent speak Italian, 
and 0.5 per cent speak Romansh. English, Portuguese, and Albanian, each 
spoken by 3–5 per cent, are also relatively common.
Cultural differences call for considerable efforts at integration on the 
part of both society and government. In cultural terms, this requires 
accepting a degree of diversity and by respecting and considering the con-
cerns of minorities. As can be seen in the next section, the political institu-
tions make an important contribution here. Switzerland also profits—especially 
if one adds economic capacity—from the fact that its cleavages do not line 
up but are instead cross-cutting. Thus, rather than having rich, Protestant, 
German-speaking cantons opposing poor, Catholic, French-speaking can-
tons, one instead has Protestant and Catholic, and economically stronger 
as well as economically weaker, cantons in both German-speaking and 
French-speaking parts of the country.
1.4  tHe model oF tHe State and tHe extent 
oF State actIvIty
Switzerland does not belong to the category of ‘Scandinavian-style welfare 
states’, and unlike Germany or Austria, it also does not clearly endorse the 
‘social market economy’ model. If one looks at the ratio of government 
expenditures (33.6 per cent) or tax revenues (27.7 per cent) to GDP,5 
then these are markedly lower than in most European countries and are 
more comparable with the values found for Australia and the US.6 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to regard the Swiss model of the state 
as being that of ‘minimal state’. The Swiss state in the nineteenth century, 
dominated by the Liberals (Freisinn, now FDP.Die Radikalen), was not a 
‘night-watchman state’ (Gruner 1964) concerned only to guarantee 
enough scope for economic interests, providing the infrastructure for 
modern trade and making workers available. Within the ‘extended family’ 
of the Freisinnige at the time, one could find not only adherents of the 
Manchester School but Democrats and Radicals as well. The latter made 
efforts, first at the level of individual cantons, to pursue socially balanced 
fiscal and social policies based on social justice and the provision of bene-
5 See Bundesamt für Statistik: Kennzahlen der öffentlichen Finanzen im internationalen 
Vergleich 2015.
6 See OECD Economic Outlook 90, Annex Table 25: General government total outlays in 
per cent of nominal GDP.
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fits, including free public education and the founding of cantonal banks to 
provide cheap ‘popular credit’7. Towards the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, not least as a consequence of the economic crises during the 1880s, 
the national government increasingly influenced the economic framework 
(Code of Obligations 1881; Copyright Act 1883; Trademark Protection 
Act 1890; Patent and Invention Law 1883) and took measures to protect 
vulnerable groups (the Factory Law; the promotion of vocational training; 
support provided for agriculture in 1884).
Swiss politics at the national level was always dominated by centre- 
right, employer-friendly forces. It was only at the end of the 1950s that 
left-wing parties, along with the Catholic People’s Party that had become 
more centrist, and then later, particularly with the help of the Greens, that 
it was possible to form majorities around certain topics. Earlier, certain 
cantons, and especially certain cities, achieved left-wing majorities, and in 
recent years, nearly all large Swiss cities have been dominated by coalitions 
of Social Democrats, Green and left-wing parties.
Economic peak associations played an important role early on in 
Switzerland. They were successful at convincing the national government 
to subsidize their association offices (e.g., general-secretariats) already by 
the late nineteenth century (Mach 2006: 273). Their political involve-
ment was strengthened in particular by governmental interventions dur-
ing the economic crises of the interwar period. Their middle-class-oriented 
economic policies were also expanded and strengthened through corpo-
ratist arrangements (Sozialpartnerschaft). A series of protectionist deci-
sions—limiting imports, barriers to market access, measures to limit 
competition, binding collective agreements by private economic associa-
tions—and economic arrangements—price fixing, participation in produc-
tion costs, or eased access to capital—worked to the benefit of a whole 
series of sectors (Linder 1983: 278 et seq.). The peak associations made 
use of the government not just to protect their interests, but themselves 
became implementers of governmental policies to protect the market 
(Ackermann and Steinemann 1981: 86 et seq.).
The Second World War intensified the nexus between government and 
economy, one which was eventually ratified through revisions made, in 
1947, to various articles of the Swiss constitution that addressed the 
 economy. The clause concerning the freedom of trade now included a 
7 See Linder (1983: 260 et  seq.) on this, with the corresponding references to Gruner 
(1964).
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caveat giving the national government the power to pass measures against 
cartels (especially if they had socially or economically damaging effects), 
the power to ‘preserve a healthy farming estate’, and to protect those parts 
of the country which were economically threatened. In addition, associa-
tions were to be explicitly included in preparing as well as implementing 
laws, and the binding force of collective bargaining agreements was con-
firmed. Finally, more formally, what had been constitutional articles 
designed to combat crises were now changed into constitutional articles to 
promote the economy.8
The proximity of government to economy can be seen in the signifi-
cance para-state organizations are awarded.9 Through its branch associa-
tions, the private sector is involved in helping formulate and implement 
government policies. Traditionally, such organizations had particular 
influence in agriculture but also in other economic sectors (see Farago and 
Kriesi 1986); para-state organizations take on important roles in imple-
menting policy, in market regulation, or in organizing vocational educa-
tion. Such strong interlinkage between government and economy in 
carrying out tasks is called ‘neocorporatism’ in the political science litera-
ture (Schmitter 1974).
In calculating the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, part of the 
expenditures for social insurance is not included. Similarly, when calculat-
ing tax revenues relative to GDP, certain compulsory costs which residents 
in Switzerland must pay—for example, for the occupational pension 
scheme (the ‘second pillar’) or for medical insurance—are not counted. In 
other countries, these costs, to a lesser or greater degree, are included in 
the taxes residents pay.
Therefore, the low values found for the ratio of government expendi-
ture or tax revenue to GDP do not reflect a limited set of benefits or a 
particularly efficient provision of services but are to some degree the result 
of a differing structure for meeting government obligations. If one 
includes mandatory payments into the pension funds and mandatory 
medical insurance payments, for example, then the ratio of tax revenues to 
GDP would rise (by about ten percentage points) to a little over 40 per 
8 In the current Swiss constitution, economic associations are wholly integrated and noted 
in Art. 94–104 (Economy) as well as in Art. 110 (Labor).
9 A parliamentary investigation carried out in 1983 found 232 para-state organizations, 
employing nearly 12,000 people, at the national level; the received one billion CHF in sub-
sidies. These figures do not include health insurance funds or organizations devoted to the 
handicapped. See Germann (2002).
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cent.10 Similarly, social insurance costs not included in government expen-
ditures account for an additional 10 per cent of GDP.
The history of the Swiss state, like that of other comparable states, is 
one of growth, increased differentiation, and shifting emphases. At the 
beginning, the primary goal was to secure independence externally (e.g., 
establish sovereignty) and to ensure domestic peace and security. 
Subsequently, rights to participate or co-determine were added, and civil 
liberties had to be guaranteed. It also became important to create the 
necessary preconditions for the economy to develop. These preconditions 
included lowering barriers to trade and increasing government commit-
ments to expand infrastructure (transportation, energy) and education. 
Over time, the national government took on more tasks related to health 
care and social security as well. Crises and structural changes also meant 
that business cycle and economic policies increased in importance. 
Maintaining the natural environment and sustainable development have 
become governmental tasks only in the more recent past.
Increased governmental activity can be illustrated by public outlay fig-
ures. When the modern Swiss federal state began in 1850, total expendi-
tures at federal, cantonal, and local levels were about 50 million Francs. 
The federal share of this was only about 10 per cent, or 4.5 million Francs 
(Weber 1969: 17), and the remainder was about equally divided between 
the other two levels (Guex 1998: 102).11 By 2014, this had risen to 207.6 
billion Francs (Federal Finance Administration 2016: 5). Of this, federal 
or national outlays constituted 64.7 billion (25.5 per cent), cantonal 85.2 
billion (32.6 per cent), and community outlays 46.4 billion (18.3 per 
cent) Francs. To this, one can add expenditures for social security of about 
59.8 billion (23.6 per cent).12
However, increases in government expenditures relative to GDP did 
not do so linearly. Until the late 1950s, they increased more or less parallel 
10 See the answer of the Federal Council to the interpellation of Jean-Pierre Graber on 29 
September 2011 (Curia Vista 11.3970).
11 Cantonal and community expenditures in this era are very difficult to establish because 
the data is very spotty or available only for certain places (e.g., Zurich or Bern).
12 If one adds these four sums together, one arrives at a value of more than 256 billion; 
these are gross expenditure figures. However, the national government transfers money to 
the social security system and to the cantons (transfer payments between the levels) which in 
turn record the money they pay out as expenditures (e.g., a ‘duplicated’ outlay). The totals 
do not include such duplications, but they are included in the calculation of the 
percentages.
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to economic activity, meaning the ratio of government expenditure to 
GDP remained both low and relatively stable.13 The 1960s saw a signifi-
cant expansion of government activity, and the average real growth rate, at 
all governmental levels, exceeded the growth rate of real GDP (Kirchgässner 
2004: 2). At the beginning of the 1960s, government outlays at all three 
levels were still considerably under 20 per cent of GDP.
Outlays may be contrasted with income. Interestingly, and typically for 
Switzerland in international comparison, all three governmental levels 
control their own tax income, as well as raise their own income taxes. As 
they have taxing autonomy, cantons and communities set their own tax 
rates. The highest tax rates the national government can charge, however, 
as well as the level of the value-added tax, are set out in the Swiss consti-
tution.14 The authority given to the national government to raise taxes is 
also laid out in the constitution, and has a (renewable) time limit.15 This 
constitutional anchor means, for example, that to raise the national tax 
rate requires amending the constitution, and hence also calls for the 
approval of both the people and the cantons. Only the national govern-
ment levies a value-added tax, and in European comparison, it is at a rela-
tively low level. The cantons participate, partly, in the tax revenues 
gathered by the national government.
National revenue in 2014 stood at about 65 billion Francs, and of that, 
tax revenue constituted 58 billion Francs (Federal Finance Administration 
2016). Of that 20 billion Francs (32.9 per cent) were generated from the 
value-added tax and 18 billion (28.5 per cent) from direct federal tax. 
Direct income taxes play a rather larger role at the cantonal and commu-
nity levels. Total cantonal income stands at about 83 billion Francs. Of 
that 43 billion (52 per cent) comes from tax revenue, with 31 billion of 
that coming in turn from the direct taxation of natural persons and 25 bil-
lion (30 per cent) from transfer payments. Total income at the community 
level is about 45 billion Francs, 27 billion (60 per cent) from tax income 
and 5 billion (11 per cent) from transfer payments.
13 Following Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000: 6), the ratio of government expenditure to 
GDP in 1870 was about 16.5 per cent; in 1960, it stood at 17.2 per cent.
14 Article 128 of the Swiss Constitution sets the maximum tax rate at 11.5 per cent. Article 
130 sets the normal value-added tax rate at 6.5 per cent, though has been raised to 8 per cent 
until the end of 2017.
15 See the transitional stipulations for Articles 128 and 130. Currently, the constitution 
stipulates that permission to raise direct federal taxes, as well as to charge a value-added tax, 
will run out in 2035.
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Switzerland is not just strongly decentralized. It also has a public sector, 
at least in the classic sense, which is relatively small. Certain tasks which 
elsewhere are the responsibility of the public sector have traditionally been 
provided in cooperation with private actors. This goes along with the idea 
that government, economy, and society need not be antagonistic. 
Switzerland is often characterized as a liberal variant of the neo-corporatist 
model (Katzenstein 1985).
1.5  polItIcal InStItutIonS
The political institutions help integrate different segments of the popula-
tion as well as the regions, but also contribute to holding the country 
together and maintain the country’s (considerable) political stability. 
These institutions enjoy broad support among Swiss, ensuring the legiti-
macy of political decisions and political actions taken.
Political observers agree16 that the three cornerstones of the political 
system are provided by federalism, ‘concordance’—meaning all important 
political actors and interests are involved in the decision-making process—
and direct democracy. These factors are often cited as reasons for Swiss 
‘distinctiveness’ if not its idiosyncrasy.17 What they have in common is that 
they all either serve to limit the exercise of power or they encourage the 
sharing of power. Federalism divides power between the federal and can-
tonal levels, as well as between the cantons, while the ‘concordance’ sys-
tem divides power between the parties and interests, and direct democracy 
divides power between the authorities and the people.
1.5.1  Federalism
It has already been noted that a federalist solution was the only possible 
path to pursue when the Swiss nation-state was founded in 1848. The 26 
cantons (called Stände in Swiss usage) each have their own parliaments, 
their own executives, their own courts and their own constitutions, though 
cantonal constitutions cannot be in contradiction to the Swiss national 
16 See Linder (2005), Kriesi and Trechsel (2008), and Vatter (2016).
17 Some authors also refer to the ‘militia’ idea of volunteering one’s time to perform politi-
cal and social tasks communities need, an idea which is still widespread. Neutrality is also 
often cited, though both it and the ‘militia’ character of politics, while they exert influence 
over politics and administration, have a less pronounced institutional character than federal-
ism, ‘concordance’, and direct democracy.
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constitution. Cantons implement national laws and directives but other-
wise organize their own activities according to their own needs. They have 
considerable leeway, for example, in how they organize education and 
hospitals, in the area of culture, as well as with respect to the police. Each 
canton levies its own income and wealth taxes to finance its cantonal tasks.
Cantons also participate in political decision-making at the national 
level. The primary locus for this is the upper house of Parliament 
(Ständerat), in which each full canton has two seats. Additionally, cantons 
have a special status in the context of Swiss direct democracy (see below), 
but what is decisive is the principle that every proposed extension of pow-
ers at the national level must be approved by a majority of the cantons. 
Cantons also exercise influence when new laws are being drafted, at which 
time their representatives, as experts, are consulted. Finally, they play an 
important role in implementing policies decided at the national level, and 
in doing so, have some degree of freedom.
The hundreds of inter-cantonal agreements (Konkordate), many of 
which involve infrastructure arrangements, play a special role as do can-
tonal inter-ministerial meetings (e.g., of the finance ministers of all the 
cantons). There is also a Conference of Cantonal Governments whose 
goal is to coordinate political policies among the cantons. One goal of this 
Conference is to keep political tasks from drifting up to the national level 
and thereby diminishing the influence of the cantons.
Swiss federalism is noteworthy particularly for its readiness to accept, 
and respect, different kinds of solutions; it also has an explicitly competi-
tive orientation. Unlike German federalism, there is no constitutionally 
based mandate to ensure that the same living conditions prevail through-
out the country. The logic of Swiss federalism operates much more with 
an eye to ensuring minimal standards that are to be ensured with the help 
of a nationwide financial equalization scheme which in essence takes from 
the rich(er cantons) and gives to the poor(er cantons). Tax competition 
between cantons (and communities) leads to considerable variation in the 
tax burden on individuals.
A comprehensive reform designed to bring about greater financial 
equalization between economically strong and economically weak cantons 
came into effect at the beginning of 2008. As part of the new rules, certain 
tasks were unbundled, cantonal cooperation was reorganized, and coop-
eration between cantonal and national levels was reconfigured. Still, 
increasing centralization remains an issue, as more and more tasks call for 
uniform regulation, and some of the pressures to do so derive from inter-
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national rules formulated outside of Switzerland. Education, health, and 
social expenditures, which have grown significantly in recent years, pose 
additional challenges for the cantons. Large differences and the small size 
of some cantons make inter-cantonal cooperation increasingly important, 
with the result that decisions are increasingly taken by executives and 
administrators rather than by voters.
1.5.2  Direct Democracy
Another key element of the political system is provided by the extensive 
direct democratic tools at hand. All changes to the constitution, as well as 
accession of the country to collective security or international organiza-
tions, call for a mandatory referendum. Here, it is not enough to obtain a 
majority of the votes; a majority of the cantons must also be in favour. 
Citizens can also launch popular initiatives to alter the constitution, for 
which they must collect 100,000 signatures within 18 months of launch-
ing the proposal. For a popular initiative to be successful, a majority of the 
votes as well as a majority of the cantons are also needed. Finally, citizens 
can also launch a referendum, if they so wish, against a new law that has 
been passed, as well as against certain international treaties. To do so, 
50,000 signatures need to be collected within 100 days. If no (simple) 
majority is reached, the existing law stands. Individual cantons can also 
launch initiatives, and eight cantons together can launch a so-called can-
tonal referendum, though both happen quite rarely.
Direct democracy in Switzerland goes back to the 1830s, when St 
Gallen and Basel-Land first introduced a veto right for voters (Kriesi and 
Trechsel 2008: 4). Proposed amendments to the constitution requiring 
the approval of voters and cantons triggered a mandatory referendum 
already as of 1848, and a limited and relatively complicated version of the 
right to launch an initiative was introduced then as well, with whose help 
one could demand a total revision of the constitution. The 1874 revised 
national constitution introduced an optional referendum for laws that had 
been passed; in 1891, the initiative for a partial revision of the constitution 
was also introduced. More recent important changes have included 
extending these direct democratic tools to cover foreign policy issues, 
understandable in light of the increasing importance of supranational 
associations and international treaties.
There is no doubt that the existence of the referendum mechanism 
slowed the expansion of tasks the government could undertake. A series of 
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modernization and centralization proposals failed during the early years of 
the federal state, largely due to the opposition from Catholic and conser-
vative cantons (Kölz 2004: 633). Otherwise too, the expansion of the 
state—and not least of the social welfare state—was relatively slow and 
remained at a low level (Linder 2005: 263 et seq.).
The threat of a popular referendum leads to the integration of the most 
significant political forces into the government, thereby contributing sig-
nificantly to the third major element, ‘concordance’. A referendum gives 
interest group associations, political parties, and other organized groups 
the chance to defeat unloved changes made to constitution or law. To 
prevent this, strong political parties are represented in the government 
and participate in formulating proposals. Hence, they are, at least morally, 
obligated to support the resulting formulations. Efforts are also generally 
undertaken to include legitimate arguments brought by the opponents of 
a proposal in order to make them ‘referendum-immune’ (Neidhart 1970). 
Witness the extensive consultations (Vernehmlassungsverfahren) with all 
the interested groups, cantons, and parties that form part of the legislative 
process. Those groups less well represented in the political system, how-
ever, can articulate their concerns through the popular initiative process, 
and thereby can also exert influence on politics and policy-making.
Direct democracy not only means that politicians must be more strongly 
attuned to the ‘popular will’ but it also means the citizens’ will carries 
greater weight in the work of the public administration. In the end, pro-
posed laws or changes must convince a majority of the citizens, making 
ballot box decisions particularly relevant to administrative activities. It may 
go too far to ascribe a ‘citizen-orientation’ to administrators that results 
from the use of such direct democratic tools, but it is true that the verdict 
reached by the voters has a different valence than instructions received 
from the government.
1.5.3  The ‘Concordance’ System
The term ‘concordance’18 refers to the more or less willing inclusion of the 
most important parties in the executive, as well as the willingness to  govern 
in common with changeing majorities. As a rule, all the largest parties are 
represented in the executive, whether this is at community, cantonal, or 
18 See Arend Lijphart’s conceptualization of consensus democracy and division of power 
(Lijphart 1999).
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national levels. The Federal Council (Bundesrat), Switzerland’s national 
executive, is composed of seven members who have equal status, and who 
not only come from the various regions of the country but also are mem-
bers of the four largest political parties. The Federal  Council makes deci-
sions collegially, its members oriented to reaching a consensus which will 
allow policy to be carried out. Outwardly, individual members of this 
Council represent the collegial consensus which has been reached—even 
when it goes against their personal convictions or against the position of 
the political party they belong to. Unlike in other countries, there is no 
clear distinction between government and opposition in Switzerland. 
There is no single party, or a coalition of parties, which determines policy 
for the duration of a legislative period. Instead, the individual representa-
tives of various parties craft temporary majorities; these may shift, depend-
ing upon the issue. The executives at the lower levels of the Swiss system 
function similarly; parliaments and commissions have shifting majorities, 
depending on the issue, and their major task is to find sufficient support, 
from whichever political direction it may come, to create a majority for a 
given proposal or policy or law.
The ‘concordance’ system does have certain indirect effects on admin-
istrative activity. Though individual departments are headed by the repre-
sentatives of various political parties, the political orientation of a 
department overall is more heterogeneous than in a system where the post 
as head of an administrative unit is filled by a person representing the cur-
rent party in power. Thus, top civil servants do not necessarily belong to 
the same party as the (nominal) head of their department. That does not 
mean that civil servants do not quickly learn which proposals are likely to 
find greater favour with their administrative superiors, but it does mean 
that there is room for differing positions and arguments. In the end, pro-
posed projects need to not only find favour in the ranks of one’s own 
political party but also convince other members of the executive as well as 
other parties; otherwise, they will not achieve majority support either in 
Parliament or among the voters.
Aside from these ‘soft’ effects of ‘concordance’ and direct democracy 
on administrative activity, one also finds quick direct implications. Political 
processes take their time until all the political hurdles have been taken, and 
the great challenge is to suggest proposals which will find majority sup-
port. These, inevitably, are the creatures of compromise, and may call 
for—sometimes quite costly—concessions to be made to the various 
stakeholders.
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The effects of federalism and community autonomy paired with the 
commitment to subsidiarity are even more dramatic and incisive. They 
lead to a pronounced segmentation, both horizontally and vertically. This 
makes it easier to take account of social and cultural differences, and to 
create much more homogeneous sub-units. However, the consequence, 
along with the considerable diversity it permits, is a small-scale partition-
ing of what is already a very small nation-state. Corporative networks 
between the various levels are needed if the many necessary tasks are to be 
fulfilled by government and administration, and it is not surprising that in 
many areas, and in many places, it has not been possible to establish pro-
fessional administrative structures. As we will see in Chap. 2, governmen-
tal tasks have therefore had to be carried out with the aid of private sector 
organizations and the help of many ordinary citizens who, in what Swiss 
call a ‘militia system’, volunteer their time to help govern communities.
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CHAPTER 2
The Organization and Provision of Public 
Services
Andreas Ladner
2.1  IntroductIon
The residents of many countries which are comparable to Switzerland all 
have access to more or less the same types of public services. However, how 
services are provided varies widely. Health care in the UK, for example, is 
provided by the National Health Service, but to a large degree in Switzerland, 
health care is provided by the cantons and communities. Swiss cantons play 
a central role in education; in France, it is far more centrally organized.
The key to understanding how public services are provided lies in how 
a country is territorially organized. As a rule in federalist countries, the 
middle level plays a larger role, potentially at the expense of the communi-
ties or of the central state. In unitary countries, by contrast, more tasks are 
performed directly by the central state, but there are also countries like 
Denmark or Sweden, where the communities play a very important role.
One also needs to take the relationship between different levels into 
account. In dual systems, one of the two levels is wholly responsible for 
a given task and how it is regulated, financed, and implemented, while 
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in cooperative systems, more than one level is involved in providing a 
given service. It is also possible, though for various reasons not always 
desirable, that different levels address the same task largely indepen-
dently. In cooperative systems, the relations between different levels can 
be hierarchical or can be a partnership. Tasks can be performed by 
decentralized (or deconcentrated) administrative units, implementation 
can be carried out at lower levels (Vollzugsföderalismus), or task fulfill-
ment can be achieved using negotiated contracts for specific programs 
or outcomes (Programmvereinbarungen).
Terms used today, such as the ‘guarantor state’ (Gewährleistungsstaat), 
the ‘activating state’, or ‘governance’, point to the fact that not all tasks 
have to be fulfilled by public administration bodies, but that a government 
must ensure that all the necessary services are available in the desired form. 
This blurs the distinction between public and private sectors; rather than 
clear, hierarchical structures, services are provided through political 
networks.
This chapter briefly sketches the development of state functions and 
describes the various areas of responsibility of different administrative lev-
els. Expenditures at different levels for specific tasks are addressed sepa-
rately. Relations between the different levels of government are an 
additional aspect, as is the relationship to private sector providers and the 
current forms cooperative efforts take.
2.2  the development of State functIonS 
In hIStorIcal perSpectIve
Prior to 1848, expenditures at the national level were limited to paying for 
diplomatic representation abroad, and covering the costs of the head of 
state (Landammann), the Chancellery, and a small part of the army—at 
the time, the cantons had jurisdiction over the latter. Beyond military 
expenditures, the cantons paid for roads, education, the judiciary, and the 
police (Stalder 2010). Social welfare was a community responsibility but 
only to a limited degree: when family networks proved inadequate, either 
the community or private institutions stepped in.1
At the national level, immediately after the Swiss nation-state came into 
being in 1848, the largest single category of outlays (55–65%) was for the 
military. The amount expended for administration (3%) was minimal by 
1 This section is based on Ladner (2013) and on the detailed analysis of the development 
of state activities found in Linder (1983).
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comparison. Still, the national government did provide subsidies for can-
tonal roads, bridges, correcting river courses or lakes, and for reforestation 
in the higher mountains. With the founding of the Federal Polytechnical 
School in 1855 (renamed the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology or 
ETH (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule) in 1911), the national 
government began to pay for a tertiary education institution (Halbeisen 
2010). Expenditures at the cantonal level, particularly for primary educa-
tion (Volksschule) and scientific research, had begun to play a greater role, 
along with cantonal spending for administration, the judiciary, the police, 
health care, and the military.
The military began to centralize in the period from 1874 to 1913. 
National-level outlays in other areas only began increasing in the 1890s, 
and included repurchasing railway concessions previously granted to the 
cantons (1898) as well as the subsequent expansion and creation of a 
nationwide public railroad system. Subsidies were also given for agricul-
ture, for vocational education purposes, and for primary school teaching 
(after 1902). In 1884, such subsidies for civilian purposes amounted to 
only 7.5% of all outlays, but by 1913, this had increased to 40% (Halbeisen 
2010). Such increases occurred at the same time as the founding of the 
Swiss National Bank (1905), the medical insurance system (1914), and 
the Swiss National Accident Insurance Fund (1918).
Even before the First World War, communities and cantons had begun 
to build an electricity industry, creating intercantonal enterprises under 
private law that were funded with public capital. Communities at the turn 
of the century were primarily engaged in expanding their water supply as 
well as building residences, with larger cities also expanding their public 
transportation networks (Linder 1983: 268). Education expenditures also 
grew in significance at community and cantonal levels: by 1910  in the 
canton of Zürich, they comprised 30% of public outlays. Spending on 
health care was over 20% of the canton of Bern’s outlays at this time as 
well. Depending on the canton, there were also significant spendings for 
poor relief and the churches, or for agriculture and forestry.
In the war and crisis-ridden years, the national government not only 
faced large expenditures for military defense but it also had to ensure the 
country was supplied with adequate food and raw materials, alleviate infla-
tion effects, and combat unemployment (Weber 1969: 17 et seq.). Overall, 
foreign affairs, agriculture, transportation, social insurance, education, 
and research increased in importance. Though there were fluctuations, 
there was a steady increase in outlays at the national level.
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This began to change after the Second World War. From 1890 to 1950, 
the Swiss economy grew 2%, on average, but now the increase was over 5%. 
With a little delay, state expenditures ‘explosively’ increased in the 1960s, 
first in the outlays for infrastructure. Considerable investment, not least by 
the communities and cantons, was made in roads, schools, and hospitals, as 
well as in supply and disposal (Linder 1983: 238). Swiss higher educational 
institutions expanded and the national road system was enlarged.
New tasks and functions were also transferred to the state. The over-
all regulation, or steering, of the economy increasingly became a public 
responsibility, with measures to combat crises added to those meant to 
ensure the economy did not overheat. Economic imbalances created 
through urbanization and rural flight, for example, were addressed 
through regional planning stipulations added to the constitution 
(1969) and by a regional planning law passed a few years later (1976). 
Some of the consequences of economic growth were also countered 
with new water pollution and environmental protection laws (both 
1971). Characteristic for these times were efforts to coordinate policy 
proactively, and over a longer term, by using tools such as regional and 
financial planning, government directives, and formulating nationwide 
strategies for defense, transportation, or energy (Linder 1983: 291 
et seq.). This was the heyday of the interventionist and performance-
oriented state.
During the worldwide recession from 1974 to 1976, the national-
level measures to address crises again come to the fore. In addition to 
the existing instruments, anti-cyclical measures to support specific eco-
nomic sectors came into play, including investment programs, housing 
subsidies, and export risk guarantees along with the expansion of unem-
ployment insurance (Linder 1983: 296). Unlike during economic 
booms, however, the incurred costs could be covered less and less by 
revenue, and a discussion over the limits to the interventionist, perfor-
mance-oriented state—as well as about state regulation—began. A 
pragmatic phase followed, one no longer oriented to bringing about 
larger reforms or nationwide strategies but instead to ‘perpetuating’ or 
‘freezing what already exists’ (Linder 1983: 298). The center-right, in 
particular, criticized the increasing imbalance between revenues and 
outlays, and this resulted in freezing new hires in the federal administra-
tion and to a greater scrutiny of costs. In the 1990s, efforts to increase 
efficiency merged into larger reforms known as New Public Management 
(NPM; see the next chapter as well as Hablützel 2013). Parallel to this, 
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liberal demands for deregulation focused on  making labor law (and 
shop opening hours) more flexible, as well as preventing the creation of 
cartels (1996), limiting the expansion of the social welfare state, and 
reducing taxes (Maissen 2010: 316).
Such reforms affect the organization of services governments pro-
vide. Outsourcing efforts have increased, as have efforts to eliminate 
government- controlled monopolies such as in postal, telephone, and 
telegraph services which were state-run until the late 1990s. Reforms 
were carried out with two goals in mind: one was to increase, in an 
environment more oriented to market forces, the ‘entrepreneurial’ 
scope in providing public services; the other was to rein in the growth 
of the state—or to have an answer for those who criticized such per-
ceived growth. Outsourced enterprises and ‘agencies’ (Pasquier and 
Fivat 2013) now no longer appear (wholly) in the state expenditure 
column, though what they do—in the case of the Swiss Federal 
Railroads, the post office, Swisscom, cantonal banks, hospitals, and 
road traffic offices—can continue to be counted as part of what the 
state, in a broader sense, provides.
Despite the demands for more deregulation and greater liberalization, 
economic downturns in the early 1990s, as well as the economic and 
financial crisis at the end of the 2000s, again necessitated greater govern-
ment intervention. The role the national government played in 2001 (the 
grounding of Swissair) and in 2008 (bailing out the UBS bank), and in 
more recent interventions in response to a weak Euro, has made state 
interventions in the economy appear necessary. Still, increased globaliza-
tion sets limits. The bilateral agreements with the EU, reached in the wake 
of the 1992 Swiss referendum turning down EEA (European Economic 
Area) membership, along with the fundamental need to find transnational 
political solutions nowadays, means that in this international context, 
Swiss public administrators face increasing demands which are difficult to 
meet if they are based only on domestic political mechanisms.
In sum, the state has continually increased in importance, and steadily 
taken on new tasks. This is mirrored in the figures. Per capita expenditures 
in 1848 stood at 24 Francs; in 2010, they were 22,680 Francs. Even when 
taking inflation into account, per capita expenditures today are more than 
60 times greater than they were 160 years ago (Ladner 2013: 31). The 
growth of the state, however, goes hand in hand with a more complex 
fulfillment of different tasks.
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2.3  taSkS undertaken today by the three levelS 
of Government
As noted in the first chapter, one of Switzerland’s characteristic features is its 
three-tiered, federalist, and pronouncedly fine-meshed, territorial division 
into about 2200 communities and 26 cantons. As also noted, the tasks dele-
gated to the national level only gradually increased over time, not least because 
this alteration or expansion of mandates calls for a change to the national 
constitution, and these must be approved by the voters and the cantons.
Several basic principles, set out in the constitution, guide the division of 
tasks and responsibilities, particularly between the national level and the 
cantons. One of these is that in allocating and performing state tasks, ‘the 
principle of subsidiarity must be observed’ (Art. 5a). The national level 
only undertakes tasks cantons are unable to perform or that require uni-
form national regulations (Art. 43a (1)). By doing so, the principle of fis-
cal equivalence has to be respected; it states that whichever ‘collective 
body’ benefits from a public service also bears its costs (Art. 43a (2)) or 
putting it another way, the collective body paying for a public service can 
also decide about the nature of that service (Art. 43a (3)). The same prin-
ciples guide the division of tasks and responsibilities between cantons and 
communities, though depending on canton, these principles may be inter-
preted or implemented differently.
It is contested whether such principles are applicable to every case, but at 
least they do offer some guidance. In the case of subsidiarity, one can argue 
about what calls for uniformity in regulation, or when exactly the power of 
the cantons is exceeded. The answers depend in part on political preferences 
and values. There is also a danger, under the subsidiarity principle, that the 
weakest cantons become the touchstone when it comes to allocating tasks. 
The smallest cantons reach their limits faster than do the bigger cantons in 
trying to perform certain tasks, which partly explains why certain responsi-
bilities are shifted and performed by higher levels. In the case of fiscal equiva-
lence, which links together regulation, provisioning, financing, and utilization, 
it is unclear how directly this utilization must incur. Not everything can be 
financed by those who directly utilize or can be provided by those who regu-
late, or regulated by those who provide.  (((Drop the next sentences, the 
system did not accept it))) Not everything can be financed by those who 
directly utilize or by the providers who regulate or by regulators themselves. 
One should also not forget, finally, that there can be deviations from basic 
principles arising through constitution and law, and that certain international 
obligations may take no account of domestic regulatory principles.
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Following the logic of how the Swiss state was structured, the national- 
level tasks are explicitly limited and stipulated in the constitution. Article 
1 (1) of the Swiss constitution states that: ‘The Confederation (Bund) 
shall carry out the duties assigned to it by the Federal Constitution’. There 
are 81 articles (Title 3, Ch. 2 and 3, Arts. 54–135) in the Swiss constitu-
tion listing specific tasks and competencies allocated to the national level, 
including the following:
• Foreign relations
• Security, national defense, and civil defense
• Education, research, and culture
• Environment and spatial planning
• Public works and transportation
• Energy and communications
• The economy
• Housing, employment, social security, and health
• Temporary and permanent residence of foreigners
• Civil law, criminal law, and weights and measures
• The financial system
The competencies, the form regulations take, the degree of national 
involvement and participation in provisioning, and the financing share 
vary by task area.2 There are various tasks the national government shares 
with the cantons. The classic form of cooperation between the national 
government and cantons is described in Art. 46 (1): the cantons are to 
implement national law in accordance with the national constitution and 
national legislation. This organizational form is commonly referred to as 
implementation federalism (Vollzugsföderalismus). This arrangement is 
often criticized, since cantons receive no guarantee they will be able to 
participate in decision-making and may simply be required to carry out 
superordinate tasks—which they may even have to partly finance.
More recently, and as part of the reform of the financial equalization 
scheme, it has become common to talk of joint tasks (Verbundsaufgaben). 
These include those which, as part of deconcentration or ‘unbundling’ 
efforts, cannot be assigned to one or another level. The idea is that the 
2 For a detailed typology, see the 2006 corporate governance report from the Federal 
Council (Bericht des Bundesrates zur Auslagerung und Steuerung von Bundesaufgaben), 
and Waldmann and Spiess (2015).
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responsibility for carrying out and financing (the fulfillment of) a given task 
should be shared by the national and cantonal levels, on the basis of a new 
type of partnership. Examples of such joint tasks include the official cadastral 
survey, the penal and correctional system, scholarships, nature and cultural 
heritage preservation, major roads, flood control, transportation in metro-
politan areas, noise control, water pollution control, supplementary benefits 
entitlements, reduction of health insurance premiums, and improvements 
to structural development in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing.
Within their area of competence—Art. 3 of the constitution states that they 
exercise all rights not vested in the national government—cantons themselves 
decide which tasks, and to what extent, they wish to fulfill. In that sense, can-
tons possess what is called a ‘Residualkompetenz’ (residual competencies). 
This also means that the portfolio of tasks will vary from canton to canton.
In recent years, cantonal constitutions have increasingly included lists 
of cantonal tasks and goals, in an effort to make citizens better aware of 
them. These give a useful survey of what the ‘collective body’ at this level 
is responsible for (Buser 2011). Detailing all the differences between the 
cantons would go too far, but the following list of responsibilities noted in 
Bern’s cantonal constitution gives some idea of the scope:
• Environmental protection
• Protection of nature and cultural heritage
• Regional/land-use planning and building codes
• Transportation and roads
• Water and energy supply
• Sewage treatment and waste disposal
• Maintaining public order and security
• Social welfare
• Labor
• Habitations
• Health care
• Schools
• Universities and polytechnics
• Media
• Culture
• Leisure, sports and recreation
• Agriculture and forestry
• Cantonal usage rights (to salt, water, mountains, hunting, and fishing)
• Cantonal bank
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Communities, in turn, carry out tasks determined by local, cantonal, 
and national policies, and in so doing, distinguish between those in their 
own sphere of influence and those delegated to them by canton or the 
national government. In delegated tasks, the community is charged with 
implementing decrees from canton or national government. Federal law is 
carried out by the communities, for example, when implementing water 
pollution or food inspection laws, or by civil defense regulations; cantonal 
laws are carried out, for example, in the school system.
Statutory regulation is also in a community’s jurisdiction. Unlike tasks 
delegated from above which must be carried out, having this power means 
communities have the right to set their own laws and administrative pro-
cedures, and can on occasion even administer justice, as when they set 
penalties for violating community regulations (Steiner and Kaiser 2013: 
150). Within a community, one can distinguish between obligatory and 
self-chosen tasks. In the case of obligatory tasks such as land-use planning 
or setting building codes, these must be carried out in accordance with 
national or cantonal law. Self-chosen tasks, inasmuch as they do not lie 
within the sole jurisdiction of the national government, the canton, or 
other organizations, and inasmuch as they serve the general good, may 
include such things as building a multipurpose community hall or a com-
munity tennis court.
In practice, it is not always easy to establish which tasks belong to which 
level; it often calls for an interpretation of the relevant regulations. 
Wastewater disposal in the canton of Zurich, for example, is a community- 
level task, but because cantonal law and regulations have an influence on the 
financing, there is little scope for communities to act as they might wish.
The tasks carried out, or services provided, by communities and their 
administrators vary from canton to canton. The following is a list of what 
is often provided (Steiner 2002):
• Kindergarten, primary school, and middle school (lasting three years)
• Welfare, outpatient care, elder care, and certain social insurance tasks
• Wasser, wastewater, refuse, and electricity
• Public transportation within the community
• Community zoning and land-use planning, building inspection, 
nature and cultural heritage preservation, roads and paths, sports 
infrastructure, and cultural institutions
• Appointment or election of officials, organization of the administra-
tion, and personnel management
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• Budgeting and accounting, administering the community’s property 
and wealth, and setting the community’s tax rate
• Fire prevention authorities, traffic police, and workplace inspectors
• Granting community citizenship to foreign residents
The guiding principle behind dividing tasks between canton and com-
munity is again that of subsidiarity. Communities, inasmuch as this is objec-
tively feasible and leads to results that are both qualitatively and quantitatively 
acceptable, should take on as many tasks as possible. The hope is that this 
will lead to better legitimation and greater responsiveness in governmental 
action, as well as to both more effective and more efficient service provision 
(Steiner and Kaiser 2013). The division of tasks between cantons and com-
munities, however, is also a result of historical developments and political 
power relations. In the last ten years, numerous Swiss cantons have newly 
regulated the division of tasks between them, in keeping with the restructur-
ing of tasks brought about by changes to the financial equalization scheme 
and the redefinition of national and cantonal tasks. Noteworthy here is the 
shifting of tasks upward from the communal to the cantonal level, a move 
often justified with reference to the greater professionalism and stronger 
financial position of the cantons. Smaller communities are no longer in a 
position to fulfill their tasks. New regulations promulgated at the federal 
level are often the trigger, as they call for changes to cantonal law, as in the 
reordering of the civil registration system in the 1990s or in changes made 
to child and adult protection laws in the 2010s.
2.4  fulfIllInG State taSkS In lIGht of revenueS 
and expendItureS
Increasing governmental responsibilities and the importance of the vari-
ous actors in fulfilling tasks is mirrored in the finances. This is all the more 
significant because each level in Switzerland has its own sources of income 
and its own budgets, and must pay for its own expenditures. This is par-
ticularly true for the communities, as there is relatively little vertical trans-
fer of funds. Of much greater significance are the transfers between the 
national level and the cantons, a large part of which is made up of contri-
butions from the national level to joint tasks and implementation costs.
In terms of expenditures, when the Swiss federal state began in 1850, 
the national level was the least significant: communities accounted for 
47% of the expenditures, and cantons 45% (Guex 1998: 102). By 1913, 
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the national level accounted for 22%, the cantons for 40%, followed by 
communities at 38%. The national level continued to increase in impor-
tance, so by the 1950s, it was the most significant source of expenditures, 
with communities now comprising less than 30% of the total. This trend 
reversed after 1960, with cantonal expenditures reflecting the expansion 
of the state and the economic boom. The trend has persisted: in 2014, 
cantons accounted for 43.4%, the national level for 33%, and communities 
for 23.6% of expenditures.
The low proportion of outlays at the community level is striking, par-
ticularly in international comparison. If one includes social insurance in 
calculating total expenditures, as is done in comparative Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) studies, then 
Switzerland belongs, at less than 20% as of 2009, to the countries with 
low community expenditures (OECD 2011). The share of community 
expenditures is still lower in German, Austrian, Spanish, and Greek com-
munities but higher in Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands (30–35%). 
They were exceptionally high in Sweden (about 50%) and Denmark 
(over 60%). This is in contrast to the repeated assertion of how signifi-
cant communities are in Switzerland. Yet this is not really so surprising, 
given the small average size of Swiss communities and their consequent 
limited ability to provide services. The part of the national level is also 
comparatively small. By contrast, the share of social insurance costs is 
large (in other countries, these form part of the expenditures of a central 
state, or these costs are integrated into the communities),  as is the share 
of the cantons, an administrative and political level that is only signifi-
cant in federalist countries.
If one looks at the national-level expenditures for specific tasks, then 
at 33.4%, social welfare—a responsibility accepted haltingly and rela-
tively late (early nineteenth century) in Switzerland—takes the lion’s 
share (see Table 2.1). The second largest category, considerably smaller, 
is transportation (11.8%), followed by education (9.5%) and the military 
(8.5%). Especially noticeable, historically speaking, is the relative decline 
in importance of the army, and the relative increase in importance of 
education, transportation, and the environment. That health expendi-
tures by the national level are so low is due to the fact that the provision 
of health services is organized by the cantons and communities. 
Furthermore, the costs of treatment are borne to a very large extent by 
privately run health- care insurance funds, so their expenditures do not 
form part of state expenditure tallies.
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Education (28.1%) is the large single expenditure category at the can-
tonal level, followed by social security (20.2%) and health (14.1%). 
Education is also the largest category of outlays for communities (26.3%), 
followed by social security (18.5%).
If one combines expenditures at all three levels, and adds social insur-
ance outlays to it (independent of territorial entity), then the distribution 
of expenditures proves to be quite lopsided: more than 40% flows into 
social security, followed by a little more than 15% into education. All other 
expenditure categories are under 10%. Adding the full costs of health care 
(including health insurance) means more than 70% of all public spending 
goes to social security, health, and education.
However, listing the expenditures for specific task areas at the three 
political levels provides only limited information about how much leeway 
there is or how large an influence a particular level has in a given case. If 
one level is responsible only for covering the costs and another has 
decision- making power or room to act, then, despite contributing more 
funds, the significance of the former will be markedly smaller. In the coop-
erative federalism typical for Switzerland in which the national level lacks 
its own implementing administrators—unlike, say, in the US—an expan-
sion of tasks at the national level can therefore lead to more implementa-
tion activity at the cantonal level. This increased importance of the cantonal 
level is thus sometimes the result of the increased scope of federal-level 
tasks (Vatter 2006: 223).
Cantons, and at times communities as well, have complained since the 
1970s that tasks and costs increasingly are being shifted to them without 
a corresponding increase in decision-making power. The political 
 interlacing (Politikverflechtung) of the system makes it generally more 
cumbersome, and it can be accompanied by a lack of clear responsibilities. 
Changes to the financial equalization scheme, and the reassignment of 
tasks,3 particularly to be in accordance with the principle of fiscal equiva-
lence anchored in the constitution, along with a reorganization of ‘vertical 
cooperation’, were attempts to counter such tendencies.
The largest share of revenues, which are gathered at all three levels, is 
provided by income taxes (see Fig. 2.1). The maximum tax rate which the 
national level can levy is laid out in the constitution, but cantons and com-
munities—within certain limits—are free to set their own level of taxation 
3 The corresponding Federal Council decision of 3 October was clearly accepted by a plebi-
scite of the people and the cantons (64.4% and 18 5/2 cantons in favor; the electoral partici-
pation rate was 36.9%) on 28 November 2004, and came into force at the beginning of 2008.
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according to their needs. As a result, the tax burden varies quite widely 
depending on where one lives. Most political communities also have bal-
anced budget requirements, forcing them to keep expenditures and 
 revenues in balance. In European comparison, the value-added tax is low 
and currently stands at 8%; this tax is paid directly to the national govern-
ment and is its most important source of revenue.
A clear division of tasks, or of revenue sources, between political levels 
was not strictly observed even when the Swiss federal state began in 1848. 
Over time, however, the interlacing has increasingly meant lower levels 
carry out or implement decisions they did not participate in, with the 
financial flows becoming ever more complex and opaque. As noted several 
times, reform of the financial equalization scheme in 2008 was undertaken 
precisely in order to counter this tendency and to ‘revitalize’ Swiss federal-
ism. But despite a new division of tasks, the financial autonomy of the 
individual political levels, and a declared commitment to fiscal equivalence, 
considerable interlacing, especially between the national level and the can-
tons, remains. Of the 63 billion Francs revenue received at the national 
level in 2010, nearly 19 billion (nearly 30%) of that was transferred to the 
Fig. 2.1 Expenditures and revenues of the three political levels
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cantons, and about 14 billion was transferred to social insurance, especially 
for pensions and disability insurance. Most of the transfers to the cantons, 
which amount to more than 11 billion Francs, are linked to tasks per-
formed by the cantons and come in the form of contributions, compensa-
tion, or investment. The cantonal share of federal revenues run to about 
4.5 billion (direct federal tax, withholding tax, gasoline tax, heavy vehicle 
tax, etc.), and about 3 billion are accounted for by the federal share of the 
financial equalization scheme between the cantons.
That the higher level spends less money directly than it receives, and that 
a part of its revenues flows to the lower level, is a phenomenon one finds in 
all (federalist) states (Anderson 2010: 50). Herein also lies the justification 
for a central state to steer activities at the lower level, as well as to equalize 
the differences between the various territorial bodies. Characteristic of 
Switzerland, however, is how low the national share of total expenditures is, 
and how much of that flows, as transfers, into other public budgets. The 
national government, and this can be read out of how it developed histori-
cally, was in many areas never given the sole competence to provide state 
services. It was also not given independent power to increase its resources 
by raising value added or direct federal tax rates. The power to do so is set 
out in the constitution, and such increases cannot even be decided by parlia-
ment but must be approved by a majority of the voters and of the cantons.
2.5  InterGovernmental relatIonS and cooperatIon 
wIth the prIvate Sector
If one examines the expenditures, one can see that the political levels are 
seldom solely responsible for a given policy area or for fulfilling a specific 
task. Instead, vertical cooperation between political levels as well as hori-
zontal cooperation between cantons, or between communities, matter 
considerably more.4 To this one should add the cooperation with private 
sector actors, at all three levels.
2.5.1  Vertical Cooperation
In the case of vertical cooperation, the first question is how hierarchical, or 
conversely how egalitarian, the relationship between the three levels is—
and more to the point, how independent lower levels are. The relationship 
4 On intergovernmental relations in Switzerland, see Ladner (2010).
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between the national level and the cantons is often discussed in terms of 
sovereignty, and that between canton and community is often couched in 
terms of autonomy.
The determinative question is who is responsible for which aspects of 
task performance and to what degree. Without going into too much 
detail, one can distinguish between regulation, financing, and implemen-
tation. Following the principle of fiscal equivalence (see the constitutional 
articles noted above), these three should coincide—though this is not 
always possible to achieve in jointly implemented tasks.
As a rule, authority to set regulations lies at higher levels, with lower 
levels given less or more decision-making scope in this process. But part of 
the financing and implementation are in the competency of the cantons. 
Depending on the particular area, the national government may help 
finance but as a rule is not involved in actual implementation: Article 46 
(1) explicitly states that the cantons are the implementers of federal law.
Reform of the financial equalization scheme in 2008 tried to modern-
ize, and clarify, vertical cooperation in the country. As part of the ‘pro-
gram agreements’ (Programmvereinbarungen), cantons and the national 
government (at times, with the communities and in consultation with pri-
vate sector service providers) may sign four-year agreements which clearly 
define the tasks to be undertaken. They also contain a fixed funding for-
mula. The idea is to complete stated tasks based on a partnership, one in 
which strategic questions are handled at the national level and the opera-
tive implementation is left to the cantons.
Cooperation between communities and cantons is less complex, though 
communities,  of course, do insist on their independence and resist efforts 
to increase the financial burdens they already bear. Generally speaking, and 
in international comparison, Swiss communities have a very high degree of 
autonomy (Ladner et  al. 2016). However, they are weaker than 
Scandinavian communities when it is a matter of political discretion they 
are granted in fulfilling tasks.
As far as vertical cooperation is concerned, the standard view has been 
that the national level negotiates with the cantons, and the cantons then 
negotiate with the communities. In more recent times, this model has 
proven inadequate, since there are cases of multi-level policy-making (tri-
partism) of this kind found in descriptions of multi-level governance. Art. 
50 provides the constitutional basis, as it not only guarantees the autonomy 
of the communities, in accordance with cantonal law, but also explicitly 
A. LADNER
 37
states that the national government must take the possible consequences of 
policies for communities into account. Indeed, the national government is 
also obligated to take the special position of cities and urban regions, as well 
as that of the mountain regions, into account. Regional planning in urban-
ized areas or integration/inclusion policies are examples of policy areas 
coordinated through tripartite practices.
2.5.2  Horizontal Cooperation
Horizontal cooperation plays an important role in carrying out tasks at 
lower levels; here it refers to cooperation either between the cantons or 
between the communities. For a long time, the former played a relatively 
subordinated role, but this has changed and now is of considerably more 
importance (Bochsler 2009). Such cooperation includes coordination 
between cantons over policy areas (without including the national govern-
ment), exchange of information about cantonal experiences with policies, 
representing common cantonal interests vis-à-vis the national govern-
ment, and in more recent years, organizing common implementation of 
political tasks (Bochsler and Sciarini 2006; Vatter 2016: 468).
The organizational expression of such cooperation includes the 
Conference of Cantonal Governments (since 1993), four regional 
(Western, Northwestern, Eastern, and Central) conferences of cantonal 
governments, policy-specific conferences (Cantonal Finance Directors’ 
Conference, Cantonal Education Directors’ Conference, etc.), as well as 
intercantonal meetings between specialized officials. More than 500 such 
bodies exist in the various branches of the cantonal public administrations, 
which create a dense and influential network of relationships (Iff et  al. 
2010). The organizational center for this activity is the House of the 
Cantons in Bern—and this degree of activity has led to some grumbling 
that it competes with the Ständerat, the upper house of Parliament which 
represents the cantons.
There are also more than 800 Konkordate (‘concordats’, meaning con-
tracts or agreements) between the cantons, the vast majority of which are 
less than 40 years old (Bochsler 2009). Their main purpose is to regulate 
intercantonal and regional cooperation. About three-quarters of the con-
cordats are bicantonal; only a dozen or so involve all the cantons (Vatter 
2016: 470). Most concordats address tax or finance, education, research, 
or cultural issues.
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Intercantonal cooperation efforts are often criticized for their ponder-
ousness and a tendency to be technocratic or over-determined by admin-
istrators and executives. Cantonal parliaments do have less influence in 
preparing and carrying out concordats than they have in the case of can-
tonal laws, though there have been efforts to address this through greater 
cantonal inter-parliamentary cooperation.
A special form of intercantonal cooperation is laid out in Art. 48a of the 
Swiss constitution, which identifies areas (including cantonal higher edu-
cation institutions, cultural institutions of supraregional importance, 
urban transportation, and advanced medical science) over which the 
national government, at the request of interested cantons (as a rule, 18 are 
needed), can declare intercantonal agreements to be binding or can 
require cantons to participate in them. This constitutional article was a 
direct result of changes made to the financial equalization scheme. 
Interestingly, it is a way cantons can initiate nationwide rules without the 
national parliament being involved in shaping them. That no such gener-
ally binding agreements have yet been crafted shows that this invitation for 
cantons to coordinate their efforts works.
Cooperation between communities is equally widespread, following a 
variety of organizational models. The ‘community seat’ model 
(Sitzgemeindemodell) foresees a (larger) community fulfilling certain 
defined tasks for other communities or a special purpose association 
(Zweckverband, a juridical entity) can be designated as the entity respon-
sible for fulfilling a certain task. Communities do cooperate in service 
 provisions, including in common fire brigades, providing medical services, 
school cooperation, wastewater and sewage systems, eldercare, or in waste 
disposal. Most Swiss communities say they work with at least one other 
community in providing such services (Steiner and Kaiser 2013: 164). 
Numerous newer cantonal constitutions also have articles which make it 
possible to force communities to cooperate should they not themselves be 
in the position of providing certain services in a satisfactory manner.
The small size of certain communities and cantons is a factor which 
favors cooperation. Very small communities may not be able to have their 
own schools for lack of pupils and therefore cooperate with neighboring 
communities to provide education. In consequence, inter-community 
cooperation is often seen as an alternative to community mergers—which 
have increased sharply in recent decades. Similarly, the smaller cantons do 
not have their own universities, so it has been necessary for them to find 
cooperative solutions with the cantons which do.
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2.5.3  Cooperation with Private Actors and Outsourcing
Public tasks are fulfilled not only by the state in a narrower sense, but also 
in cooperation with the private sector. These can range from dependent 
institutions given contracts to provide services to private enterprises given 
public sector contract to fully private enterprises which provide services 
that are of a public nature.
Enterprises, institutes, or agencies under public law, which belong fully 
to the national government but which may be separate legal entities, 
include the Swiss Institute for Intellectual Property, the two Federal 
Institutes of Technology (ETH), and the Federal Pension Fund (Publica). 
Furthest away from the core of the administration one finds enterprises 
under public law or under special provisions in which the national govern-
ment is the sole or majority owner. This includes former state monopolies, 
such as the SBB(Schweizerische Bundesbahnen)/the Swiss Railway, 
Swisscom, and the Swiss Post. Similarly, the maintenance and production 
facilities of the Swiss army have been turned into Ruag, a joint stock com-
pany under private law; it describes itself as engaged in aerospace defense 
technology. Similarly, the national government’s former control of Swiss 
airspace and air navigation, both civilian and military, is now in the hands 
of Skyguide, a joint stock company.
According to ‘The Cantons as Enterprises’ (Meister and Rühli 2009), a 
2009 study, cantons cooperated with or participated in about 600 inde-
pendent (private) enterprises in the following sectors:
• 190 in public transportation
• 146  in financing (banks, insurance companies, credit or surety 
cooperatives)
• 102 in energy
• 56 in education
• 42 in health (esp. hospitals)
• 447 other (esp. in agriculture)
Our own community surveys (see Gemeindemonitoring 2017) found 
that in areas such as the computerization of administrative services, zoning 
and regional planning, energy supply, or supplementary childcare, one in 
five communities made use of private sector providers.
In addition to certain entrepreneurial freedoms granted in Switzerland, 
the subsidiarity principle is at work here too, though in its horizontal mani-
festations. In keeping with the tradition of Catholic social thought, this 
principle argues that as much as possible, all tasks should be carried out 
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through private efforts. The state should only intervene when this is objec-
tively justifiable, thereby reinforcing the reluctance to having a strong state.
A further force encouraging cooperation with the private sector is size. 
Many communities, and even certain cantons, are too small to be able to 
afford an extensive, efficient public administration, so it is not surprising 
that relief is sought from the private sector. Preparations for construction 
permits or local land-use plans, the maintenance of streets, or the care pro-
vided to the elderly are given into the hands of private providers. The call 
for greater private involvement in public tasks in the ‘provider’ or ‘guaran-
tor’ state (Gewährleistungsstaat) also comes from advocates of NPM. This 
effort is meant, among other things, to create competitive structures as 
well as to profit from greater entrepreneurial and economic liberties.
2.5.4  New Cooperation Forms: Multi-level Governance
Multi-level politics and cooperation with private actors merge into an 
organizational form called multi-level governance in the literature. 
Cooperation between the political levels is no longer hierarchical, and 
both public and private actors participate in shaping politics and imple-
menting policies. With this, all the characteristics of the concept of gover-
nance, as suggested by Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004: 152) and 
others, are fulfilled. One can see it illustrated in urban development or 
integration policies, in the various program agreements, or in national 
policy discourses about welfare, health, energy, or culture. Given their 
experience(s), private service providers, together with local, cantonal, and 
national authorities, are involved in helping to formulate policy.
However, studies of this new organizational form, not to speak of expe-
rience with it, are still largely lacking, so that one cannot yet speak of a 
new, promising form of policy coordination and policy steering. But there 
are certainly efforts being made to address ever more complex demands 
being made on the various policy areas.
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CHAPTER 3
The Characteristics of Public Administration 
in Switzerland
Andreas Ladner
3.1  IntroductIon
As the history of the country, the founding of the modern Swiss state and 
its political institutions, the organization of public services, and the under-
standing of state task fulfillment as the basis for public administration have 
been addressed already, this chapter is devoted to the characteristics of its 
various administrations. The plural is deliberate. The federalist structure, 
along with the many cultural differences in the country, means one cannot 
treat public administration in Switzerland as a unitary entity. The 
Confederation, the cantons, the cities, and the communities each have 
their own administrations which differ from one another—beyond their 
common basic responsibilities.
For Switzerland, as elsewhere, public administration has increased in 
importance vis-à-vis politics, due to the greater professionalization and 
specialization which go hand in hand with the heightened complexity of 
political tasks nowadays. As the locus of important decisions shifts to 
higher, or even international, levels, the administrators who carry out 
decisions come to have more and more influence and distance themselves 
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from the policy makers. Also the ‘militia’ manner in which public services 
are organized and delivered that is still widely used in Switzerland nowa-
days only works if politicians can rely on strong administrations.
Switzerland does not have a politicized administration that is replaced 
when a new government comes to power, and party affiliation is not a 
precondition for employment in the higher civil service. Still, such affilia-
tion can be important when filling top administrative posts: it is not 
uncommon for successful applicants to belong to the personal political 
network, and hence to the party, of the elected politician who selects 
them. At the local level, some of the community secretaries 
(Gemeindeschreiber), the highest civil servant, are still elected, though less 
often so than in the past.
Despite various criticisms, the degree of bureaucratization in Switzerland 
remains relatively low, and the various public administrations are generally 
not perceived as authoritarian, superordinate powers one must submit to. 
That the aspect of service provision is more prominent may in the end be due 
to a direct democratic system in which the voters have the last word—and 
perhaps also that voter’s tax monies directly pay the wages of administrators. 
This becomes particularly visible at the local level. The level of satisfaction 
with administrative service provision is exceptionally high, particularly at the 
community level and also compared with such satisfaction levels in other 
prosperous countries (Denters et  al. 2016). Residents are highly satisfied 
with the accessibility and performance of their administrators, and this makes 
the Swiss civil service system interesting to outside observers.
This chapter describes the scope of the public sector and administration 
in a narrower sense, followed by a description of how the various govern-
mental levels are organized. The more important characteristics of the 
Swiss administrations are then discussed, as well as reforms which have 
been carried out in recent years. The chapter closes with a brief compari-
son of the Swiss system of public administrations with those in other West 
European countries.
3.2  the delImItatIon and Scope of publIc 
admInIStratIon
It is not that easy to determine the scope of public administration, nor its 
changes over time, due to the relatively fluid boundary between public 
and private sectors in Switzerland, and also because the attribution of tasks 
A. LADNER
 45
has changed through the years. There is a gray area where governmental 
bodies provide services also provided by private actors, or where mixed- 
economy and private enterprises are charged with providing public ser-
vices. Demarcation problems arise, on the one hand, in trying to separate 
core administration in a narrower sense from what other governmental 
actors do, and, on the other hand, in clearly separating public and private 
sectors. Employees of the postal service or the national railroads, for 
example, are not counted as part of public administration in a narrower 
sense, yet they provide public services and are employed by the govern-
ment (formally, as Staatspersonal). Hospital employees too, depending on 
who owns their place of employment, may either count as public sector 
employees (e.g., of a canton) or as part of the private sector.
The nomenclature used by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office bases its 
determination of what counts as part of the public sector on the legal form 
a given administrative entity takes.1 Public administration in a narrow 
sense thus includes national, cantonal, district, and community adminis-
trations, along with public corporations. Commercially oriented entities 
over which the government holds a controlling majority are counted 
among the public enterprises,2 as are the public enterprises of the cantons, 
the districts, the communities, the public enterprises of a corporate body, 
as well as entities under public law. The public sector is composed of these 
public enterprises and entities, along with the public administrations in a 
narrower sense.
As of 2015, the Swiss public sector comprised about 575,000 full-time 
positions (see Table 3.1),3 or about 15 percent of all full-time positions. 
Just under two-thirds of these positions were in the public  administrations, 
and a little more than a third were in public enterprises. In the case of the 
former, the largest share, at a little more than half, is accounted for by 
cantonal public administrations. About one-quarter of these positions are 
in the communities, and about 10 percent are at the national level. Among 
public enterprises, the largest share by far consists of positions in the pub-
lic institutions, followed by the cantons and the communities.
1 The NOGA (Nomenclature générale des activités économiques) makes it possible, based on 
their economic activity, to classify the statistical units ‘enterprises’ and ‘workplaces’. NOGA 
2008 is the current version.
2 The legal entities which fall under corporate law (such as stock companies, sole propri-
etorships or unregistered partnerships) can also offer public services. However, they are not 
counted as part of the public sector and instead belong to the private sector.
3 See BFS – STATENT.
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The growth of the public sector has been a repeated subject of political 
controversy. However, the statistics show that the share of the public sector 
has actually diminished, at least in recent years. My own calculations based 
on Federal Statistical Office figures show the numbers shrank by around 
2000 full-time equivalents (FTEs) from 2012 to 2015. If one looks at the 
changes in FTEs relative to population increase, then the reduction is even 
clearer. In 2012, there were 72.2 FTEs per 1000 residents; in 2015, this 
stood at 69.4 FTEs. Hence there was a reduction in the public sector share 
of all positions from 15.4 to 14.9 percent, largely due to changes in public 
enterprises and entities under public law. Among the public administra-
tions, however, FTEs increased from 44.9 per 1000 residents in 2012 to 
45.4 FTEs in 2015, or from 9.6 to 9.8 percent of all employees.
The figures from the 2001, 2005, and 2008 business censuses showed 
no great shift of positions from the private to the public sector, either.4 
4 See Branchenporträt des öffentlichen Sektors (2015), p. 9 and 10.
Table 3.1 Full-time equivalent (FTE) positions, public sector employees, by 
legal form (2015)
Legal form FTE In % In %
Public sector 572,044.3 100.0
Public administrations 373,969.5 100.0 65.4
National administration 36,071.3 9.6 6.3
Cantonal administration 190,145.6 50.8 33.2
District administration 1072.1 0.3 0.2
Community administration 92,329.9 24.7 16.1
Entities under public lawa 54,350.6 14.5 9.5
Public enterprises 198,074.8 100.0 34.6
Cantonal public enterprises 40,075.7 20.2 7.0
District public enterprises 824.7 0.4 0.1
Community public enterprises 26,511.9 13.4 4.6
Corporate body public enterprisesb 14,438.6 7.3 2.5
Entities under public law 116,223.9 58.7 20.3
Source: BFS – STATENT: https://www.pxweb.bfs.admin.ch (consulted on September 2, 2017), pub-
lished values (provisional)
aThese are public corporations which cannot be listed as falling under national, cantonal, district, or com-
munity administration, such as municipal associations, administrative districts, the public bodies respon-
sible for schools in certain cantons (Schulgemeinden), and administrations managed by several corporate 
bodies. See Datenstandard eCH-0097, Version 3.0
bPublic enterprises which cannot be listed under national, cantonal, district, or community enterprises, 
such as the forestry enterprises of residents’ communities (Ortsbürgergemeinden) in certain cantons. See 
Datenstandard eCH-0097, Version 3.0
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Unfortunately, such figures do not allow one to follow developments over 
a longer time period, and the constantly changing definitions and catego-
ries do not make a definitive assessment easy. There is still a notion in 
Switzerland that the public sector generally, and public administration in a 
narrower sense, continue to increase in importance, at least in terms of 
positions and wages.5 The empirical evidence, however, is less unanimous 
or conclusive.
The proportion of Swiss public sector employees is markedly lower 
than in most other comparable countries. In Scandinavia, especially 
Denmark and Norway, it lies near 30 percent; at about 10 percent, 
Switzerland is right behind Germany and well below the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average (OECD 
2017a). Particularly noteworthy is the low share, at under 10 percent, of 
those employed at the national level in Switzerland, largely due to the 
country’s federalist political structure. Yet even among federalist coun-
tries, this is very low. It may in part be due to a unique understanding of 
the state as well as to a particularly pronounced decentralization (OECD 
2017b).
The largest single public administration in Switzerland is at the national 
level. If one looks at the development of civil service positions here, then 
one sees an increase starting around the year 2000 followed by a marked 
reduction (Fig. 3.1). In the following decade, the numbers again increased, 
reaching a plateau of about 35,000.6 As the country’s population also 
increased substantially in this period, then at least in terms of positions per 
1000 residents, the tendency since 2003 has actually been regressive. At 
least some of the reduction in personnel is probably attributable to efforts 
at rationalizing jobs and increasing efficiency, in turn related to external-
izing some activities, dispensing with certain services, and outsourcing 
specific task areas. There is relatively high political pressure in the country 
to not increase the outlays for public administration activities.
Evidence for an implicit ceiling of 35,000 also is reflected by figures 
from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when between 32,000 and 35,000 
national-level administrative positions were recorded. Since 2000, a 
5 See the NZZ, February 3, 2017.
6 Though the Federal Council had proposed 254 FTEs for 2016, as well as 177.5 addi-
tional FTEs based on internal changes, the total actually reduced (−21 FTE, for a total of 
34,914 positions) for the first time in six years. This was due in part to cuts in personnel the 
Federal Council had decided upon, as well as a certain reluctance to recruit (Bericht zur 
Bundesrechnung R2016, Vol. 1, p. 79).
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number of entities, including the ETHs (Eidgenössische Technische 
Hochule) in Zurich and Lausanne, have no longer been listed under the 
‘general national administration’ heading (Varone 2013: 113)—though 
they accounted for nearly 15,000 positions. Many of these are supported 
through third-party funding.
The government holds a majority of the shares in a number of large enter-
prises, such as Swisscom (telecommunications), and controls others (the 
postal service, the Swiss railroads, the defense company Ruag), and though 
these are not counted as part of the national administration in a narrower 
sense, they account together for considerably more than 100,000 FTEs 
(2015–16). With 44,000 employees in the postal service, 21,000 at Swisscom, 
and 9000 at Ruag, the current numbers in these enterprises are higher than in 
previous decades. The national railroads, at 33,000 FTEs, have also increased 
their employment compared to the turn of the millennium. However, one 
should not forget that the number of beneficiaries of these services (e.g., rail-
road passengers) also has increased, as have the services provided.
Most public administration staff, as noted, work at the cantonal level. 
In 2015, all cantons together employed about 190,000 FTEs, plus an 
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additional 40,000 in cantonal public enterprises. The most populous can-
tons (Zurich, Bern, Vaud, Geneva) have the largest administrations, 
though it is noteworthy that Zurich’s cantonal administration (19 posi-
tions per 1000 residents) is significantly smaller than in these other can-
tons (26, 28, and 44 positions per 1000  in Bern, Vaud, and Geneva, 
respectively).
There are various reasons for this. In addition to the respective signifi-
cance accorded the public sector, how public services are provided, for 
example, as a division of labor between public and private enterprises, or 
between canton and community, has an influence on the size of a cantonal 
administration. The centrality of a canton can play a role as well. Generally, 
the more urban a canton is (e.g., Geneva, Basel-City), the larger the can-
tonal administration. French-speaking cantons traditionally also give more 
weight to the public sector and prefer tasks being carried out at the can-
tonal rather than at the community level. One can speak of a kind of can-
tonalization of administration in French-speaking Switzerland but of a 
municipalization in German-speaking Switzerland.
In 2015, more than 92,000 FTEs worked as municipal administrators, 
plus an additional 27,000 in municipal public enterprises. Less work at the 
community than at the cantonal level, and communities have dwindled in 
relative importance as employers over the last few decades compared with 
the cantons. This is largely due to the considerable expansion at the can-
tonal level in education and health sectors.
There is even more variation in the size of administrations at the com-
munity level than among the cantons. In the smallest communities (less 
than 500 inhabitants), of which many still exist, the administration con-
sists of the community secretary (Gemeindeschreiber) and at most one or 
two additional employees who divide less than two FTEs between them. 
The cities, by contrast, have fully developed and effective public adminis-
trations which may employ several thousand people. The relative size of 
community administrations, defined as the number of employees per 100 
residents, takes a U-shaped form. As the number of residents increases, the 
relative number of community employees at first declines, but then gradu-
ally rises—above about 2000 residents—and reaches its highest values in 
the cities. This confirms findings familiar from research on organizations 
and administration: with increasing size of an organizational unit, a degree 
of rationalization can be achieved in fulfilling tasks, but that with increased 
functional differentiation, coordination efforts, and with it the costs, of 
administration begin to rise again (Geser et al. 1996).
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If one compares the administrative density among the largest Swiss cit-
ies, defined as the number of city employees per 1000 residents, Zurich 
(28.5 positions) has the highest density, followed by Lausanne (27.5). At 
first glance, the difference between German-speaking Zurich and French- 
speaking Lausanne does not appear all that large. But in Zurich, one needs 
to add the 25 positions in the city’s public enterprises, while Lausanne has 
only seven (per 1000 residents). This is corroboration for the point noted 
above: administration at the community level plays a greater role in 
German-speaking Switzerland than it does in Western, French-speaking 
Switzerland. French-speaking Geneva, for example, has only 18.5 posi-
tions (per 1000 residents) in city administration, and none at all in city 
public enterprise, due to a strong cantonal presence in public administra-
tion. Likewise, Bern has no positions in the city’s public enterprises, and 
thus has a comparatively low administrative employment of 21 (per 1000 
residents). Strong cantonalization is at work here, as is the fact that it plays 
less of a role as a regional center: the area taken up by the city itself is very 
small, and it is encircled by larger, high-performing communities.
According to surveys we have repeatedly carried out, the number of 
community personnel has increased over the last 20 years. In 2016, about 
60 percent of the communities (n = 1757) have noted an increase in the 
number of positions over the last decade, while 30 percent report no 
change. Increases are largely confined to larger communities and cities.
3.3  organIzatIonal Structure
The Swiss national administration7 is divided into seven Federal 
Departments: Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Home Affairs (FDHA), Justice 
and Police (FDJP), Defense, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS), Finance 
(FDF), Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER), and 
Environment, Transportation, Energy, and Communications (DETEC). 
To this one should add the Federal Chancellery (FCh). The Departments 
have General Secretariats—four also have State Secretariats—and a variety 
of Offices and other units below them.
Compared to the Ministries found in other countries, there are few 
Departments, and this is directly related to the number of Federal 
Councilors (Bundesräte). The national executive, the Federal Council 
(Bundesrat), has consisted of seven members since 1848 (see Chap. 1), 
7 For a detailed overview, see Varone (2013).
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and the number of Departments in the national administration reflects 
this. Some of them are quite large and heterogeneous: the head of the 
UVEK (Eidgenössisches Departement für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie 
und Kommunikation) Department is simultaneously Minister for 
Transportation, Minister for Energy, Minister for Communications, and 
Minister for the Environment, and in international negotiations, depend-
ing on subject area, must deal with numerous different colleagues.
In terms of national civil service employment, the DDPS (Defense), at 
30 percent in 2015, accounts for the largest share, followed by the FDF at 
about 25 percent, and the FDFA at about 15 percent (see Table 3.2). The 
other four departments all have less, though the number of employees is 
not directly related to how much that department spends. Thus, the 
FDHA, at about one-quarter, has the largest share, closely followed by the 
FDF; the share of the DDPS (Defense), however, has shrunk, and now 
stands at less than 8 percent.
The real backbone of the national administration is found at the lower 
level, in the Offices and other units associated with a given Department 
(Grisel 1984: 213). The Departments themselves are relatively immobile, 
so governmental activities occurs at these lower levels; in most depart-
ments, the number of such offices and other units have grown in the last 
century (see Table 3.3). Only in the DDPS (Defense), despite its size, can 
one see a countertendency owing to recent changes and reorganization 
efforts. The State Secretariat for Education, Research, and Innovation 
Table 3.2 Personnel (positions) and expenditures (million CHF) by depart-
ments in 2015
Departments Employees 
(absolute)
Employees  
(in %)
Expenditures  
(in million CHF)
Expenditures  
(in %)
FCh 216 0.6 46 0.1
FDFA 5537 15.8 3170 4.8
FDFI 2227 6.3 16,870 25.7
FDJP 2410 6.9 2280 3.5
DDPS 11,670 33.2 4850 7.4
FDF 8681 24.7 16,230 24.7
EAER 2150 6.1 12,220 18.6
DETEC 2232 6.4 10,000 15.2
Total 35,123 100 65,666 100.0
Source: Der Bund kurz erklärt 2017: 42 ff
Note: Entities with large degrees of autonomy (the ETHs formally under the FDHA, FINMA under the 
FDF, or the Competition Commission under the EAER) are not included here
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(SERI) and the ETHs, both previously in the FDHA (Interior), were 
transferred into the newly named Department of Economic Affairs, 
Education, and Research (previously: Federal Department of Economic 
Affairs), and together with the Commission for Technology and Innovation 
(CTI) comprise the new SERI.
The General Secretariats play a significant role in the individual 
Departments. They coordinate the administrative work of or for the Swiss 
parliament and the Federal Council, and serve as the interface between the 
various Offices in a Department and the respective Federal Councilor. In 
doing so, they undertake planning, coordination, consulting, and control-
ling or monitoring tasks, exert influence on personnel and finances, and 
also have the job of communicating messages externally. The individual 
General Secretariats are also responsible for, and provide, other, partly 
department-specific services, including for Presence Switzerland [public 
diplomacy, nation-branding], to aid gender equality, carry out transla-
tions, answer consumer inquiries, and so forth.
Certain areas are not directly under the respective Departments and 
follow a different organizational logic. This includes institutions and 
enterprises located farther afield as well as the ‘militia’ administration. In 
the case of the former, these include the enterprises, institutes, or agencies 
under public law which belong entirely to the Swiss Confederation, some 
of which may even be separate legal entities (e.g., the Swiss Institute for 
Intellectual Property, the two Federal Institutes of Technology [ETH], 
and the Federal Pension Fund [Publica]). Further from the center, one 
finds enterprises under public law or under special provisions in which the 
national government is the sole or majority owner. This includes former 
Table 3.3 Number of offices directly under department heads, 1928 to 2017
Year/department FDFA FDFI FDJP DDPS FDF EAER DEVEC Total
1928 1 7 6 15 7 6 3 45
1959 4 12 6 11 8 6 6 53
1980 5 14 8 7 13 7 7 61
1991 6 11 11 7 11 8 7 61
2001 5 11 11 7 10 8 9 58
2006 6 11 9 7 11 8 7 59
2011 6 12 10 6 11 10 8 63
2017 7 11 12 7 12 10 8 67
Sources: Germann (1996: 49) for 1928–91 and Der Bund kurz erklärt 2017 for 2001, 2006, 2011, and 
2017
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state monopolies, such as the SBB/the Swiss Railway, Ruag Holding, 
Skyguide SA, the Swiss National Accident Insurance Fund SUVA, 
Swisscom, and the Swiss Post (Pasquier and Fivat 2013: 192). This seg-
ment of the Swiss public administration has gradually opened to greater 
competition.
Extra-parliamentary commissions, brought to life by the Federal 
Council or by individual Departments to carry out certain public tasks, are 
counted as part of the ‘militia administration’. Their members are mostly 
not federal civil servants but rather experts, and they are asked to address 
a large range of political and policy tasks. A commission might take the 
form of a board of experts or consultants who offer advice to federal 
administrators, or of interested parties who help with the preliminary 
work for proposed laws, or they might be those parties interested and 
involved in implementing specific policies. One study found 223 commis-
sions of this kind in 2010 (Rebmann and Mach 2013: 167, 170).
Examples of such commissions, which gives an idea of just how broad 
a range of issues this ‘militia administration’ addresses, include the Anti- 
Racism Commission, the Commission for Women’s Issues, the Tobacco 
Control Commission, the Consumer Affairs Commission, the Commission 
for Radiopharmaceuticals, the Regional Planning Council, and the Swiss 
Delegation for the Regulation of Lake of Geneva. Over time, the work of 
some of these commissions can result in creating regulatory authorities 
which themselves may come to play significant roles in the nation’s admin-
istration. Prominent examples include the Competition Commission 
(under the EAER), the Communications Commission (under DETEC), 
FINMA (under the FDF), the Electricity Commission (independent of 
both the DETEC and the Federal Council), or the Swiss Agency for 
Therapeutic Products (affiliated with the FDHA) (Gilardi et  al. 2013: 
203).
Due to the ‘implementation federalism’ (“Vollzugsföderalismus”) which 
is characteristic of the Swiss political system, the cantonal administrations, 
in spatial terms, can be counted part of decentralized administration—at 
least for those public administration tasks which are carried out in com-
mon. This category also includes deconcentrated services provided by the 
national level, for example, the customs directorate.
To some degree, cantonal administrations are analogs of the national 
administration.8 Public tasks and activities are first divided between 
8 For a detailed overview, see Koller (2013).
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Departments (or Directorates) and then distributed among the various 
Offices (or Services). The cantonal administrations are also supported by 
the work of various commissions, with at least some cantons (Graubünden, 
Jura, Luzern, Obwalden, Uri; see Moor 1992: 43) anchoring the exis-
tence of such commissions in their constitutions, at least in part.
In the 1990s, the cantons began to simplify their administrative appa-
ratus. Many cantons dissolved departments previously devoted to military 
or civilian defense, or agriculture, or welfare issues. In some cases, if inte-
rior or justice departments were not closed, they might be consolidated. 
Reorganization of this kind was carried out in nearly all the cantons, 
though at differing levels of intensity and with different results.
Two models have established themselves since 2006, with either seven 
or five equally strongly represented departments. Both cantonal depart-
ments and the cantonal offices below them have seen increased concentra-
tion. The number of cantonal departments has declined, across the 
country, by 33 percent (from 208  in 1990 to 156  in 2008), while the 
number of offices only slightly  increased (by 4 percent from 1070 to 
1110) over the same time period (Koller 2013: 139).
The activities carried out have also seen greater harmonization, reflected 
not least in the nomenclature used. Every canton at this point has an edu-
cation department, one also responsible for science and culture, and every 
canton has a construction, transportation, energy, and environment 
department. Out of 26 cantons, 23 have police and justice departments, 
21 have finance departments, and 19 have health and social welfare 
departments.
Generally speaking, the number of lower-level offices are proportionate 
to the size of the department, with education the largest (227 offices in 
the 26 cantons), followed at considerable distance by the health and social 
welfare departments (132 offices). As at the national level, six cantons 
(Aargau, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen, Solothurn, 
Schwyz) had Interior Departments (as of 2001). One more rarely finds 
offices devoted to newer policy concerns such as the promotion of gender 
equality (nine cantons); only ten cantons have bureaus devoted to inter-
cantonal cooperation and community reform (Koller 2013: 141).
As for the community administrations, there is quite a difference between 
the larger municipalities and the cities. The structure of city administrations 
is very similar to that of the cantonal administration, but due to the charac-
ter of their tasks, they are closer to the citizens and the users of their ser-
vices. Some of the city administrations are larger than the administrations 
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of smaller cantons, whereas the administrations of the smaller municipali-
ties may only consist of a few people.
The president of a community, despite his or her role as primus inter 
pares in a community’s executive or ruling council, also has added compe-
tencies, which in quite a few communities means managing the commu-
nity’s employees. Political and administrative responsibility lies with the 
community’s executive body as a whole, with each executive council mem-
ber responsible for one or more areas—typically construction, finances 
and taxes, public works, social issues, health, schools, security, and the 
official registration of the residents.9 The heads of these departments as a 
rule are only involved in preliminary consultations, or at best in the imple-
mentation of administrative decisions; decision-making power is in the 
hands of the executive council as a whole, or in a sub-committee it dele-
gates to address certain tasks.
Legislative powers in slightly less than 20 percent of the bigger, or 
French-, or Italian-speaking municipalities are in the hands of a local coun-
cil which decides on the budget, public expenditures or projects, and local 
regulations. In the rest of the municipalities, predominantly German- 
speaking, or the rather small ones, most decisions are taken in a local assem-
bly. These gatherings of citizens entitled to vote take place about two or 
three times a year. Prior the vote, typically by a show of hands, the issues at 
stake are open to debate and amendments and changes can be suggested.
Beyond the executive and legislative, communities also have other 
organs at their disposal, in particular commissions which are responsible 
for a very specific sector in the community (e.g., construction, fire preven-
tion, welfare, taxes, schools). On the one hand, they fulfill political pur-
poses, inasmuch as different (political) groups in the community thereby 
have a chance to participate in decision-making. On the other hand, they 
fulfill function related to expertise, inasmuch as the occupational or pro-
fessional skills and knowledge (of individual commission members) can be 
drawn on. As a rule, a member of the community’s executive body pre-
sides over these community commissions, and its members are selected or 
elected by the legislative or the executive if they are not directly elected by 
the citizens, as it is often the case for school commissions.
In addition to community commissions which are granted independent 
administrative powers, communities can also create oversight commis-
sions which examine the work of the administrators and of the executive. 
9 For further details, see Steiner and Kaiser (2013).
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These include audit commissions, finance commissions, and controlling 
commissions.
The community secretary plays a particular, and important, role. As the 
‘chief of staff ’ of the executive, he or she is at the intersection of politics 
and administration. His  or her responsibilities include organizing the 
entire administration of the community, preparing meetings (including of 
the executive council), and advising the political authorities. In 
 communities with part-time executives, he or she may exert a great deal of 
influence on its political affairs.
Since the 1990s, and influenced by New Public Management (NPM) 
ideas calling for a sharper division between strategic (political) and opera-
tive (administrative) levels, various Swiss communities have increased the 
duties of the Gemeindeschreiber so that he directly manages the entire 
community administration. As in other European countries, this gives him 
a position like that of a city manager. In such communities, the executive 
is then responsible for the political decisions, and this city manager equiva-
lent is responsible for implementation (Steiner and Kaiser 2013: 159).
The basic challenge for every administrative organization is both lead-
ership and coordination. The typical form of organizational division used 
in Switzerland leads to structuring the second level down by subject or 
field—education, health, security, planning/construction, culture, and so 
forth. This runs the danger that departments (or directorates at the can-
tonal level or municipal level), owing to a certain degree of egoism, make 
themselves independent, and leave the executive, as a collegial body, hav-
ing to accept the loss of a degree of control (Thom and Ritz 2008). That 
the heads of the various departments (at once also members of an execu-
tive council) may also have different party allegiances may reinforce this 
kind of organizational ‘silo’ culture.
Certain problems are also created for leadership. Though the higher- level 
civil servants are usually experts in their areas and remain for many years at 
their posts, the political careers of members of the executive are typically of 
more limited duration. This is a special issue at the community level, as politi-
cal candidates often have little experience relevant to administering a com-
munity (Geser et  al. 2011). It is also here where reforms, including new 
leadership models developed as part of NPM efforts, underscored by the 
Swiss Government and Administrative Organization Law of 1997, come into 
effect. A genuinely collegial leadership of public administration, based on a 
common perspective shared by all executive council members, has been no 
more possible to achieve (Germann 1996: 53) neither has a forward-looking, 
effects-based steering following political guidelines set out by a legislature.
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3.4  characterIStIcS
Characteristic of administrations in Switzerland is their permeability with 
respect to the private sector, along with the now nearly obsolete status of 
permanent civil servants (Beamtenstatus). There is no particular examina-
tion that needs to be passed to become a civil servant, and the often life- 
long guarantee of continued employment government officials enjoy in 
many countries is an exception in Switzerland. Most cantons and commu-
nities, as well as the national administration, employ or employed a system 
of appointment to office for a specified length of time. According to 
Germann (2011), this reflects a pronounced republicanism, as well as the 
later direct democratic tradition, one alien to the professionalized civil 
services which emerged out of monarchical court administration in other 
countries.
With the new Federal Employment Law, in effect since 2002, the sys-
tem changed from one in which civil servants were employed for four- 
year, renewable, periods to one with open-ended employment. With few 
exceptions (e.g., employees in judicial capacities), all those who work at 
the national level are employed using individual contracts under public 
law which can be canceled by either party. During the 1990s, numerous 
communities and cantons switched to employment relationships under 
public law.10
Nevertheless, in Switzerland, as elsewhere, there is critique of the 
bureaucratic mentality thought to be found among government employ-
ees, and critique of increasing bureaucratization. The perception, at times, 
is of a state which regulates life more and more with the help of a mighty 
administration dictating what the country’s residents have to do. Overall, 
though, residents do not have an antagonistic relationship to administra-
tors per se, and also do not perceive them as an authority deserving exces-
sive respect. The strong degree of decentralization in the country and the 
traditions of direct democracy, coupled with the fiscal sovereignty at each 
political level, results in a rather different relationship of citizen to state 
and public administration than seems to be the case in other countries.
10 In 1997, the Swiss parliament decided to separate postal, telephone, and telegraph enter-
prises (then: PTT), creating the independent entities of the Post and of the Telecom AG 
(since 1998: Swisscom). Swisscom employees had earlier already been changed from that of 
civil servants to being employees under public law. When the new Federal Personnel Act 
came into force, employees of the postal services and of the federal railroads also lost their 
status as civil servants.
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At the community level, people see exactly what is being done with 
their taxes, and they have quite direct ways to influence not only policy but 
also—and in particular—the expenditures of the local authorities. They do 
so with full knowledge that it is through their taxes that these expendi-
tures will be financed. Correspondingly, they do not just let themselves be 
‘managed’ or ‘administered’ but expect good quality, efficiently delivered 
services from ‘their’ community and ‘their’ community employees. Local 
politicians and administrators take this seriously, and make considerable 
efforts to be both transparent and accessible, and this seems to work 
extremely well. Residents in Switzerland, especially when compared with 
other wealthy nation-states like Denmark, Norway, or the Netherlands, 
are not only happier with the avenues open to them to influence policy 
locally, but are also happier with the local provision of services (see Denters 
et al. 2016).
Having part-timers fulfill public mandates contributes to this sense of 
being in touch with the people. Due to how small many communities are, 
but also often as a conscious choice, many public tasks are performed not 
by career administrators but by citizens who also pursue other professions 
(Geser 1981). Swiss often refer to this as a ‘militia’ system, and it reaches 
deep into local administration. In many communities, operational man-
agement also is carried out by elected, but part-time, politicians. Other 
residents, sometimes endowed with the requisite expertise from their ‘real’ 
professions, people the local commissions, and while these might only 
have consultative functions, they can have regulatory or even decision- 
making powers. Here, too, administrative tasks are carried out in the neb-
ulous area between public responsibility and the private sector.
Since the Swiss political system does not function following a pattern of 
parties in government and parties in opposition ready to assume power, 
the politically motivated replacement of top administrators after a success-
ful election, as occurs in the US, is also unknown. The party affiliation of 
top administrators plays a quite small role in Switzerland, allowing for 
greater continuity over time as well as more focus on the subject at hand 
(Krumm 2013: 230). At most, members of the Federal Council might 
select their personal staff or the directors of certain offices based on their 
party affiliation, but because the four most important political parties are 
all permanently represented in the national executive, these parties are also 
all represented in key offices in the national administration. True, for many 
years the Liberals (now: FDP. Die Liberalen) dominated the administrative 
posts, but this party also long dominated Swiss politics. Their  predominant 
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position has weakened, so both the left-wing Social Democratic Party (SP) 
and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) today have numerous 
officials in important civil service positions. Only the right-wing Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP), whose rise to prominence and power (from 12 per-
cent in 1991 to nearly 30 percent by 2015) has been relatively recent, is 
underrepresented in top administrative posts.
There is also a general feeling that a multilingual country should try to 
make sure its major language groups are proportionately represented in 
the civil service, even though this complicates how both administration 
and politics function. Some mitigation comes through federalism and 
community autonomy, since relatively few cities (Biel, Fribourg) or can-
tons (Valais, Fribourg, Bern, Graubünden—4 of 26) face genuine issues 
arising from multilingualism in their jurisdictions. Nearly all communities 
in the country are monolingual, whether in Italian, French, or German; so 
in terms of politics and administration, it is at the national level where 
multilingualism is most addressed and most relevant.
Multilingualism does not mean one can interact with the authorities 
anywhere in the country in one’s own language, or even that one has a 
right to do so. Rather, if a German-speaking family moves to a French- 
speaking part of the country, then French becomes the relevant language 
for interacting with local and cantonal authorities. The right that does 
exist to use one’s own language when dealing with the authorities is one 
that applies, in particular, to dealing with the national-level authorities.
At this national level, more or less successful efforts are undertaken to 
have the civil service mirror the proportion of those who speak a given 
language in the Swiss population. As a result, one finds 71.3 percent 
German-speakers, 21.4 percent French-speakers, 7 percent Italian- 
speakers, and 0.3 percent Romansch-speakers among civil servants at the 
national level, numbers which approximate the native speakers of these 
languages among Swiss (Eidgenössisches Personalamt 2017: 8).
Given this ambition at proportionality, it is perhaps not surprising that 
controversies arise, whether over the underrepresentation in key positions 
of those who speak particular minority languages, over the translation of 
working documents, or about the use of Swiss-German rather than High 
German in informal conversations. At regular intervals, directives are sent 
out in an effort to promote multilingualism.11 As exceedingly few admin-
istrators are perfectly trilingual, the operative practice is that everyone uses 
11 See also Kübler (2013).
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their mother tongue, under the assumption that everyone understands the 
other languages quite well. With three languages and complex problems, 
this can be a challenging standard to meet. The language which ends up 
functionally dominating is High German, though English is threatening 
to replace it and become the new lingua franca.
3.5  reformS and modernIzatIon
The NPM movement reached Switzerland in the 1990s (Lienhard et al. 
2005). Here one should distinguish between reforms which concerned 
the responsibilities for, and the organization of, carrying out public tasks 
and reforms made to internal administrative processes and service delivery 
itself. While all of these are reforms to administration, we can call the first 
external and the second internal (see Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016: 4 
et seq.),
Switzerland has a tradition of outsourcing public tasks, one established 
long before NPM emerged. Beginning in the early twentieth century, 
communities and cantons found numerous ways to fulfill public duties 
with the help of private and semiprivate providers.12 This tradition has 
been strengthened more recently, particularly in areas where the market 
has been liberalized, with examples of such outsourcing including 
Swisscom, the defense industries and military workshops now part of Ruag 
Holding, or the cantonal banks.
At the national level, this trend is manifested in what are called the 
third and fourth circles.13 The third includes enterprises and institutions 
owned by the national government (the ETHs, Swissmedic, etc.) which 
exist due to dedicated legislation. These enterprises and institutions are 
chartered or organized under public law, but do not fall under the provi-
sions of the Federal Budget Act. In the fourth circle, one finds public-
private enterprises or stock companies chartered under specific laws 
which fulfill special national tasks (the national railroads, the postal ser-
vice, Swisscom). This reorganization has led to a reduction in the size of 
the state sector, as understood narrowly (see Germann and Ladner 
2014). At the cantonal level, building insurance and traffic offices have 
12 On this, see Pasquier and Fivat (2013: 190).
13 This model was introduced as part of NPM reforms. It separated the national adminis-
tration into four concentric circles, with the innermost containing the core ministerial 
administration. The second contained the FLAG offices with their performance agreements 
and global budgets. The third circle included the enterprises and institutions under public 
law, while the fourth contained the mixed and private enterprises.
A. LADNER
 61
been outsourced; communities, by the same token, turn relatively often 
to private computer technology, spatial planning, or energy providers.
Administrative reforms in a narrower sense, particularly at the national 
level, also have a certain tradition, and in the past were often part of aus-
terity measures or efforts to increase efficiency. More comprehensive 
reforms initially primarily affected the second circle of the ‘four-circle 
model’ introduced in the 1990s. Offices not primarily involved with polit-
ical coordination, such as general secretaries or cross-departmental agen-
cies, were gradually transformed into a new steering model given the 
acronym FLAG (Führen mit Leistungsauftrag und Globalbudget—Leading 
with Performance Mandates and Global Budgets), with the idea of intro-
ducing a more outcome-oriented form of administration providing more 
operative freedom. The differentiation between first and second circles 
was eliminated as of the beginning of 2017, and in introducing a new, 
comprehensive leadership model in the national civil service (the German 
acronym for which is NFB), a format very close to the NPM model is now 
operating. Administration and leadership are now goal and outcome- 
oriented, and both transparency and controllability are to be improved at 
all levels.
During the 1990s, a crisis in public financing, and changes to the eco-
nomic and ideological environment led to radical administrative reforms 
in many cantons, including abolishing the tenure of civil servants, intro-
ducing NPM reforms, or reorganizing administrative departments 
(Germann and Ladner 2014). At the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, more than half the cantons use elements of NPM, most of them 
across all administrative areas (as in the Aargau, Bern, Luzern, Solothurn, 
Thurgau, and Zürich).
Efforts to modernize administration were also undertaken in the com-
munities in the 1990s, in part, in response to what NPM called for. 
However, such changes tended to be carried out in the largest communi-
ties, and only rarely were core elements of NPM, such as outcome- oriented 
steering and the reorganization of the different public activities in the 
form of products or group of products, which can be quantitatively mea-
sured and which have a fixed price, introduced (see Ladner 2016).
The concepts and the goals of these reforms, which replace the inter-
ventionist and performance-oriented state model through a ‘guarantee-
ing’ state notion, were not fundamentally new to Switzerland, nor was the 
suggestion contained in these NPM and governance models that public 
service and tasks could or ought to be provided through greater private 
sector involvement. In fact, many smaller nation-states have traditions of 
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public-private cooperation and negotiating political solutions across party 
lines (Lijphart 1999). Noteworthy in Switzerland are the mixed or para- 
state solutions governments find, making the state appear quite lean 
despite the density of public services provided.
The Swiss state is certainly liberal in the classical sense, but it has little 
in common with the minimalist state. It is not that governmental tasks are 
not carried out. It is instead that they are carried out in other ways and, 
most particularly, not with the help of a central state apparatus. As history 
shows, this is not just the product of a consciously chosen strategy, but was 
in the end, and given the country’s cultural differences and the absence of 
strong, centralized power, the only way a national Swiss state could 
emerge. This was augmented by appropriate political institutions which 
shared power both between the cantons and between the cantons and the 
Confederation (federalism), between the parties (‘concordance’), and 
between the people and the political authorities (direct democracy). All 
these elements make it difficult to engage in grand and transformative 
political or administrative acts. The reforms the international literature 
calls for, however, are not completely unfamiliar to the Swiss administra-
tive system. With its traditionally decentralized form and in light of the 
services already provided in partnership with the private sector, Swiss pub-
lic administration is more modern than is often thought.
3.6  SwISS publIc admInIStratIon In ItS 
InternatIonal context
The Swiss system of public administration was long ignored in compara-
tive studies,14 and in light of the country’s small size and minor interna-
tional importance, this is understandable. But given the country capacities 
and capabilities, the high degree of acceptance its civil service enjoys in the 
population, and how accessible its public administration is, it stands as a 
model that could well be of interest outside its borders.
When the Swiss public administration is included in models, as in 
Kuhlmann und Wollmann’s 2013 study, then it is seen as an example of a 
continental European federalist nation-state, along with Germany and 
Austria. This sets it apart from the administrative systems found in France, 
Italy, or Spain (continental European Napoleonic), in Great Britain (the 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ or English-speaking world), or Denmark and Sweden 
(Scandinavian).
14 For more detail, see Giauque (2013).
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This can certainly be justified but only up to a point. Like them, 
Switzerland is federalist as well as a constitutional state under Roman law. 
Decentralization and a commitment to the principle of subsidiarity are 
also in common, though the latter is more pronounced in Switzerland.
What is far more alien to the Swiss case are traditions engendered by a 
hierarchical Prussian state (out of which German state administration 
grew) or by an imperial dual monarchy (which Austrian public administra-
tion has struggled to overcome). There are also differences with respect to 
public officials. Germany and Austria traditionally regarded their officials 
as ‘servants of the state’ who occupied a place above society (Kuhlmann 
and Wollmann 2013: 26). In Switzerland, civil servants are more often 
seen as ‘employees of the people’. The boundary between public and pri-
vate professional roles is more porous in Swiss administrations, and ‘the 
state’ has been regarded far less as a lordly, superior authority than in 
Austria or Germany. The acceptance of diversity, coupled with adamant 
assertions about cantonal sovereignty and community autonomy, together 
with strong elements of fiscal federalism, also sets Switzerland apart from 
its neighbors.
There are a number of parallels with the administrative systems one 
finds in Scandinavia. These include an openness toward public employees 
with respect to recruitment and career, as well as an openness toward the 
citizenry with respect to transparency, citizen participation, and a kind of 
‘user democracy’. The Swiss also would seem to have some affinities with 
the liberal, utilitarian understanding of government found in the English- 
speaking world: the government is seen as one which acts, rather than as 
one whose existence is of ‘inherent value’ (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 
2013: 27). If one puts all these differences (vis-à-vis Switzerland’s German- 
speaking neighbors) and similarities (with Scandinavia or with England) 
together, then one can with good reason refer to the Swiss system as a 
hybrid model (Giauque 2013).
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CHAPTER 4
The Law and the Principle of Legality
Sophie Weerts
4.1  IntroductIon
In the European legal tradition, the law embodies the privileged instru-
ment of public action since the emergence of the modern state. Its legiti-
macy comes from its author—a democratic organ—its content—its 
presumed rationality—and its formalism—its procedure of adoption and 
publication. Nevertheless, since the 1990s, social transformations occurred 
and blurred the concepts of law and state. The foundations of administra-
tive law are particularly involved (Mockle 2007; Caillosse 2015). The 
law—taken broadly—sees its field of intervention competing with non-
obligatory instruments that bring out the idea of ‘soft law’. Such a phe-
nomenon questions what lawyers call the sources of law (Hachez et  al. 
2010). As for the state, traditionally described by models of liberal state 
and then social state, fits the model of the ‘propulsive state’ (Morand 
1991) or the ‘state - resource manager’ (Moor 2005: 63) better. Sovereign 
powers and social competencies are no longer the main concepts used to 
analyze the state’s actions. A more dynamic concept of public policy has 
been adopted in which the law takes different forms of normativity. These 
two trends indicate a general transformation of the law.
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More specifically, in the field of statute law, more and more legal norms 
are generated by the executive branch. The democratic legitimacy of the 
law is also called into question when international rules are the basis of 
public action. Private bodies adopt standards which sometimes are later 
included in the law (Uhlmann 2013). This evolution highlights a shift in 
the center of gravity of power that is no longer located in the (representa-
tive) democratic body. Normative instruments which are less formalized, 
such as soft law, are emerging as a new category in the typology of (for-
mal) sources of law. Finally, the infallibility of the law has been questioned 
with the development of constitutional justice. From the point of view of 
legal science, some identify the beginnings of a global administrative law 
(Kingsbury et al. 2005). Others consider that the principle of legality must 
be revisited (Popelier 2012: 48–54).
In Switzerland, all state activities are based on, and limited by, law (Art. 
5 (1), Federal Constitution, abbreviated as Const.). Nevertheless, the defi-
nition of the word law is not easy to grasp and does not always fit perfectly 
with the idea of statutory law. Since the 1990s, Swiss legal scholars have 
worked on the issue of the law, noting the contextual and structural trans-
formations of state activities (see Moor 1990, 2005; Morand 1991; Müller 
2006; Flückiger 2007, 2008).
The following four chapters address many of the issues surrounding the 
figures of the law. Chapter 5 presents a particular stage in the formation of 
the law: the pre-parliamentary phase. It evokes the hypothesis of the shift 
of the center of gravity of the parliamentary to executive power and pres-
ents the ‘compensation mechanisms’ that have been instituted in Swiss 
law. Chapter 6 deals with the development of international law. Here, the 
federal administration plays an important role in maintaining the coher-
ence of the Swiss legal system and making it congruent with its interna-
tional commitments, while respecting the exercise of political (or popular) 
rights. Chapter 7 examines the phenomenon of soft law in Swiss public 
law and shows how this mode of public action developed with respect to 
legislation (the main formal sources of law, called ‘hard law’). Finally, the 
last chapter addresses one of the singularities of Swiss public law: its lim-
ited ability to review the constitutionality of laws. Each of these chapters 
addresses the challenges faced by Swiss law and, in turn, challenges for the 
public administration which must act within the framework and the limits 
of the law.
In that context, some basic legal notions are worth presenting. A first 
one is the understanding of the concept of law (in Swiss law) (Sect. 4.1). 
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Indeed, from the strictly legal point of view, it constitutes the first formal 
source of law within the meaning of Article 1 of the preliminary title of the 
Civil Code and is understood as written law (statute law). Its corollary is 
the principle of legality (Sect. 4.2), which is essential in all the activities of 
the state as stated in Article 5 (1), Const. Both are indispensable for 
understanding the main features of the legal framework Swiss public 
administration acts within.
4.2  the Law
The law takes many forms which vary according to legal traditions. In the 
continental legal tradition, the law is defined as any general and abstract 
rule resulting from a collective will and endowed with binding force. It 
corresponds to the idea of legislation. Strictly speaking, it is defined as the 
acts adopted by the legislative branch (primary legislation), as opposed to 
the acts (statutory instruments) adopted within the framework of the 
executive branch and by the administrative authorities (delegated or sec-
ondary legislation). This distinction echoes the notions of formal law and 
material law, formulated by German constitutional theory (Sect. 4.2.1). 
Both are found in Swiss law, which also makes another crucial difference 
between ‘legal rule’ and ‘decision’ (Sect. 4.2.2). Finally, even if some ele-
ments indicate the emergence of a more flexible law (see the chapter by 
Flückiger), a series of procedural mechanisms also shows the strengthen-
ing of the democratic legitimacy of the legal norms (Sect. 4.2.3).
4.2.1  The Distinction Between Formal Law and Material Law
The distinction between formal and material law has its origin in German 
constitutional theory (Popelier 2012: 19 et seq). It allowed the Prince’s 
power to be limited by defining the areas in which he needed to have the 
support of Parliament. In France, a different conception of the law devel-
oped after 1789: the law only rests on the institutions that collectively 
exercise the legislative function. The government then exercises the execu-
tive function and adopts acts to put the law in action. In the French case, 
the idea of material law was thus not conceivable. In both cases, the 
explanatory criterion, therefore, lies in the democratic legitimacy of formal 
law. This is produced by a democratic body, Parliament. This legitimacy 
justifies its pre-eminence over the acts of government or administrative 
authorities.
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Formal law, however, competes with other sources. International trea-
ties, European law, or the use of delegated legislation for the benefit of 
executive authorities are all expressions of a form of law which is no longer 
the result of the deliberate will of a parliament. They embody the concept 
of material law. In the field of fundamental rights, the European Convention 
on Human Rights allows restrictions if they are made in accordance with 
or prescribed by the law (Art. 8 (2), 9 (2), 10 (2) and 11 (2) ECHR). In 
its case law, the European Court of Human Rights has nevertheless not 
made the formal character of the law a condition for a restriction to be 
valid. It considers that an act corresponds to a law, within the meaning of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, on four conditions: it con-
stitutes a legal basis for public action, it is accessible to all, the conse-
quences of the law must be foreseeable and the law must, if the act is 
accessible to individuals, be formulated in precise terms to allow everyone 
to predict the consequences of their actions (ECHR, Sunday Times vs. The 
United Kingdom, 1979). Two exceptions, however, are well known. The 
first is Article 6 ECHR, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. In this 
framework, jurisdiction must be established by legislation to ensure that 
an individual is not subject to the discretion of the executive. The second 
is when a national constitution requires that a matter be regulated by leg-
islation (see Popelier: 26–28).
The determination of the form of law is an important element in Swiss 
public administration, as any public action involves defining an action 
tool. However, the distinction between formal and substantive law is also 
present in Swiss law (Auer et al. 2006: 88 et seq). Indeed, several consti-
tutional provisions require the adopting of a law. This varies according to 
subject, but also according to the degree of restriction of the autonomy of 
an individual. The general requirement of a law, for example, is laid out in 
the context of any restriction of fundamental rights. It is listed in Article 
36 (1) Const. The statutory requirement is also stated in Article 164 
Const. for federal legislation in general. In both cases, the idea of law is a 
two-way street. Depending on the circumstances, it is either an act adopted 
by Parliament or an act adopted by an authority empowered to decide. In 
the fields of taxation—according to the principle of ‘no taxation without 
representation’—(Art.127 (1) Const.), access to justice (Arts. 29a and 30 
Const.) and deprivation of liberty (Art. 31 (1) Const.), the requirement of 
a law is understood within the meaning of formal law. The extent to which 
individual autonomy, the keystone of the liberal state, is undermined or at 
risk justifies the public action being taken by a democratically elected 
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body. It should be added that Swiss law does provide for an exception to 
the legal requirement: the general police clause. This clause allows the 
government to act without any legal basis, and to limit fundamental rights, 
in the event of preventing or putting an end to a serious and imminent 
infringement of public order (Aubert and Mahon 2003: 325).
4.2.2  The Legal Rule as a Criterion for Distinguishing 
the Legislation
Between German and French conceptions previously described, Swiss law 
follows the German tradition. The legislative function can be exercised by 
the parliament, the people and the executive branch (the Federal Council). 
The word law—formal law—is reserved for acts adopted by Parliament, 
possibly with the support of the people. However, the parliament can also 
adopt ordinances just like the Federal Council. In other words, it is not 
the author of the legal norms that qualifies the legal act but the content of 
it.
In Swiss law, when referring to legislation, the determining factor is the 
legal rules. The notion of a legal rule is defined in Art. 22 (4) of the 
Federal Act of the Federal Assembly. It refers to the norms of a general and 
abstract scope addressed to a circle of recipients who are not defined in a 
precise way (Federal Office of Justice 2007: 229). This could concern all 
citizens or all motorists. The rule applies to general cases, for example, all 
instances of speeding, or all taxable income. It is called on to be applied in 
a repetitive way, that is to say, whenever situations appear which corre-
spond to its abstract hypothesis. It is intended to be sustainable and is 
presumed stable. These characteristics of generality and stability are key 
elements in ensuring ‘legal certainty’ for members of society. Indeed, they 
allow recipients to predict their actions and the consequences thereof.
However, any act adopted within the framework of public administra-
tion is not necessarily a legislative act or a legal rule. If the norm is not 
general and abstract, then it is called a ‘decision’. In this case, the act set-
tles an individual and concrete case. This distinction between legal rule 
and decision constitutes a fundamental element for the understanding of 
public administration and Swiss public law in general (see the chapter by 
Mahon). Indeed, this distinction carries many consequences in terms of 
the authority’s competence, the means of appeal, the mode of communi-
cation of the act (official publication of the legislation and notification of 
the decision) or information contained in the act. In addition, the 
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 distinction between the two notions is not always easy to identify. Some 
urban plans are ambivalent acts with a scope that exceeds the individual, 
without being of general scope. When the public authority is in doubt as 
to the form of the law it intends to adopt, it must consider whether, to 
produce its effects, a legal act still needs to be concretized by individual 
acts; if so, the legal act to be adopted has an indeterminate scope that is 
characteristic of a legal rule (Federal Office of Justice 2007: 230).
Where the public authorities have to act by legal rules, the form may 
still vary. At the federal level, it can take the form of a law or ordinance. 
The Federal Assembly has the power to adopt laws and ordinances (Art. 
163 (1) Const.). It also participates in the ratification of international trea-
ties (Art. 141a Const, see the chapter by Weerts and Sofia). Among all 
these acts, it is the norms that are qualified as ‘important’ that must take 
the form of a law. The Constitution states that this concerns the rules 
relating to the exercise of political rights, the restrictions on constitutional 
rights, the rights and obligations of persons, the fiscal field, the tasks and 
services of the Confederation, the obligations of the cantons in the imple-
mentation and enforcement of federal law and the organization of the 
procedure of the federal authorities (Art. 164 (1) Const.). Norms that do 
not have such a fundamental dimension for individuals or for federal activ-
ities can then take the form of an ordinance, which can be passed by the 
Federal Assembly but also by the Federal Council and the federal admin-
istration (departments and offices).
At the federal level, the author of the legislation is either the Parliament 
or the Federal Council. The most important legislative body is, of course, 
the Federal Assembly, which is composed of two elected chambers. Laws 
adopted by the Federal Assembly may still be submitted to a legislative 
referendum within 100 days of publication in the Federal Gazette (Art. 
141 (1) Const.). In this case, the people participate in the adoption of the 
law. The Federal Assembly also adopts ordinances. For that, it must draw 
its competence from the Constitution or the law. All acts adopted by the 
Federal Assembly are not necessarily legal rules. It can adopt decrees as 
well. These acts have no normative scope. This form of act is used notably 
for acts which concern the Federal Assembly. The decree is also the legal 
act adopted by the Federal Assembly in the framework of the ratification 
process of international law. Depending on the type of treaties ratified, the 
decree can be submitted to a legislative referendum (see the chapter by 
Weerts and Sofia). The Federal Council is the second legislative body. It 
has the power to enact ordinances, which extend the rules contained in 
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the primary law (Art. 182 Const.). It may also be empowered to adopt 
so-called substitution orders. In this case, it must have been given the 
power to legislate under the Constitution or the law. Finally, the Federal 
Council can also delegate to the departments of the federal administration 
the power to enact rules of law (Art. 48 (1) Government and Administration 
Organization Act).
Once the form and the author of the law have been determined and the 
content has been set in accordance with legislative procedures, the act 
produces legal effects as long as it is known by everyone. This requirement 
presupposes a condition of publication and directly shapes the democratic 
and liberal state (Hangartner 2008). Under Swiss law, the legislation—
domestic law as well as international treaties—is published in the official 
compendium of federal law (Recueil officiel). At the same time, it is gath-
ered by subject in a systematic collection (Recueil signalétique), which 
facilitates access to legislation and allows everyone to see the state of the 
law in force. The publication requirement allows everyone to anticipate 
the consequences of their activity and to comply with the law. For this 
purpose, the entry into force does not coincide in principle with the date 
of publication, except for the constitutional provisions (Art. 195 Const.). 
In essence, publication must take place at least five days before the entry 
into force of the law (Art. 7, Publications Act). The decision to enter into 
force usually belongs to the Federal Council, but it may also have been 
included in the legislative act itself. For international treaties, it is the 
treaty itself that contains its own rules of entry into force (Mader 2013: 
258–259).
These different elements show that in Swiss public law, the notion of a 
legislative act encompasses the concepts of formal and material laws. It 
does not follow the institutional distinction between parliament and gov-
ernment. Thus, the type of legislative acts is not determined according to 
its author but according to its object. Finally, in all cases, legislative acts 
must comply with formal requirements.
4.2.3  Strengthening the Procedural Dimension of the Law
While it is generally observed that the formal law is losing ground in favor 
of a substantive conception of the law, Swiss public law has mechanisms 
and practices that reinforce the procedural dimension of the legislation. 
From this point of view, these mechanisms and practices reflect an attach-
ment to the law as the first formal source of law, which can also be seen in 
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the principle of the immunity clause in the framework of constitutional 
review (see the chapter by Mahon). These mechanisms and practices illus-
trate a trend toward an increasing ‘proceduralization’ of legislation. This 
can be analyzed as a strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of the law. 
It accentuates the symbolic value of the law, at the risk of being more 
focused on a purely formal and non-substantive approach to law. Two ele-
ments are a part of such a trend. On the one hand, there is the dissemina-
tion of a genuine ‘culture of lawmaking’ through the federal administration 
and, on the other hand, the tools of direct democracy.
4.2.3.1  The Culture of Lawmaking
Switzerland has several instruments to ensure the quality of its legislation. 
All these instruments represent a culture of lawmaking, which can be 
defined as ‘an (applied) science of legislation that seeks to determine the 
best ways of developing, enacting and applying legal norms’ (Chevallier 
1998: 15). It addresses the fundamental question of what good law is, a 
classic theme in the philosophy of law. This concern has become an impor-
tant aspect of legislative activity when the law is analyzed as one of the 
resources available to implement state activity in terms of enacted public 
policies (Knoepfel 2017: 142 et seq.). Several elements can be identified in 
Swiss public law and public administration as illustrating this approach. 
Some belong to ‘formal lawmaking’, others are a part of ‘material lawmak-
ing’ and both improve the formal and the substantive dimensions of law.
The purpose of drafting formal law is to improve editorial quality and 
legislative technique. Among the instruments available to Swiss public 
administration in this area are internal instructions or recommendations of 
the administration. Another aspect that fits into a culture of drafting formal 
law is the training of lawyers. Although the drafting of the law is traditionally 
the prerogative of lawyers, only a few law schools offer courses in drafting 
law. Such training has therefore been set up in the federal administration and 
is also open to those without previous legal training. Federal civil servants 
thus have access to training combining theory and practice, which simulta-
neously allows the development of a network for sharing experiences. A 
Swiss Society of Legislation has been created and, under its mandate, three 
universities offer several courses open to lawyers from cantonal and com-
munity administrations. A Legislation Forum has also been created. It is 
now a network active throughout the executive branch that allows for a 
fruitful sharing of experiences and which publishes a triennial newsletter.
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The purpose of material lawmaking is to improve the law’s ability to act on 
social reality. In Switzerland, it is implemented through legislative evaluation, 
since following Art. 170 Const., the Confederation must assess federal mea-
sures with regard to their effectiveness (Flückiger: 2007). This generalized 
what had already been practiced in implementing asylum policies or in efforts 
to combat inequalities, be it against women or people with disabilities (Mader 
2015: 69).
The consultation procedure (Art. 147 Const., see the chapter by Guy- 
Ecabert) constitutes a means of acting on the formal as well as the substan-
tive quality of the law. It enables cantons, political parties and interested 
parties to comment on important legislative acts. It has acquired a certain 
importance and several qualities are attributed to it (Mader 2013: 
255–256). It expands the collection of information about a proposed leg-
islative project, helping to promote greater relevance of the legislative 
project to social problems, and likely bringing greater legitimacy to it. It is 
also hoped that the consultation process will foster consensus among 
political actors, and makes it possible to test the practicability of the pro-
posal with those who will implement it, namely the cantons. In any case, 
it promotes a process of learning and information to the public when 
details about the consultation are publicized.
These different elements contribute to strengthening the quality of the 
law. They are mobilized when the legislative process is initiated by the 
executive branch, but also—in the case of legislative evaluation—ex post 
facto. They are grouped into legislative guides (Flückiger and Guy- Ecabert: 
2008). These include not only editorial guidelines but also quality stan-
dards, methods of codification or consolidation of the law and a periodic 
review of legislation. However, they remain imperfect. Indeed, they are of 
little use when the legislative process comes from the parliamentary or 
popular initiatives. In terms of substantive law, it is not sufficiently inte-
grated by lawyers in administrative or judicial positions. Indeed, the qual-
ity of the law is mainly considered with regard to social or economic 
objectives. It leaves aside social justice dimensions, that is to say its capacity 
to participate in the realization of constitutional values such as respect for 
the rule of law, fundamental rights, democracy and federalism, which are 
part of the law as well and a keystone of liberal democratic states.
4.2.3.2  Instruments of Direct Democracy
The extension of political rights (or ‘popular rights’) is the second element 
reinforcing the procedural dimension of the law. They allow citizens to par-
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ticipate in decision-making through voting. In Switzerland, popular rights 
are provided at federal, cantonal and communal levels. At the federal level, 
they have been progressively expanded. They were first instituted with the 
constitutional referendum (since 1848), then the optional legislative refer-
endum (1874), the constitutional initiative (1891) and finally the referen-
dum on international treaties (implemented progressively in 1921, 1977 
and 2003; see Chap. 6, Weerts and Sofia). Their use strengthens the demo-
cratic legitimacy of legislative acts, which were historically derived, at the 
federal level, from their adoption by democratically elected institutions.
At the federal level, the participation of the people in the legislative 
process varies according to the form of the legal act (Art. 138–142, 193, 
194 Const.), of which there are three categories: the constitution, the law 
and the decrees ratifying the texts of international law. The procedure for 
popular participation varies according to the form of the legislative act. In 
some cases, the people must participate in the legislative process, in a 
broad sense, when there is a mandatory referendum. In other cases, peo-
ple can intervene in the legislative process (optional referendum).
The procedural requirements are laid out in the Federal Constitution 
and in the Federal Act on Political Rights (Art. 68 to 76, Political Rights 
Act). The number of signatures required is set by the Federal Constitution. 
The referendum is obligatory in the case of revisions of the Constitution 
and accession to international organizations. These call for a dual majority, 
of both the voters and the cantons. In this case, there is no requirement to 
collect signatures (Auer et al. 2013: 810–819). At the constitutional level, 
people can also propose changes by using the ‘popular initiative’ (Art. 138 
and 139 Const.). If they collect the signatures of 100,000 eligible voters, 
a vote has to be organized within 18 months after the official publication 
of their initiative. The optional referendum can be triggered with regard 
to federal laws but also relative to the ratification of international treaties 
(Art. 141 (1) Const.; Art. 59 to 67 Political Rights Act). A vote will be 
held if 50,000 eligible voters or eight cantons request it within 100 days 
of the official publication of a federal law (Art. 141 (1) lit. a Const.).
Since 1848, 617 federal votes (referenda and initiatives) have been 
held.1 Since 1970, their frequency has increased. They peaked between 
1 Federal Statistical Office, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/poli-
tique/votations.html#1384097411 (consulted on April 5, 2018).
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1990 and 1999, achieving a number of 100 votes.2 In such a trend, one 
instrument has been very successful: the popular initiative. Thirty-nine of 
these latter have already been addressed between 2010 and 20183 (Federal 
Chancellery: 2018). This trend indicates an increasing participation of 
citizens in setting the political agenda, even if such a participation is mainly 
activated by political parties.
4.3  the PrIncIPLe of LegaLIty
The other figure of the law is embodied in the principle of legality. This 
principle is enshrined in Article 5 (1) of the Federal Constitution and 
reads: ‘all activities of the state are based on and limited by law’. The other 
paragraphs of this Article require the Confederation and the cantons to act 
or respect the principles of public interest and of proportionality (2), the 
principle of good faith (3) and international law (4). All these elements are 
described as constituting the rule of law.
Before its 1999 revision, this principle of legality was not explicitly 
stated in the constitutional text. However, it already guided the action of 
the state, having the form of an ‘unwritten constitutional principle’ unani-
mously recognized by doctrine and jurisprudence (Federal Council 1997: 
133), and having a binding value recognized by all. This is not the only 
unwritten constitutional principle: not all laws, or all legal principles, are 
contained in written acts.
The function of the principle of legality is to limit and regulate the 
activities of the state. For individuals, the principle of legality is an impor-
tant element in terms of legal certainty and equal treatment. The legal 
doctrine (Aubert and Mahon 2003: 41) considers that all collectivities and 
public institutions are intended. It is thus aimed at the Confederation, the 
cantons, the communes, but also all the individuals who assume, by 
 delegation, tasks of the state. In addition, the principle applies to all activi-
ties of the state, meaning not only activities that limit the rights of indi-
viduals but also those that provide benefits to individuals or activities 
related to state organization (Tanquerel 2011: 152).
2 Federal Statistical Office, ‘Évolution de la participation aux votations populaires fédérales’. 
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/politique/votations/participation.
assetdetail.3602769.html. Bern: Swiss Confederation (consulted on April 5, 2018).
3 Federal Chancellery, ‘Initiatives populaires ayant fait l’objet d’une votation’. https://
www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis_2_2_5_7.html#. Bern: Swiss Confederation (con-
sulted on April 5, 2018).
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In Swiss law, the principle of legality contains two aspects (Federal 
Council 1997: 133). The first aspect is called the ‘primacy of the law’ 
(Sect. 4.3.1); the second is the ‘reserve of the law’ (Sect. 4.3.2). These 
two aspects mean that the principle of legality embodies the formal dimen-
sion of the rule of law (Epiney 2015: 93).
4.3.1  The ‘Primacy of the Law’ and Its Corollary, the Hierarchy 
of Norms
The ‘primacy of the law’ aspect means that the public administration must 
respect the law. This requirement applies to all laws, formal and material 
and to all activities. Such an affirmation must be understood in the light of 
the hierarchy of norms.
Simply put, the hierarchy of norms means that lower-level acts are sub-
ordinate to superior acts, thus putting the legal system in order. This sub-
ordination implies that every act of public administration respects the 
higher standards. The hierarchy is first of all between the legal orders 
(international law/domestic law) and then within each legal order. Thus, 
a ‘decision’ must respect a ‘material law’ and this one must in turn respect 
a ‘formal law’. It should be noted, however, that legal norms have become 
more complex and call into question the idea of a well-ordered hierarchy. 
Without going into this debate, it can be noted that the ordering of the 
legal system is built on the basis of a combination of legal rules enshrined 
in the Federal Constitution and rules of interpretation (Haller 2016: 
20–26; Mahon 2014: 65–68).
A series of legal acts can be identified. First, there is the Constitution 
itself, which is adopted on the basis of a particular procedure (Art. 192 to 
195 Const.). Then the Constitution designates several legal acts which 
have a federal rank such as statutes (Art. 164 Const.), ordinances and 
orders. Some of the ordinances are adopted by the Federal Assembly (Art. 
163 Const.) and others are adopted by the Federal Council (Art. 182 
Const.). Laws and ordinances constitute the essence of domestic law. In a 
federal system, the legal system also has several subsystems. There is can-
tonal law (Article 49 Const.). Each canton has a constitution, which in 
turn sets its list of legislative acts. Thus, within each canton, there are 
laws—formal law—and decrees or ordinances—material law. Municipal 
law is still a third tier of the Swiss legal system (Art. 50 Const.). All these 
federal, cantonal and communal rules are adopted unilaterally. However, 
Swiss law also has legislative acts that are adopted in a contractual sense. 
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Among these rules, there are ‘intercantonal concordats’ (see Chaps. 1 and 
2 by Ladner). This form of acts does not belong to cantonal law. It is also 
not included in federal law, although the Confederation can also—within 
the limits of its powers—participate in these concordats (Art. 48 para. 2 
Const.). Swiss law also incorporates rules of international law. Some are 
negotiated and adopted between states and take the form of bilateral or 
multilateral conventions and treaties. As for European regulations and 
directives, they are generally taken up through the practice of autonomous 
adaptation. Switzerland creates standards equivalent to European law, 
these European-inspired standards thus taking the legislative forms of clas-
sical federal law.
The Swiss Federal Constitution does not provide for a general rule of 
organization or articulation between all these legal norms. Several ele-
ments, however, make it possible to reconstruct the matrix of the Swiss 
legal system.
First, from the point of view of international law, every state party to a 
treaty is bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda (‘agreements must 
be kept’). This customary principle is declined in Art. 26, 27 and 46 (1) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It requires the state 
which is a party to a treaty to respect its international obligations, regard-
less of its domestic law. In other words, international law imposes the 
primacy of international law on the signatory state that has ratified rules of 
international law.
The Constitution provides also several indications of its commitment to 
the respect of international law. Articles 139 (3), 193 (4), and 194 (2) 
Const. indicate that popular initiatives must respect the imperative rules of 
international law (jus cogens or ‘compelling law’). In addition, Article 5 (4) 
indicates that the Confederation and the cantons respect international law. 
Nevertheless, this does not follow the wording of Article 46 (1) Const. 
according to which federal law takes precedence over cantonal law. This 
choice of wording is analyzed as the result of a political compromise 
(Mahon 2014: 48–49). The case law of the Federal Court (the Schubert 
case), which had not been consistent on the principle of primacy of federal 
law over domestic law, explains such a nuance. Since then, however, the 
Federal Tribunal has been consistent in favor of the primacy of  international 
law. The principle of the primacy of federal law flows from the very nature 
of the international rule, hierarchically superior to any internal rule 
(Federal Supreme Court: ATF 131 V 66). In 2012, it indicated that inter-
national law takes precedence over domestic law (Federal Supreme Court: 
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ATF 139 I 16), without addressing a rigid clause of precedent rule (Keller 
and Balazs-Hegedüs 2016: 717).
However, the question of the primacy of international law over 
domestic law is a subject of intense political discussions. By virtue of 
their sovereignty, states may decide to denounce their commitments, but 
they will take the risk of threatening their international credibility with 
their partners (Keller and Balazs-Hegedüs 2016: 719). If they violate 
their international obligations, they then engage their international 
responsibility (Kolb 2016: 572–573).
Within the Swiss legal system, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
federal level and the cantonal level. Federal law—Constitution, federal 
laws and ordinances—prevails over cantonal law (Art. 46 para.1 Const.). 
Within each level, there are also hierarchical rules according to the type of 
standards. Thus, the constitution prevails over the law. The supremacy of 
the Constitution stems from the fact that the other rules of domestic law 
have their source in the Federal Constitution, which is pre-eminent over 
other sources of law. Laws are formulated on the basis of the Constitution 
and they are implemented by the ordinance (Art. 182 Const.).
Courts and legal scholars have developed interpretative methods. The 
first of them, deduced from the above-mentioned constitutional rules, 
derives from the maxim lex superior derogat legi inferiori (‘a law higher in 
the hierarchy displaces a lower law’). The two others apply in the context 
of conflict between standards of the same level. The first provides that the 
special rule derogates from the general rule and the second implies that 
the subsequent rule derogates from the previous rule. The method of 
interpretation in conformity with the Constitution is also used by the 
judge to develop an interpretation of the legal norm in line with the values 
of the constitution.
All of these provisions and rules of interpretation help lawyers to main-
tain, as far as possible, coherence between the legal norms within the Swiss 
legal order.
4.3.2  The Requirement of a Legal Basis
The second aspect of the principle of legality is generally named as the 
‘reserve of the law’. This is the principle of requirement of the legal basis 
and means that, except in cases of force majeure, any state activities must 
be based on a legal rule (Schindler 2014: 118). This aspect of the principle 
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of legality allows individuals to foresee the consequences of their actions 
but also guarantees they will be treated equally.
The requirement of a legal basis can take the form of a formal law but 
also of a material law. However, it is in this dimension that the principle of 
legality presents its most flexible aspect, thus being able to fit the contours 
and specificities of public administration.
As noted above, the choice of the legal basis will depend on the type of 
intervention. In some areas, such as criminal law or questions of taxation, 
formal law is a condition for the state’s action. In other areas, material law 
is sufficient. In the event of restricting personal freedom, the greater the 
degree of infringement, the higher the legislative quality of the rule.
If the legal basis is material law, its legal quality will be assessed accord-
ing to its accuracy. This element makes it possible to assess the degree of 
predictability of the law for the citizen. However, practice shows that the 
degree of accuracy is a criterion that can be easily achieved. This flexibility 
is accepted on the grounds that, on the one hand, the legislator cannot 
foresee everything, and, on the other hand, it is also up to the judge to 
give a more precise content to the legal basis. It is the elements of the 
hypothesis of application that will then make it possible to determine the 
degree of precision of the legal rule. In general, the more numerous the 
persons targeted by the norm, the greater the infringements on personal 
freedom, the more likely the situations concerned, the more important the 
accuracy of the norm must be (Tanquerel 2011: 158).
4.4  concLusIon
The aim of this chapter was to introduce two basic legal notions of Swiss 
law, both crucial for public administration: the law and the principle of 
legality. Starting with the concept of law, it showed that the law does not 
only consist in written laws adopted by Parliament (formal law), but 
includes norms adopted by the executive branch and public authorities 
(material law). The two aspects (‘primacy of law’ and ‘requirement of legal 
basis’) of the principle of legality each refer to the law as well. Their 
description made it clear that formal and material laws are part of the Swiss 
law. In the Federal Council’s message on the total revision of the 
Constitution, the term law was defined as referring to the Constitution, 
the law and ordinances (Federal Council 1997: 134).
Nevertheless, the law implicitly referred to rules of conflict between 
norms established by legal doctrine and jurisprudence (Federal Council 
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1997: 134). In other words, law also referred to something which was not 
explicitly included in legislation. On this point, another example shows 
that Swiss law is not limited to statutory law. In the framework of revising 
the Federal Constitution in 1999, described as a ‘fundamental reform’ and 
an ‘update’ of constitutional law (Federal Council 1997: 20 and 9), the 
idea of a material constitution was evoked. Adopting this new text was 
justified by the fact that the 1874 Constitution—a formal law—did not 
encompass all of Swiss constitutional law. The idea of material Constitution 
was used to designate all the rules and principles, which form constitu-
tional law (Aubert 1993: 101–103). It referred to constitutional systems 
without a written constitution, such as those found in the United Kingdom 
or New Zealand. It then included the practice of the Federal Assembly and 
the Federal Council, the case law of the Federal Court, as well as many 
norms of international law, which Switzerland has undertaken to respect 
(Federal Council 1997: 17). The revision of the Constitution did not cod-
ify this entire material constitution, for ‘the text of the Constitution never 
fully restores substantive constitutional law’ (Federal Council 1997: 19). 
This conception of the Constitution, therefore, indicates that Switzerland 
has a ‘living constitution’ that has evolved over time, but especially with 
respect to the scope given to its values. Here, the judge plays a major role. 
Respect for fundamental rights, democracy and the separation of powers 
and federalism represent these Swiss constitutional values and contribute 
to shaping the activities and limits of the state, and that includes Swiss 
public administration.
Yet, as we have noted, the formalistic dimension of the law develops as 
well. Several elements show such a trend. This was the case with the 
requirement of a certain legal quality of laws set in guidelines for specific 
methods of codification or with the federal consultation procedure. It was 
also the case with the enlargement of the popular participation in ratifica-
tion procedure of some international treaties, which has added an extra 
formal condition to the validity of the ratification.
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CHAPTER 5
The Pre-parliamentary Phase in Lawmaking: 
The Power Issues at Stake
Christine Guy-Ecabert
5.1  IntroductIon
Swiss law contains a certain number of rules concerning the lawmaking 
process. In this framework, the federal administration has developed an 
impressive practice in lawmaking which has been progressively established 
in specific guides and enshrined in law. The aim of this chapter will not be 
to present all the lawmaking, but will instead focus on the pre- parliamentary 
phase during which the federal administration has to act.
Before coming into force, a federal law goes through four phases: pre- 
parliamentary, parliamentary, referendum, and implementation. Swiss are 
generally quite familiar with the parliamentary phase of the legislative pro-
cess; debates in the two chambers of the Federal Assembly are well cov-
ered by the media during each of its four annual sessions. By contrast, the 
pre-parliamentary phase remains relatively unknown if not confidential 
(Sciarini 2011). Yet it is during this phase that the draft legislation submit-
ted to parliament is negotiated, and this partly determines its future fate. 
The federal administration plays a major role in this phase, which is why it 
is worth devoting attention to this preparatory phase when addressing 
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public administration and the lawmaking process at the federal level. To 
make it more explicit, the dossier on the revision of the Federal Data 
Protection Act (DPA) will be used to illustrate the room for maneuver 
available to the federal administration, and more specifically to the federal 
offices.1
Chronological logic is used first to describe the preparatory phase, 
which focuses more on the process than on organizational issues. Next, we 
present the supporting material (reference documents) that governs this 
process, and discuss the limits of their accessibility. Then we contrast how 
the federal authorities portray the objectives of the pre-parliamentary 
phase with the results of studies by legal scholars and political scientists. 
Finally, we examine an underlying issue, namely what is at stake in terms 
of power in the pre-parliamentary process.
5.2  the StageS of the Pre-ParlIamentary ProceSS
In federal law, there are several categories of legal instruments. The major 
ones are laws and ordinances; only the first are considered, as they have to 
be adopted by the legislature. Moreover, in Switzerland, laws (Art. 164 
Federal Constitution, abbrev. as Const.) can be subjected to an optional 
referendum (Art. 141 Const.). In terms of competencies, because it 
involves preparing a legislative act at the level of law, it is the responsibility 
of the Federal Council, the national executive (Art. 181 Const.), to direct 
the pre-parliamentary phase. This is different if the impulse for the law 
comes from a parliamentary or cantonal initiative, a rare situation—less 
than 20%—that will not be considered here (Art. 181 and 171 Const.; 
Art. 7 Government and Administration Organisation Act (GAOA); 
Federal Office of Justice 2014: 100).
We draw here on the many federal guidelines which govern the pre- 
parliamentary process (for a particularly critical stance, see Jochum and 
Ledermann 2009: 92), and follow the chronological development: the 
design of the legislative project (Sect. 5.2.1), the preliminary draft and its 
explanatory report (Sect. 5.2.2), and the external consultation on the pre-
liminary draft and finalizing the bill (Sect. 5.2.3).
1 The author would like to thank Simone Füzesséry, deputy head of the Legislation Projects 
and Methodology Unit, Public Law Division, Federal Office of Justice and co-responsible for 
the revision of the Federal Law on Data Protection, for answering numerous questions as 
well as his careful reading of the present text.
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5.2.1  Designing the Legislative Project
It is at the beginning of the first, conceptualizing, phase that the necessary 
information for analyzing the problem is collected and a project organiza-
tion is set up. The scope of knowledge needed depends on the structure 
of the project, understood as the organization of the project. The choices 
here are, on the one hand, a function of the staff resources and expertise 
of the office in charge, and on the other hand, the likelihood of finding a 
sufficient consensus. In other words, the more complex and politically 
sensitive the problem is, the larger the group that prepares the project.
Overall, three variants are possible. The first is an internal working 
group, which presupposes the federal administration has the necessary 
knowledge. The second is a joint working group, in particular, committees 
composed equally of federal and cantonal representatives, formed when 
the latter are particularly concerned. The third, in exceptional cases when 
specialist expertise seems needed, is a group of experts from outside the 
administration. The most common is the joint working group, which 
brings together interdisciplinary skills. Nevertheless, lawyers are very evi-
dent in these different types of working groups.
The conceptual phase allows for the construction of a base of knowl-
edge on which the draft law and the explanatory report—called the ‘mes-
sage fédéral’—later rest. It is based on a material lawmaking approach 
whose goal is to improve the ability of the law to act on social reality 
(Flückiger 2008). One can see this as a problem-solving cycle with three 
stages: defining the problem (by analyzing its causes and its dynamic), 
determining the objectives (describing the desired future state by priori-
tizing the objectives to be achieved), and deciding on the instruments to 
use (presenting the variants in conjunction with the various instruments of 
action available to the government, and roughly assessing them before 
selecting which to use) (Jochum and Ledermann 2009). Depending on 
the circumstances, this iterative approach can be repeated at each state of 
the pre-parliamentary process.
The problem-solving cycle culminates in drafting an outline of a nor-
mative act which summarizes—in the form of theses or guiding princi-
ples—the material lawmaking approach, without yet expressing it in the 
form of a normative text. The following sketch also provides variants to 
the chosen solution (Art. 141 of the Law on Parliament). It is during the 
conceptualizing phase that the federal administration can best develop its 
room for maneuver or be at its most creative.
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The DPA case: Almost 20 years after it came into force (on 19 June 1992), it 
was clear that the Swiss data protection law was outdated, superseded by tech-
nological and societal developments and the new requirements under European 
law. Based on an evaluation carried out by an interdisciplinary research group 
(Büro Vatter 2011), the Federal Council instructed the Federal Department 
of Justice and Police to revise the law (Federal Council 2011). The Federal 
Office of Justice, which was responsible for this dossier, established a working 
group composed of representatives from the federal administration, the cantons, 
the universities, as well as from consumer protection and economic interest 
groups. They drew up a report – incorrectly entitled ‘Outline of a Normative 
Act’ – which described the basic axes of the revision, the form of the normative 
act, the general regulatory structure, its normative density, and a timetable for 
implementation (Federal Office of Justice 2014). In fact, no outline will ever 
be drafted, despite the directive calling for it by the Federal Office of Justice, 
probably in order to avoid consulting the head of the department again. 
Instead, the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law was asked to provide expert 
reports on how data protection is organized in various countries (Germany, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the UK, Finland, Slovenia, 
Spain, and in Argentina, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and 
the U.S.) and what powers data protection authorities have in these countries. 
Contracts were also given to the Universities of Applied Sciences in Zurich and 
Lucerne to analyze the jurisprudence and literature on the cost-benefit ratio in 
the area of data protection.
5.2.2  Preparing the Preliminary Draft and the Explanatory 
Report
The outline of a normative act, which summarizes the main political and 
legal features of the proposed bill, is now transformed into a text, the draft 
bill. This is where formal legal rules, in particular those governing struc-
turing, are crucial. The original drafting language is most often German, 
with a parallel French translation. Depending on the available resources, 
the text is drafted in parallel in two official languages but often in just one. 
Italian is the poor relation in the federal administration and is generally 
only a language of translation rather than of formulation.
The DPA case: The working group was composed largely of French-speakers, so 
the draft data protection law was formulated originally in French and then 
immediately translated into German. This is exceptional.
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Once the draft is prepared, its potential effects are evaluated. According 
to the letter of the law, this includes speculation about ‘the consequences 
the project, if carried out, will have on the finances and the status of the 
personnel of the Confederation, the cantons and the communities, the 
modalities proposed and their financing, the impact it has had or will have 
on financial planning, and the cost/utility evaluation of the proposed 
measures’; ‘the economic, social and environmental consequences of the 
proposed project and its effects on future generations’; and the foreseeable 
‘consequences the project will have on equality between men and women’ 
(Art. 141 (2)(f, g, and i), Federal Act on the Federal Assembly). However, 
the Confederation limits this type of study, called a Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA), to an economic analysis (Federal Department of Economic 
Affairs 2013). In undertaking these prospective evaluations, the adminis-
tration seeks to improve the preliminary draft and the explanatory report 
which comments on it.
The DPA case: After having read the ‘outline of a normative act’, the Federal 
Council instructed the Federal Department of Justice and Police to formulate 
a draft law together with three other Departments, and together with the 
Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner.
On behalf of the Federal Office of Justice and of the State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs, a private firm conducted an RIA (PWC 2016). According 
to its conclusions, it is necessary to legislate, in particular due to the evolution 
of law at international and European levels. The RIA also showed that from 
the point of view of firms operating in Switzerland, the preliminary draft 
would significantly affect those companies with medium or high exposure to 
data protection law. With respect to international competition, companies 
would nevertheless benefit from Switzerland maintaining its status as a coun-
try with an adequate level of data protection. Those concerned would benefit 
from a strengthening of their position.
The first part of the explanatory report of 21 December 2016 on the prelimi-
nary draft federal law (on the total revision of the data protection law and on 
the modification of other federal laws) places it in its national and international 
contexts, discusses the objectives of the revision (adapting Swiss legislation to tech-
nological developments and integrating changes in European regulations), pro-
vides a comparative study of relevant laws, and addresses implementation issues. 
Another section addressed the new standards, commenting on them article by 
article. Finally, the various financial, economic and social consequences on the 
IT sector are evaluated. The report also addresses various legal issues, in particu-
lar the constitutionality of the preliminary draft in terms of case law, compati-
bility with international agreements, and the form of the draft act.
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5.2.3  Consulting About the Preliminary Draft and Finalizing 
the Bill
The consultation process marks the beginning of opening up the pre- 
parliamentary process. The addressees are organizations which do not 
belong to the federal administration. Federal judicial authorities are only 
consulted on projects which affect their own processes or organization 
(Art. 11, Federal Ordinance on the Consultation Procedure). The can-
tons, the political parties, local authorities’ associations (cities and com-
munities), and those circles interested in drafting federal laws are also 
involved in the consultation, one which is supposed to take into consider-
ation all the interests at stake. This is a key instrument of cooperative 
federalism (Federal Council 2004) which allows NGOs to contribute to 
the formation of public opinion and help establish whether a project of the 
Confederation is ‘materially correct, executable and likely to be accepted’ 
(Art. 2 (2), Federal Ordinance on the Consultation Procedure).
The drafts of federal laws are generally open to consultation, though 
the federal administration can waive this (Art. 3a, Federal Act on the 
Consultation Procedure). This takes place in principle over a period of 
three months. The federal administration drafts the final report, which 
presents and weighs the expressed opinions. If the Federal Council 
approves the bill and the preliminary report, it is sent to the Federal 
Assembly. This marks the end of the pre-parliamentary phase and the 
beginning of the parliamentary process.
The DPA case: As part of the consultation process, which lasted a little over three 
months from the end of December 2016 to the beginning of April 2017, the 
Federal Department of Justice and Police invited 65 organizations – in par-
ticular the federal courts, the cantons, the political parties and various inter-
ested organizations – to give their opinions about this proposed bill, while 164 
other actors, unasked, also provided input. The Department received 222 state-
ments, 176 from relevant circles (Federal Office of Justice 2017: 5). On 10 
August 2017, the Federal Office of Justice published a 79-page summary of the 
results of the consultation process, laying out the main points (an assessment of 
the need to legislate and a general assessment of the preliminary draft), along 
with details on the opinions about specific articles. On September 15, 2017, the 
Federal Council received the 247-page report about a federal law to revise the 
federal data protection act (as well as about modifying other federal laws), 
along with a draft bill which contained 67 articles (Federal Council 2017: 
6565).
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5.3  reference documentS and theIr acceSSIbIlIty
Being familiar with a process internal to the administration implies having 
access not just to the legal instruments that define it abstractly, but also to 
the files of the preliminary legislative procedures which are in process or 
are completed. The few normative texts can be found in the classified com-
pilation of Swiss law. Anyone who wants to obtain information on the pre-
parliamentary process can readily find the many texts meant to guide the 
administration in its work—constitutional norms, laws, ordinances, and 
directives—on the webpages of the federal administration. On the one 
hand, the documents concern the phase which has external effects, mean-
ing the consultation process (Art. 147 Const., Federal Act and Federal 
Ordinance on the Consultation Procedure), and on the other hand, they 
are related to information provided to the Federal Assembly by the Federal 
Council which defines the content of the explanatory report, which the 
second addresses to the first (Art. 141 Federal Act on the Federal Assembly).
The Swiss Confederation did not enact a ‘law of laws’ forcing a legisla-
tor to follow a methodical approach in drafting legislation (Flückiger 
2008). However, numerous directives guiding the administration can be 
found on the respective websites. Thus, the Guide de législation (Federal 
Office of Justice 2007) and the three modules (law, regulations, and par-
liamentary initiative) which complement it as well as the Directive sur la 
présentation d’esquisses d’acte normatif may be found on the website of the 
Federal Office of Justice. The Directives sur la technique législative and the 
Aide-mémoire sur la présentation des messages du Conseil fédéral are avail-
able on that of the Federal Chancellery. These texts provide step-by-step 
guides for the administrators responsible for carrying out the internal pro-
cedures. There is thus a mass of information, the largest part of which 
comes from the good practices of the federal administration. The practice 
of consultation, for example, is an old tradition which was codified by a 
Federal Council directive on May 6, 1970, about the preliminary process 
for legislation (Federal Council 1970: 1003). This was reinforced by a 
Federal Council order on June 17, 1991; the Law on the Consultation 
Procedure was only first passed in 2005.
Documents about each draft bill in the pre-parliamentary phase are as 
readily accessible for the procedures in progress, though only once the 
external consultation has begun. Electronic records are more or less well- 
organized; they are provided as a function of the care various offices give 
to their own webpages.
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The DPA case: The ‘strengthening data’ file of the Federal Office of Justice is 
particularly well-documented. One finds in it a summary of the political and 
legal motivations for revising the law and of the preliminary steps taken, the 
reports from the experts, the documents made available for consultation, the 
positions taken and the results of the consultation, along with the preliminary 
report and the bill.
It would be fascinating to add information to this layer of legal and 
technical information, about what is at stake, in terms of power, at the 
heart of government. However, Federal Council deliberations are not 
public (Art. 21, GAOA), nor are the documents it produces. Indeed, 
despite a Copernican revolution—which has made it a priority to have 
transparency outweigh secrecy in the access to federal government docu-
ments—the Federal Council does not fall under the scope of this law. In 
the case of documents relating to co-reporting procedures—the final stage 
of negotiations between the heads of departments which precedes the 
Federal Council’s decision—they too evade the principle of transparency 
(Art 8 (1–4) Freedom of Information Act).
The reason for this is that a collegial authority must be able to remain 
silent about how it reaches its opinions and makes its decisions in order to 
present a united front to the public. The public is deprived of knowledge 
about the clash of ideas, the political conflicts, and the alliances formed 
within the executive—certainly for good political reasons—and does not 
know what the real power issues are that are at stake. It is thus doubtful 
that the Federal Council might one day risk opening the door of its ‘fed-
eral chalet’2 to allow a [Bruno] Latour interested in the Swiss political 
system to research and publish a work entitled ‘The Making of Swiss Law: 
An ethnography of the Federal Council’.3 As for the negotiations which 
take place in the offices and in the working groups in which preliminary 
drafts and legal projects are conceived, they remain secret. They thus 
evade the rules of the democratic game which is played during parliamen-
tary debates.
2 Owing to its decor and furnishings, the room in which the Federal Council meets is given 
this amused moniker (https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/conseil-federal/ou-travaille-
le-gouvernement/salle-seance-conseil-federal.html).
3 See the remarkable work by Bruno Latour (2002), especially the chapter ‘Quel étrange 
atelier d’écriture’: 69 et seq.
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5.4  the objectIveS of the Pre-ParlIamentary 
ProceSS
The political organs of the Confederation are in agreement over the two 
objectives of the pre-parliamentary process. On the one hand, it is meant 
to contribute to the quality of the law (Sect. 5.4.1); on the other, it is 
meant to encourage political acceptability in the parliamentary phase and 
subsequently in the referendum phase (Sect. 5.4.2). After briefly describ-
ing the means the authorities put into practice to achieve these objectives, 
we contrast them with critical studies written by legal scholars and political 
scientists (Sect. 5.4.3).
5.4.1  To Contribute to the Quality of the Law
The quality of the law can be judged from a legal, editorial, or political 
vantage point, and it is a topic which always ignites controversy (Flückiger 
and Guy-Ecabert 2015: 21–45). It is possible to improve the legal quality 
of the law before it is adopted or published (as a preventive control) or 
after its publication or its entry into force (as a subsequent control, see the 
chapter by Mahon). Switzerland does not have the judicial review of fed-
eral laws once they are passed, and even if they are unconstitutional, the 
Federal Supreme Court and the other authorities are obliged to apply 
them (Art. 190 Const.).
As early as the preliminary phase, the Federal Office of Justice is primar-
ily responsible for monitoring whether draft federal laws conform with 
higher law (constitutional provisions), whether they are compatible with 
international law, and whether they are basically accurate. Its Legislation I 
and II Units and its European Law and Schengen Coordination Unit pro-
vide this legislative support. It is not uncommon for a draft bill to be 
checked six or eight times by the Federal Office of Justice (Mader 2006: 
5), and by virtue of this, this office enjoys considerable de facto autonomy 
(Mader 2006: 7).
Other offices and administrative units come into play when questions 
relevant to their area of expertise arise. For example, the Federal 
Chancellery’s legal department systematically examines proposed legisla-
tive acts from the perspective of legislative technique and the drafting of 
laws (Art. 7 (3) Federal Ordinance on the Organization of the Federal 
Department of Justice and Police and Art. 4 (1) (b) Federal Ordinance on 
the Organization of the Federal Chancellery). As needed, the Federal 
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Finance Administration checks compliance with budget law and the law 
on subsidies, the Directorate of International Law checks compatibility 
with Switzerland’s international obligations, the Directorate for European 
Affairs of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs monitors compliance 
with the agreements concluded between Switzerland and the EU, and the 
Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner is concerned 
with data protection. The opinions provided by the Federal Office of 
Justice and other administrative bodies are certainly not binding. 
Nevertheless, given the subject matter, if the competent offices do not 
take up the conclusions reached by the Federal Office of Justice, they must 
explain why.
Evaluating the quality of the law comparatively would require research 
into many legal systems, most likely the reason why such studies have yet 
to be undertaken. It would also be necessary to decide first on a definition 
of the ‘the quality of the law’ and establish some means for correlating this 
‘quality’ with the pre-parliamentary process. Nevertheless, some authors 
cautiously estimate that federal law is ‘rather affordable, concise and 
understandable in international comparison’ (Müller and Uhlmann 2013: 
49; Flückiger and Guy-Ecabert 2008: 40; Flückiger 2008: 32).
5.4.2  To Successively Build a Consensus
In Switzerland, laws passed by the Federal Assembly are vulnerable as they 
can be subjected to (an optional) popular referendum. The consequence 
of this Damoclean sword is that the entire pre-parliamentary process is 
designed and organized so as to progressively build a consensus—in the 
hope of escaping the threat of a subsequent referendum. This intent is 
clearly expressed by the Federal Council: ‘the question whether a project 
will be accepted politically is extremely important for legislators in light of 
the possibilities the referendum provides within the Swiss democratic sys-
tem’ (Federal Council 2004: 498). The search for consensus commences 
already in the very first stage, the conceptualizing one, of the 
 pre- parliamentary phase when the experts who will work together in the 
mixed working groups are selected. Consensus is also sought through the 
joint interdepartmental report intended for the Federal Council: the intent 
is to iron out the differences between the departments beforehand (Müller 
and Uhlmann 2013: 148). This consensus-building is also particularly evi-
dent during the process of consulting outside interested parties.
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This idea of building consensus is not without its psycho-sociological 
foundation. It is based on the assumption that involving actors in a deci-
sion means that, having accepted that they will participate and contribute 
to a decision, they will also support it later. However, many political sci-
ence studies show the opposite to be true (Sciarini 2015: 31; 2011: 196). 
Both in the parliamentary and referendum phases, media coverage of con-
certation or consultation efforts compels actors to reveal their positions 
publicly. Positions stated clearly and openly can exacerbate conflicts. 
Contrary to what might be expected in a good theory of negotiation, 
consultation may well not encourage an open exchange of opinions and 
can hinder symmetrical interactions, leading to an escalation of conflict 
(Papadopoulos 1997: 48). The ability of the actors to negotiate and find 
compromise can thus be affected by media coverage of the pre- 
parliamentary procedure.
5.4.3  Critics
The consultation process has its critics. It has the potential of strengthen-
ing conservative views by allowing those who reject change to oppose it, 
leading to solutions close to the status quo. It can also lead to self- 
censorship on the part of the authorities (Papadopoulos 1997: 47), and 
even worse, to a large deficit in Swiss innovation policy (Keller 1997: 14).
The DPA case: The EU imposes very severe criminal sanctions for violations of 
data protection. To be in compliance, the preliminary draft sanctioned various 
infractions by imposing a maximum fine of 500,000 CHF. Following the con-
sultation process, the draft law halved this amount, though at the risk that the 
EU could declare the DPA to be insufficiently deterrent.
One criticism is that consultation considerably lengthens the decision- 
making process. Legislative proceedings last, on average, for 51 months 
(more than four years), of which just over two-thirds are taken up by the 
pre-parliamentary process, or a little under three years (Federal Office of 
Justice 2007: 23).
Despite these critiques, the stakeholders involved in the consultation 
process are of the opinion that it allows factual elements to be brought in 
which both improve the draft law and help right the power imbalances 
between the actors concerned. It also contributes to greater transparency 
in the decision-making process (Christe et al. 2016: 212). In the end, it 
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also helps counter the centrifugal forces which exist in a multicultural soci-
ety, and thus helps preserve social cohesion (Papadopoulos 1997: 46).
5.5  decryPtIng the Power ISSueS
We now focus on the question of who has decision-making power, in a 
material sense, within the domestic legislative process. It can be consid-
ered from two perspectives. First, it concerns the relations between the 
executive—the Federal Council—and the different levels of the federal 
administration (head of department, offices and general secretariats). 
Second, it is about the designation of the leading office of a given 
project.
The Federal Council functions according to two principles: collegiality 
(all its members collectively assume responsibility for governing), and the 
departmental principle (each member heads one or more departments) 
(Auer et al. 2013: 54). In this configuration, the federal administration, 
hierarchically subordinated to the Federal Council, is not considered as an 
organ of the state.
As the chronological presentation of the process highlighted, such an 
organization has an impact on the power game that is played. The execu-
tive, meaning the government relying on a public administration is subdi-
vided into offices and agencies, reigns supreme over the first phase of the 
legislative process. It is here that the major legal and political decisions 
about a given project are taken. These decisions will only later be submit-
ted, in the form of a bill, to the Parliament. As we have focused here only 
on the preliminary phase, we must leave aside the very important question 
of the horizontal balance of power between government and parliament 
throughout the legislative process (Sciarini 2015). The question which 
concerns us here is the vertical distribution of power between Federal 
Council, the departments, the offices of the federal administration, and 
the general secretariats of the departments. We will approach this from the 
top down.
In the context of implementing federalism, where the federal executive 
is transferring the power to implement federal law to the cantons, the ‘pre- 
legislative’ phase is important from the point of view of political power. 
Nonetheless, this power is largely delegated to the federal administration. 
Though the Federal Council certainly has the right to make decisions, 
which it makes use of at each stage of the pre-parliamentary process, it in 
fact exercises its power in the form of a right of veto over the decisions 
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made by the federal administrative offices rather than making collegial 
decisions within the Council. Indeed, everything is played out, in a for-
malized decision-making process, called the interdepartmental co-report 
procedure, prior to the Federal Council meeting, which is to say in the 
meeting of the department heads to prepare a joint interdepartmental 
report (Art. 15 GAOA and Art. 5 Ordonnance on Government and 
Administration Organization; Müller and Uhlmann 2013: n. 147–150).
The first step is consultation at the level of the federal offices inside the 
departments. This makes it possible to gather proposals and amendments, 
and establish whether the relevant office will accede or resist. In a second 
step, the dossier goes back to the heads of other departments. They can 
express their disagreement in a report addressed to the head of the respon-
sible department, who can in turn take a position in response to it and to 
the reports submitted by other departments. A last round of replies from 
the departments to this response is also possible. These reports, signed by 
the heads of departments, are in fact prepared by the federal offices (Mader 
2001: n. 45), and are the veritable ‘backbone’ of the federal administra-
tion (Grisel 1984: 213); they play a major role in the decision of the 
Federal Council.4 Unlike the Federal Councilors, the heads of federal 
offices, managers of domains, or heads of units (Mader 2006) are not 
subject to re-election. Because they define the principal orientations, they 
exercise major and lasting influence over the procedure and the bills.
The general secretariats of the departments are also a locus of power. 
Serving as general staff, they assist the heads of departments in performing 
various tasks (Art. 143 et seq. GAOA). However, they benefit from having 
a different position. They are certainly closer to the head of the depart-
ment than to the heads of the offices and can intervene at the highest level, 
at the end of the process. On the other hand, they no longer influence the 
important points which have not previously been considered in the federal 
offices internally.
At the very beginning of the preliminary procedure, the new legislative 
project is assigned to one federal office. Although this decision falls within 
the material competence of the Federal Council, it is not the result of a 
political negotiation, on a case-by-case basis, between the Councilors. It is 
based instead on regulations it has enacted about how the seven federal 
4 As Alain Berset confirmed when he exclaimed: ‘Heavens – parliament has dismantled my 
proposed law!’ Cited in Flueckiger and Guy-Ecabert (2008: 141–142). The author, now a 
Federal Councilor, was vice-president of the Council of States at the time.
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departments are (to be) organized, establishing such distribution accord-
ing to subject (e.g., based on the areas of expertise of the various offices). 
These offices are supposed to organize themselves in such a way that they 
can assume their respective legislative responsibility.
In fact, they have very different human resources available to produce 
quality legal texts. Some, such as the Federal Office of Public Health or 
the Federal Office for the Environment, have legal services with many 
employees, or even quality assurance systems. Others, by contrast, do not 
even have positions for lawyers. In such cases, lawyers from the Federal 
Office of Justice or the Federal Chancellery provide assistance. In this 
context, the internal legislative process begins in decentralized ‘work-
shops’ which bring together various skills and resources. In a Weberian 
sense, the administrative system ‘delineates spheres of competence and 
powers’ and ‘prioritizes functions’.5
Federal offices enjoy considerable power in making proposals during 
the pre-parliamentary phase. They are certainly subordinated hierarchi-
cally to the head of the department, as well as potentially subject to a 
Federal Council veto as it decides about each stage of the process, most 
especially in starting the consultation process (Art. 5 Consultation 
Procedure Act). Though responsible for the organization of the project, 
they nevertheless have an impact on the integration of knowledge and the 
extent of consultation in the drafting of bills.
Compared with other offices, the Federal Office of Justice enjoys 
important prerogatives, which has earned it the label of being the ‘juridical 
conscience of the administration’ (Mader 2006: 3). It guarantees control 
over the quality of draft laws, carries out legal assessments, and enacts an 
important part of the directives and formal legalistic guidelines. It also 
provides training for federal law clerks. This office has, in effect, designed 
and implemented a complete training concept—something found rarely 
even among Swiss university law faculties.
Ultimately, while it is formally a power of the Federal Council, it is the 
federal offices and even the general secretariats which exercise power over 
the pre-parliamentary process (Mader 2006: 7). This means a strengthen-
ing of public administration relative to the executive, so much so that 
some describe the federal administration as ‘the fourth power’ in the state 
(Häfelin et al. 2016: n. 1698). Of the relevant offices, the Federal Office 
5 Michel Crozier, ‘Bureaucratie’ in Encyclopædia Universalis. http://www.universalis.fr/
encyclopedie/bureaucratie/ (consulted on August 25, 2017).
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of Justice enjoys a particularly powerful position, a situation not without 
its problems. Indeed, the control of the preventive control of compliance 
with the law by an office raises questions of independence. Author of 
numerous bills—20%, the office also happens to be the relevant office for 
the subject matter as well as the locus of preventive control, which could 
lead to conflicts of interest. It is therefore not surprising that, in response 
to a postulate, the Federal Council issued a report in which it declared 
itself satisfied with the status quo, while also advocating some modest 
optimization measures. It is thus perhaps not surprising that the Federal 
Council also opposes judicial review: if introduced, it could guarantee 
oversight by an organ of the state which would be independent of the 
government and parliament (Federal Council 2010).
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CHAPTER 6
The Federal Administration 
as an Actor in the Domestic Integration 
of International Law
Sophie Weerts and Amalia Sofia
6.1  IntroductIon
The twentieth century witnessed a remarkable expansion of international 
law, and the Swiss federal constitution of 1999 expresses a strong commit-
ment to international cooperation and respect for international law 
(Rhinow and Schefer 2009: 696 et seq). Nevertheless, the Swiss legal sys-
tem is distinctive in its commitment to using direct democratic instru-
ments. Indeed, together with federalism and neutrality, direct democracy 
has become one of the founding myths of Swiss constitutional identity 
(Hertig Randall and McGregor 2010: 429).
Yet in recent decades, direct democracy has been increasingly seen as 
potentially threatening to the coherence of Swiss foreign policy (Federal 
Council 1997: 445; Haller 2016: 38). Swiss public administration faces a 
dilemma here. On the one hand, it must comply with the rule of law, 
applying the principle of legality and respecting international law (Art. 5 
(1) and (4), Swiss Federal Constitution, henceforth Const.). On the other 
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hand, it must simultaneously recognize the people’s will expressed at the 
polls if it is to keep the citizens’ trust in the system. This chapter intends 
to show how the federal administration, guided by Swiss law, plays a role 
in maintaining a balance between direct democracy and respecting inter-
national law. It will not offer a detailed description of the rules and prac-
tices regulating the relationship between international and domestic law. 
Instead, it focuses on the legal and political mechanisms which influence 
how international and Swiss law are articulated in a manner which ensures 
respect for the country’s ‘monistic’ tradition. A monistic tradition means 
that international law is part of the domestic legal order, so new obliga-
tions created by treaty do not have to be ‘incorporated’ into national leg-
islation (Haller 2016: 19).
We begin by briefly defining the constitutive mechanisms involved in the 
development of international law and direct democracy in contemporary 
Swiss law. Next, we examine the current ratification procedure for interna-
tional treaties before turning to the implementation phase of international 
law. In our conclusion, we identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Swiss 
system, especially in the face of opposition from international law.
6.2  InternatIonal law and dIrect democracy 
as constItutIve elements of the swIss PolItIcal 
system
6.2.1  The Development of International Law
After World War II, the main purpose of international treaties was no lon-
ger to define geographic borders or regulate peace negotiations, but rather 
to institutionalize international organizations. These newly created multi-
lateral bodies quickly became a locus producing, coordinating and inter-
preting international norms. Such international fora have become a 
privileged location for discussing and regulating a growing number of 
important policy issues, while also benefiting from the participation of 
each state. The development of international law takes different shapes 
and forms which include international treaties, recommendations, guide-
lines and other soft law instruments (see Flückiger in this volume). This 
results in a sharp increase of norms and actors in the field of public inter-
national law. These norms can have an effect on the activities of states, 
their administrations and even on the legal situation of private individuals, 
if treaties include directly applicable provisions (Mader 2013: 247).
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Such developments have been taken into account in Swiss constitu-
tional law, particularly in the 1999 complete revision of the Swiss con-
stitution which included a number of new provisions related to 
international law (Haller 2016: 37). As noted, the Confederation and 
the cantons ‘respect international law’ (Art 5 (4) Const.) (Aubert and 
Mahon 2003: 48 et seq). The Confederation is ‘committed…to a just 
and peaceful international order’ (Art. 2 (4) Const). Mandatory provi-
sions of international law also must not be violated when changing the 
constitution (Art. 193 (4) and Art. 194 (2) Const.). The federal Supreme 
Court and other judicial authorities ‘apply federal acts and international 
law’ (Art. 190 Const.). All these provisions express Switzerland’s strong 
commitment towards international law.
Moreover, the number of texts in force for international law is higher 
than for domestic law (Federal Council 2016a). Switzerland signed and 
ratified 121 Council of Europe conventions (Federal Council 2016a: 
6828). Switzerland, however, chose not to become a member of the EU, 
opting instead for a ‘bilateral path’ (Maiani and Bieber 2016; Maiani 
2013) involving numerous individual agreements with the EU which 
cover a wide array of issues and policies. In that context as well, European 
law is pervasive and very evident in Swiss law (Maiani 2013).
6.2.2  The Development of Direct Democracy
Direct democracy is one of the hallmarks of the Swiss legal and political 
system. It allows Swiss citizens to participate in the lawmaking process as 
well as in revising the constitution. This can be done either to encourage 
political action (popular initiative) or to alter political actions already taken 
(via referendum). (Art. 138 to 142 Const.). Also referred to as ‘popular 
rights’, the mechanisms of direct democracy exist at communal, cantonal 
and federal levels. Historically, they emerged first at the cantonal level and 
were only gradually established at the federal level to complement the sys-
tem of representative democracy. Switzerland has gradually increased the 
use of referenda, thereby compensating for the reduced possibility of pop-
ular participation in decision-making processes at the international level 
(Hertig Randall 2016: 166). Changes introduced in 1999 and 2003 gave 
parliament a right to participate when international treaties were concluded 
(Federal Council 1997: 231), and popular rights were modified. Democratic 
participation in international treaties was thereby brought into line with 
participation in national legislation (Federal Council 2001: 5795).
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To date, while the right to launch an initiative is limited to domestic 
matters (e.g., it can be used only for the adoption of norms on the consti-
tutional level), referenda can—and in some cases must—be held about 
international matters such as treaties (optional referendum for specified 
kinds of treaties) or joining a supranational community (mandatory refer-
endum) (Art. 140 and 141).
6.3  the role of the federal admInIstratIon 
In the accessIon to InternatIonal treatIes
The UN’s Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) sets 
out the accession procedure to international law for states. When acceding 
to a Convention, a state either adheres outright to the treaty, thereby indi-
cating it will commit to it, or signs the treaty, pending internal examina-
tion. It will then later ratify it. The Vienna Convention leaves it to each 
state to determine domestically which organs are given the competency to 
participate on behalf of the government.
Switzerland has a signature phase and a ratification phase (Art. 184 (2) 
Const.), but the procedure it adopts, and the internal actors involved, can 
vary according to whether the treaty is bilateral or multilateral.
6.3.1  Signature
The Federal Council is responsible for foreign relations (Art. 184 (1) 
Const.) and represents Switzerland abroad (Art. 54 (1) Const.). It has the 
general competence to sign and ratify international treaties (Art. 184 (2) 
Const.). In some instances, the treaties must be submitted to the Federal 
Assembly for approval before ratification. The Federal Council can also 
delegate the concluding of a treaty to a relevant department or office—of 
the federal administration (Art. 48a GAOA). If an international negotia-
tion is launched, a negotiating mandate is issued by the Federal Council. 
The negotiating minister must then consult the parliamentary committees 
responsible for foreign relations, allowing the negotiator to establish the 
main outlines and directives of the mandate (Art. 152 (3) Federal Act on 
the Federal Assembly).
In practice, the procedure combines legal rules and certain processes, pro-
viding a guide for public action, though the Federal Council must play a 
nuanced role. The cantons can themselves play an active role internationally 
by being associated with a foreign policy decision by the national executive 
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(Art. 55 (3) Const.), and even conclude international treaties in matters fall-
ing within their competences. Nevertheless, cantons must act in such a way to 
ensure the coherence of the Swiss external policy. Their international commit-
ments cannot be contrary to the interests of the Confederation: therefore, 
prior to the conclusion of a treaty, the federal authority must be informed 
(Art. 56 Const.; Art. 61c and 62 GAOA; Art. 27o and 27 t of the Ordinance 
on Government and Administration Organization). If the Federal Council 
was to consider this cantonal engagement to be against the nation’s interests, 
the Federal Assembly is notified (Art. 186 (3) Const.). The latter shall then 
give its approval to the convention (Art. 172 para. 3 Const.; Haller 2016: 
250; Ziegler 2015: 88). Furthermore, if a field of cantonal competence is 
covered by the new international norm, cantons may also take part in the 
negotiation (Art. 55 Const.; Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure). 
The impetus to the signature of an international treaty can thus come from 
the Federal Council itself, from the Federal Assembly, or from a canton 
(Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2015: 9).
That being said, the proposal to sign generally comes from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and, in some cases, other federal depart-
ments when the treaty in question falls within their competence (Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs 2015: 9). Furthermore, prior to the signa-
ture, a collaborative process takes place during which there are many 
exchanges between the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly and the can-
tons (and sometimes social and professional organizations) under the aegis 
of the federal administration. The Department of Foreign Affairs, in par-
ticular, early on played the role of general guardian of the development of 
international law (‘juridical conscience’). This role has been remarkable in 
the treaties adopted within the Council of Europe, and according to Art. 3 
of the Statute of the Council of Europe, Switzerland agreed to ‘collaborate 
sincerely and effectively’ in the realization of the organization’s goals. 
Accordingly, the Federal Administration follows the Council of Europe’s 
work closely, and, since 1976, a yearly report on ‘Switzerland and the 
Council of Europe’s Conventions’ have been published. This document 
provides the reasons why Switzerland should or should not adhere to 
Conventions elaborated within the Council of Europe. The report is drafted 
by the offices in the federal administration and then submitted to the Federal 
Assembly via a preliminary report provided by the Federal Council.
The Federal Council, supported by the federal administration must 
base its proposal on measurable elements defined in 1969 (Federal 
Council 2016a: 6829). Switzerland’s international commitment is 
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based on the idea that the state can comply with its engagements, all the 
more necessary as respecting international law is a principle of Swiss law 
(Art. 5 (4) Const.). As a consequence, determining whether Switzerland 
will or will not be able to respect its new international commitment is 
central, and every ratification project should be analysed in terms of its 
usefulness and necessity from the point of view of the national interest 
or of the efficiency of cooperation with other state parties. Moreover, 
only conventions whose ratification is feasible within a reasonable time 
are suggested.
Furthermore, Article 147 of the Swiss Constitution requires a consultation 
procedure, with all actors involved, which is coordinated by the Federal 
Council. Its aim is to test whether the project is correct, executable, and 
whether it would likely be accepted (Art. 2 Consultation Procedure Act). The 
consultation procedure is really a key moment for the federal administration, 
as it gives public administrators an opportunity to point out any fundamental 
incompatibility between a convention and the domestic legal order. Once the 
comments and responses have been received, a procedure to iron out the dif-
ferences is launched, both at the executive and at lower administrative levels. 
Nevertheless, the current ratification practice makes it possible to submit con-
ventions which are not in line with domestic law to the Federal Assembly for 
approval. This is notably the case when existing gaps in Swiss law could be 
filled by directly applicable provisions contained in the treaty. Otherwise, par-
liamentary approval might be solicited when accompanying legislative mea-
sures can be adopted in sufficient time (Federal Council 2016a, b: 6829).
From a procedural point of view, consultation can occur before signa-
ture or during the parliamentary phase afterwards (Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs 2015: 47). In practice, it usually takes place during the 
pre-parliamentary phase (see the chapter by Guy-Ecabert in this volume). 
The actors usually have a three-month period in which they can draft an 
answer, and cantons, political parties and civil society actors take part, 
sometimes quite extensively so.
Thus, the signature of a treaty by the Federal Council is part of a much 
larger political process, much more extensive than the simple signature of 
a document by a public authority. The procedure shows the implication of 
different political actors, allowing the Federal Council to evaluate the 
political support to a treaty. It can reinforce national commitment to a 
new adhesion and thereby avoid opposition once the international rules 
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are ‘incorporated’ in the domestic legal order. Such a procedure ‘a priori’ 
can thus attempt to limit the chances of a referendum that may arise later.
6.3.2  Ratification
The second phase is ratification. The main actors are the Federal Assembly, 
the people and the cantons. Their intervention formally confirms (or over-
turns) the Federal Council’s proposition. It takes its final form with the 
adoption of a federal decree.
This phase begins with the Federal Assembly’s intervention, as it must 
give its approval to ratification (Ziegler 2015: 90) in the case where the 
Federal Council has not an exclusive competence (Art. 166 (2) Const.; 
Art. 24 (2) Parliament Act). To allow the parliament to reach a decision, a 
document describing the reasons why Switzerland should ratify the treaty 
in question is drafted by the relevant federal department. This ‘federal 
message’ is received by the Federal Council and communicated to the 
Federal Assembly (Art. 141 Parliament Act). In this communication, the 
federal administration gives a global evaluation of the treaty text, specify-
ing the content and the scope of every provision. After the Federal 
Assembly approves the treaty, it adopts a federal decree.
The adoption by the Assembly does not necessarily end matters. In 
some cases, Swiss constitutional law requires that the citizens and cantons 
must be consulted. Indeed, a mandatory referendum is required if the 
treaty in question concerns the accession to an organizations for collective 
security or joining supranational communities (Art. 140 (1) (b) Const.). 
On this basis, a referendum was organized in 1992 where citizens voted 
on joining the European Economic Area. Though strongly supported by 
the Federal Council, this project was rejected at the polls. Optional refer-
enda (Art. 141 (1) (d) Const.) are also possible, for which 50,000 voters 
must sign a petition, or eight cantons ask for such a vote, within 100 days 
of official publication of the federal decree. Signed treaties of an unlimited 
term or when withdrawal from the treaty is not permitted may be subject 
to popular vote (those cases were introduced in 1921 and in 1977, 
 respectively). This is also the case for treaties containing important provi-
sions establishing binding legal rules or whose implementation requires 
the adoption of federal laws (introduced in 2003).
Here, too, the federal administration plays an active role, as it estab-
lishes whether the treaty in question must be subjected to a mandatory 
referendum. If an optional referendum is held, the federal administration 
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must verify whether one of three hypothesis take place. Assessing whether 
a treaty contains important provisions establishing binding legal rules is 
considered as particularly delicate to assess (Ziegler 2015: 115).
It also has to organize the referendum. Documents must be distributed 
to all electors in order to allow them to cast their vote validly and in accor-
dance with the respective cantonal procedure (ballot, legitimation card, 
official voting envelope or validation stamp, etc.). The federal administra-
tion provides electors with objective and exhaustive information about the 
proposed treaty, and by law, this should take into account the main views 
which have been expressed, including those of the federal Assembly, those 
of the referendum’s initiators and of important minorities (Art 10a and 11 
Political Rights Act). Inside the federal administration, the Federal 
Chancellery is in charge of organizing the referendum, and it takes a self- 
defined neutral position in doing so.
While the federal authorities may plead for a strong commitment to 
multilateralism, the referendum process may show a desire on the part of 
the population to be more isolationist. The mechanism itself works to the 
advantage of adhering to international law; it completes the democratic 
debate by directly connecting the parties concerned. Moreover, it requires 
of the federal administration that it deliver a clear explanation to the voters 
explaining Swiss interests in deepening and extending its international 
relations, but equally evaluating the impact of international law on the 
domestic legal system. It makes it possible to directly address the potential 
conflicts between international and national provisions.
A clear institutional dynamic is at work, with its special characteristics 
deriving from the institutions of federalism and direct democracy. Of these 
two, direct democracy appears to be of particular relevance for explaining 
the flexibility in the Swiss ratification system. It allows a soft control over 
the federal government’s actions in its international commitments. The 
federal administration is a key factor here, though it must combine some-
times contradictory tasks involving monitoring, coordinating, synthesiz-
ing and narrating the debate on ratification.
6.4  the role of the federal admInIstratIon 
In the aPPlIcatIon of PublIc InternatIonal law
When applying international norms in the domestic legal system, Swiss law 
is faced with the traditional issues of international law, namely the direct 
applicability of the international norm (Sect. 6.4.1). Switzerland, how-
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ever, is also confronted by a particular challenge: the possibility for citizens 
to launch a popular initiative, even if that initiative potentially contradicts 
existing international obligations (Sect. 6.4.2).
6.4.1  The Direct Applicability of International Law and Its 
Position Within the Domestic Hierarchy of Legal Norms
The development of international law raised a number of legal questions, 
most notably about the effect and legal force international norms would 
have on the domestic order, both in terms of national law and constitu-
tional law. Such issues have a direct effect on the work of public adminis-
tration, and here the Federal Supreme Court provided a response.
As already mentioned, as far as direct applicability is concerned, 
Switzerland is in the ‘monistic’ tradition (Haller 2016: 19). This means no 
particular act is required for an international rule to be considered valid in 
the domestic legal system (decision of the Federal Supreme Court case of 
27 October 1994: ATF 120 Ib 360, 366). More concretely, the Federal 
Supreme Court stated that an international provision is directly applicable 
if sufficiently precise and unconditional to produce a direct effect. In other 
words, international provisions must permit the constitution of a basis for 
a concrete decision (decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 2 September 
1986: ATF 112 Ib 183, 184). From then on, such conditions determined 
by the Court have been used by the Federal Council to determine the 
impact of an international engagement on Switzerland’s internal bodies 
(preliminary report of the Federal Council 2003: 80; ibid. 1994: 1481). 
In practice, these conditions are verified and explained when a federal mes-
sage on a ratification is drafted. If the international provisions do not fulfil 
those criteria, they are considered not self-executing. It is then for the 
legislators (cantonal and/or federal) to implement the programmatic pro-
visions (this was notably the case when the Federal Council elaborated the 
ratification project to the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities 2012: 601 et seq.). Furthermore, over time 
the Federal Supreme Court has promulgated several interpretations about 
the legal force of international provisions on Switzerland’s legal system.
During the 1920–1930s, the Federal Supreme Court considered interna-
tional treaties to be on equal terms with national legislation. In this perspec-
tive, in case of conflict, it applied the interpretation rule lex posterior derogat 
priori, meaning a later legal rule prevails over an earlier rule. In 1968, the 
Court recognized the ‘principle of interpretation in conformity’ with inter-
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national law. In other words, when facing a conflict, the national legal norm 
must be interpreted in a manner compatible with the relevant international 
rule. A national legal rule adopted after the ratification of an international 
treaty shall also be interpreted in conformity. Moreover, if a conforming 
interpretation is impossible, the Federal Supreme Court confirms the non-
application of the national rule. By doing so, the Court progressively estab-
lished the idea of the superiority of international over domestic law. Five 
years later, in 1973, in the Court’s ‘Schubert’ ruling, it halted this idea of 
superiority in the event legislators expressly overrode international law. In 
such cases, the national norm outweighs international law (Decision of the 
Federal Supreme Court of 2 March 1973: ATF 99 Ib 39).
With the acceleration of the development of international law, the 
Federal Supreme Court did rule in 1991 that Switzerland cannot avoid its 
international obligations by applying its domestic law. Domestic law has to 
be interpreted in conformity with the rules of international law (Decision 
of the Federal Supreme Court of 26 July 1999: ATF 125 II 417, 424; for 
an analysis of the case law, see Lammers 2015: 80). If a conforming inter-
pretation is not possible, the Court said that then national rules are not 
applied. Such a solution has been considered as particularly pertinent 
when a domestic rule breaches an international rule relating to the protec-
tion of human rights (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court of 26 July 
1999: ATF 125 II 417, 424; and 26 July 2002: ATF 128 IV 201, 205). 
Such an interpretation has been retained in the wording of Article 5 of the 
Constitution of 1999, which said ‘the Confederation and the Cantons 
shall respect international law’ and not ‘shall comply’ as in art. 49 (1) 
Const. (Aubert and Mahon 2003: 48 et seq; Thürer 2001: 190).
By 2005, however, the Federal Council was taking a more cautious 
position, referring to the Schubert ruling, when answering a parliamentary 
question: ‘International law has, in principle, precedence over federal 
law—at least, if the federal legislation did not knowingly adopt a rule in 
conflict with international law. The place held by international treaties in 
the internal hierarchy of norms is controversial in both legal literature and 
case law. The peremptory norms of public international law (jus cogens) 
take precedence over all public law rules and set limitations to constitu-
tional revisions’ (Federal Council, written answer d.d. 23 April 2005, 
Official bulletin of the National Council 2005: 212).
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6.4.2  Constitutional Amendments and International Law
In practice, it is generally known that Swiss citizens—and, in particular, 
those political parties failing to find policy decisions which accord with 
their ideologies—increasingly use the instrument of the popular initiative. 
One of them, in particular, even seems ready to propose breaching consti-
tutional amendments to achieve its goals.
To prevent an open conflict between international law and the Swiss 
Constitution, a system to monitor the compliance of popular initiatives with 
international law has been instituted (Art. 139 (3) Const.). This control is 
carried out by the Federal Assembly, which verifies that prior to voting, the 
proposed constitutional provision will not breach the jus cogens. The object 
of this control is limited to the basic norms and principles of international 
humanitarian law and the safeguards required by international law not sub-
ject to derogation. The parliament has no power to block a popular initia-
tive, but it can formulate a counter-proposal (Auer 2016: 399). To date, 
only one initiative has been ruled invalid because it was deemed incompat-
ible with a peremptory norm in general international law, namely the non-
refoulement principle (Rhinow and Schefer 2009: 722; Mahon 2014: 115). 
Other initiatives, which did not violate any of the above-mentioned norms 
but remained problematic, have been put to vote and, in some cases, 
adopted. The initiative banning the constructions of minarets, approved by 
Swiss voters in 2009 (see Art. 73 (3), Const.), is a good example. Clearly 
targeting one specific religion, the Federal Council judged that it violated 
norms concerning the freedom of religion as well as the prohibition of dis-
crimination (established in Art. 9 and 14 European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), but also in 2 and 18 of the UN Covenant II and, possibly, 
the protection of minorities guaranteed by art. 27 of the Covenant (prelimi-
nary report of the Federal Council 2008: 6924)).
In the end, the federal administration, bound by international law, 
must implement initiatives, respecting the policy aim of the initiative’s 
promoters and the results of the vote. In this case again, the role of the 
federal administration is important. Indeed, several scenarios to solve a 
similar situation have been imagined and sometimes tested.
The first scenario is to imagine implementation laws in conformity with 
international law. This delicate strategy was used to deal with the initiative 
for the automatic expulsion of foreign criminal offenders, voted in 2008 
(Art. 121 Const.). The application of the new constitutional provision can 
expose some individuals to a dangerous return to a state where they could 
potentially be threatened with violence or persecution. To avoid this 
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hypothesis, the federal administration applies the norm by implementing 
the expulsion decision only if the individual’s life is not endangered in the 
country of origin (Hertig Randall and McGregor: 431).
The second scenario, untested today, is to renegotiate or withdraw 
from the treaties that are in conflict with a newly adopted constitutional 
norm. The Federal Council began a political discussion with the Federal 
Assembly in 2015 (Conseil des Etats 2016), which has initiated a bill on 
the competence to renounce a treaty (Conseil des Etats 2018). The option 
of renegotiation was evoked when the popular initiative for ‘ending mass 
immigration’ was adopted in 2014, requiring the implementation of immi-
gration quotas and giving Swiss workers priority in employment. This new 
article 121a is viewed as particularly problematic, given the bilateral agree-
ments—especially on the free movement of persons—between Switzerland 
and the EU, which gives Switzerland access to the single market (Maiani 
2013) and also other treaties as the ECHR, the UN Covenant II and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Erhenzeller et al. 2014: 2196). 
Nevertheless, given the potential impact of this norm on the Swiss econ-
omy, one dependent on commerce with the EU member states, the appli-
cation of this provision required considerable negotiation between the 
Federal Council and the EU. After long and intense diplomatic exchanges, 
the Federal Administration found a solution. They chose to adopt a regula-
tion compatible with the current agreement, thereby maintaining good 
relationships with the EU without completely negating the new provision 
in the Swiss constitution.
A third scenario was foreseen by extending the recognized grounds for 
invalidating popular initiatives. This proposal was abandoned in 2014, 
after the federal administration discovered during the consultation process 
that there were fundamental and unbridgeable differences of opinions 
among the actors involved (Commission des institutions politiques du 
Conseil d’Etat 2015: 6493).
Finally, ‘popular initiatives which are incompatible with Switzerland’s 
international obligation are not new, the violation of international law has 
in the past been rather accidental than intentional’ (Hertig Randall and 
McGregor 2010: 429). An initiative calling for ‘Swiss law instead of for-
eign judges (self-determination initiative)’ is part of the current trend 
(Kolb 2016). Its aim is to produce a constitutional amendment which 
would establish the primacy of national constitutional law over interna-
tional law, thereby reversing the historical trend integrating international 
law in Swiss law.
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6.5  conclusIon
Swiss law shows a variety of interesting norms visible when dealing with 
the impact of international law on domestic legislation. The distribution 
of roles and competencies demonstrates sophisticated institutional engi-
neering in terms of treaty ratification. The risk in activating direct democ-
racy mechanisms can be seen as the reason justifying this complex system. 
With this in mind, direct democracy can be considered as producing a 
positive, legitimizing effect on the recognition of the place of international 
law in the domestic order. This allows one to dismiss the argument often 
put forward by detractors who frequently assert international law is pro-
duced by technocratic decision-makers and lacks democratic legitimacy.
The effect of direct democracy can also be unwholesome, particu-
larly in the case of popular initiatives, and serve to promote minority 
ideologies, whether progressive or conservative. Currently, in the 
human rights domain, the use of the popular initiative is aimed at call-
ing into question Switzerland’s foreign policy engagements, or to 
reject the autonomous developments of international law. It has advo-
cated an ideology of retreat into national self-interest, in opposition to 
the humanist perspective found in contemporary international law, 
echoing the humanitarian tradition of the country, another founding 
principle of the Swiss constitutional order.
In this particularly tense situation, the federal administration plays a 
key role. Like a mediator, avoiding the confrontation between actors and 
legal norms, it contributes to finding a compromise. The key challenge 
for the federal administration is to maintain this position of equilibrium 
between the international openness of Switzerland regarding its humani-
tarian and neutrality traditions and its adherence to a political system 
defined by its direct democracy mechanisms. From this point of view, the 
political  context seems to show the popular initiative will still represent 
a challenge in the future.
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CHAPTER 7
Soft Law Instruments in Public Law
Alexandre Flückiger
7.1  IntroductIon
In Switzerland, the principle of legality establishes that state activity is 
based on, and limited by, law (Article 5, Swiss Constitution). Its function 
is to ensure that the democratic will expressed by legislators is imple-
mented by an administration that does not act in an emotional or capri-
cious manner. The instruments available to the state, and through which 
it acts, are laws, decisions, and contracts, along with the actions it takes to 
plan and coordinate individuals working together. It is characteristic of 
such acts that they are legally binding.
Administrative activity is not exhausted by the aforementioned legal 
acts, however. In fact, administrative practices manifest modes more suited 
to governance: preferring incentives over obligations, citizen cooperation 
rather than unilateral decisions, and coordinating multiple actors to the 
detriment of maintaining a hierarchical order. Such instruments are fre-
quently grouped under the label ‘soft law’—in French, droit souple Conseil 
d’Etat 2013; Hachez et al. 2013.
Soft law has often performed an experimental function, to test a possible 
future legal rule (for ‘green’ law, see Abi-Saab 1997: 207 et  seq., for 
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‘pre-law’, Peters 2011: 34). The state can thus accustom addressees to a 
new standard which, once sufficiently matured, may become obligatory. 
An example is the use of seat belts: they were recommended before they 
became mandatory. Soft law thus guides the behavior of citizens without 
imposing a legal obligation. It does not replace traditional administrative 
activity but instead complements and strengthens it in areas where more 
traditional modes of governance reach their limits (Mader and Rütsche 
2004: 18 et seq.; Morand 1999).
The development of this kind of state action, which is at the fringes of 
the law, poses difficulties for jurists. Indeed, if the ability of soft law to 
achieve results—in other words, its effectiveness—is likely to legitimize a 
remedy for a problem, its democratic foundation totters. In fact, the prin-
ciple of legality, at least initially, was not designed to legitimize such flexible 
instruments. In addition, the limited formal requirements for carrying out 
soft law measures make it possible to circumvent the sluggishness of admin-
istrative or parliamentary procedures, dampen the resistance of political 
actors to new policies, prevent adopting regulations which are too binding 
or, in certain domains, compensate for an absence of competence to pass 
obligatory measures. From the point of view of legitimacy, this character-
istic of soft law instruments is particularly problematic, since under the rule 
of law, efficiency criteria cannot be allowed to supersede legality.
In the Swiss case, the legal system has a tendency to tolerate or even 
establish mechanisms of administrative action under soft law. The Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court even defends this practice: ‘It is not necessary that 
every governmental intervention take the form of a decision. If so, it 
would affect the proper functioning of the administration. It is often indis-
pensable that the authorities proceed informally’ (Decision of the Federal 
Supreme Court of 9 April 2002: ATF 128 II 156, 163). This flexibility can 
be understood as an application of the principle of proportionality, as 
Article 5 of the Swiss Constitution notes that ‘state activities must be … 
proportionate to the ends sought’. The Swiss legal system thus evinces a 
gradual normativity that reconciles the need for flexibility on the part of 
the administration. This is an essential ingredient to ensure a degree of 
efficiency and legitimacy, one indispensable for ensuring a democratic 
governance of the rule of law.
One thus needs to examine this type of instrument at the disposal of 
Swiss public administration. To specify this notion of soft law and identify 
the legal issues involved, we use a typology that covers differing types of 
state instruments in Swiss public law (Sect. 7.2). Next, we look at the legal 
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effects (potentially) generated when public authorities use this type of 
instrument (Sect. 7.3). Then, we turn to how effective they are for the 
functioning of the state (Sect. 7.4). At the end, we return to the need, 
within the Swiss constitutional framework, to both guarantee the legiti-
macy of soft law and maintain its effectiveness (Sect. 7.5).
7.2  A LegAL typoLogy of non-obLIgAtory StAte 
InStrumentS
One can begin with the observation that non-binding state instruments 
can change the behavior of individuals either by means of a text (more 
formally, as ‘acts of non-obligatory declaration’) or by de facto acts (‘mate-
rial acts in the narrow sense’). However, in the case of the former, they can 
be enacted unilaterally by the state (Sect. 7.2.1) or in a concerted manner 
(Sect. 7.2.2).
They thus resemble classic legal acts. Like legal norms, they also con-
tain norms of behavior. In the case of legal acts, the norms are mandatory 
and must be followed. In the case of ‘acts of non-obligatory declaration’, 
however, the norms are only recognized inasmuch as they are acknowl-
edged by their addressees. Standards, in their non-legal sense, are not nec-
essarily imperative in such cases. Finally, while such ‘acts of non-obligatory 
declaration’ contain rules which may or may not be followed, ‘de facto 
acts’ consist of specific actions and contain no norms (Moor and Poltier 
2011: 28 et seq.) (Sect. 7.2.3).
7.2.1  Unilateral Non-obligatory Acts
The principal unilateral non-obligatory act at the disposal of the state is to 
make recommendations; a number of other special cases also illustrate this.
7.2.1.1  Recommendations
Recommendations are declarations which suggest a certain behavior 
should be followed. They take many different forms. Behind this diversity 
lie different degrees of emphasis; a warning has a stronger character than 
a wish or simply a piece of advice.
Giving a recommendation is a classic instrument in international public 
law and EU law. The resolutions and declarations adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly, the most famous of which is the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, are recommendations, as are the various 
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recommendations made by the Council of Europe. Similarly, declarations 
made at international conferences, such as at the Rio Summit on 
Environment and Development in 1992, or the Bologna Declaration 
about higher education in 1999, are also recommendations (Daillier et al. 
2009: 416 et seq.; Guzman and Meyer 2010; Shelton 2008). In European 
law, recommendations and opinions have been institutionalized, though 
here too, these acts are not binding (Article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU). Thus, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union was not legally binding before the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force (Nowak 2011: 134 et  seq.). At the international level, some 
rules which take the form of a recommendation are also produced outside 
of government. These may come from private, semi-public, or hybrid 
actors and their influence on internal law may be decisive (Pauwelyn et al. 
2012). To some authors, they even appear to be a kind of global adminis-
trative law (Cassese 2005).
As will be shown later, recommendations have become a classic instru-
ment in Swiss law. In terms of formulating behavioral rules, recommen-
dations may be either explicit or implicit in nature. Thus, when they 
directly state what the recommended behavior is, they will be described 
as explicit. Some examples are provided in Table 7.1 (Moor et al. 2012: 
404 et seq.).
However, when state instruments point toward following a behavior 
without expressing it explicitly, the behavior to be followed stems implic-
itly from the instrument; its purpose, more or less obviously, amounts to a 
recommendation. Thus, through the publicity a public authority gives to 
its exemplary behavior, it can exhort individuals to adapt their conduct 
(Morand 1999: 178). Furthermore, a public administration thus demon-
strates the feasibility of adopting the conduct, and thus increases its 
credibility.
For example, in public procurement, the incentive effect is reinforced 
when the state uses its power to issue contracts. They serve their own rec-
ommendations and are contained, in turn, in their public policy objec-
tives. Although the potential contractors remain free not to conform to 
the state’s new requirements, they then take the risk of being excluded 
from the public market (Manfrini 1991). In keeping with the principles of 
transparency, equal treatment, the prohibition of discrimination, and free 
competition, the state may lay out certain criteria, particularly ecological 
or social, before awarding a public contract (Rodondi 2001).
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Incentive taxes in the context of the environment operate the same way 
(Oberson and Maraia 2010). Individuals are free to put vegetable peelings 
in their garbage bags, but if the bag itself is taxed, it serves as a financial 
encouragement or incentive for individuals to sort their waste a little more 
carefully.
Labeling or certification requirements (Article 43a, Environmental 
Protection Act or EPA) serve to guide the choices market actors make. 
They can certainly ignore the requirements, but may then find themselves 
at a competitive disadvantage in obtaining public contracts (Subilia-Rouge 
2010: N. 73 et seq.), or find themselves in difficulties when monitoring or 
controlling procedures are carried out.
Awards and prizes to citizens from the authorities (Article 7, Film Act) 
are an indirect recommendation to follow the rewarded behavior. Training 
can also profoundly influence an individuals’ behavior, at least over the 
longer term. What is taught acts like a recommendation for those who are 
taught when public authorities include this means in their toolkit (Delley 
1991).
Table 7.1 Typology of recommendations
Recommendations 
strictly speaking
The grape varieties recommended for cultivation in Switzerland 
(Art. 3, Ordinance on Grape Varieties)
Alerts Public warning (Art. 54, Foodstuffs Act)
Advice The waters protection agencies shall provide advice to the 
authorities and to private individuals (Art. 50 II, Waters 
Protection Law)
Notice The Competition Commission shall provide other authorities with 
expert reports on competition law issues of general importance 
(Art. 47, Cartel Law)
Notification The office notifies the insured about any final decision it intends 
to take on a claim for benefits (Art. 57a, Disability Insurance Act)
Conclusions of 
certain reports
The report of the study must include the following information: 
Conclusions and recommendations (Art. 8 II, HIV Studies 
Ordinance)
Invitations The office invites organizations which have concluded an 
agreement, along with those enterprises engaged in distribution 
and projection in the respective film region and which have not 
finalized an agreement concerning diversity in their offer, to 
submit their agreements in writing (Art. 5 I, Film Ordinance)
Wishes The International Telecommunications Union formulate 
recommendations and opinions […] concerning 
telecommunication matters (Art. 1 II h, ITU Constitution)
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Depending on the context, even objectively presented information or 
description may have an incentive effect. The scientific observation that 
‘smoking kills’, when affixed to a cigarette package, can be interpreted as 
a recommendation not to smoke.
However, unilateral, non-obligatory acts are not exhausted by recom-
mendations alone. A series of special cases attests to this.
7.2.1.2  Special Cases
Many special cases demonstrate that non-obligatory acts take a different 
form than recommendations. Thus, in areas where international relations 
are strongly intertwined, foreign law can have a place in national law like 
that of soft law. Switzerland’s adoption of EU law provides an illustration. 
As a non-EU member, Switzerland is not obligated to follow EU law. 
Nevertheless, it behooves—and helps—the Swiss to follow EU law, as 
appropriate. The same could be said of domestic draft law: it can exert real 
influence in helping interpret a rule, justify a litigious legal basis, or antici-
pate potential implementation issues (Flückiger 2004: 205 et seq.). These 
are not examples of recommendations, as neither a foreign law nor a 
domestic draft law in itself has a recommendatory purpose.
Swiss law also produces administrative orders, which encompass circu-
lars, directives, instructions, guides, and similar material. These are not 
binding on the administered but are binding on those who administer 
(Moor et al. 2012: 420 et. seq.). The former may be interested in comply-
ing almost by reflex, particularly when such orders affect their legal 
situation.
In urban planning, certain actions are obligatory, the best known of 
which are land allocation plans (Section 21, Land Use Planning Act). Many 
other actions are only partly required, or not required at all, and in this 
case, they bind only the authorities (Moor and Poltier 2011: 578 et seq.).
7.2.2  Concerted Non-obligatory Acts
The soft law toolkit includes concerted acts, referred to here as arrange-
ments. This notion of concerted non-obligatory acts is also known in 
international public law, and are called gentlemen’s agreements, non- 
binding agreements, joint statements, charters, arrangements, codes of 
conduct, and the like (Daillier et al. 2009: 422 et seq.; Pauwelyn et al. 
2012; on codes of conduct specifically, see Keller 2008). Such acts unite 
flexibility with cooperation, two typical features of governance. They are 
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the favored expressions of self-regulation but should not be confounded 
with it. Numerous classifications are imaginable, but we focus here on 
concerted acts which have a degree of linkage to legal acts.
7.2.2.1  Preparing a Legal Act
Certain arrangements may be made in conjunction with preparing a legal 
act. We can mention (Flückiger 2004: 207 et seq.):
• a declaration of intent describing reciprocal concessions;
• an agreement on a draft decision;
• a consultation charter intended to frame the negotiations in con-
struction procedures;
• informal arrangements in the context of legislative consultation 
procedures.
Such arrangements may also be concluded between public authorities 
(see Article 31a EPA, which provides for a mediation procedure if the 
cantons cannot agree).
7.2.2.2  Implementing a Legal Act
Other arrangements are meant to help implement the legal rules, such as 
those for environmental audits in which the state agrees to reduce the 
intensity of surveillance in return for commitments by a company to 
implement an audit and certification system (Subilia-Rouge 2010: N. 51).
7.2.2.3  Preventing a Legal Act
Some gentlemen’s agreements are concluded with the aim of preventing 
the state from carrying out a legal act. In return, individuals provide a ser-
vice which makes it possible to respond more appropriately to the problem 
that the legal act was meant to resolve. In legal terms, if the renunciation 
of the power to legislate does not rest on a legal basis, the state can always 
intervene. In this situation, individuals could not avail themselves of this 
renunciation should the state nevertheless decide to legislate (Decision of 
the Federal Supreme Court of 7 July 1992: ATF 118 lb. 367, 380, § 9b 
and d). This type of arrangement is therefore based on a dual relationship. 
On the one hand, it is a relationship—in the nature of a recommenda-
tion—between the state and private individuals. On the other hand, it is a 
link—at times obligatory—between individuals that makes it possible to 
implement the substituted mechanism (Errass 2010: 62 et seq.).
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One should note here that codes of professional ethics are very informal 
precursors of this type of arrangement. They make it possible to avoid hav-
ing public authorities themselves adopting rules to monitor the profes-
sion. The Swiss National Bank used such informal arrangements as early as 
the 1930s, and they were gradually integrated into ordinary law and thus 
lost their initial informality. More recently, public authorities have con-
cluded many gentlemen’s agreements (Brunner 2004).
Swiss law provides several examples of the gradual formalization of the 
vertical relationship between the state and individuals:
• In environmental matters, the law now requires the public authori-
ties to work with private sector organizations to enforce the law. The 
public authorities are free to encourage sectoral agreements by indi-
cating targets and timelines. However, before issuing implementa-
tion requirements, they must examine voluntary private sector 
measures. Wherever possible and necessary, sectoral agreements are 
to be incorporated into the implementing regulations, in whole or in 
part (Art. 41a, EPA).
• ‘Damoclean’ laws institutionalize the vertical relationship of an 
agreement by specifying the objectives to be attained, the state’s 
commitment to not legislate pending finding a self-regulating solu-
tion, and its substitution mechanism should the specified objectives 
not be reached. The CO2 Emissions Reduction Act was designed in 
this manner (other examples can be found in Flückiger 2005). There 
are other cases which are simply meant to keep the state from making 
a decision in a particular case.
• The most questionable, in a legal sense, are those agreements in 
which the public authorities tolerate an activity in exchange for spe-
cific actions to be carried out by the citizens. To try to frame such 
practices in the most sensitive areas, legislators have formalized the 
question. This is the case when relief is granted by the public author-
ities when the remediation of an ecologically non-compliant installa-
tion is disproportionate (Article 17 (1), EPA).
• By contrast, there are agreements to nullify illegal situations, such as 
informal agreements reached to clean up contaminated sites. The 
public authorities should try to reach an agreement with the persons 
directly affected and may renounce making a formal decision if 
enforcement of the measures can be otherwise assured (Article 23, 
Contaminated Sites Ordinance).
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7.2.3  Material Acts
Among non-obligatory state acts, one can also speak of material acts in 
the narrow sense. Their common point is their use of concrete mea-
sures. Examples include building traffic obstructions to mitigate traffic 
flows, installing gates or barriers to prevent trespassing, installing 
mechanisms which keep vehicles from starting until the cars’ seat belts 
have been fastened, or regulating the Internet by using its technical 
architecture.
Such material acts in the narrow sense are not legally binding but are 
instead concrete actions. Unlike mandatory or voluntary norms, acts of 
this kind influence behavior through facts rather than declarations. One 
can therefore say this type of state action is neither ‘law’ nor even ‘soft’. 
Transgression, when it is possible, provokes consequences at the level of 
facts. Still, depending on the case, such a transgression can be more penal-
izing than the transgression of a legal act. For example, repairing shock 
absorbers damaged by driving too quickly over a speed bump meant to 
slow cars down may ultimately prove more expensive than paying a fine for 
speeding.
7.3  LegAL effectS of non-obLIgAtory StAte ActS
Although state actions under soft law are in principle not legally binding, 
they are nonetheless legally relevant (Moor et  al. 2012: 410 et  seq.). 
Indeed, they can infringe on rights, fundamental or not. Article 35 (2) of 
the Swiss Constitution, in fact, states that ‘whoever acts on behalf of the 
state is bound by fundamental rights and is under an obligation to contrib-
ute to their implementation’. This ensures that material acts, in a broad 
sense, are subject to concrete legal control (Decision of the Federal 
Supreme Court of 13 November 2006: ATF 133 I 49, 56). In this case, 
examining non-obligatory state acts makes it possible to detect a specific 
normativity, one staggered in several steps.
Thus, in some very particular cases, non-obligatory state acts may 
become mandatory. For example, the Federal Food Act empowered the 
Federal Council to order that certain sections of the Food Manual are 
binding, even though the manual itself was a recommendation (Articles 
22 (2) and (3)). Another example is provided by the Competition 
Commission. Indeed, given ‘good faith’ principles (noted in both Art. 5 
and Art. 9 of the Swiss Constitution), this Commission is obliged to 
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apply the criteria it adopts and publishes in documents called ‘general 
notices’ (see Art. 6 (1) of the Cartel Act), which are without binding 
force.
Legislation may also include special clauses which indirectly confer a 
binding force on a non-obligatory act, such as when a law states that deci-
sion X must be consistent with recommendation Y, which means there is 
no choice but to comply with the recommendation. Thus, in constructing 
high-current electrical equipment, the technical recommendations of the 
association of Swiss electric power stations ‘must be followed’ (Article 7 
(2), High Current Ordinance).
Less frequent are the cases in which a recommendation is included in a 
normative act. Here the recommendation has no direct effect on individu-
als. It can however bind other public authorities, especially those in a hier-
archical or supervisory relationship. For example, according to the Federal 
Road Traffic Ordinance, car lights ‘should’ be on even during daylight 
hours (Article 31, FRTO). The Federal Office of Energy, for example, no 
longer has the right to make a recommendation to the contrary, on the 
grounds that compliance with such a measure would increase fuel con-
sumption and increase pollution.
A governmental recommendation may also have a permissive effect, in 
that it legitimizes the action of those who follow it. In this case, its recipi-
ents do not commit an offense by acting in a manner which is recom-
mended. If it was to be considered that they committed one, it would 
mean that the act itself is contrary to the law. This implies that such acts 
can be controlled by a judicial body in case of doubt as to their compatibil-
ity with legal norms.
Finally, the public authorities may define, using a legal standard or 
norm, the jurisdiction for adopting a non-obligatory act. Here again, such 
a rule does not bind the addressees. However, it has a legal effect since the 
public authorities still must act within the framework thus drawn. It is the 
same when the law incorporates such an act into a more general proce-
dural framework. The enactment of the recommendation is then a prelimi-
nary step in a process which leads to adopting a legal act. The result is a 
legal effect, since the failure to enact may constitute a procedural defect. 
In this case, the non-obligatory act constitutes a prerequisite for the adop-
tion of the obligatory act. For example, Article 14 of the Price Surveillance 
Act requires the public authority in charge to obtain a ruling from the 
Price Regulator when required by law.
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7.4  the ImpLementAtIon of non-obLIgAtory StAte 
ActS
When the authority resorts to governance mechanisms which are not 
binding, one can legitimately wonder whether these have a useful effect on 
society. To answer this, one needs to address the more general issue of the 
effectiveness of soft law (Sect. 7.4.1) and then examine the techniques 
which have been developed to strengthen it (Sect. 7.4.2).
7.4.1  The Effectiveness of Soft Law
The addressees of acts of soft law are not legally bound to follow them. 
Nevertheless, such acts are recognized as having a concrete effect of vary-
ing intensity (Moor et  al. 2012: 415 et  seq.)—and many non-binding 
state acts do not need to be legally binding to be regarded as politically 
imperative. Obedience obviously does not depend on attractiveness or 
fear, consequences classically sought by the law. They instead depend on 
moral, ethical, political, economic, or psychological considerations.
Some examples serve to illustrate the power and influence of acts of 
soft law. Thus, the 1999 Bologna Declaration has led to a rapid and 
profound reform of the practices in institutions of higher education 
throughout Europe even though the Declaration itself is devoid of 
legal force. Public administration offices or courts are also likely to use 
soft law to interpret legal rules, though here the effect is indirect. For 
example, the European Court of Human Rights has condemned 
Romania for violating the right everyone has ‘to respect for his private 
and family life and his home’ (Article 8, European Convention on 
Human Rights) on the grounds that Romania has not stopped mining 
for gold ore, despite the precautionary principle enshrined in the Rio 
Declaration, a non-obligatory act (Tatar vs. Romania, 27 January 
2009, vs. 120; Ailincai 2017).
Fear of civil or criminal liability can act as a strong incentive to com-
ply with a recommendation. Following a drowning, the head of a water 
park was convicted of negligent homicide, on the grounds that a CCTV 
camera placed underwater, as recommended by the Swiss Accident 
Prevention Bureau, could have prevented this death (Federal Supreme 
Court, Decision 6S.358/2004 of 10 November 2004, paragraphs 5.3 
and 7.2).
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In some cases, the effects of soft law may be even more severe. The clas-
sic example is provided by alerts issued against defective products. Due to 
the potential damage to the image of the company, the publicity generated 
by issuing a warning (a non-obligatory act) carries greater weight than a 
simple notification prohibiting the distribution of a defective product (an 
obligatory act).
7.4.2  Techniques for Reinforcing Effectiveness
The state can resort to various mechanisms, both psychological and legal, 
to increase the effectiveness of the actions it takes. Techniques from social 
psychology or affective science can be particularly effective; they make 
tactical use of the emotions of addressees of an act by evoking feelings of 
fear, guilt, or desire. The use of such techniques, however, is clearly an 
issue in a society predicated on freedom and individual autonomy. They 
must therefore be justified, all the more so because of the weaker demo-
cratic legitimacy of soft law (Flückiger 2009).
Mechanisms of a legal nature can also strengthen the respect for soft 
law. Those to whom such soft law is directed remain free to follow them 
or not, but the de facto constraint can be strong, and in terms of its effects, 
may be indistinguishable from a legal constraint. Take the example of 
financial or regulatory pressure. The behavior an incentive tax or a subsidy 
suggests is only a recommended path, but not following it may be expen-
sive or even jeopardize the existing system.
Legislation may also require that a recommendation be used simply as 
a basis for making a decision or that exemption from a recommendation 
be motivated (non-binding imperative clauses). Public authorities are 
not obliged to scrupulously follow the provisions contained in such a 
soft law act, but must instead use it as a basis in the decision-making 
process. Thus, the Federal Veterinary Office, in preparing and publishing 
statistics, takes international recommendations ‘into account’ (Article 
147 II, Animal Protection Ordinance). Finally, legislators can insert a 
retrospective evaluation clause regarding the implementation of a non-
obligatory act. Under Swiss law, for example, the federal government 
must ‘inform’ the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of actions taken 
as a result of safety recommendations, or the reasons measures are not 
being taken (Art. 32 Directive on investigating aviation accidents and 
serious incidents).
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7.5  concLuSIon: LegItImIzIng Soft LAw, 
beyond effIcIency
Implementing the goals of public policy is no longer conceivable today 
without the use of soft law, as the Swiss case amply demonstrates. Indeed, 
the flexibility in adopting such instruments, combined with the effects 
they are likely to have, makes them indispensable in terms of efficiency.
However, as noted in the introduction, such soft law tools are problem-
atic inasmuch as they do not enjoy the same democratic legitimacy as 
ordinary acts of law. If soft law had no effect, this would not pose particu-
lar problems, but as we have shown, this is not the case. Faced with this 
situation, it is necessary that public authorities adopt legitimization mea-
sures adapted to the particularities of soft law. One can suggest the follow-
ing: the more non-obligatory acts by the state infringe on a right (at 
whatever level), and/or the more important their effects, the more one 
must ensure they are treated as equivalent to ordinary legal acts.
Specifically, a non-imperative act must be treated by the legal system 
almost the same way a legal act is when its effects are virtually obligatory 
(or very binding in fact), and when it affects a right extensively. Conversely, 
a non-imperative act which is devoid of effect and does not encroach on a 
right can have a quiet existence far from the legal constraints of the state.
In this perspective, the public authorities then need to become creative 
in finding ways to legitimize soft law. On the one hand, they must respect 
the values underlying basic principles of the rule of law: legality, public 
interest, proportionality, equality, and prohibiting arbitrariness. On the 
other hand, they must avoid codifying acts of soft law to the point of sac-
rificing their effectiveness.
Analysis needs to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, according to 
the different types of acts and the contexts in which they occur. For exam-
ple, we can cite the requirement that recommendations be carried out in 
a way that respects the principles of objectivity and transparency, or the 
need for a consultation in order to guarantee an open, consensual, and 
participatory process when it comes to non-obligatory urban planning 
acts. It is also conceivable that procedural guarantees be increased (estab-
lishing a consultation process, providing a right to be heard before a rec-
ommendation is adopted, or publishing charters).
Finally, one needs to ensure soft law acts can be reviewed. Long limited 
to liability law, Swiss law has now been extended to allow for the judicial 
review of non-obligatory acts. Thus, any person with an interest worthy of 
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protection can request that the public authorities refrain from illicit acts, 
cease trying to carry them out (or even revoke them), eliminate their con-
sequences, or recognize their illegality. The responsible public authorities 
then reach a decision on this demand, one subject to appeal (Article 25a 
of the Federal Act on Administrative Procedure). In the case of an infringe-
ment of a fundamental right, at least one which is sufficiently grave, Article 
35 (2) of the Swiss Constitution cited above imposes legal control (see 
also Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 13 November 2006: ATF 
133 I 49, 56).
It is not always possible to have a judge intervene, and in such cases, it 
is preferable to develop alternative control mechanisms, such as mediation 
bodies, an evaluation of public policies, or reporting to the relevant super-
visory authority.
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CHAPTER 8
Judicial Federalism and Constitutional 
Review in the Swiss Judiciary
Pascal Mahon
8.1  IntroductIon
This chapter deals with the Swiss judicial system. Its aim is to succinctly 
present the judicial system and to highlight its main features, though 
length constraints limit this overview to the essential characteristics of the 
system and what makes it unique. The focus is on two elements: the fed-
eralized manner in which the judiciary is organized (Sect. 8.2), and the 
particularities of Swiss constitutional justice (also called constitutional 
jurisdiction) (Sect. 8.3).
The chapter first describes the organization of the judicial system, 
which is strongly marked by the federal character of Switzerland (so there 
is a pronounced judicial federalism). The philosophy of the system at the 
federal level is presented, and judicial organization of the cantons is briefly 
described. The chapter then describes the Swiss system of judicial review 
(control of the constitutionality of the laws and other state acts), a system 
which is relatively complete and extended, but, at the same time, has a 
notable exception in international comparison: Switzerland lacks judicial 
review of federal laws (and international law).
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8.2  JudIcIal organIzatIon In general: 
a Pronounced JudIcIal FederalIsm
8.2.1  Judicial Federalism and ‘Reforming the Judiciary’
Swiss judicial organization remains very marked by federalism. The appli-
cation of cantonal law naturally lies with the cantonal judicial authorities. 
Less naturally, the application of federal law is to a great extent also in the 
hands of the cantonal judicial authorities. This is generally true for nearly 
all civil law and practically all criminal law (Art. 122 and 123, respectively, 
of the Swiss Federal Constitution, abbreviated Const.). Hence, divorces 
are finalized and murderers prosecuted and punished under material fed-
eral law (following the Civil or the Penal Code), by cantonal and not 
federal prosecuting authorities and courts.
This very pronounced judicial federalism differs from other systems, 
such as the American, in which two complete, but separate, judicial organi-
zations coexist and yet are superimposed. Put simply, US federal courts 
deal with federal and inter-state matters while state courts deal with cases 
arising within their respective states. This is not the case in Switzerland, 
other than in a few rare cases recently introduced in the context of what is 
called ‘the reform of the judiciary’, which is discussed later in this chapter.
Since modern Switzerland began, which is to say since the advent of the 
modern federal state in 1848, each of the cantons has had a complete 
judicial organization. Today, their mission, in matters of civil and criminal, 
and to some extent administrative, is to apply federal law in the same man-
ner as the application of cantonal law. In return, the constituent power in 
1848 dispensed with creating an entire federal judicial apparatus. It left to 
the cantonal judicial authorities, as subordinate bodies, the task of guaran-
teeing the application of federal law. The federal power limited itself for a 
long time to only establishing a single higher instance, the Federal Supreme 
Court, which itself was made permanent only in 1874.
This sharing of organizational and judicial competencies has been 
somewhat modified in recent years as the result of a constitutional amend-
ment to reform the judiciary approved by the voters and the cantons on 
12 March 2000. Its purpose was to give the Confederation the power to 
legislate in procedural matters in civil and criminal domains (through 
amendments to Art. 122 and 123 Const.), though the organization of the 
judiciary and the administration of justice were to remain, in principle, in 
the hands of the cantons (Haller 2016: 80).
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In addition, Articles 188 et seq. of the Federal Constitution were modi-
fied to permit a complete revision of the Federal Judicial Organization Act 
intended to introduce a single appeal to the Federal Supreme Court and 
to regulate—meaning limit—access to this tribunal (Federal Council 
2001: 4000). The creation of two new federal courts of first instance, a 
Federal Criminal Court and a Federal Administrative Court, followed by 
a Federal Patent Court, was also provided for (Art. 191a Const.).
On 1 January 2007, the new Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) of 17 
June 2005, which replaced the old Federal Judicial Organization Act of 
1943, entered into force. To unify criminal and civil procedures, the 
Federal Parliament adopted a new Criminal Procedure Code on 5 October 
2007 and a new Civil Procedure Code on 19 December 2008. These 
codes, which entered into force on 1 January 2011, replaced the 26 can-
tonal codes of criminal procedure and of civil procedure.
As part of the revision of the Swiss Constitution in 1999, a number of 
new statutes were adopted concerning the two new Federal Courts of First 
Instance; the Federal Criminal Court Act (of 4 October 2002), later replaced 
by the Federal Criminal Law Justice Authorities Act of 19 March 2010, in 
force as of 1 January 2011; the Federal Administrative Court Act of 17 June 
2005, in force as of 1 January 2007; and the Federal Patent Court Act of 20 
March 2009, in force as of 1 March 2010. We will return briefly below to 
these different federal courts of first instance. First, however, the Federal 
Supreme Court, Switzerland’s highest court of law, will be presented.
8.2.2  The Federal Supreme Court
8.2.2.1  The Dual Role of the Federal Supreme Court
The Federal Supreme Court is ‘the supreme judicial authority of the 
Confederation’ (Art. 188 (1) Const.).
The Federal Supreme Court has a dual role. On the one hand, it must 
ensure that national law is interpreted and applied in a uniform  manner, 
whether these are legislative acts, regulations, or international law (where 
it plays the role of supreme judge). On the other hand, it needs to guar-
antee that both federal and cantonal constitutions are respected, including 
protecting the constitutional rights of individuals (where it plays the role 
of constitutional judge). It is therefore one and the same court which, 
as supreme authority, performs the functions of ordinary judge (in civil, 
criminal, and administrative matters) as well as constitutional judge of 
the Confederation. As compared with the French judicial system, the 
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Swiss Federal Supreme Court combines the roles of the Cour de cassa-
tion (the highest court in civil and criminal matters), the Conseil d’Etat 
(the highest court for administrative justice), and the Conseil constitu-
tionnel (the highest constitutional review authority). In German terms, 
it combines the roles of the Bundesgerichtshof, Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 
Bundesfinanzhof, Bundesarbeitsgericht, Bundessozialgericht, as well as that 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
Consequently, it generally only intervenes as a last resort. As already 
noted, the control over the application of cantonal law is not only the 
business of the cantonal courts, but is largely true in the application of 
federal law—at least at the lower levels—as well. The cantons all have com-
plete, multi-level judicial organizations, but with exceptions for specific 
areas, the Swiss Confederation has few lower instances. So for the most 
part, the Federal Supreme Court only acts once the cantonal courts have 
done their work, and then as a court of appeals against their judgments, 
whether in civil (Art. 72 et seq. FSCA) or criminal matters (Arts. 78 et seq. 
FSCA), and in public law (Art. 82 et seq. FSCA). Only in exceptional cases 
does it judge certain cases as the sole instance, for example, when jurisdic-
tional disputes arise between federal and cantonal authorities, or between 
cantons (Art. 120 (1) (a) and (b) FSCA).
The law provides for various means of legal redress in bringing a case to 
the Federal Supreme Court: three ordinary (civil law, criminal law, and pub-
lic law appeals) and one extraordinary (a subsidiary constitutional appeal). As 
conditions for admissibility, it also places certain limitations on access, such 
as setting minimum values in civil or administrative litigation or even restrict-
ing access entirely. The FSCA (Art. 83), for example, gives a long list [from 
a. to x.] of areas where a public law appeal is not admissible, for example.
8.2.2.2  The Composition of the Federal Supreme Court 
and the Appointment of Judges
By law, the Federal Supreme Court is composed of 35 to 45 ordinary 
judges (Art. 1 (3), FSCA); the number of deputy judges may not exceed 
two-thirds of the number of ordinary judges (Art. 1 (4) FSCA). Through 
a regulation, it is in fact the Federal Assembly which determines the num-
ber of judges (Art. 1 (5), FSCA). As of 30 September 2011, this was set at 
38 ordinary judges and 19 deputy judges. It is also the Federal Assembly, 
meaning both houses of Parliament, which elects the federal judges (Arts. 
168 (1) and 157 (1) a) Const.).
In practice, Parliament tries to adhere to a proportional representation 
of the different linguistic regions, the two Christian denominations and, 
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above all, the main political parties represented in the Federal Assembly. 
As a result, federal judges are always associated with a (major) political 
party (Lienhard et al. 2017: 417–419). When a vacancy occurs, it is the 
political party of the retiring judge which, in principle, selects and presents 
replacement candidates to the Judicial Committee of the Federal Assembly. 
The National Council (lower house) is re-elected every four years; if a 
significant modification in the equilibrium of the political forces takes 
place, the new power balance can be taken into account when one or more 
vacancies appear in the Federal Supreme Court, whence the composition 
of the latter can be adapted to the new order. Ordinary judges and depu-
ties are elected for a six-year period and can be re-elected (Art. 145 Const. 
and Art. 9 (1) FSCA).
It is a peculiarity of the Swiss judiciary system that federal judges are 
elected on a partisan basis, and for a limited time period, by Parliament. 
Cantons follow suit: some even provide for the popular election of judges, 
and the terms can vary from one to as many as ten years, depending on the 
canton.1 Such a judicial system is often little understood abroad, given the 
principle of an independent judiciary. This process is rarely strongly contested 
in theory and is fairly widely accepted in Switzerland, as it is seen to guarantee 
to the citizens that judges will represent the existing, and differing, political 
tendencies or sensitivities in society, at least as represented in Parliament.
According to many authors and even some magistrates, it can give the 
third power—as with the other two—the democratic legitimacy and the 
transparency it needs. Added to this argument is the fact that this system 
is the result of a long tradition and reflects the Swiss conception of democ-
racy. However, the democratic argument loses force with regard to re- 
election, as judges in most cantons and at the federal level are subject to 
re-election at regular intervals (Mahon and Schaller 2013a, b). It is theo-
retically possible that a judge will not be re-elected, and that at the discre-
tion of politicians and without reasons given; this can pose problems in 
terms of judicial independence. One cannot rule out the potential influ-
ence which could be exerted and which could threaten a re-election.
However, while there is no right to be re-elected, in practice, at least 
thus far, re-election has always been the rule and non-re-election the 
exception. Judges are virtually never removed for political reasons. The 
rare cases of a failure to reelect were due to a dysfunction, not politics. 
Thus, despite the theoretical risk to the independence of the magistrates 
1 The only exception is the canton of Fribourg where judges are elected by the cantonal 
Parliament, but since 1 January 2008, for an unlimited period.
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which the system suggests, in practice such independence has been  relatively 
well ensured until now. In Switzerland, the risks to an independent judi-
ciary are also linked to the small size of the (cantonal, especially in the 
first instance) territories in which magistrates exercise their office. The 
‘cantonalisation’ of the judicial system, and in the cantons, its organization 
into districts, results in an almost complete absence of mobility.
Another peculiarity in recruitment is the absence of initial vocational 
training for becoming a judge in Switzerland, in contrast to the relatively 
extensive training which exists, and is required, abroad. However, for fed-
eral judgeships, Parliament only selects experienced and eminent jurists 
from the ranks of the cantonal judges, though they sometimes also choose 
lawyers or university professors (Lienhard et al. 2017: 418).
Finally, at the cantonal level, cantonal laws sometimes require that 
judges be domiciled in the canton where they exercise their office.
8.2.2.3  The Structure of the Federal Supreme Court
The headquarters of the Federal Supreme Court are in Lausanne (Art. 4 (1) 
FSCA), and the work of the court is organized by the domains of law they 
address. The two divisions which address social law are located in Lucerne 
(Art. 4 (2) FSCA). Currently, there are two public law divisions (each with 
six judges), two civil law divisions (one with five, the other with six judges), 
one criminal law division (five judges), and two social law courts (each with 
five members). They serve as appeals courts to challenge the judgments of 
lower cantonal and federal authorities. Other bodies also exist, with their 
member judges who belong to one of the seven divisions. They include an 
Appeals Commission, composed of three ordinary judges, which decides in 
particular about personnel and transparency issues, and two administrative 
bodies, the Conference of Presidents and the Administrative Commission.
With the exception of the powers—essentially administrative—for 
which the law requires plenary sessions, the Federal Supreme Court exer-
cises its judicial powers through its divisions, which deliberate alone, 
unless one of them proposes to derogate from the case law of one or more 
other divisions, in which case an agreement of that (or those) divisions is 
necessary (Art. 23 FSCA). The law provides that the divisions are consti-
tuted for two years, and as a rule, sit as a three-judge court which is assisted 
by a law clerk (Haller 2016: 154, 155; Lienhard et al. 2017: 415, 416). If 
a case concerns a legal question of principle or if a judge so requests, this 
can be raised to five. A five-judge court is also necessary for appeals against 
a cantonal act which can be subjected to a referendum, as well as cantonal 
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decisions about the admissibility of an initiative or the requirements of a 
referendum (Art. 18 et seq. FSCA).
In principle, court sessions are open; remarkably, this is also true for the 
deliberations as well as voting. However, the law provides for the possibil-
ity of ordering a closed session (Art. 57 et seq. FSCA) (Haller 2016: 155). 
In practice, it is possible to choose a simplified procedure, specifically 
when the decision is to not consider a case (Art. 108 and 109 FSCA), in 
which judges decide unanimously and by circulating material (Art. 58 
FSCA). Open or public deliberations have become rare or very rare.
8.2.3  The Other Federal Courts
As noted earlier, as part of the ‘reforming the judiciary’, and in particular to 
relieve the Federal Supreme Court, the Federal Assembly created new federal 
courts of first instance which had not previously existed: the Federal Criminal 
Court, the Federal Administrative Court, and the Federal Patent Court.
8.2.3.1  The Federal Criminal Court
If the application of the federal criminal law is largely in the hands of the 
cantonal judicial authorities, in the sense that crimes and offenses are in 
principle prosecuted and judged by the cantonal prosecuting authorities 
and courts, there are still certain categories of infractions whose prosecu-
tion and adjudication are the responsibility of the federal authorities 
(namely, the Federal Public Prosecutor and Federal Criminal Court). 
These include crimes committed against federal authorities or members of 
foreign states, offenses related to the use of explosives or toxic gases, and 
crimes and offenses related to forging money. They also include falsifying 
watermarks, stamps, or official titles used by the Confederation, genocide 
and crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes against the state and 
national defense, crimes which go against the will of the people and the 
public authorities, and other matters (see the list of offenses listed in Art. 
23 and 24 Criminal Procedure Code).
As the first instance, the Federal Criminal Court therefore judges crimi-
nal cases which fall within the purview and competence of the Confederation; 
its decisions can then be appealed to the Federal Supreme Court.
The Federal Criminal Court has its seat in Bellinzona and is composed 
of 15–35 ordinary judges who are elected by the Federal Assembly. As per 
a parliamentary order of 13 December 2013, there are currently 16 ordi-
nary judges and three deputies serving on this court.
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8.2.3.2  The Federal Administrative Court
On 1 January 2007, the Federal Administrative Court replaced the 30 or 
so federal administrative appeals boards that had previously existed. They 
had been responsible for reviewing, on appeal, the application of federal 
administrative law in their specific area of competence.
Generally speaking, it is the responsibility of the cantonal administra-
tions to apply federal administrative law. Thus, to take the example of road 
traffic, cantonal offices are responsible for applying the federal laws regard-
ing car registration. By having the cantons administer federal substantive 
law, the Confederation had thus been—and is—able to avoid setting up 
and maintaining a ponderous network of federal offices. In various 
domains, it has been satisfied with maintaining a relatively small adminis-
trative apparatus that in essence supervises the application of federal sub-
stantive law by the cantons.
In some areas, however, the federal legislature has chosen to entrust the 
application of federal administrative law not to the cantons but to a spe-
cific federal administrative unit which is created and set up to this end. 
This is the case, for example, in asylum law, where the decisions about 
applying the federal laws on asylum are taken by a federal entity, the State 
Secretariat for Migration (SEM, formerly the Federal Office for Refugees 
and then the Federal Office for Migration). This is also the case in a num-
ber of other, quite disparate domains, including applying customs, nuclear 
energy, and organ transplantation laws and regulations.
However, in matters of federal administrative law, litigation is orga-
nized following a distinction related to competencies. Thus, when federal 
administrative law is applied in a given field by a cantonal instance, then 
recourse is first sought in that canton’s administrative court. Only then, 
insofar as a further appeal is admissible, does it go to the Federal Supreme 
Court. But if federal administrative law is implemented through an admin-
istrative authority of the Confederation, then the appeal is to a federal 
judicial authority, which since 2007, is the Federal Administrative Court. 
In this new Court, competencies previously scattered among specialized 
appeals boards have been concentrated in a single appellate authority of 
first instance.
As long as the law does not preclude the possibility, decisions of the 
Federal Administrative Court may be appealed to the Federal Supreme 
Court (Art. 1 (2) FACA). The Federal Administrative Court has its seat in 
St. Gallen, and is composed of 50–70 judges who are elected by the 
Federal Assembly. As per a parliamentary order of 17 June 2005, there are 
currently 65 judges serving on this court.
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8.2.3.3  The Federal Patent Court
The Federal Patent Court Law came into force on 1 March 2010. This 
Court rules as the first instance of the Confederation in matters of patents, 
replacing the cantonal courts which previously had competence in this area.
The Federal Patent Court has its seat at the Federal Administrative 
Court. It is composed of two ordinary judges and 41 deputy judges who 
must have technical training, meaning that 28 non-permanent judges pos-
sess technical training and 13 have legal training. All of them have proven 
knowledge of patent law, and all are elected by the Federal Assembly.
8.2.4  Judicial Organization in the Cantons
The cantons have a great deal of autonomy in terms of judicial organiza-
tion. With the exception of the federal courts just discussed, all Swiss judi-
cial authorities do indeed proceed from cantonal law.2 However, what 
characterizes this cantonal judiciary organization is its extreme diversity 
from canton to canton. This is not only a horizontal diversity between 
cantons but also vertical: one has to distinguish, in each canton, between 
the civil, criminal, and administrative jurisdictions.
The Swiss Constitution expressly states that the cantons ‘are responsi-
ble for the organization of the courts and the administration of justice in 
civil matters’ (Art. 122 (2) Const.), and the same is true for jurisdiction in 
criminal cases (Art. 123 (2) Const.). The Swiss Constitution does not 
expressly state the same for administrative matters, but jurisdiction here is 
based similarly on the organizational autonomy of the cantons. The orga-
nization of the cantonal judicial authorities includes the questions of ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, the conditions of appointments and remunerations of 
the judges, and the finances and the overseeing of the management of 
courts (Tophinke 2013: 273, 274; Lienhard et al. 2017: 419).
For civil and criminal matters, cantons generally have two authorities at 
their disposal in their judicial organization. The judicial system is often 
organized into lower courts, constituted by district or region, depending 
on the canton, and a single superior instance, usually called the Cantonal 
Court. In administrative matters, the application of cantonal administra-
tive law is generally the responsibility of the cantonal administration and 
its departments. Their activities and decisions are usually overseen by the 
2 One should also note the exception of military courts and military jurisdiction, both 
under federal law; they are not addressed further here.
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higher cantonal administrative court, which is the final cantonal instance 
before appealing to the Federal Supreme Court.
8.3  constItutIonal JurIsdIctIon: an extensIve 
revIew wIth a notable excePtIon
The so-called in Switzerland ‘constitutional jurisdiction’ (constitutional 
justice) is well developed and combines different types of constitutional 
review (Auer 1983).
Different types of constitutional review are generally identified. It is 
either centralized in the hands of a (supreme or constitutional) court or 
decentralized (Cappelleti 1970). It should also be noted that an abstract 
constitutional review occurs in the absence of a concrete case of applica-
tion. The Court simply reviews the constitutionality of norms and these 
will either not come into force or be repealed. By contrast, concrete con-
stitutional review takes place when an individual decision is based on 
potentially unconstitutional legislation and the court conducts a prelimi-
nary review of the legal norm.
Paradoxically, and despite the worldwide enlargement of constitutional 
justice (Hertig Randall 2010: 221 et seq.), there has been a notable excep-
tion in Swiss law with respect to a category of legal norms: federal laws. 
Indeed, even if they are unconstitutional, federal laws must be applied by 
courts and authorities. With the exception of this limitation, all state acts 
(promulgated in the form either of federal statutes, ordinances, and 
decrees or decisions), whether adopted by federal, cantonal, or municipal 
authorities, are subject to constitutional review.
To outline the main aspects of constitutional justice in Switzerland, we 
therefore first examine it from the perspective of legal instruments (Sect. 
8.3.1). Then we will examine the peculiarity of having an absence of review 
of federal laws (Sect. 8.3.2).
8.3.1  Legal Instruments Subject to Constitutional Review
As mentioned, other than federal laws (Art. 190 Const.), all legal instru-
ments are subject to constitutional control. Nevertheless, the type of 
review is not always the same. Two forms of instruments must be distin-
guished. First, there are ‘legal rules’ which express binding, abstract, and 
general norms. Such legal rules can be adopted by the Parliament (statutes 
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or ordinances) or by the Executive (ordinances or decrees) at the federal 
or cantonal level. These legal acts form the legislation. Second, the scope 
of some legal instruments can be limited to individual and concrete cases, 
which are then the ‘decisions’. Public authorities, such as public adminis-
tration or the judiciary, can adopt decisions. To look more precisely at 
consequences on the question of constitutional justice, we will start with 
the federal regulations. After that, we will consider the cantonal law and 
finally we will briefly look at decisions.
8.3.1.1  Federal Regulations
Federal legal rules can be adopted in the form of statutes and federal ordi-
nances, which are adopted by the Parliament (statutes and ordinances), 
the Executive (ordinances), or the department and offices of the federal 
public administration (ordinances). The sources of review are the Federal 
Constitution but also international law. However, not all appellants have 
the possibility of invoking all the provisions of the Federal Constitution, as 
will be seen.
A concrete constitutional review of federal legal acts is undertaken only 
when they are applied. This means that when the Federal Council or 
another federal authority adopts an ordinance contrary to the Constitution, 
individuals can only challenge the unconstitutional act in the framework of 
a specific case. In other words, other than in cases of action taken by can-
tons (see below), there is no ‘abstract constitutional review’ for federal 
legal rules, at least not one at the disposal of individuals.
Such a conception of constitutional review was adopted in 1874 in the 
first Federal Judicial Organization Act, and remained unquestioned. This 
option was not questioned either when a new Federal Judicial Organization 
Act was adopted in 1943, or in the latter’s replacing FSCA of 2005. 
However, as already mentioned, there is an exception to this absence of 
abstract review of federal (non-statutory) acts. Cantons can appeal to the 
Federal Supreme Court (the formerly so-called public law claim) by claim-
ing that a non-statutory act violates the Federal Constitution, in particular 
that it violates the division of powers between the Confederation and the 
cantons, thus encroaching on cantonal competencies. Through this form 
of appeal can cantons trigger an abstract constitutional review of federal 
acts by the Federal Court (Art. 189 (2) Const.). In this framework, the 
Federal Supreme Court does verify the constitutionality (and legality) of 
federal ordinances. In such cases, the Federal Supreme Court generally 
shows considerable restraint. If the ordinance is based on legislative dele-
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gation, the Federal Court limits itself to verifying that the author of the 
ordinance remained within the framework and limits of the delegation. 
Furthermore, insofar as the law does not authorize the delegate to dero-
gate from the Constitution, the Federal Supreme Court reviews the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance (for the formula generally used by the 
Federal Supreme Court see, e.g., the Decision of the Federal Supreme 
Court of 22 December 1978: ATF 104 Ib 412, 420, 421).
Let us add here that the constitutional review is not only concentrated 
in the hands of the Federal Supreme Court but also decentralized, mean-
ing that any federal or cantonal authority which is responsible for applying 
federal legislation in a given case must—or at least may—refuse to apply it 
if they consider it contrary to the Federal Constitution. The question of 
constitutionality may thus be raised at any stage when applying the legal 
rules and before any authority. In the end, this question can even be 
brought to the Federal Supreme Court in principle by ordinary means of 
appeal (whether in civil, criminal or public law matters).
8.3.1.2  Cantonal Law
The review of cantonal legislation is significantly more extensive than for 
federal legal rules in two respects. The review can be abstract as well as 
concrete and, in both cases, is available to individuals. It should be empha-
sized, however, that the Federal Supreme Court refuses to review—in 
principle—the cantonal constitutions, on the grounds that these have 
already been controlled by the Federal Assembly (Art. 172 (2) Const.) 
(Mahon 2014: 110, 111).
Concerning the sources of the review, it is first of all based on the 
Federal Constitution and on international law as well. There is also a con-
formity control with cantonal constitutional law or at least with certain 
parts of cantonal constitutional law. It must be added that the cantonal 
norms have to be in conformity with the federal law (see below).
The constitutional review of cantonal norms is decentralized, meaning 
it applies to all the procedures applying these norms. When applying a 
cantonal norm in a concrete case, all authorities, administrative or judicial, 
must—or at least can—refuse its application if they consider it contrary to 
the Federal Constitution. For example, an administrative court of a canton 
will thus refuse to apply a tax law if it considers it contrary to the principle 
of equality (Art. 8 (1) Const.) or refuse to apply a cantonal law on trade if 
it deems it contrary to economic freedom (Art. 27 Const.).
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The constitutional review of cantonal norms can also be abstract. 
Indeed, unlike federal acts, a cantonal or municipal act enforced can be 
appealed for violation of the Constitution outside any cases. In such a 
hypothesis, the appeal is brought directly before the Federal Court, which 
judges in principle as the sole and unique body. The review is therefore 
‘concentrated’. However, the cantons are also free to establish a constitu-
tional court which can review all the laws and ordinances of the canton 
(Bolkensteyn 2014). Some cantons have done so, including the canton of 
Jura (Art. 104 Constitution of Jura), the canton of Vaud (Art. 136 
Constitution of Vaud), the canton of Graubünden (Art. 55 Constitution 
of Graubünden), and the canton of Geneva (Art. 124 Constitution of 
Geneva). The cantons of Nidwalden and Zurich provide such review to a 
more limited extent (without control of the laws). In such cases, the indi-
viduals must first appeal to the cantonal authority and then, on review, 
take the case to the Federal Supreme Court. An appeal against a cantonal 
law must be sent to the Federal Supreme Court within 30 days of publish-
ing the cantonal act. Once this period has elapsed, the legal norms can no 
longer be reviewed in an abstract manner, but it can still be controlled in 
an application case (concrete control). However, the abstract control does 
not prevent—with exceptions—the entry into force of the norm.
As cantonal law is applied by the cantons, there is a general right of 
review in the cantonal judiciary. The remedy must be appealed to in the 
framework of the application of the norm. Indeed, in concrete cases, when 
two legal norms are in conflict, the judiciary must determine which one 
prevails and apply it. Such a power has been derived from the principle 
that federal laws break cantonal law (Art. 49 Const.) (Mahon 2014: 
141–143). Cantons are obliged by federal law to have courts of second 
instance, meaning cantonal courts or upper courts, and decisions they take 
can be brought to the Federal Supreme Court if they apply a cantonal 
norm that violates the Federal Constitution or a constitutional right, by an 
ordinary means of appeal (appeal in civil matters and appeal in criminal 
matters will however be rather rarer than appeal in matters of public law 
insofar as there are none or only few cantonal statutes in these fields). If 
none of these ordinary appeals are possible, the legislator has created a 
subsidiary constitutional appeal (Art. 113 FSCA) for which three condi-
tions must been fulfilled: the decision emanates from a cantonal authority 
of last instance, the appellant invokes a ‘violation of constitutional rights’, 
and the appellant must prove a ‘legal interest’ (Art. 113 to 116 FSCA).
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The means of appeal to review a cantonal legal act by the Federal 
Supreme Court, without any application, is always the public law remedy 
(Art. 82b (b) FSCA).
8.3.1.3  Decisions Taken by Federal or Cantonal Authorities
Administrative authorities and the judiciary make decisions in which legal 
rules are applied. Their common feature is that they concern an individual 
and specific case, and all levels—federal, cantonal, and local authorities—
can make such decisions. They are the last category to be considered under 
this section.
Such legal instruments are subject to reviews of their constitutionality 
regardless of the legal norm on which they are based. It is alleged that the 
decision itself is violating the Constitution. In other words, it is how the 
law is applied which is—supposedly—contrary to the Constitution and 
not the legal norm on which the decision is based. Unlike the decision, the 
legal norm can be entirely in accordance with the Constitution.
The remedies for the constitutionality review against such acts are those 
applied in general. As far as the Federal Supreme Court is concerned, as 
the last instance, the remedies (civil matters, criminal matters, public law 
matters or subsidiary constitutional appeal) depend on the subject. Appeals 
are directed either against the cantonal court, the Federal Administrative 
Court, the Federal Criminal Court or another federal authority (Haller 
2016: 153). Nevertheless, individual decisions taken by the Federal 
Assembly ( e.g. concerning the validity of a popular initiative) are excluded 
from the constitutional review despite the fact that it creates a conflict with 
the guarantee of access to the courts guaranteed by the Swiss constitution 
in Article 29 (Haller 2016: 263).
8.3.2  A Breach of the Rule of Law: The Case of Federal Laws 
(and of International Law)
Article 190 of the Federal Constitution provides that ‘the Federal Supreme 
Court and the other judicial authorities must apply the federal acts and 
international law’. Known as the ‘immunity clause’ of federal laws, the 
constitutional provision limits the constitutional review of legal norms in 
Switzerland. It implies that federal statutes adopted by the Federal 
Assembly, having found the endorsement—explicit or tacit—of the Swiss 
people, have to be applied even when they have no constitutional basis or 
are in conflict with the Federal Constitution. That being said, the Federal 
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Assembly must respect the Federal Constitution when adopting laws. To 
understand better the scope of such a limitation, we will briefly evoke the 
reasons behind it and question this breach in the Swiss constitutional jus-
tice. We will thereafter describe the extent of the notion of ‘immunity’ and 
will finish by presenting its mitigated effect due to international law.
8.3.2.1  Reasons and Questions on the Breach
This rule also applies to international laws. In this case, it is motivated by 
the concern of ensuring the international credibility of Switzerland. To 
put it another way, once an international law has been validly adopted, the 
binding rules resulting from international obligations must be respected.
The reason for limiting the constitutional review in Article 190 Const. 
is founded in concepts of separation of powers and direct democracy. The 
constituent power of 1874 made these two principles prevail over the idea 
of complete judicial control of legal norms. In short, the idea was that a 
federal law should rarely be contrary to the Constitution. Most often, it is 
the opinion of the sense of the Constitution which varies according to 
interpretations. Finally, there was also no reason to prefer the interpreta-
tion of a court to that of Parliament. Such a vision of the constituent 
power in 1848 occurs at a time where there were very few legislative pow-
ers and therefore federal laws.
Nevertheless, the immunity of federal laws has always been debated, and 
the question of whether it (still) has a raison d’être remains controversial today. 
While many legal scholars advocate to enlarge the constitutional review to 
federal laws, the political authorities have always been opposed to it, at least in 
their majority. Two motions in 1923 and 1924 and a popular initiative in 
1939 were rejected. At the time of the total revision of the Swiss Constitution, 
the Federal Council proposed—in the project on the ‘reform of the justice 
system’ (Federal Council 1997: 652)—to abrogate, at least partially, such a 
rule of immunity of the federal laws but the Federal Assembly did not agree. 
The Federal Council once again proposed a partial lifting of the immunity of 
federal laws in the framework of the reform of financial equalization and divi-
sion of powers between the Confederation and the cantons (the so-called 
“RPT reform” (for “Réforme de la  péréquation et de la répartition des 
tâches”), Federal Council 2002: 2155). The cantons, and only they, would 
have had the opportunity to challenge federal laws affecting their sphere of 
jurisdiction, but this proposal too was rejected by Parliament. Two more 
recent parliamentary interventions proposing the repeal of Article 190 Const. 
have also suffered a similar fate (Report of the National Council’s Legal Affairs 
Committee 2011: 6707–6724; Federal Council 2011: 6995–7000).
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This notable exception inside the constitutional justice seems thus 
deeply entrenched in the Swiss constitutional beliefs and shows a certain 
contradiction with the idea of constitutional state, in which all legal norms 
must absolutely be adopted in conformity with the constitution and be 
reviewed by an independent court. It is now appropriate to consider more 
specifically the scope of this concept of ‘immunity’.
8.3.2.2  The Scope of the Notion of ‘Immunized’ Legal Norms
As stated in Article 190 Const., it is federal laws and international law 
which are immunized. Considering federal laws, this applies to both ordi-
nary and urgent laws (Art. 165 Const.; Mahon 2014: 275). Other legisla-
tive instruments are not open to review by the Federal Supreme Court.
Indeed, as already mentioned, the cantonal constitutions are also immune 
against the (federal) constitutional review. Such an interpretation has been 
developed in the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, which often argued 
that cantonal constitutions are guaranteed by the Federal Assembly (Art. 51 
(2) Const.). This Supreme Court jurisprudence is often criticized by legal 
scholars (Grisel 1996; Töndury 2004). They consider that the review exer-
cised by the Federal Assembly is too summary to bind the courts. The 
Federal Court has remained unmoved by this critique and continues to 
refrain from checking whether cantonal constitutions are in conformity with 
federal law. However, it must be noted that the Court has exceptionally 
agreed to check the conformity of the cantonal constitution with the rules of 
federal law that were adopted after the granting of the Federal Parliament’s 
guarantee. In such a case, it is not likely to disavow the Federal Assembly (see 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 18 Mai 2004: ATF 131 I 126, 
130, where the Federal Court notes, despite the almost unanimous criticism 
among Swiss legal scholars, that there is no need to change the case law).
In addition, when a legal norm inferior (e.g. an ordinance or a cantonal 
decree) to a federal law, in the hierarchy of norms, repeats or applies an 
unconstitutional legal rule found in an immunized act (e.g. federal law), 
the former is also covered by this immunity clause. It is therefore an indi-
rect effect—a reaction, in a way—of this immunity. Indeed, the Federal 
Court has considered that such a norm is not controllable, because here 
the review would relate, indirectly, to the immunized act and would come 
up against the immunity clause. Such is the case of a federal ordinance, 
adopted by the Federal Council or the Assembly, which repeats or exe-
cutes the solution chosen by the federal legislators (Mahon 2014: 329, 
330; Haller 2016: 261).
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8.3.2.3  The Mitigated Effects of the ‘Immunity Clause’ 
and the Relationship Between National and International Law
If the immunity clause of federal laws is not ready to be questioned by the 
political authorities, it has been, however, subject to various attenuations.
The first of these temperaments is that the enforcement authority can, 
while applying the law, criticize it and even invite the legislator to modify 
the provision in question. In other words, to use the German adage often 
used to illustrate this aspect, Article 190 provides an Anwendungsgebot but 
not a Prüfungsverbot—an application directive but not a prohibition on 
scrutinizing it (see Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 11 December 
1996: ATF 123 II 9).
Another form of mitigation of the rule of immunity of federal laws is 
related to the principle called ‘interpretation in conformity with the 
Constitution’. Concretely, when a law is open to more than one interpre-
tation, the implementing authority gives the preference to the one com-
patible with the Constitution. Such a margin of discretion can only go so 
far in an attempt to give a norm a constitutional content, as the authority 
cannot deviate from the clear text of a legal norm (see Decision of the 
Federal Supreme Court of 12 July 1993: ATF 119 Ia 241).
Third temperament to the rule of immunity is the fact that a new consti-
tutional provision prevails, if it is sufficiently precise, over an earlier statute. 
This is logical, as far as prevails the subsequent decision of an organ endowed 
with a greater legitimacy (the constituent) than that of the legislator.
To conclude on the question of the immunity rule, it must be noted that 
Article. 190 Const. does not answer the question of which rule prevails in 
the event of a conflict between a provision of a federal—immunized—law 
and that of an international treaty—which benefits from the immunity clause 
provided in Article 190 Const. as well. On this question, Article 5 (4) Const. 
entrenches the principle of the primacy of  international law. It means that a 
provision of an international treaty prevails on a domestic law provision. This 
rule must be underlined. Indeed, the Federal Supreme Court has admitted, 
in some cases, to review federal laws in light of the international law of the 
European Convention of Human Rights or the UN Covenants (Hertig 
Randall 2010: 248 et seq.). Such a test is known as the ‘control of conven-
tionality’, skirting around the limit of the constitutional review of Swiss laws.
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CHAPTER 9
The New Model of Swiss Public Management
Jean-Loup Chappelet
9.1  IntroductIon
During the 1980s, the need for academic research and teaching in public 
administration was fully recognized in Switzerland. The response was the 
creation of the Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP) 
in 1981, interestingly, by the same visionary, Enrico Bignami, who had 
created a similar institution (the IMEDE, today the International Institute 
for Management Development or IMD) for the needs of private indus-
try—a sector in which Bignami worked as CEO of Nestlé (Marion 2004).
New public management (NPM) emerged in Switzerland, as in many 
other countries, in the 1990s. One could even say that Switzerland is one 
of the main loci, at local, cantonal and federal levels, for experimenting 
with the many managerial approaches it has inspired (Steiner et al. 2014). 
The management of Swiss public organizations has evolved considerably 
under the influence of these new approaches, though not all of these evo-
lutions have been successful (Emery and Giauque 2008).
In 2017, the Swiss Confederation introduced a new management 
model (known as NMG) to better manage the federal administration and 
“increase transparency and facilitate steering at all levels” (FFA 2017). 
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The goal is to apply this model to all administrative units at the federal level. 
It is worth exploring this model better, to understand how it is applied in 
practice, and to consider whether it can inspire new ways of managing not 
just at the national but also at the cantonal and local levels, much as when 
NPM was introduced (and when it seemed ubiquitous). Will the NMG 
become the “Swiss way of management” in the public sector, to borrow the 
title of a well-known book about the Swiss private sector (Bergmann 2000)?
To answer this question, we first look at the history of NPM-inspired 
approaches adopted by the federal government, in particular the GMEB 
(in German, FLAG) model, a precursor to the NMG. We then describe 
the peculiarities of the NMG, and in what manner it is “new” compared 
with other Swiss and foreign approaches. Finally, we examine the case of 
the Federal Office of Topography, known as swisstopo, an office which 
was both a pioneer in adopting the GMEB model and one of the first to 
use the new NMG mode.
9.2  the GMeB Model and nPM-InsPIred 
aPProaches
The first applications (and proliferation) of NPM approaches took place 
in Switzerland at the local and cantonal levels (e.g., see Delley 1994 or 
Schedler 1995). In 1997, meaning soon thereafter, the Swiss federal 
government launched the GMEB, the Management by Performance 
Mandate and Global Budget program. Its focus was on measurable per-
formance in the federal administration, and on results. After a pilot 
phase, the GMEB was introduced in about 20 administrative units by 
2002 (see FFA 2006 for a program overview and list of the units which 
used this program at the time).
In 2009, the federal government published a generally positive evalua-
tion of this large-scale experiment. This accorded with commitments 
made to Parliament during the institutionalization of the model, in turn 
part of the 2004 revision of LOGA, the Government and Administration 
Organization Act (in German, RVOG) and the LFC, the Federal Finance 
Act (in German, FHG). Twelve years later, about one-third of the units in 
the federal administration were using GMEB, including the Federal Office 
of Sports, the Federal Roads Office, and swisstopo, the Federal Office of 
Topography. A total of 23 units used GMEB, about one-sixth of the fed-
eral administration and accounting for 30% of its expenditures.
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GMEB is based on having each administrative unit involved develop a 
performance mandate specifying the objectives to be achieved by that unit 
in the coming years, together with the criteria for attaining those objec-
tives. After the Federal Council and Parliament approve the strategic objec-
tives, the performance objectives and the budget, the mandate is entrusted 
to the administrative unit. It is to be carried out operationally in the form 
of an annual performance agreement or a service-level agreement.
Figure 9.1 illustrates how the GMEB model is operationalized. It is 
inspired by the Schedler model (Schedler and Eicher 2013: 380) which 
summarizes a series of NPM approaches used in Switzerland. It com-
bines political and administrative management by converting political 
and strategic objectives into administrative objectives geared to the 
provision of benefits.
This model allows the department to which an administrative unit 
belongs, and its head (one of the seven Swiss cabinet members who form 
the Federal Council, the federal executive), to regularly receive the infor-
mation needed for judging the extent to which stated objectives have 
been achieved. If necessary, the department can correct the unit’s per-
formance. At the end of the mandate, usually after four years, the depart-
ment reviews the mandate and objectives, together with the administrative 
unit. Swiss cabinet members in fact are formally the administrative heads 
of the ten or so units in the department they are responsible for.
Controlling
Services mandate (SM)
Federal Council (FC) / Administrative units
Service-level contract
Departments / Administrative units
Negociation on objectives
Supervisor / manager
Consultation with
Parliament
Assignment of SM to an
administrative unit by the FC
Report on outputs and outcomes
to FC and Parliament
Preparation of
anew SM
Service-level contract on 
ouputs / Budgetary allowanceReporting
Implementation /
operations
Proposal to the
Federal Council
Fig. 9.1 The GMEB model. (Source: www.flag.admin.ch/f/themen/1-
3-1modell.php)
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The transformation of political into administrative rationality which the 
GMEB (Fig. 9.1) provided nevertheless reached its limits when it came to 
performance. The GMEB did not go so far as to evaluate the results 
achieved; we will examine how well the NMG, in place since 2017 (and 
presented below), is tackling this task.
According to the GMEB website, the following four principles were 
put into practice (www.flag.admin.ch/e/themen/1-1-4entstehung.php):
 – Separating strategic management from operational management; 
implementing management tools;
 – Transforming resource-based (input) into service-based (output) 
management;
 – Transforming administrative units into service centers which 
assume greater responsibility for results (they benefit from greater 
autonomy in their operations);
 – Introducing elements of marketplace competition.
A self-assessment conducted in 2009 by the Federal Council (2009: 
7152) concluded that units in which the GMEB had been introduced 
were satisfied and did not want to return to the earlier model. The GMEB 
allowed them to have a more integrated planning with respect to available 
resources and tasks, allowing the relevant bodies to carry out controlling.1 
The departments responsible for the administrative units were also satis-
fied and found the GMEB facilitated political management. A new 
accounting system for the federal government was introduced the same 
year. The departments found “there was still significant room for improve-
ment” in linking GMEB managed using the new accounting system.
A substantial majority of parliamentarians were also satisfied, though 
some (Rey 2005) found the GMEB “strengthens the position of the Federal 
Council and the national administration at the expense of the sovereignty of 
Parliament over the budget”. To better control expenses, the parliamentar-
1 According to the Glossary of Terms of Evaluation issued by the Federal Office of Public 
Health (FOPH) in 2005 (page 5), “Controlling is a central management task which is 
intended to provide a solid basis of information to assist in decision-making. It guides the 
entire planning process and management of an organization. It includes the selection, collec-
tion, analysis and interpretation of data relevant to the goals and objectives of the organiza-
tion as well as the procedures put in place to achieve these ends. The analysis takes into 
account the quantitative and qualitative indicators defined to measure the achievement of the 
different sets of objectives. ‘Controlling’ in Switzerland is taken as synonymous with ‘perfor-
mance management’”.
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ians insisted that the principles of annuity and of specialty2 in the budget 
lines should be strictly respected. The socialist group in parliament, how-
ever, proposed intensifying the use of the GMEB model, in particular to 
better take into account outcomes expected beyond the outputs themselves. 
The self-assessment (Federal Council 2009) noted in particular that, beyond 
cost efficiency, efficacy and economizing/economy in the federal adminis-
tration were better taken into account, thanks to the GMEB:
Setting targets based on efficiency models has a motivating effect on employ-
ees because it allows them to better measure the importance of their contri-
bution to their office’s performance. Developing an orientation towards 
results and objectives is an ongoing task in managing staff and administer-
ing, beyond the GMEB model:
 – Relevance or economy: employees in GMEB units felt they were 
more aware of costs than those in non-GMEB units. However, a 
review of resource use showed no significant differences between 
the units. This is why more attention needs to be paid to the spe-
cific indicators used to assess the relevance of objectives;
 – Global budget: the flexibility administrative units have in opera-
tional management is one of the major advantages of the 
GMEB. This room for maneuver is a result of the principle of a 
global budget itself, as it encourages administrative units to per-
form their tasks in a cost-efficient manner. A global budget, how-
ever, can only fully deploy its effects when it is combined with 
indicators one can measure.
In this quote, and in the GMEB approach, we find the well-known trio 
of efficiency, efficacy and economy, the “triangle of management control” 
(DIRE 2002) which link objectives, resources (or inputs) and services (or 
outputs, achievements) (see Fig. 9.2).
The GMEB reflects a general trend observed in integrated models of 
public management at the turn of the century; they link these three peaks/
vertices of the management control triangle. Service-oriented and output- 
oriented models are now widely used in Swiss cantonal administration 
(wirkungsorientierte Verwaltung in German), and they are used abroad. 
They are very similar to management models in the private sector, except 
2 “Budgetary specialty” is one of the main public finance principles (along with annuity, 
unity, universality and sincerity). It consists of ensuring that each budget line item has a clear 
purpose; the executive or the administration cannot modify it without legislative approval.
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that in private companies, managers do not have to share responsibility 
with executives and legislators, or even with citizens (see the “Public 
Management Tetrahedron” (Chappelet 2013) which links the four sides 
of this solid to the four main stakeholders of public management: public 
managers, executives, MPs, citizens).
The GMEB five main characteristics can be summarized as follows:
 – An orientation toward the tasks and services to be performed in an 
efficacious manner by the administration
 – The coordination of tasks and means or resources (through 
budgets)
 – Global budgets to give more autonomy and responsibility to 
administrative units in carrying out their objectives-based tasks
 – The assignment of performance mandates by the administration
 – Performance measurement through management control and 
evaluation
Following the self-assessment of the GMEB in 2009, Parliament agreed 
with the Federal Council in 2010 that the GMEB model should be used 
in the entire federal administration. It would be recast as a new model 
more focused on results and performance, and be better linked to globally 
allocated financial means or resources. “From this perspective, planning 
and reporting will be redefined from the ground up to conform to an 
integrated, results-based approach. Financial means (resources) and per-
formance will be brought together in a visible manner, with global appro-
OBJECTIVES
OUTPUTS
SERVICES
MEANS
RESOURCES
efficiency
Fig. 9.2 The triangle of performance control
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priations for the particular domain of the administration. The political 
leadership will focus more on medium-term objectives; the annual budget 
will remain the decisive financial benchmark” (Federal Council 2013a).
9.3  the new nMG Model
Following the introduction of a new model for accounting at the national 
level, it was felt necessary to improve budgetary management by reorient-
ing it not just to deliver services and assess efficiency and efficacy but to 
provide services or benefits according to the political objectives to be 
achieved. In other words, the idea was to engage in performance-oriented 
budgeting (and auditing) in the manner increasingly practiced in private 
companies. This approach, called the new management model for the 
Federal Administration (in French NMG and in German, Neues 
Führungsmodell für die Bundesverwaltung or NFB), was introduced in 
2017.
It is based on the GMEB and augments the scope of the performance 
contract and of the traditional budget by adding a PITF, an Integrated 
Task and Financing Plan. This is a new way of presenting the budget of a 
given unit according to groups of services that the administrative unit 
provides or produces, along with a global budget for each group of ser-
vices. It also states the political objectives to be achieved, as well as the 
indicators and target values for the next four years. A department and the 
administrative units that comprise it then agree on a performance con-
tract. This contract sets out the operational objectives for projects, defines 
the groups of services to be provided or produced (in principal, from one 
to maximum of five), and these are accompanied by two global budgets, 
one for outlays, the other for income.
In other words, the strategic/political aspect of the services provided is 
included in the budget through a PITF—which allows for better control 
by Parliament—while the operational aspect is included in the annual per-
formance contract agreed upon between a given unit and its department—
which allows for better control by the (political) head of the department. 
Under the GMEB, the performance mandate combined information 
about political and operational steering; the NMG separates them better.
The NMG approach is based on five documents or instruments (Federal 
Council 2013b):
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 – At the beginning of a parliamentary term, the Federal Council sets 
priorities for the next decade or so. In light of this proposed politi-
cal program, the legislature, which is elected for a five-year term, 
establishes a financial plan, paying particular attention to the fore-
seeable budgetary expenditures in doing so.
 – The annual federal budget includes a PITF for each administrative 
unit. It describes the ongoing multi-year projects, along with their 
objectives and target values, and identifies the groups which will 
benefit. This document is submitted to Parliament, which may 
amend it following to the rules given in the Parliament Act or in 
the Finance Act.
 – A performance contract is drawn up for each administrative unit. 
It is the result of the agreement reached annually between the 
head of the department (who sets policy) and the head of the unit 
(who lays out the administrative guidelines). It also establishes the 
annual objectives to achieve relative to the service groups, and it 
discusses the projects mentioned in the PITF.
 – Global budgets and the rules which make it possible to build 
reserves and/or transfer credits from one group which benefits to 
another (as in the GMEB).
 – An analysis of accounting practices in the federal administration to 
ensure that the costs of the services are known; this makes it pos-
sible to control expenditures.
Figure 9.3 summarizes the relationship between these different NMG 
management and planning instruments (FFA 2017: 2). The NMG insists 
that operational tasks be politically steered through the annual budgetary 
process.
As a basis, the NMG needs a catalog of the services provided by all adminis-
trative units. The achievements can be described on the basis of quantity, 
quality, timeliness, cost, or how satisfied the recipients of a service are. Each 
administrative unit should identify one to five groups it serves; the federal 
administration thus will have about 140 such groups in all. This level of 
detail is to ensure that political actors will not get lost in too long lists of 
articles and services, and to ensure that administrative managers can still 
recognize their activities and effectively implement the directives of the 
political actors. (Federal Council 2013b)
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Introducing the NMG was an objective of the legislative session of 
2011–15. To facilitate its implementation in 2016–17, the Federal Finance 
Administration (FFA) made online training available, based on what was 
learned from introducing PITFs or global budgets at the cantonal level in 
the Aargau, Bern, Graubünden, Lucerne, Solothurn, Zug and Zurich.
The NMG model should make it possible to abandon the running of 
two systems in parallel (the new GMEB in 20 units and the old/tradi-
tional system in all the other units) and create an identical, homogeneous 
management model throughout the federal administration. It should 
improve the units’ room for maneuver and improve transparency. In terms 
of savings, under certain conditions, the units will be authorized to accu-
mulate financial reserves, as in the GMEB model. Ultimately, this will be 
a shift from a management culture based on resources (e.g., GMEB) to a 
culture based on goals and results (e.g., NMG).
This evolution can be schematically represented by a “performance dia-
mond” (see Fig. 9.4) where two new dimensions of performance appear: 
effectiveness and allocative efficiency.
Effectiveness, which is to say the relationship between services and out-
comes, measures the real effects, or the results a public policy actually has 
on the societal problem to be solved (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 17). 
Allocative efficiency, which is to say the ratio between inputs and outcomes 
(Knoepfel et  al. 2006: 256), is about optimally allocating means or 
Legislave programme
Legislave financial plan
Budget with PITF
PITF
Objecves in terms of outputs and outcomes
Budget
Performance contract
Budget implementaon
evaluaons Performancecontrol
State
Accounts
Basic legal mandate and polical instrucons
Fig. 9.3 Relationship between NMG management and planning instruments
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resources to obtain desired results. Efficiency (sometimes called “technical 
efficiency” or “productive efficiency”), by contrast, focuses on the unit 
cost of services (if possible, kept as low as possible). The diamond repre-
sents the two dimensions of public performance: output management 
(top triangle) and outcome management (bottom triangle).
The NMG model is the apex of a number of reforms (NGP, NPM) 
introduced at the federal level since the late 1990s to better monitor 
administrative objectives, performance and outcomes. At the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, and after LOGA was adopted in 2004, the GMEB 
model was a first step in this direction, tried in a few federal units.
Other changes were also taking place at about the same time. A “debt 
brake”3 was enacted. A new model of accounting introduced in 2009 
transformed the management of the federal budget management. IT 
management, as part of an evolving technology, has also been profoundly 
3 The debt brake is a budgetary device intended to guarantee balanced accounts over a 
complete business cycle. Adopted in 2000  in Switzerland at the national level and imple-
mented as of 2003, it serves as a model for Germany as of 2009. It aims to curb the growth 
in debt as well as curb structural budget deficits.
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Fig. 9.4 The public 
performance diamond
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changed. Finally, by abolishing the status of federal civil servant and intro-
ducing salary elements related to benefits, the formal status of federal 
employees has also been altered (see the chapter by Yves Emery).
The efficiency and efficacy objectives highlighted in GMEB have also 
been pursued through reforms such as clearly separating federal from can-
tonal tasks, or by transferring federal tasks to private sector companies or 
more autonomous para-public agencies. The result-oriented NMG model 
should allow greater progress to be made in managing the federal “house-
hold”. Since 1999, Art. 170 of the Swiss Constitution has called on the 
Parliament “to ensure that federal measures are evaluated with regard to 
their effectiveness”.
9.4  the case of swIsstoPo
The Swiss Federal Office of Topography (swisstopo) is responsible for the 
description, representation and long-term availability of spatial geodata, 
including national maps, altitude and landscape models, satellite images 
and orthophotos4 of the Swiss territory. Swisstopo is a unit (office) of the 
Federal Department of Defense, Population Protection and Sports 
(DDPS). It was selected as a pilot project office for trying out the GMEB 
model when it was first launched in 1997. In 2017, it was also one of the 
first federal offices to use NMG.
As compared to the GMEB, the application of the NMG in swisstopo 
introduces new elements. It comments on contextual factors and the 
results to be achieved globally (e.g., to guarantee the provision of Swiss 
geodata), provides indicators with deadlines, has a section on the strategy 
and important projects conducted by swisstopo and provides a new level of 
detail about services, staff and IT. The part of the 2018 Swiss national 
budget relevant to swisstopo, which includes a PITF, begins with a list of 
current projects. It then provides an “overview of the profit and loss state-
ment and of the investment account (including benefit entitlements)” for 
2016 and 2017, together with the budget for 2018 and financial plan 
projections for 2019–21, accompanied by a commentary (FFA n.d.). 
Swisstopo sells various services and thus has significant income (more than 
23 million CHF in 2017, with costs of nearly 90 million), though invest-
ments have been very low in 2017.
4 An orthophoto is an aerial digital image, in color, of a landscape taken so as to neutralize 
the influences of camera inclination and terrain relief.
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A number of pages in the budget are dedicated to the groups of services 
(outputs) which are produced by swisstopo. For 2018, as in 2017, swiss-
topo lists three groups of services:
 1. Topography and cartography
 2. Measurement and geo-coordination
 3. National Geological Service
A page in the PIFT describes each of these, giving the basic mandate 
along with comments relevant to the group of services. It is followed by a 
commented table of operating and investment income and expenses, a 
table of objectives (broken down by services) with the criteria to be 
achieved, accompanied by contextual information with financial figures. 
Figure 9.5, as an example, gives all the objectives set in the 2018 PIFT, 
including information about criteria and performance by unit of measure-
ment for the first group of services (topography and cartography).
The PIFT document concludes with the items relevant to the federal 
budget, namely income and expenditure. These are explained and com-
pared to the previous three years. Projections for the 2018–21 period are 
also provided, which allows for planning over four years. In the depart-
Fig. 9.5 Swisstopo group of services 1: objectives and contextual data. (C = 
accounts, B = budget, PF = financial plan)
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ment of defense—where swisstopo was formally placed—performance 
contracts remain on an annual basis. As swisstopo makes specific products 
or services (such as maps, models or orthophotos) available, these prod-
ucts or services can be more readily quantified and enumerated for the 
purposes of the budgetary process. A qualitative indicator (customer satis-
faction) is also measured.
The financial data come from SAP accounting software. Reporting is 
done annually, as part of the federal budgeting process, and quarterly 
within the department. Parliamentary committees (Finance Committee, 
Management Committee, and the specialized Committee, which in the 
case of swisstopo is the Committee on Education, Science and Culture) 
provide political guidance. Meeting—or not meeting—the stated objec-
tives do not (yet) carry the practical consequences as in other countries 
where incentives are offered—or sanctions levied—in case the stated crite-
ria are exceeded—or not met.
The NMG model emerged from the strong desire to better link the 
federal budget with the services or benefits provided and with the final 
results obtained by the administrative units. Output needed to be linked 
to outcome. It is reminiscent of the objectives set out in the 2001 French 
constitutional bylaw on budget acts (known as LOLF) which wanted to 
modernize the management of the French administration and set quanti-
fied objectives for the various ministries. The goal was to move from a 
budget based on resources to a public administration managed based on 
results, even if this goal was difficult to achieve (Rochet 2010; Petitbon 
and Ledenvic 2011).
9.5  conclusIon
This chapter has looked at the NMG model in the Swiss federal adminis-
tration, from its origins to its introduction across all federal-level adminis-
trative units in 2017, including in swisstopo. Beyond the public services to 
be provided, the NMG emphasizes the results to be achieved. This empha-
sis is both operational and political (or strategic), and stands in relation to 
the main mode of governmental action, namely its budget. That budget 
also determines the number of posts which can be funded to achieve the 
stated objectives, both through services and by specifying expected results.
In addition to the classic criteria of efficiency, efficacy and economy, an 
analysis of the NMG indicates the importance of effectiveness and alloca-
tive efficiency (see Fig. 9.4), aspects which should more often be taken 
into account by managers in public administration positions.
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Though it is not wholly original, the NMG has the merit of being 
implemented on a large scale throughout the entire Swiss federal adminis-
tration. It is a practical way of combining operational management with 
strategic or political management. The former is the responsibility of man-
agers in the public administrative units as well as of the heads of their 
departments—who in Switzerland form the federal executive. The latter is 
provided by Parliament, and, at times, also by the people through the 
referendums and initiatives they can launch. The exception here is finances: 
this remains the responsibility of Parliament, whose power and oversight 
is now reinforced through PITFs. We therefore have a new and genuinely 
“Swiss Way of Public Management” (at least at the federal level), and how 
it will be implemented, given recent changes to the system of national 
public administration, will be followed with interest in the years to come.
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CHAPTER 10
The Road to Digital and Smart Government 
in Switzerland
Tobias Mettler
10.1  The Beginnings of e-governmenT 
in swiTzerland
With the advent of the Internet, low-priced computing devices, and the 
increasing availability of broadband access in offices and households in the 
late 1990s, governments all over the world started to discuss how to harness 
information and communication technology (ICT) to enhance govern-
mental operations and transform public services, and thus their relationship 
to citizens and businesses. Emulating the preceding radical revolution in 
banking and commerce, which led to an ‘e-everything’ phenomenon across 
all sectors of the economy (Cronin 2000), the new catchword ‘e-govern-
ment’ emerged at the turn of the millennium to characterize the onset of 
digitalizing governments, as well as to describe a new mindset of technol-
ogy-inspired, forward-looking, and entrepreneurial civil servants.
At about this time, the European Commission (EC) set out the Lisbon 
Strategy 2000—later succeeded by the Europe 2020 strategy in 2010—
which formulated the first strategic objectives related to the use of 
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 innovation in general and ICT in particular for boosting economic prog-
ress throughout Europe. This strategic memorandum also paved the way 
for more detailed e-government action plans—known under different des-
ignations over the years, such as the eEurope (Europe Commission 2001), 
i2010 (Europe Commission 2006), or simply the e-government action 
plan—the first of which was published only a year later (see Fig. 10.1).
Though not a member of the European Union (EU), the Swiss govern-
ment’s strategic objectives related to e-government have been very much 
aligned with the EC’s strategy. As it was confronted with rapid technologi-
cal and societal changes at the end of the millennium, the Swiss Federal 
Council launched a working group in 1997. The goal was to devise a 
strategic plan and establish priorities with respect to the emerging infor-
mation society, as well as reallocate the responsibilities for overseeing and 
coordinating ICT efforts at the federal level.
Based on these working group discussions, the Federal Council man-
dated a complete reorganization of federal ICT efforts, which led to estab-
lishing a new federal steering unit (FITSU)1 in 1999. It was responsible 
for overall ICT program management, and a first federal ICT strategy was 
set out in 2000. This strategy included preparing two ‘lighthouse’ proj-
ects, an online platform for citizens and businesses known as a ‘virtual 
counter’, which went live in 2005,2 and a multi-site ‘e-voting’ project. 
The latter was set up in 2003 in the cantons of Geneva, Neuchâtel, and 
Zurich to experiment and obtain experience with electronic voting sys-
tems, though access to it was limited to Swiss expatriates.
FITSU launched two additional initiatives in 2002. The first was meant 
to increase interoperability and foster collaboration between the 
Confederation, the cantons, and the communities. To this end, the non- 
profit eCH association3 was founded. Consisting of volunteers from all 
levels of government, industry, and academia, organized in dedicated 
chapters or sections, and run on a militia basis—a principle and notion 
firmly rooted in Swiss identity and mentality—eCH defines technical and 
non-technical standards and promulgates exemplary process models as 
well as data to make the implementation of e-government services easier. 
The second, the eVanti project (Didisheim and Belle 2004) (from the 
1 Swiss Confederation, Federal IT Steering Unit, https://www.isb.admin.ch/isb/en/
home.html
2 Swiss Confederation, https://www.ch.ch/en/
3 eCH Association, https://www.ech.ch
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Italian word “avanti”, meaning “forward”) sought to create a common 
platform for information exchange between stakeholders, to increase the 
visibility of successful e-government projects, and to measure how far 
along existing digital services were. This effort bore some similarity to the 
Good practice framework for e-government (European Commission 2007) 
established in 2002 by the EC.
Despite these early efforts and an above-average broadband Internet 
availability, Switzerland ranked at the bottom of the list of countries 
assessed in the 2005 EU e-government benchmark. This low ranking led 
to a reconsideration of strategic objectives several years later and led to 
crafting a new E-government Strategy Switzerland 2007–2015. This strat-
egy had three goals: first, the most important administrative procedures 
between businesses and the authorities henceforth should be conducted 
electronically; second, frequent or complex administrative procedures 
between citizens and the authorities should be digitalized as well; and 
lastly, all governmental authorities should modernize their business pro-
cesses and deal with each other using contemporary electronic channels. 
To advance the last of these, the Federal Council created a framework 
agreement on e-government cooperation in 2008 (Federal Council 2007), 
which clarified the financing, organization, tasks, and responsibilities of 
the different bodies within the Swiss e-government ecosystem.
While the Swiss authorities at the end of the decade were still occupied 
with projects such as GEschäftsVERwaltung (GEVER),4 meant to re-engi-
neer internal processes and managing the transition from paper-based to 
electronic styles of working, the EU e-government community—inspired 
by the targets defined at the Malmö Ministerial Declaration of 2009—had 
shifted its focus toward a more citizen-centered design, production, and 
delivery of online services. Accordingly, the EU e-Government Action Plan 
(2011–2015) (European Commission 2010) emphasized the increased 
mobility of citizens and their need for empowerment. For instance, the 
accessibility of public information could be improved by establishing a more 
user-friendly service delivery through social networking and collaborative 
tools. Open standards and a service-orientation could further improve the 
interoperability of existing services and initiate deliberations about the nec-
essary legal and technical preconditions for cross-border services.
Yet because the country neglected to emphasize the central place of the 
citizen, along with the inward-looking orientation of Swiss governmental 
4 Federal Chancellery, “GEVER”, https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/dokumenta-
tion/gever-bund.html
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authorities, the Swiss e-government community was dealt a fresh shock in 
2009, when Switzerland was again ranked at the bottom end in the EU 
e-government benchmark.
10.2  The TransiTion Years: from e-governmenT 
To digiTal governmenT
Confronted with yet another poor ranking in the EU’s e-government 
benchmark, and given that the last major strategy update had been in 
2006, the Swiss Federal Council realized that it needed to engage in a 
major revision and recalibrate its strategic objectives. The updated Strategy 
of the Federal Council for an Information Society published in early 2012 
(Federal Council 2012) included several new areas of activity under sub- 
headings such as Internet governance, high-performance computing, 
open networks, and the role of ICT as a tool for optimizing energy and 
resource efficiency.
Three new initiatives were also launched. As a result of an Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ decision to abolish most 
restrictions on the names of generic top-level domains, the first initiative 
dealt with developing appropriate instruments to preserve Switzerland’s 
public interest in view of the imminent liberalization of the domain name 
market. On account of the missing citizen-centricity in the previous years, 
a second priority initiative was to improve and extend barrier-free and 
equal opportunity access to online information as well as to improve the 
communications services and transactions of and with the government 
and the federal administration. The third initiative aimed to enhance the 
range and availability of statistical data in order to be able to compare the 
attractiveness of Switzerland with other countries.
As part of this third initiative, the Federal Council devised an open 
government data (OGD) strategy in 2014, one of whose goals was to 
increase the availability and reuse of, as well as the access to, public data in 
machine-readable and open formats. A further goal was to establish an 
open-data culture in the federal civil service through free, uniform, and 
understandable terms of use (standardization) and by providing additional 
information about individual data sets (metadata).
To realize this objective, the Federal Council envisaged building a cen-
tral infrastructure to replace the pilot portal opendata.admin.ch, which 
had never been fully operational. It was a major milestone for the Swiss 
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e-government community when the new OGD portal opendata.swiss was 
launched on February 2016. It held about 500 unique datasets originat-
ing from 17 different public organizations, including the Swiss Federal 
Railways and the Federal Roads Office, and it covers a wide range of topics 
in the Swiss public sector (see Fig. 10.2). It is hosted and maintained by 
the Swiss Federal Archive5.
5 Swiss Federal Archive, https://opendata.swiss/
Fig. 10.2 Opendata.swiss—Switzerland’s open government data portal
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10.3  The vision for a new digiTal swiTzerland
In many ways, 2015 marked an important turning point for the 
European e-government community. Jean-Claude Junker’s election as 
President of the EC in late 2014 ushered in a new orientation to, and 
prioritization of, digital initiatives. The previous Europe 2020 strategy 
had focused strongly on the transition to a digital society; the new 
Digital Single Market Strategy envisioned establishing a business-
friendly environment for the European economy with the goal of fos-
tering innovation and creating hundreds of new jobs in the technology 
and service sector. There are plans to emend the rules for online cross-
border sales, improve cross-border parcel delivery, abolish geo-block-
ing, reform European copyright law, review the rules for audiovisual 
media, assess the role of big corporate online platforms, define priorities 
for e-government standards and interoperability, and to address issues 
of ownership, usability, and access to large data collections (European 
Commission 2015).
In keeping with this shift in European e-government priorities, there is 
now a new Federal Council strategy for a digital Switzerland (Federal 
Office of Communictions 2016) and a redefined Swiss e-Government 
Strategy 2017–2019 (Swiss Confederation 2016).
The goals of the Federal Council’s new strategy include the following:
• Improving the general conditions of Switzerland’s digital economy 
and monitoring developments, anticipating challenges and address-
ing regulatory issues related to the sharing economy
• Defining coherent and future-oriented national data policies and fur-
ther developing the national data infrastructure based on the existing 
OGD platform
• Extending access to high-speed broadband to all Swiss municipalities 
by 2020
• Increasing the use of innovative technology to reduce energy con-
sumption and CO2 emissions as well as enhancing the attractiveness 
of domestic online trade
• Ensuring multiple uses of different solutions and implementing a 
secure digital identity to create seamless interactions with civil soci-
ety and the private sector
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• Introducing electronic patient files to improve both quality and effi-
ciency in health care, facilitating health reforms, and enhancing 
information exchange with European health organizations
• Expanding the use of ICT for democratic decision-making and 
opinion-formation
• Increasing the availability of new opportunities for education and 
training as well as intensifying Switzerland’s role in research and 
innovation related to the digital society and the digital economy
• Establishing digital cultural production and providing universal 
access to cultural heritage facilitated by the Internet
As before, and in keeping with the Federal Council’s strategy and 
with the strategic objective to support the innovative potential of 
the Swiss economy, as well as strengthen standardization and the 
economic viability of governmental digital initiatives, the Swiss 
e- Government Strategy 2017–2019 also identified a number of 
‘lighthouse’ projects6 that are meant to have a short-term impact 
and pave the way for a new digital Switzerland. The Swiss 
Confederation, cantons, and communities agree to collaborate on 
realizing the following goals and projects:
• A joint organization to be established by 2018 for procuring, operat-
ing, and maintaining e-government solutions
• Having a seamless electronic change of residence registration system 
throughout Switzerland by the end of 2018
• Establishing a uniform registration procedure for e-government ser-
vices on various government portals by 2019
• Integrating the ten electronic public services most frequently 
requested by the general public and by businesses into the national 
e-government portals by the end of 2019
• Introducing an electronic identity (eID) that is valid nationally and 
internationally, as well as assigning data to a specific person as part of 
the electronic exchange between information systems to be estab-
lished by 2019
• Developing an electronic transmission procedure for reporting value 
added tax (VAT), to be effective by 2019
• Extending electronic voting to more voters, with the aim of seeing 
two-thirds of the cantons use electronic voting by 2019
6 Swiss Confederation, “Strategic projects and services”, https://www.egovernment.ch/
en/umsetzung/schwerpunktplan/
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10.4  The PaTh YeT To go To CreaTe a smarT 
governmenT…
Aside from the actions coordinated from the top that have been noted, 
there are many promising bottom-up developments at the local and can-
tonal levels, including hospitals or universities that have experimented with 
new service delivery models facilitated by the Internet of Things (IoT) 
(Wortmann and Flüchter 2015). These ‘smart government initiatives’ use 
emerging technologies such as sensor-based systems or artificial intelligence 
in conjunction with various social innovation strategies. The goal is to 
improve a public authority’s understanding of its community and constitu-
ency in order to enhance the accuracy of their decision- making and response 
efficiency, not at least in case there are unexpected or seriously adverse 
events (Gil-Garcia et  al. 2014). In doing so, physical components and 
devices (e.g. intelligent energy controllers, parking lot systems, web cams, 
motion sensors) are connected with extant public digital platforms and pri-
vate infrastructures, creating unprecedented ways for both passive and active 
interaction between a public administration and citizens (see Fig. 10.3).
Fig. 10.3 Smart government lifecycle Guenduez et al. (2017)
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Thus, the city of Lausanne is developing a centralized management 
system that is able to control all 14,000 of its street lights. The city of St. 
Gallen has recently implemented several smart appliances, including intel-
ligent power-charging stations which can inform electric car owners where 
to find free spots for charging their batteries in the city or sensor-based 
waste containers that can notify citizens and municipal garbage collectors 
alike about how full the containers currently are. Based on combining sen-
sor data with open data, the city of Zurich has introduced online services 
and mobile apps such as AirCHeck (which issues real-time information 
about the city’s air quality) and ParkenDD (which shows where the free 
parking spaces are in the city). Given that smart appliances and services 
frequently raise privacy concerns, at Lausanne’s Swiss Graduate School of 
Public Administration (IDHEAP) we are also experimenting with privacy-
aware alternatives to 24 × 7 monitoring, including in the search and rescue 
of people with disabilities7.
Such examples are only the first steps toward smarter governance, sus-
tainability, and increased citizen experience. But there is still a long way to 
go until smart government projects can create value beyond the local hab-
itat which nurtured them.
10.5  ConClusion
Digital initiatives in Switzerland involve various stakeholders at different 
government levels, but unlike countries which are ruled from the center, 
Switzerland’s approach to digitalization has required finding political con-
sensus. That has both advantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, important top-down decisions concerning the basic 
direction and prioritization of digitalization endeavors are more broadly 
supported in this consensus-oriented polity, resulting in targeted and col-
laborative efforts among and across different levels of government. 
Moreover, positive and dynamic change has resulted from bottom-up ini-
tiatives driven by local communities, cities, non-profit organizations, and 
businesses. This combined approach—coordinated political and policy 
actions together with grassroots movements—is characteristic of Switzerland 
and is a continual driver of innovation as well as modernization.
On the other hand, Switzerland’s decentral form of governance signifi-
cantly increases the complexity of the country’s digital transformation and 
7 T. Mettler, “iCare Research project website”, http://unil.ch/icare/
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ultimately negatively influences the pace at which emerging technologies 
are introduced. To a certain extent, it also means tolerating inefficiencies, 
as when various rival systems co-exist. In this context, the Swiss 
e- government community needs to find more efficient and effective ways 
of overcoming issues concerning legal and organizational boundaries. 
Suitable ways to align top-down and bottom-up initiatives or competing 
innovation strategies will also need to be developed.
From an international perspective, it would be nice to see a more lay-
ered, contextual monitoring and benchmarking of technological, political, 
economic, and social aspects of the country’s digital transformation. Many 
attempts to somehow ‘quantify’ the effects of digitalization favor centralist 
countries, often disregarding the inequalities or ignoring the ‘digital 
divide’, which separates regions, urban from rural areas, differing cultures, 
or population segments in the country. In this regard, Switzerland is an 
interesting case, as digitalization is promoted both centrally and locally, 
yet with a view to balance needs, power, and responsibilities among the 
many distinct actors in Swiss society.
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CHAPTER 11
Public-Private Partnerships: A Swiss 
Perspective
Laure Athias, Moudo Macina, and Pascal Wicht
11.1  IntroductIon
Since the first implementation of the Private Finance Initiative in the 
United Kingdom in 1992, the last decades have seen a spectacular devel-
opment of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in many developed as well as 
developing countries. It has meant an increased participation of the pri-
vate sector in providing a service itself as well as its accompanying 
infrastructure.
Interestingly, while most countries have adopted PPPs, the prevalence 
of such arrangements differs widely across countries, and the differences 
have persisted. In particular, while 722 PPP projects were launched in the 
United Kingdom between 1994 and 2016, Switzerland only had two dur-
ing the same period. In Europe, Switzerland exhibits one of the lowest 
numbers of PPPs.
What could explain this low number, and is this a good or a bad thing? 
What is the right number of PPPs? In answer, we first define what PPPs 
are and what they are not (Sect. 11.1). We then develop a theoretical 
framework establishing the conditions under which PPP arrangements are 
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 optimal, or more optimal than other possible modes of provision (Sect. 
11.2). This normative analysis highlights that the choice to use a PPP 
should be driven by the characteristics of the public service considered. 
As we expect public services to be quite similar across countries at a simi-
lar level of economic development, only cultural and institutional differ-
ences can explain the differences in the PPPs which are actually 
implemented. We then consider the bad reasons to use and not to use 
PPPs which might differ across countries. We point out that while there 
are probably too few PPPs in Switzerland, there are clearly too many of 
them in some other countries (Sect. 11.3). We conclude with some policy 
recommendations.
11.2  What Is a PublIc-PrIvate PartnershIP?
11.2.1  Public-Private Partnerships Within the Myriad Ways 
of Providing Public Services
Once a public service has to be provided, public authorities can choose 
between a large number of modes of provision. To distinguish between 
these possibilities, it is useful to divide the life cycle of a project or an infra-
structure into four main tasks: designing, building, financing and operating 
or maintaining. The allocation of these tasks between one and several 
agents (public and/or private) determines the mode of provision. The 
most frequent modes of provision are presented in Table 11.1.
Under traditional procurement, the public authorities remain in charge 
of all four stages, except for building, which is often contracted to a private 
firm through a procurement contract. This means that the public author-
ity keeps control over the infrastructure and the service provided, and that 
it also bears all the risks except for construction risks. The public authority 
may give some autonomy to the public provider of the service by creating 
specific public entities. These entities can be either autonomous public 
entities (e.g., the Geneva Airport) or state-owned limited companies 
under public law (e.g., the Swiss Federal Railways and the Swiss Post) or 
under private law (e.g., the air navigation service provider Skyguide). The 
relationship between the authority and the autonomous entity can either 
be based on a law or on a contract (as in FORS, the Swiss national centre 
of expertise in the social sciences; see Athias 2013 for details). All these 
arrangements correspond to a public provision of a public service.
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Another way to provide a public service, quite specific to Switzerland,1 
is when a private operator builds and finances all or part of a public infra-
structure in exchange for the opportunity to exploit the premises for com-
mercial purposes unrelated to the public service (e.g., shopping malls or 
office buildings). This is made possible by granting a distinct and perma-
nent leasehold right,2 whose duration is typically between 30 and 100 years. 
This gives the private partner the right to build and own a distinct asset on 
ground whose ownership remains in the hands of the public authority. An 
example is the Tissot Arena, the new sport complex inaugurated in 2015 in 
Biel, which encompasses football, ice-hockey and curling fields, as well as 
a shopping mall. While these arrangements are often considered as PPPs 
due to the private financing of the public infrastructure, they are not PPPs 
as there is no involvement of the (same) private partner in the service 
provision.
When the provision of a public service does not require physical assets 
or when the public authority owns an infrastructure but wants to delegate 
1 Among the projects considered as PPPs by the Association PPP-Switzerland, 11 projects 
actually correspond to private financing schemes.
2 Known in French as Droit distinct et permanent (DDP), and in German as Selbständiges 
und dauerndes Recht (SDR).
Table 11.1 Overview of the possible modes of provision of public services
Tasks Designing Building Financing Operating Ownership of the 
infrastructure
Modes of provision
Traditional 
procurement
Public Private Public Public Public
Private financing Public 
(possibly 
with private)
Private Private 
(possibly 
with public)
Public Public
Service contract 
(lease/
management 
contracts)
Public Private Public Private (≠ 
building)
Public
PPP Private 
(possibly 
with public)
Private Private 
(possibly 
with public)
Private Public
The same private provider is involved in all stages
Regulated market Private Private Private Private Private
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only its operation to a private entity, the private party involvement is 
mostly based on service contracts, such as for child day-care centres or for 
services provided to migrants. Within such contracts, we can distinguish 
between lease contracts, where the private firm is paid by the users of the 
service, and management contracts, where the private operator receives a 
fixed-price payment from the public authority.
The provision of the public service can also be outsourced through 
PPPs. PPPs can be defined as long-term arrangements between a public 
authority and a private partner, chosen after a competitive tendering, in 
order to design, build, finance and operate an infrastructure that is used to 
provide the public service.3 This infrastructure can be either a new one or 
an already existing that needs to be renovated. The peculiarity of PPPs lies 
in the bundling of building and operation stages. As highlighted by HM 
Treasury, “Private sector expertise and experience has always been used in 
public sector procurement, but, where in traditional procurement, private 
companies built and then walked away, PPP seeks to ensure that the private 
sector takes responsibility for the quality of design and construction it under-
takes, and for long term maintenance on an asset, so that value-for-money is 
achieved” (HM Treasury 2003).
PPPs can be either contractual or institutionalized. In the first case, 
the public authority concludes a contract with the project company 
(which can be a consortium) without being part of it. By contrast, in 
institutionalized PPPs, the public authority is a (minority or majority) 
shareholder of the project company. Boxes 11.1 and 11.2 below provide 
Swiss examples of both types of PPPs. Among PPPs, we can further dis-
tinguish availability and concession schemes. Whereas both are fixed-price, 
long-term arrangements to design, build, finance and operate a public 
infrastructure, the main difference relies in the sharing of risks between 
the public and private partners. In availability schemes, the public author-
ity pays a fixed price to the project company according to performance 
criteria (demand risk is hence borne by the public sector). By contrast, in 
a concession scheme, the project company is remunerated according to 
the demand for the service (either directly by the users or indirectly by the 
3 Maskin and Tirole (2008) define a public-private partnership as “A long-term development 
and service contract between government and private partner. The government typically engages 
its partner both to develop the project and to operate and service it. The partner may bear sub-
stantial risk and even raise private finance. Its revenue derives from some combination of gov-
ernment payments and user fees”.
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public authority via shadow tolls) and hence bears the demand risk. In 
Switzerland, the term concession is used to describe the right to pursue 
economic activities that are regulated by the state, mainly because of the 
monopolistic nature of the market (e.g., local public transportation) or 
because this activity needs an access to a limited public resource (e.g., 
water, as in the case of dams or run-of-river facilities, or radio frequencies) 
or the use of the public domain (e.g., to build and operate a gas network) 
or due to the sensitive nature of the regulated activity (e.g., casinos) or to 
increased risks (e.g., airports or the storage of dangerous substances). Swiss 
“concessions” must then be distinguished from PPP concessions as they 
can be awarded to public or private service providers, and under all kinds 
of governance structures. For instance, the Federal Office of Civil Aviation 
(FOCA) can award concessions to operate airports to public authorities or 
to private firms. Although no such example curently exists in Switzerland, 
it would also be possible to award an airport concession to a PPP.
Finally, a public service can be provided through a regulated market. In 
this case, an authorization to provide the service is required, subject to 
compliance with some minimum requirements to ensure the quality of the 
service provided. Unlike PPPs, which are dedicated to specific projects, 
the requirements in regulated markets apply to all the firms in a sector; 
they are based either on federal, cantonal or municipal legislation, or on 
specific guidelines issued by a public authority. This is, for example, the 
case for nursing homes, which are more or less strictly regulated by the 
cantons (Athias and Wicht 2018a). This regulation can, in some cases, be 
the counterpart of public subsidies.
Box 11.1: The Administrative Centre Neumatt, the Only Contractual 
PPP in Switzerland
The first and only example of a contractual PPP in Switzerland is the 
administrative complex Neumatt, in the town of Burgdorf (BE). 
The availability contract was signed in 2009 between the Canton of 
Bern and the project company Zeughaus PPP AG, formed by the 
construction groups Marti AG and Royal BAM AG, as well as Hälg 
Facility Management AG. This contract covers a period of 25 years, 
starting in 2012, and includes designing, building, financing and 
operating a new complex which includes a regional prison for 110 
inmates, four administrative buildings, a workshop for the canton’s 
Road and Civil Engineering Services, as well as an underground car 
 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A SWISS PERSPECTIVE 
192 
11.2.2  PPPs in the World and the Swiss Position
Between 1994 and 2016, 1458 PPPs were created in Europe (see 
Fig. 11.1), with a total value of 428.2 billion Euros. Among these projects, 
Box 11.2: Cadiom, an Institutionalized PPP to Provide Distance 
Heating in the Canton of Geneva
Cadiom is an institutionalized PPP created in 1999 between the 
Services Industriels de Genève (SIG, an autonomous state company) 
and the consortium Vulcain, composed by CGC Energie, two engi-
neering companies, and the construction group Zschokke (now 
Implenia). The public authority holds a majority (51%) in the project 
company Cadiom SA. The goal of this company is to design, build 
and operate a distance heating network in order to use the surplus 
heat coming from the incineration plant of Les Cheneviers in Aire- 
la- Ville. This network provides heating to more than 10,000 homes 
in five municipalities in the Canton of Geneva. The company Cadiom 
is paid directly by the clients (homeowners), hence corresponding to 
a concession scheme. The canton grants Cadiom the right to use the 
public domain and monitors the price and the quality of the service. 
The private partner was chosen after a competitive tendering 
process.
park. The project company was chosen from among five companies, 
after three rounds of competitive tendering, and the total value of 
the project is 150 million CHF.
The operator of the complex is in charge of all tasks except those 
related to the custody and care of inmates. The services provided by 
the private partner encompass, among others, building facility man-
agement, the management of the car parks, refuse management, 
internal mail service, the staff restaurant, the signage, the manage-
ment of the keys and the management of the office supplies. The 
private company is also in charge of the security and the surveillance 
of the complex, with the exception of the prison, which remains in 
the hands of the public authority.
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almost half were realized in the United Kingdom (49.1%), far ahead of 
France (11.9%) and Spain (10.9%).
Switzerland has a very low number of PPPs. Indeed, though many 
projects are incorrectly described as PPPs by the authorities, only two 
genuine PPP projects have been realized in Switzerland so far: the admin-
istrative centre Neumatt in BE (a contractual PPP, see Box 11.1), and the 
distance heating network Cadiom in the Canton of Geneva (an institu-
tionalized PPP, see Box 11.2).
11.3  When should Governments resort to PPPs?
This question is related to the more general question of optimal organiza-
tional choices, addressed in the work of the economists Ronald Coase 
(“Nobel Prize” 1991) and Oliver Williamson (“Nobel Prize” 2009).
11.3.1  Make or Buy for Public Services: The General 
Framework
A broad distinction can be drawn between the in-house provision of pub-
lic services (“make”), such as through traditional procurement and private 
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financing schemes and by outsourcing to the private sector (“buy”), either 
through service contracts or PPPs or regulated markets.
Ronald Coase posed the fundamental question of what the difference is 
between “make” and “buy”, in other words, why firms (or more generally 
public and private organizations) exist alongside the traditional market 
governance structure. He distinguishes between the hierarchy (the firm/
organization) as a governance structure, where the coordination mecha-
nism is the authority and hierarchy of the entrepreneur (through the 
labour/subordination contract),4 and the market, where it is the price 
mechanism that ensures the coordination of different players. As Coase 
(1937, p. 390) wrote: “The main reason why it is profitable to establish a 
firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism”. 
The concept of a cost of using the price mechanism—a transaction cost—
was further developed in the early 1970s by Oliver Williamson,5 who 
developed the transaction cost theory (hereafter TCT) and formulated 
precise propositions on the nature of transactions costs, their measure-
ment and the trade-off between “make” and “buy”.
According to the TCT, the market has a productive efficiency advan-
tage due to stronger incentives related to the private ownership of profit 
and the competitive pressure that allows for disciplining and sanctioning 
the poor performance of agents. In some cases, the market governance 
structure might also achieve cost efficiency through economies of scale 
associated with high fixed costs services. That is the case, for instance, 
when the private partner has many clients and is present in many markets, 
which enables it to spread the average costs across a larger area of produc-
tion, which is not possible for a single geographically limited public admin-
istration entity. Finally, the market governance structure might lead to 
productive efficiency gains when it allows an optimal allocation of risks. In 
particular, the market solution makes it possible for the public authority to 
transfer some risks to the private provider, who has a better ability to man-
age these risks (due to greater experience), such as risks associated with 
demand, availability and construction. By contrast, a public authority is 
better able to manage other risks, including the political and the environ-
mental, and should bear such risks.
4 As Coase (1937) points out, when the firm’s employees switch from one department to 
another, this is not because they are responding to changes in the wage but because they are 
ordered to do so.
5 In particular Williamson (1975, 1985).
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There is nevertheless a cost in using the market, because contracts are 
incomplete per se due to the assumption of the bounded rationality of 
agents. Agents are assumed to be rational, but they face cognitive limits in 
processing all the available information to design a complete contract. 
This contractual incompleteness leads to transaction costs that can mani-
fest themselves ex ante (costs of redaction and negotiation, guarantees) 
and, above all, ex post (costs of contract maladaptation, renegotiation, con-
tract enforcement, as well as the costs of breaching the contract). While 
the most important transaction costs are not observable, the very impor-
tant contribution of the TCT is to highlight that their magnitude can be 
nevertheless assessed according to the characteristics of the transaction in 
terms of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity.
Asset specificity is defined as the extent to which the investments made 
to support a particular transaction have a higher value to that transaction 
than they would have if they were redeployed for any other purpose (this 
difference of value constitutes a quasi rent). For example, if an individual 
learns Navajo, a language only spoken by a specific Amerindian commu-
nity in the southwestern United States, he is making a very specific invest-
ment compared to those learning English, as the knowledge of Navajo is 
nearly without value outside this community. As a result, the presence of 
specific assets leads to the apparition of the so-called quasi rent (the differ-
ence of value of the investments for the transaction and outside the trans-
action). Asset specificity can be of different types such as physical specificity 
involving specific equipment, human capital specificity associated to the 
specific knowledge valuable to the transaction or site specificity involving 
specific geographical localization and other types. Asset specificity leads to 
transaction costs because it locks-in contracting parties into a situation of 
bilateral dependence, increasing the likelihood of occurrence of opportu-
nistic behaviours to appropriate the quasi rent from both contracting par-
ties, knowing that contracts are incomplete.6
In addition to asset specificity, uncertainty regarding the conditions 
that will prevail during the execution of the contract is another important 
determinant of transaction costs. As agents are supposedly rationally 
bounded, they might be unable to forecast all future contingencies during 
the life cycle of the contract. Thus, uncertainty often calls for welfare 
6 It is important to note that asset specificity, if it generates transaction costs, has important 
advantages in terms of production costs reduction or product differentiation, leading to 
higher revenues.
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enhancing adaptation ex post by renegotiating the initial contractual terms, 
opening the door to potential opportunistic behaviour, and hence, overall, 
transaction costs.
Finally, transactions might be intrinsically complex in their object. The 
contractual difficulty generated by complexity can manifest itself either ex 
ante or ex post. Ex ante, it comes from the difficulty in specifying in the 
contract the expected service and the quality requirements, whereas ex 
post, it comes from the difficulty of observing and measuring the quality of 
the service provided. It might also be the case that even if the quality can 
be measured, it may be difficult to prove to third parties (e.g., a court) 
that an observed insufficient quality is attributable to the provider and not 
to exogenous causes. As a consequence, private providers can reduce costs 
to the expense of the quality of the public service. This is what Hart et al. 
(1997) observe in the particular case of US prisons. When operated by 
private operators, they observe that wardens are under-qualified, leading 
to an increase in violence and escapes. This would explain why, according 
to them, prisons delegated to private providers in the United States are 
prisons for those under 18 and not for dangerous prisoners.
Thus, the magnitude of potential transaction costs is determined at the 
transaction level, according to the above-mentioned transaction character-
istics. This magnitude, in turn, drives the choice of the governance struc-
ture. Considering the respective advantages and drawbacks of the 
governance structures, the main theoretical proposition from the TCT is 
as follows: the higher the expected transaction costs, the more hierarchical 
the chosen governance structure should be. The optimality of the choice 
depends then on the adaptation of the governance structures to the char-
acteristics of the transactions that they have to frame, defining the align-
ment principle.
11.3.2  Relative Optimality of PPPs
The trade-off developed above applies to the particular case of PPPs. As 
described in the first section of this chapter, PPPs correspond to a “buy” 
solution and hence exhibit advantages in terms of productive efficiency 
but drawbacks in terms of transaction costs, which will be more or less 
important according to the public service considered. Nevertheless, PPPs 
also have specific potential advantages and drawbacks.
First, a specific benefit of PPPs derives from bundling different phases 
of a project. In particular, bundling the design, build, operate and mainte-
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nance phases leads to life cycle cost savings. The private partner responsi-
ble for building a certain infrastructure has a stronger incentive to provide 
better quality when she also has to manage the maintenance of this infra-
structure, in order to reduce her total costs. In other words, bundling 
induces the private partner to internalize, at the building stage, possible 
externalities during the operating phase, and thus to exploit the comple-
mentarities and synergies between the different phases of the project. This 
could lead to innovations at the building stage. The higher the externali-
ties between different project phases, the higher the productive efficiency 
gains associated with PPPs. This bundling also allows for an improvement 
in global cost transparency.7 Bundling hence increases the alignment of 
incentives between public and private partners.
However, bundling involves a certain number of disadvantages in terms 
of transaction costs. In particular, bundling leads to a longer procurement 
process and to higher costs associated with bidding than traditional pro-
curement processes  (see Athias and Chever, 2018). Bundling different 
phases also increases the complexity and uncertainty of the project, and 
hence may increase transaction costs due to contract maladaptation and/
or renegotiation. As a consequence, problems of adverse selection might 
arise; these are certainly the main source of transaction costs. More specifi-
cally, the winning private provider might not always be the most efficient 
one. Instead, this provider might be either the most opportunistic one 
(i.e., who best anticipates the future renegotiation of the contract) or the 
most optimistic one (regarding future demand or costs). It leads to the 
“winner’s curse” (see Athias and Nuñez 2008, 2015).
Thus, the specificities of PPPs increase both productive efficiency gains 
and transaction costs associated with the market solution. The alignment 
principle mentioned above would then call for a hierarchical PPP structure 
to minimize total costs. Athias and Saussier (2018) highlight that contrac-
tualized PPPs, more specifically concession contracts, might indeed be 
very hierarchical, with, for instance, contractual clauses that foresee not 
7 PPPs reduce the leeway to “salami-slice” a project, that is, to break the project into a 
number of distinct sub-projects (which could consist in dividing the construction and opera-
tion stages of the project), so as to favour legislative project approval. A good example is 
given by the concert hall of Fribourg. In 2006, a budget of 35 million CHF for its construc-
tion was approved. In 2010 (one year before the inauguration), the local parliament voted 
an additional five million CHF in order to complete the construction, in particular to 
improve the quality of the technical infrastructure, but also to finish equipping the office 
spaces (e.g., air conditioning as well as heating and electric installations).
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only that partners will have to renegotiate the contract every three or five 
years but also how renegotiations should take place. They also highlight 
that PPP contracts exhibit heterogeneity in terms of hierarchical structure, 
a function of the degree of uncertainty surrounding the transaction, as 
predicted by the theory. In addition, within PPPs, the features of institu-
tionalized PPPs make them more hierarchical than contractual PPPs.
We expect then that institutionalized PPPs would more likely be chosen 
for public services which are potentially prone to significant contractual 
hazards. This is in line with the two case studies presented in Boxes 11.1 
and 11.2. In the case of the Cadiom, the project involved the design, 
building and operation of a distance heating network with high uncer-
tainty over the source of energy to be used. This uncertainty led to the 
choice of a more hierarchical form of PPP, which allowed for more coor-
dination and mutual adaptation. By contrast, the Neumatt project involved 
simpler tasks, thus leading to a less hierarchical form of PPP, the availabil-
ity contract.
As a result, the question of when governments should use PPPs, and 
which form of PPPs, depends on the characteristics of the service(s) to be 
delivered. It is hence possible to explain variations in the propensity to use 
PPPs across services, but not across countries at similar levels of economic 
development.
11.4  Why Is sWItzerland dIfferent?
Efficiency considerations should drive the use (or non-use) of PPPs, and 
that in turn depends on the type of service which is to be provided. To 
explain the low number of PPPs in Switzerland, one needs to look at insti-
tutional and cultural considerations that lead public authorities to use (or 
not use) PPPs.
11.4.1  Bad Reasons for Using PPPs
PPPs are frequently perceived by policy makers as a good way for a public 
authority to realize an infrastructure project when the financial means are 
constrained. While PPPs make it possible to avoid, or at least limit, an 
initial investment and hence the future interest and amortization of the 
debt, the counterpart is that the public authority will have to pay a contri-
bution to the private provider (in the case of an availability contract) or to 
forego earnings from user fees (in the case of a concession), and this 
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throughout the operation stage of the project. This boils down to the 
Ricardian Equivalence: the resources saved by the government by not pay-
ing the upfront investment under a PPP should be equal, in present value, 
to fees paid or user fee revenue foregone to the private provider. In addi-
tion, this leads to shifting the cost of a project to future generations. Thus, 
PPPs must not be considered as a means to get a “free lunch”.
In practice, choosing a PPP only because a public authority cannot bear 
the initial investment is often a means of circumventing a debt constraint 
imposed by law or upper tiers of government. As The Economist (2009) 
notes: “Cynics suspect that the government remains keen on PFI not because 
of the efficiencies it allegedly offers, but because it allows ministers to perform 
a useful accounting trick”. This also happened in the administrative centre 
Neumatt. The Canton of Berne decided the project did not fall under the 
debt brake, as the investment was borne by the private partner rather than 
the canton. However, the canton’s auditing office required the project be 
treated as a standard investment. The minister in charge of cantonal infra-
structure then explained that the canton subsequently became less inter-
ested in engaging in new PPPs because, despite the success of the project, 
the goal of this approach, that is, alleviating the burden on the investment 
budget, has not been reached (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2013, translation). 
This window-dressing of budget deficits as a way to get around the law is 
obviously not an acceptable, valid economic reason to justify using PPPs. 
Accounting rules for PPPs have been revised in order to avoid such behav-
iour from governments.8
In  Switzerland nevertheless, another way to circumvent debt con-
straints is through the private financing project scheme, as highlighted in 
the first section of the chapter. Since the private provider finances the 
construction of the infrastructure associated with the particular public ser-
vice being provided, no debt to the public authority is incurred. As with 
PPPs, it gives the authorities the illusion of a “free lunch”, and the oppor-
tunity cost associated with the alternative use of the ground is not assessed, 
even if it is potentially important. Thus, private financing is used in 
Switzerland as a substitute for PPPs to circumvent debt constraints. 
Privately financed projects can also be used by Swiss public authorities to 
8 In particular, the IPSAS 32 standard, whose application is also recommended by the Swiss 
Public Sector Financial Reporting Advisory Committee as part of the Harmonized 
Accounting Model for the Cantons and Municipalities (HAM2), requires that the assets and 
liabilities related to a PPP are included in the balance sheet of the public authority.
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avoid facing a referendum, which may become mandatory if proposed 
spending exceeds a specified amount. As private financing projects makes 
it possible to avoid the initial public investment, this could lead public 
authorities to use private financing schemes as a means to circumvent the 
semi-direct democratic instrument of the referendum.
PPPs are also often used in order to circumvent weaknesses in the tra-
ditional procurement process. In particular, a public authority might use 
a PPP to force itself to evaluate the overall costs of a project, by locking 
itself into a contractual or institutionalized relationship. In other words, 
PPPs could be used as a commitment device by public authorities. 
Although this might at first glance lead to better efficiency, it would be 
more appropriate to correct the organizational problems within the 
administration rather than turning to a PPP when it is not efficient. PPPs 
are not the quick-fix solution to the inefficiencies and bad practices of the 
public sector.
This would in turn explain why the use of PPPs is less frequent in coun-
tries where the public sector is considered to be more efficient, as in 
Switzerland. For instance, Afonso et al. (2005) constructed a Public Sector 
Efficiency indicator that measures the quality of the administration in 
terms of corruption, red tape, quality of judiciary and shadow economy. 
According to this indicator, Switzerland ranks well above all the other 
advanced OECD countries (see Fig. 11.2).
11.4.2  Bad Reasons for NOT Using PPPs
However, if there are bad reasons to use PPPs, there are also bad reasons 
NOT to do so.
Public choice theory tells us there are private benefits for politicians to 
keep the provision of public services within the public sector. It allows 
policy makers to award jobs to their relatives, friends or political col-
leagues, though one should quickly add that Transparency International 
considers Switzerland one of the least corrupt countries in the world. 
Switzerland does have some forms of hidden corruption in its public ser-
vice hiring and public procurement practices. This cronyism (referred to as 
the “B vitamins” in Switzerland, where B stands for the German word 
Beziehungen, i.e., Relationships) is widespread in Swiss administrations, 
especially at the local and cantonal levels. The high degree of decentraliza-
tion gives substantial power to local politicians who, due to the militia 
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system (meaning that most politicians are non-professional: less than 2% of 
local executive board members serve full time (Ladner 2011; Geser et al. 
2012)), have closer connections with private interests (Meinhardt et  al. 
2014) and are hence more likely to make biased choices. In the same vein, 
at a higher level, it is a fact that the interest groups and lobbies have an effec-
tive influence on the militia members of the cantonal and federal parlia-
ments. Their willingness and practices to advance their private interests 
which are often detrimental to the public interest are easier to hide in non- 
PPP projects for which it is easier to adapt the project in order to circumvent 
the obligation to use competitive tendering that applies to PPPs.9 This 
would also help explain why Swiss public authorities are biased against PPPs.
9 In accordance with the general rules of procurement law (i.e., the Federal Law and 
Ordinance on Government Procurement and the World Trade Organisation Agreement on 
Government Procurement), competitive tendering is compulsory for PPPs in Switzerland 
(Brahier 2017). See also Athias and Chever (2018) for an analysis of the pros and cons of 
competitive tendering.
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There are also “bad reasons” to avoid PPPs on the private sector side. 
Indeed, while PPPs allow the private sector to be involved in providing 
public services, the private sector may be sceptical about the rather hierar-
chical nature of most PPPs. In such a governance structure, the mission 
orientation of a public authority may conflict with the profit orientation of 
the private provider.
As a matter of fact,  in Switzerland, the degree of mission orientation 
strongly varies between cultural groups, in particular between language 
areas, as German-speakers are more prone to consider that public firms 
must be managed as private firms (for more on this, see Athias and Wicht 
2018b). There is a cultural reluctance, from a sizable share of the popula-
tion, to accept the fact that for a market solution to be efficient in the 
provision of complex services (which are prone to higher transaction 
costs), it has to be associated with a coordination mechanism that tends 
towards hierarchy.
Switzerland also lacks a specific legal and institutional framework at the 
federal level for PPPs. Unlike in other countries where there are laws spe-
cifically designed for PPP arrangements (e.g., France, the United 
Kingdom), PPPs in Switzerland are based on the general rules of contract 
and procurement laws. Thus, the legal environment in Switzerland is 
weaker than in other countries, leading market solutions through PPPs 
likely to be less efficient in this country  than elsewhere. In addition, 
whereas some countries have specific institutions to support the imple-
mentation of PPPs (e.g., the FIN INFRA in France), this is not the case 
in Switzerland. As a consequence, local decision makers might not have 
developed the skills and expertise to implement PPPs.
11.5  conclusIon
PPPs are not a panacea for providing public services, and they are optimal 
solutions only in very specific cases. There is thus no advocacy in 
Switzerland to systematically use PPPs, as has been the case, for example, 
in the United Kingdom. This might appear to be good news.
However, Swiss public authorities have shown a tendency to privately 
finance projects as a way to circumvent both debt and the constraints of 
a semi-direct democratic political system. Even when PPPs might be opti-
mal solution, this tendency often biases the choice to not use PPPs. 
However, one could change the accounting rules for the private financing 
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of projects by imposing competitive tendering for all projects, whether 
privately financed or as PPPs. Legislation should also be strengthened to 
provide a strong framework for implementing PPPs, and specific institu-
tions should be developed to help the public authorities in implementing 
such arrangements and providing them with the required skills. Finally, 
the conception of the market might gain from evolving in Switzerland. 
Even in a competitive market, the existence of transaction costs implies 
that the provision of public services has to be regulated.
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CHAPTER 12
In-Depth Modernization of HRM 
in the Public Sector: The Swiss Way
Yves Emery
12.1  IntroductIon
Human resources management (HRM) is undoubtedly the area in the 
public sector which has evolved the most in the last 25 years, especially 
in Switzerland. Those in positions of political responsibility in parlia-
ments and executives have realized that a modernization of the public 
sector cannot be achieved without profoundly reforming HRM statutes 
and processes; the need was already highlighted quite some time ago 
(OECD 1997a). Public managers have also often argued that they 
needed more room for maneuver in managing their staff (Hablützel 
2013). Even the voting population has supported reforms. In 2000, fol-
lowing a referendum, nearly two-thirds of the voters approved a new 
status for federal civil servants (now called public employees) by accepting 
the Swiss Federal Personnel Act (Federal Chancellery 2000). Starting 
from the simple management of personnel files, HRM in the public sec-
tor has become increasingly oriented to strategically managing human 
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capital (Emery and Chassot 2009). However, this remains a road many 
public administrations in Switzerland are still traveling; HRM projects 
continue to converge on this vision.
12.2  the ProgressIve MaturatIon of huMan 
resource ManageMent In swIss PublIc adMInIstratIon
The Swiss reforms in human resources are not the result of sudden radical 
changes. In keeping with Switzerland’s tradition of incremental reform 
(Giauque 2013), they have gradually gathered momentum. A brief look at 
the genesis of “personnel services”1 shows that in most cases, such units 
were first created in the 1970s (Germann 1996). Centralized personnel 
units gave significant impetus to professionalizing HRM in the public sec-
tor. In fact, their primary task was to administer personnel statutes by 
creating regulations and tools—such as grids for classifying jobs and grad-
ing systems—which were meant to be applied to all employees. The pro-
cesses were essentially imposed, meaning mandatory practices were 
introduced from the top down. The mission was to formulate a set of 
HRM standards that would establish a basis for treating civil servants 
equally, to have these standards approved by the political authorities in 
charge—principally by executives, but on occasion also by parliament in 
passing statutes governing personnel—and then to implement and control 
the application of these legal standards.
The idea that human resources are a decisive factor in organizations 
generally, and in public services in particular, is gradually gaining ground. 
By the early 1990s, personnel offices began to become interested in the 
people being managed and not just in their files and data (Emery and 
Gonin 2009). A parallel can be drawn with changes in operational services 
to increase their customer-orientation2. Specifically, this evolution involves 
defining and developing the skills, competencies, and behavior of civil ser-
vants, in accordance with the expectations of the administration, explicit 
job specifications, and sometimes competencies frameworks. Personnel 
recruitment, work evaluations, and training and development are increas-
ingly important, and have benefitted from increased resources. In the 
1 Often called “personnel offices” to highlight the physical space where employees came to 
discuss their affairs, and at times, to collect their pay.
2 Or Bürgerorientierung [citizen-oriented] in German; see, for example, Schedler and 
Proeller (2000).
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wake of such reforms, personnel units are often renamed as human resource 
departments to highlight their new focus on people rather than just on their 
files or records.
All such people-centered practices have inevitably led to devolving cen-
tralized human resource (HR) services and to move toward a greater decen-
tralization as well as to greater responsibility and accountability by public 
managers at all levels. Yet the fact that more interest is taken in individuals 
will not be credible if it is done remotely by human resource specialists who 
never actually meet with employees themselves. Therefore, a strong emphasis 
is placed on selecting and training managers in leadership skills and leader-
ship styles, which are designed to develop and motivate public servants. This 
role of HRM managers, now essential, is illustrated by the orientation taken 
in publications of the Federal Office of Personnel (2002); they highlight 
administrative management qualities as a key axis of modernization. This 
argument is widely found in other European countries as well with well-
developed training programs for managers (Kuperus and Rode 2008). The 
creation of “HR respondents” (see below) directly subordinate to opera-
tional departments and to those who are meant to work as business partners 
(Ulrich et al. 2009) contributes to achieving such decentralization.
The final stage of the maturation of Swiss public HRM is, for the most 
part, yet to come. It is linked to an important vein in the HRM literature 
which highlights the added value and strategic impact that HRM practices 
can have on the performance of an organization (Saridakis et al. 2017). 
This evolution implies the transition from a process orientation to a results 
orientation, as well as aligning HRM practices with the strategy and objec-
tives pursued by the administration (Barrette 2005). This evolution is 
doubtless one of the key challenges public sector HRM will face in the 
next few years, though recent studies tend to highlight more specific chal-
lenges, for example, demographic changes or talent management (Giauque 
et al. 2012a). The fact that there are more and more HR strategies in the 
administration is an indicator of this evolution to come (see below).
12.3  PublIc sector hrM In swItzerland: 
the essentIal axes of ModernIzatIon
The metamorphosis in public management resulting from the large-
scale introduction of New Public Management (NPM) principles has 
profoundly modified how civil servants do their work (see Chappelet in 
this volume). At the very least, and for the sake of coherence between 
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management systems, HRM should be adapted to meet the new expec-
tations which have arisen from NPM. It calls on training civil servants in 
new skills and competencies and to rethink the way their performance is 
evaluated and rewarded. Many analysts even think HRM has been the 
cornerstone of modernization in many countries (OECD 1997b), as it 
is an essential lever in bringing about organizational change: it directly 
affects the profile and behavior of public officials on a daily basis. We 
think that this has also been true in Switzerland, and so it is worth exam-
ining the typical levers for modernizing public HRM in Switzerland.
12.3.1  Hybrid Public Statutes
New public sector HRM practices are based on official statutes, often in 
the form of a law voted on by Parliament; these statutes have evolved con-
siderably. Internationally, public employment conditions have become 
increasingly aligned with those in the private sector, other than in coun-
tries with a long tradition of a career-based system of civil service such as 
France, Germany, or Austria (Demmke and Moilanen 2010). Most 
European Union (EU) countries have retained some form of job security 
for their civil servants, but Switzerland has gone a long way in transform-
ing its statutes, both at federal and cantonal levels, bringing civil service 
employment conditions closer in line with those found in the private sec-
tor (Bellanger and Roy 2013; Wisard 2007). It is also a question of 
remaining competitive in a labor market where specialized skills and “tal-
ents” remain rare. Because of the “open entry” or position-based system of 
the Swiss civil service, it is crucial that the public employment sector be 
concerned with how competitive its jobs and compensation packages are.
The deeper evolution of the relevant legal framework illustrates the hybrid 
nature of what we call the “post-civil service”3, since this framework usually 
provides a public law contract as the legal form of employment (Koller et al. 
2011). This was long considered heresy, as it juxtaposed a public law logic 
(with its basic in legality, equal treatment, proportionality, etc.) with contrac-
tual principles. However, it also made it possible for employer and employee 
together to agree on specific employment arrangements, albeit within the 
framework of personnel statutes which continues to define the main rights 
and duties of public employees. It was a very pragmatic Swiss solution, per-
mitting flexibility while maintaining a well- defined legal framework.
3 In line with the post-bureaucratic approach, very popular in the literature.
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Moreover, and also a hallmark of Swiss modernization, public employ-
ers enjoy considerable autonomy in setting the conditions for their per-
sonnel, and as a result, also of their HR processes and tools. Thus, the 
federal administration, the 26 cantons, and the 2200-odd municipalities 
(and in existing public enterprises, where employers have a less formal 
role), can largely determine their own conditions of employment. This 
creates a remarkable heterogeneity in what counts as being a “public 
employee” (Bellanger and Roy 2013; Ladner 2013). It reflects local needs 
as well as political relations as reflected in the parliaments and at all three 
governmental levels. In other words, it is a system diametrically opposed 
to having a unified career civil servant system governed by a single legal 
framework applying to every public official.
12.3.2  The Introduction of HR Policies and Strategies
Legislators increasingly require that civil service statutes include the for-
mulation of an HR policy (Emery and Lambelet-Rossi 2000; Thom and 
Ritz 2013). It is then up to the government to formulate, and ensure, 
the implementation of this policy; this complements or completes the 
juridical- administrative logic of the civil service, giving it a more strate-
gic orientation. Human resource policy can be defined as a strategy for 
reaching defined goals in the coming years, with the needed actions cor-
respondingly planned4. Sometimes, this strategy even forms a part of the 
master plan of the larger administrative unit, thus creating a link to a 
more general strategy being pursued.5 Thus, the federal administration’s 
new “HR Strategy” for 2016–2019 clearly states that one objective is to 
be competitive on the labor market: “Thanks to working conditions for 
personnel which are competitive, the federal government as employer 
offers interesting and attractive jobs not only for persons of all genera-
tions, as well as from the regions and linguistic communities of the 
country, but also for those who are disabled, and that irrespective of the 
sex of the persons concerned”.6
4 See, for example, http://www.pa.zh.ch/internet/finanzdirektion/personalamt/de/
ueber_uns/was_wir_tun/personalmanagement-strategie.html Accessed 14 Sept 2017.
5 HUG, Strategic axes of the Geneva University Hospitals.
http://www.hug-ge.ch/vision-2020/projets-strategiques
6 Office fédéral du personnel, Stratégie concernant le personnel 2016–2019 https://www.
epa.admin.ch/epa/fr/home/themes/politique-du-personnel/personalstrate-
gie_2016_2019.html Accessed 29 Aug. 2017.
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Defining a human resources policy permits the administration to posi-
tion itself in a clearer, more offensive, and positive way in the labor mar-
ket. This makes public service employers more attractive in an increasingly 
competitive market, one in which potential candidates may not necessar-
ily consider working for government as their top priority (Widmer 
2010). A study carried out by the author more than 15 years ago indi-
cated that the public administrations of most cantons and larger cities 
did not have a formalized HR policy (Emery and Lambelet-Rossi 2000). 
This has changed considerably, though in the absence of empirical data, 
it is difficult to know precisely how much HR policies in Swiss public 
administration have developed. Public administrations have become 
more and more active on their internet sites, as well as in social networks, 
and take an “employer branding” approach in promoting their distinc-
tive assets, as shown by a recent analysis (Emery and Kouadio 2017). 
What is evident from this research is that in addition to stressing the 
legal and material conditions of employment (most notably job security, 
but including other aspects such as ergonomics), the use of modern 
HRM practices and leadership, and the many opportunities for personal 
and professional development, emphasis is given to the value  and mean-
ing of the public mission, in conjunction with a so-called public service 
motivation (Giauque et al. 2012b).
12.3.3  The Development of a Decentralized Network of HR 
Professionals
Although HR services have long handled personnel in a very centralized 
and even centralizing manner (see above), this situation has changed con-
siderably in the past decade or so. Indeed, so much so that some analysts 
have begun criticizing what they see as the fragmentation of human resource 
management in public administration. In doing so, they echo the critique of 
private enterprises made some 20 years ago, so much had decentralization 
been pushed there. The rationale in this evolution is linked to a contextualist 
vision which emphasizes the importance of  making decisions at a level “close 
to the shop floor” so as to better understand the needs, constraints, and 
challenges of each operational unit concerned (Pichault and Nizet 2013).
In Switzerland, this development has been quite marked. It is not 
just a matter of a transfer of power between the HR department and the 
line managers, but also a gradual delegation of competencies between 
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parliament and government, which itself delegates certain responsibili-
ties to the public managers as the heads of units. This tendency of hav-
ing HR decisions being made “closer to the shop floor” is reinforced by 
the decentralization of HR units as such. To this end, many Swiss 
administrations have created the role of “HR respondent”, a function 
corresponding to that of a business partner, as the literature puts it 
(Ulrich 1998). This is a decentralized function, ordinarily dependent 
on the departmental hierarchy, but—following a functional logic—
reporting to the centralized HR department. For instance, in the city of 
Lausanne, HR respondents were established in 2004 in each of the 45 
or so administrative services, at an initial ratio of 1 full-time HR respon-
dent for 400 people (Ospel 2011). Such decentralized HR roles are 
highly developed in the federal administration, most cantonal adminis-
trations, and in the larger cities.
12.3.4  The Professionalization of Recruitment
A public administration based on merit and professional expertise is one of 
the defining characteristics of a bureaucratized civil service, according to 
Max Weber. Yet this does not mean that the skills or competencies required 
to perform the jobs entrusted to civil servants have been defined and eval-
uated in a professional manner (Guérard and Pailot 2007). The determi-
nation of specific competency profiles, to assess the degree of fit between 
the position (and its environment) and the person, is a relatively new prac-
tice and one that has improved significantly in Swiss public administration. 
It is the starting point of a professional hiring process which allows one to 
recruit those with the best skills, for public administration posts that any-
one can apply for.
The techniques for evaluating applications which are used in Swiss pub-
lic administration employ reliable and sophisticated assessment tools which 
look not only at competencies but also at the professional interests and 
personality of the candidates (Emery and Gonin 2009). This tendency is 
attributable to human resource departments which generally have exper-
tise in occupational psychology. Furthermore, these departments are more 
systematically involved as experts in recruitment processes led by public 
managers. For a long time, it was entirely up to the political and adminis-
trative hierarchy to select personnel, though without always having the 
necessary expertise. Nowadays, it is not uncommon to have recruitment 
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processes, particularly for executive managers, which involve two or three 
successive interviews along with the involvement of an assessment center, 
all of which can last more than a day. This does not include soliciting refer-
ences or conducting other analyses, depending on the post to be occu-
pied; this is especially true for senior management positions.
Finally, public administrations have increasingly resorted to using inter-
nal internet portals and both public and private internet job recruitment 
sites. These promote or accelerate recruitment and help improve the 
image of the public employer in the labor market—but it is often under-
taken without developing a proper marketing strategy (Sivertzen et  al. 
2013). A presence at recruiting fairs, for example, on university campuses, 
is now common, though this was not true even 15 years ago.
12.3.5  Performance Management Is Universalizing
In line with the NPM’s performance orientation, performance manage-
ment for public employees has been a major topic of modernization in the 
last 20 years (Gerrish 2016). Numerous analyses have addressed the prob-
lem of properly defining the performance of public employees, as well as 
objectives and criteria for their assessment. The methods implemented in 
public administrations take into account the specificity of public action 
and reflect this orientation toward results.
It is the responsibility of line managers at all levels to set goals and 
assess the performance of their subordinates, while at the same time trying 
to provide a more participatory, less transactional, and more transforma-
tional leadership (van Wart 2013). Performance assessment practices have 
a long tradition in the private sector, though even there they are not uni-
versally accepted (Reyge 2007). In the public sector, these practices are 
subjected to even greater criticism, even if their introduction is now nearly 
universal (OECD 2005).
Now widely introduced in Switzerland, the performance management 
of public employees thus appears as an indispensable practice, one that is 
basically complementary to mechanisms aiming to introduce performance- 
related pay, a theme that is dealt with in the following section. Most cur-
rent personnel statutes specify that public employees are subject to an 
annual assessment of their work. And this practice is well accepted, even 
though it does not always proceed in an optimal fashion, as it is a complex 
process both from a technical and a human point of view (Vidaillet 2012).
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12.3.6  Well-Established Performance-Related Pay
The OECD reported that the 1990s were an era in which, internationally, 
pay for performance was actively promoted in the public sector (OECD/
PUMA 1997). Such practices were also introduced in Switzerland 
(Schedler 1993). The experience and the reflection on such practices were 
very important, not least because it was possible to make needed correc-
tions: the practice of performance-related pay is not self-evident in public 
organizations (Atkinson et al. 2014).
Today most cantons, as well as the Confederation, have adopted this 
practice (Bellanger and Roy 2013). An analysis conducted a few years ago 
by the author in a dozen cantons across Switzerland7, however, revealed a 
country divided between two politico-administrative cultures. German- 
speaking Switzerland is closer to the Anglo-saxon English tradition, which 
is open to the new principles of public management, while French-speaking 
Switzerland is closer to the French tradition, corroborating wider findings 
related to NPM (Giauque and Emery 2008). Apparently, salary increases 
are near-automatic in French-speaking cantons, though they are subject to 
budget decisions in parliament, and these may limit or block the increases 
granted to civil servants. By contrast, the non-payment of the annual salary 
increase is regarded as a form of sanction for the employee concerned. In 
German-speaking cantons and in the Confederation, however, pay increases 
only depend on the performance of the employee, which is evaluated by his 
or her line manager during the annual evaluation interviews (see above).
The recognition of civil servants through remuneration is a cornerstone 
of the Swiss modernization of HRM, even when the available budget to do 
so has not always been up to the expectations of staff members or does not 
reach the levels theory recommends (Thériault and St-Onge 2006). There 
are, though, additional forms of financial reward such as bonuses for extraor-
dinary performance, for complex project management, or for suggestions 
which lead to savings. That is, the available repertoire for this type of reward 
is often broad, even if its amplitude (meaning the amounts awarded) is lim-
ited by internal directives (they rarely exceed 5% of ordinary pay).
12.3.7  The Development of Career Paths
The traditional bureaucratized career system, with its programmed and 
near-automatic progression up through the ranks, has largely disappeared 
7 Confidential commissioned report. The cantons included Geneva, Vaud, Neuchatel, 
Fribourg, Bern, Jura, Basel-Stadt, Zurich, Lucerne, and the federal administration.
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in Switzerland, with the exception of a few bodies, such as the police. The 
current arrangement structures career progression around acquiring new 
skills and competencies or completing training modules—certification is 
required in order to assume a higher level of responsibility or to perform 
more specialized tasks. Such training, or the acquisition of technical, 
social, and management skills, has been considerably expanded in the last 
15  years, making Swiss public administration organizations genuinely 
qualifying organizations, which further develop the employability of their 
staff. In most public administrations, training for basic, middle, and senior 
management is the subject of specific and compulsory seminars, as is true 
in the federal administration8.
In line with international findings (Demmke and Moilanen 2010), civil 
service careers in Switzerland today are less linear than in the past. That is, 
they are based less on a kind of automatic and incremental path, indepen-
dent of the current level of performance, previously largely linked to senior-
ity. They are also less vertical, this classic version of the civil service career 
having been supplanted by many alternate career paths. In particular, due 
to internal schemes to increase mobility, the option of moving transversally 
has been emphasized; it is an effort to decompartmentalize services, offices, 
and organizational entities more generally. But resistance to this remains 
significant. The Description des emplois et classification des fonctions 
(DECFO) project in Vaud’s cantonal administration goes in this direction9, 
in a manner similar to the general tools developed in the French intermin-
isterial Directorate of Administration and Civil Service (DGAFP 2010).
12.3.8  The Facilitated Termination of Employment
In the classic Weberian system, civil servants were sheltered from political 
pressure through their security of employment and appointment. This special 
protection has been considerably loosened in Switzerland in recent years, but 
with respect to employment security, public sector employment remains 
clearly superior to private sector employment. For this reason, it remains an 
important (extrinsic) source of motivation for job candidates, and even a com-
petitive advantage, one which can be decisive in a tough labor market.
8 Office fédéral du personnel, Développement du personnel et des cadres https://www.
epa.admin.ch/epa/fr/home/themes/developpement-du-personnel-et-formation/devel-
oppement-du-personnel-et-des-cadres.html Accessed 1 Oct 2017.
9 Canton of Vaud, DECFO-SYSREM http://www.vd.ch/index.php?id=25244 Accessed 
2 Oct 2017.
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As for termination, the Swiss tendency has been to facilitate it without 
prejudice. Therefore, it also lacks the administrative inquiry process 
(enquête administrative) that was once part of dismissing civil servants 
from their posts (Emery and Grund 2017). The message is clear, and it 
concerns as much the legal contract binding civil servant to an employer 
as the psychological contract involved. Public employment in Switzerland 
is not guaranteed and an employee can be terminated for economic rea-
sons (e.g., during a restructuring of the administration which results in 
job cuts), for inadequate performance, or for unacceptable behavior. If a 
position is eliminated, a comparable position must be offered by the 
employer in the administration concerned, but should a comparable 
position not exist, or the employee refuse to take it, then he or she can 
be dismissed. Similarly, if poor performance or unacceptable behavior is 
involved, then mandatory objectives are set and evaluated, and a formal 
warning is sent to the person concerned. If the problem persists, a dis-
missal can be pronounced.
As far as we are informed, dismissal for unacceptable behavior is rela-
tively rare—contrary to the fears civil service unions expressed when this 
possibility was introduced. But accurate figures on this are not available 
and central statistics are lacking, which is, to say the least, surprising.
12.4  other factors accountIng for the success 
of the swIss hrM Model
The HRM processes mentioned previously are at the heart of the modern-
ization of Swiss public sector HRM. However, other conditions have also 
favored this modernization:
• The comparatively high level of remuneration paid to Swiss public 
employees. However, this is not true of senior management  positions, 
where the attractiveness of the private sector is greater, given its free-
dom to set its own remuneration schemes.10 The evidence from the 
Federal Statistical Office is clear: average salaries in the public sector 
10 And that despite the Swiss population approving the “Minder” initiative (named after its 
initiator) in 2013 which was (https://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis348t.html Accessed 
2 Oct 2017) aimed at limiting the salaries of senior executives in the private sector. According 
to the latest analyses, it does not seem to have produced the desired effects (http://www.
bilan.ch/tag/initiative-minder Accessed 2 Oct 2017).
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are higher than in the private sector (Federal Statistical Office 2014). 
It is not uncommon that, for basic jobs requiring a vocational train-
ing qualification (such as the Federal Diploma of Vocational 
Education and Training) or for jobs requiring a lower level of quali-
fications, public sector pay is 20% or 30% higher than what is offered 
in the private sector. This salary attractiveness contributes to the evo-
lution of the existing public sector HRM system, in concert with the 
other fields of modernization noted.
• A fairly pragmatic “social partnership” especially in the German- 
speaking part of Switzerland, where all public management mod-
ernization efforts, including those involving HRM, have not led to 
much political mobilization. This is not the case in French-speaking 
Switzerland, particularly in Geneva, where reforms to the statutes 
governing public servants remain the object of strong opposition, 
particularly from the trade unions. It is exemplified by the Système 
compétence, rémunération, évaluation (SCORE) project, which 
tried to reassess remuneration throughout the civil service of the 
Canton of Geneva.11 Launched in 2011, this project is yet to be 
completed. Still, this example is not representative of the social 
partnership within the Swiss civil service, where the unions (exter-
nal to the administration) and the staff committees (internal to the 
administration) have shown a broad openness to modernization.
• Finally, one should mention the other key players: the political 
leaders, members of executive bodies, who are open to reforms. 
Their openness reflects a Swiss culture in which the principles of 
good organization and generic management (often mistaken for 
private management) are often welcomed. It should be remem-
bered that many Swiss women and men in politics are career pro-
fessionals who hold only part-time positions in the various 
political executives in the country. At the federal level, this par-
ticular political career profile of the “militia politician” is chang-
ing (Bühlmann et al. 2015). But that many Swiss politicians have 
experience in the private sector means modernization and innova-
tion in public administration can proceed—even if it is often at an 
incremental pace (Giauque and Emery 2016).
11 Canton of Geneva, SCORE, le nouveau système d’évaluation des emplois et des 
rémunérations http://ge.ch/etat-employeur/service-public/score-nouveau-systeme-deval-
uation-emplois Accessed 2 Oct 2017.
Y. EMERY
 217
12.5  In conclusIon
All these public HRM modernization initiatives were made possible in 
Switzerland by an evolution in the legal framework (statutes)-governing 
civil servants. They also came about due to a managerialization of public 
administration, as well as a political context receptive to this type of evolu-
tion. It has led to a convergence, in the area of employment, between 
public and private sectors. It should be remembered, however, that Swiss 
public sector HRM practices are infinitely more diverse than this brief 
overview can capture, reflecting the multitude of statutes in force.
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CHAPTER 13
Communication and Transparency
Martial Pasquier
13.1  IntroductIon
The management of public organisations has undergone considerable 
change over the past three or four decades as a result of increased pres-
sure on results, greater autonomy in using resources and setting priori-
ties, heightened accountability requirements and interest from citizens 
and the media in public decisions and action. Management tools—some 
from the private sector and others developed specifically for the public 
sector—have been added to the range of instruments available to public 
managers. Among these tools, communication—within organisations, 
with all the partners, with the community as a whole—plays an impor-
tant role. Increasingly, those responsible for public action must present 
the issues involved in public policies, explain decisions that are taken, 
provide justification for the ensuing measures and respond to the needs 
of, and requests made by, the beneficiaries of services.
A number of factors account for the development of public communi-
cation over the past two decades. Among the most important are the 
following:
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• Growing autonomy in public administration and the desire of agen-
cies to forge a distinct profile.
• Citizens’ need for information to enable them to participate in dem-
ocratic life.
• The mediatization of society, especially with respect to government 
and politics, together with the rising expectations of citizens regard-
ing the capacity of public administrative bodies to account for their 
decisions and activities.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first presents the various 
functions fulfilled by public communication in a modern democracy. The 
second sets out the principles of active communication, specifically com-
munication organised by public administrations. The third and final part 
discusses the principles of transparency—also called passive communica-
tion, meaning communication issued in response to access to information 
(ATI) requests.
13.2  the FunctIons oF PublIc communIcatIon 
In our socIety
Public communication, unlike that in private organisations (whose pri-
mary goal is to persuade people to acquire goods or services), often has 
to fulfil a number of very different functions at the same time. Although 
it is difficult to rank these functions in the order of priority (any may 
be important, depending on the type of organisation, the field of pub-
lic policy or the particular situation), core functions can be distin-
guished from complementary functions on the basis of legal 
requirements. Some tasks, such as informing the public or promoting 
values, are enshrined in laws. Other tasks, such as highlighting the 
activities of an organisation or receiving citizens, are generally accepted 
and recognised but not mentioned in laws, except perhaps indirectly.
13.2.1  Core Functions
Core functions normally arise out of a legal obligation placed on a 
public institution or organisation. Core functions can be divided into 
four main categories: information, explanation, promotion of values 
and dialogue.
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13.2.1.1  Public Information
This is the most important function in a democracy and stems from the 
principle of publicity1. If a democracy is to function correctly, debates and 
decisions must be transparent and known to all. Democracies therefore 
oblige their governments to publish all laws, by laws and orders in publicly 
available documents and to transcribe and publish parliamentary proceed-
ings. Similarly, trials and judicial decisions must be public2.
The publicity principle applies to all decisions and actions of institutions 
and the administration, which have a responsibility to provide regular, 
comprehensive information on their activities and decisions, ranging from 
the publication of the appointment books of ministers and senior civil 
servants, to announcements of public appointments and detailed activity 
reports. This function is vital because, with increased demands from citi-
zens, the complex institutional framework and “legislative inflation” 
(growth of legal norms), clear and accurate information must be readily 
accessible to those concerned.
13.2.1.2  Explanations and Complementary Information on Decisions
The complexity of public policies—as regards both their content and their 
implementation—together with a wider application of the accountability 
principle requires public institutions and organisations to provide explana-
tions of the issues and scope of the decisions made and to accompany these 
decisions with communications measures. This function goes beyond 
information, since it involves anticipating questions that may be raised by 
those concerned and requires pedagogical skills to convey information that 
is often complex for non-professionals. For example, following the passage 
of a law in Switzerland that clamped down on undeclared work, the federal 
government instituted a series of measures to provide information and 
raise awareness, including a communication campaign targeting the gen-
eral public. The primary aims of the campaign were to make people aware 
of the problem (including private households that hire domestic staff), to 
invite them to visit a website and to thank those who observed the rules.
1 Kant (1795) considered the publicity principle to be fundamental for a democracy: 
“Every legal claim must be capable of publicity.” Bentham (1830) held that general sittings 
of the legislature must be open to the public and that publicity is “the very soul of justice” 
(Gérard et al. 1987).
2 The European Union has many portals for information access, such as EUR-Lex, the 
European law portal (http://eur-lex.europa.eu), the European e-Justice Portal 
(https://e-justice.europa.eu) and the Open Data portal (https://open-data.europa.eu).
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13.2.1.3  Promotion of Values and Responsible Conduct
One of the tasks of the state is to protect and promote human rights and 
the basic values of the rule of law (equality, fair treatment, individual free-
doms, etc.), as well as values recognised by society and institutions (e.g. 
the integration of people with disabilities) and responsible civic conduct 
(respect for the environment).
First, these values and behaviours must be exhibited by public institutions 
and organisations, taking care to avoid inconsistencies that are often detected 
by interest groups and the media (such as a minister with responsibility for 
social solidarity who has undeclared domestic staff). Second, they must be 
conveyed to the population through organised events (women’s rights day, 
mobility day, etc.), awareness campaigns aimed at target groups (children 
regarding nutrition, the elderly for flu shots, etc.) or public discussion. This 
function goes beyond the promotion of values; to guarantee a lasting effect, it 
must increasingly include support for those who observe these values.
13.2.1.4  Dialogue Between Institutions and Citizens
A notable feature of democratic life is citizen participation in institutions 
and debates. The development of multilevel governance with an increase 
in the number of political decision levels (European, regional, conurba-
tion and inter-community) and the complexity of a great many public 
policies mean that both institutions and the administration have a respon-
sibility to maintain an ongoing dialogue with citizens. Many organisations 
communicate only when they have information to convey. People cannot 
be expected to take in and process information if the organisation convey-
ing the information is unknown and has little credibility. In a modern 
society, communication is an ongoing and interactive process.
13.2.2  Complementary Functions
Complementary functions differ from core functions not because they are 
less important in communications terms but because very often they have 
no explicit legal foundation. They arise out of a modern conception of 
public organisations.
13.2.2.1  Service Delivery
Very few laws address the manner in which citizens should be received by 
an administration, the information that is made available in advance, the 
physical comfort of the reception provided, the manner in which staff 
answer the telephone or attitudes displayed during personal interactions.
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And yet the initial contact with an organisation, waiting time and com-
fort, the friendliness and empathy of staff and the ease with which contact 
is made with someone using appropriate attitudes and language are essen-
tial components in the evaluation of a public service. Signage, office lay-
out, urban furniture and people’s attitudes and behaviours are all part of 
an organisation’s identity; public organisation managers are thus placing 
growing importance on establishing a distinct identity for their organisa-
tions and facilitating relations with the recipients of services, especially in 
cases where managers enjoy some administrative autonomy.
The office of a department dealing with personal bankruptcies pro-
nounced by a judge (inventory of assets, liquidation of assets, etc.) was 
housed in a building showing all the classic stereotypes associated with 
bureaucratic administration: an anonymous, overheated reception area, 
personnel separated from the public by a narrow counter topped with 
opaque glass, manually opened counter windows and so on. Relations 
with administrative personnel were often tinged with aggression (no 
privacy and an insufficient number of—uncomfortable—seats). The 
managers of the department took the opportunity afforded by a move 
to consider how their clients could be received and played an active 
part in the interior architectural design of the reception area, which 
featured a waiting room that was comfortable but not luxurious, spaces 
for discussion with tables and chairs, low partitions to provide a mini-
mum of privacy while protecting employees’ safety and so on. Managers 
reported that relations with clients improved considerably following 
the introduction of these changes.
13.2.2.2  Responsiveness
Responding to the public goes further than simply interacting with citi-
zens because it requires an organisation to have specific processes and 
instruments. Responsiveness does not refer to an individual official’s abil-
ity to comprehend a person’s needs and make an appropriate response, but 
rather an administration’s aptitude for gathering information from users in 
an organised manner, synthesising it and making sense of it so that a politi-
cal or administrative response can be made when necessary. Some tradi-
tional tools for accomplishing this are claims management, symposia for 
recording and discussing criticisms, discussions with organised user groups 
and other forms of citizen participation.
Surveys are very widespread in government and administrative spheres 
and are sometimes the subject of an official communications mission. 
They may be qualitative or quantitative and are used to assess the extent 
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to which members of the public are informed about and comprehend vari-
ous topics, to sound out public opinion on a subject at a given time or to 
take note of as yet unidentified needs or expectations.
13.2.2.3  Organisational Legitimacy and Public Actions
Many public organisations are little known to the public. There are a vari-
ety of reasons for this: they only affect small groups of the population 
(prisons), deal with highly complex subjects (research centres) or are very 
rarely on the political agenda (legal metrology departments in charge of 
units of measurement, measuring instruments and methods).
Public organisations can accomplish their missions more easily if they 
are known to the public, recognised as legitimate and provide clearly iden-
tified services. Communication measures can therefore serve to raise pub-
lic awareness, inform those concerned of their rights and obligations and 
the possibility of calling on the organisation’s services and make it easier 
for the organisation itself to recruit staff.
13.2.2.4  Maintenance of Social Cohesion
While all the functions mentioned hitherto may be the subject of tar-
geted measures and sometimes even purely ad hoc measures, the final 
function, maintenance of social cohesion, is more general and more 
difficult to pin down. It is nevertheless of vital importance, because a 
society’s vitality depends on the bonds linking members to one another. 
Although well- integrated urban populations rarely experience prob-
lems with social cohesion, it is often difficult for those who are margin-
alised physically, geographically or socially to feel that they are full 
members of the community, to develop in the community and contrib-
ute to its development in their own way. Public authorities can also use 
communication to help forge and maintain social bonds among people 
who would like to do so. Support for local media and even the creation 
of such media (regional press, web TV solutions, etc.), the organisa-
tion of lectures and discussions and online forums are all examples of 
measures that contribute to social cohesion.
13.3  the PrIncIPles oF actIve communIcatIon
A number of rules are found in almost every case, each of particular signifi-
cance depending on the political system, cultural diversity and medium used.
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13.3.1  Legal Bases
Although legal bases differ considerably from one country to another, a 
distinction can be drawn between general and specific legal bases (Barrelet 
and Werly 2011):
• General legal bases: legal bases vary between countries. In 
Switzerland, the provision of information is a duty defined in section 
180 of the 1999 Constitution3. Details of this duty are set out in sec-
tions 10 and 10a of the Government and Administration Organization 
Act. Although a legal basis for public communication exists in most 
countries, there is wide variation in the formal level of this duty and 
especially in its material content. Perhaps on account of this very 
general nature—which is of little use in differentiating public com-
munication from political communication—a number of countries 
have formulated internal guidelines to frame all such activities4.
• Specific legal bases: numerous specific provisions are found in laws, 
rulings, decrees, orders and guidelines, some concerning a field of 
public policy and others a specific institution. In Switzerland, for 
example, section 10 of the Energy Law of 16 June 1998 stipulates 
that “The federal energy board and the cantons provide the public 
and authorities with information and advice on the conditions of 
economic and ecological energy supply, the possibilities for using 
energy efficiently and rationally, and the use of renewable energies 
[…] and that […] the Confederation and the cantons may, as part of 
such activities and in collaboration with individuals, set up organiza-
tions tasked with providing information and advice to the public.”
13.3.2  Identification of the Source
The first criterion is that the source, or issuer, should be clearly identified. 
It is very important that all those to whom a communication is addressed 
are able to identify promptly and without any doubt that the issuer is a 
public institution or organisation. The legitimacy of a message is first and 
3 Paragraph 2: “It informs the public about its activity in a timely and detailed manner, 
provided that this is not precluded by any preponderant public or private interest.”
4 Switzerland: Information et communication du Conseil fédéral et de l’administration 
fédérale. Ligne directrices de la Conférence des services d’information de la Confédération 
(2003).
 COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPARENCY 
228 
foremost a function of the quality of its source. If the issuer is not known 
or not identifiable, there is a risk that the information will be given no 
more consideration than information released by any organisation without 
particular legitimacy.
The necessity for a clearly and easily identifiable source to some extent 
precludes the use of certain communications techniques, for example, 
those of viral marketing. Tools that enable messages to be transmitted 
quickly by directly asking all the members of a community or network to 
forward information must be handled with care in order to prevent any 
loss of control over the content or a biased interpretation due to the bear-
er’s lack of legitimacy.
13.3.3  Maintaining Arm’s Length from Electoral Issues or 
Referenda
The most sensitive criterion in the discussion over the use of public money 
for political purposes is the proximity of communications activities to elec-
tion or referendum dates. A party in power or an elected representative 
may be strongly tempted to use government services to promote their 
political record or defend political choices that they have made when the 
public is called upon to cast their votes.
Although rules to counter such behaviour can be introduced with rela-
tive ease in countries with a representative democracy, the situation is very 
different in countries where citizens are called to the ballot box regularly. 
This is the case in Switzerland, where use of instruments such as the popu-
lar initiative and referenda can result in citizens’ having to vote as many as 
four times per year at the federal, cantonal and communal levels. While the 
administration must show great restraint in communication activities con-
nected with the subject of the vote, it is not excluded from the debate, 
since its members can participate, provided that they observe the princi-
ples of neutrality and proportionality. Often, the administration will pub-
lish reports and civil servants will take part in the debate, but such 
communications must remain technical in nature or help to explain the 
government’s position. Taking a position could appear to be partisan and 
is thus prohibited5.
5 A senior civil servant was criticised for having authorised publication of a paid advertise-
ment in which his photograph was shown next to remarks he had made. In answer to a ques-
tion from a member of parliament, the minister stated: “[…] it is proper for a senior civil 
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So delicate is this subject, however, that such government or adminis-
tration involvement is frequently the subject of political debate or court 
rulings. In 2008, the administrative court of the canton of Geneva annulled 
a referendum on the grounds that the government’s summary of its posi-
tion and opposing arguments in the official pamphlet mailed to citizens 
was “schematic” and “peremptory” and asserted a “partisan position” 
(ATA/583/2008 of 18.11.2008). In 2003, a group of citizens launched 
a popular initiative entitled “Popular sovereignty without political propa-
ganda” demanding that both government and administration abstain 
from political debate concerning referenda (only an information brochure 
and a short position statement in the media would be authorised). 
Although the initiative was soundly rejected by over 75% of voters in a 
referendum on 1 June 2008, it highlighted the delicate balance that has to 
be maintained between the duty to inform, promoting a government proj-
ect and political debate. Very recently (2017), the president of the city of 
Geneva was sanctioned for producing an imbalanced referendum bro-
chure, leading to the referendum’s cancellation.
13.3.4  Continuity
While private organisations and political parties are free to choose whether 
or not to communicate about a given subject, the same does not apply to 
political and administrative authorities. The two elements that must be 
taken into account are continuity in communication and timely transmis-
sion of information.
Continuity in communication means that organisations cannot wait 
until the end of a process or until they have all the relevant information 
before communicating. Thus partial results, variants and intermediate 
stages must also be presented to the public even though definitive answers 
cannot be given at the time. This implies that authorities cannot keep 
important information hidden for tactical reasons or to avoid 
embarrassment.
Information must also be passed on in a timely manner in order to fuel 
democratic debate and facilitate the work of elected representatives and 
the media. Generally speaking, information is of value only at certain times 
servant to explain the technical reasons that support the Federal Council’s point of view; his 
photo may even accompany his statements, but he should not appear in the visuals of a paid 
advertisement” (Bulletin officiel du Conseil national, 11.06.07, AB 2007  N 766/BO 
2007 N 766).
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and information that is released too early or, more problematically, too 
late is in many cases useless. For example, authorities frequently time the 
release of information to coincide with holiday periods or school holidays, 
with the aim of avoiding extensive media coverage.
13.3.5  Transparency of Funding
The financing of communications activities must be transparent with 
regard to both the amounts and origins of the sums spent. If public com-
munication is directly or indirectly funded other than out of the public 
purse, this information must be clearly conveyed so that the receiver can, 
if applicable, take into account the relationship between the issuer and the 
source of funds when interpreting the message.
13.3.6  No Favourable Treatment for Recipients
Although a communication may be addressed for objective reasons to cer-
tain target groups, it must not discriminate against members of these 
groups. Public communication must therefore refrain from favouring par-
ticular journalists or particular elected representatives by informing them 
pre-emptively or more fully and thus ensure that all recipients of the mes-
sage are treated the same way. This guideline is not always easy to follow, 
particularly in view of media needs and expectations. Given the competi-
tion between media and their different publishing or broadcasting sched-
ules, the timing of the release of information may favour certain media to 
the detriment of others.
13.3.7  Objective and Comprehensive Content Tailored 
to the Target Audience
Most internal guidelines within an administration specify that messages must 
be objective and thorough. Although total objectivity in communication is 
impossible, and all the information available often cannot be released for 
reasons of time and space, public communication must strive to be objective 
by not suppressing criticism and by providing balanced information.
Adapting the content of communication to target groups is also very 
important. While specialists may be familiar with technical terms and acro-
nyms, non-experts and the general public are not. In fact, the challenge in 
formulating a comprehensible message is not only to avoid the use of 
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technical language but to consider whether people who are not proficient 
in the national language(s) are able to take in and understand official 
information. When one takes into account residents from foreign cultures 
and those who lack the ability or skills to read (the visually impaired and 
people of low literacy6), one can assume that a significant part of the popu-
lace is unable to understand typical messages disseminated by public 
authorities (the police, schools, administrative authorities, etc.). When 
formulating any important communication, administrations must con-
sider the information needs of potentially marginalised populations and 
tailor the message accordingly.
13.3.8  Consistent and Coordinated Communication 
Between Administrative Departments and Levels of Government
In matters involving public policies affecting several departments of an 
administration, administrative departments at different institutional levels, 
and sometimes private stakeholders as well, those responsible for commu-
nication must coordinate the messages issued by all actors involved and 
ensure their consistency. This is particularly important in conflict or crisis 
situations where there is a high risk that even minor differences in content 
and a lack of coordination in the timing of messages could cause confu-
sion that is difficult to remedy subsequently. In their communications 
activities, public institutions and organisations must make it a priority to 
coordinate messages and see that they are consistent—a delicate task, 
especially if the theme of the communication is a subject of much political 
controversy.
13.3.9  Communication Proportionate to Objectives and Target 
Audiences
A very useful criterion for differentiating public communication from 
political communication is proportionality with regard to objectives and 
target audiences. Although some political parties or elected representa-
tives focus a significant share of their communications on a very small 
number of subjects, public communication must cover all subjects and 
6 According to the Association lire et écrire, one in six adults in Switzerland does not have 
the expected reading and writing skills. Source: https://www.lire-et-ecrire.ch/ressources-et-
outils/lillettrisme-en-bref (retrieved on 4 January 2018).
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deal with them in a proportionate manner. While public institutions and 
organisations are rarely criticised for failing to cover certain subjects, 
extensive media coverage of other subjects can be seen as politically 
significant.
13.3.10  Communication Focused on Dialogue
Because of the functions it must perform, public communication must 
stimulate dialogue and favour media that allow interaction between the 
organisation and the recipients of the message. It is often much easier to 
purchase advertising space to publish an announcement than it is to take 
on the task of organising and participating in debates and facing criticism. 
For many governments, the concept of dialogue is broader still and 
includes taking note of citizens’ opinions through studies and surveys.
13.4  PassIve communIcatIon (transParency)
Passive communication involves information issued by the administration 
in response to a request from a person under ATI rights. These rights are 
generally enshrined in freedom of information (FOI) laws, also known as 
transparency laws (Pasquier and Villeneuve 2007; Pasquier and Meilland 
2009).
Historically, the foundations of the principle of access to government 
information were laid in Sweden, with the Freedom of the Press Act of 
1766. In recent history, Finland in 1951 was the first country to protect 
citizens’ right to information in its laws. Since then, many other countries 
have followed suit: the United States in 1966, France and the Netherlands 
in 1978 and Canada in 1983. In the early 1990s, it was the turn of south-
ern European countries to pass transparency laws: Spain in 1992 and 
Greece and Portugal in 1993. More recently, similar legislation came into 
force in the United Kingdom in 2005 and in Germany and Switzerland in 
2006.
FOI laws are similar from country to country and often have the same 
characteristics:
• Information that can be consulted: the basis of any FOI legislation is 
the possibility for citizens to request information, or a document con-
taining the desired information, without having to give reasons for 
the request. The documents in question can be very varied in nature: 
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reports, notes, minutes of meetings, letters, emails and even unwrit-
ten documents such as telephone conversations. FOI laws must thus 
explicitly state what information is available and what is not.
• Exceptions: generally, these laws apply to all government and admin-
istrative bodies. However, exceptions are provided for on grounds of 
higher interests of the State (international relations and security ser-
vices) or protection of citizens (courts and privacy).
• Assistance provided by the state in the search for information: given 
the complexity of government operations, citizens cannot be 
expected to know about all the documents that exist and are thus 
available to them. Depending on the country or the institution con-
cerned, mechanisms are provided to inform citizens of the type of 
documents produced by the government.
• Time required for delivery of information: laws and regulations gen-
erally stipulate the time frame within which the government or body 
concerned must respond to an ATI request. Governments cannot 
therefore keep citizens waiting unduly. This is a vital point, consider-
ing that information often loses its value over time (subject no longer 
topical, important vote taken, etc.).
• Search costs and fees: generally, access requests are free or carry a 
nominal charge that will not create a significant obstacle. If search 
costs exceed a certain threshold (high number of photocopies, 
research time, etc.), they may be billed. However, the amounts in 
question must be reasonable, so as not to put access rights beyond 
the reach of some citizens.
• Remedy procedures: generally, a distinction is drawn between levels 
of remedy within the administration and the right to go to court to 
defend ATI rights when the administration refuses to comply, exceeds 
the permitted time frame or bills unreasonable charges.
Even though FOI legislation varies in the different countries that have 
adopted such legislation and processes can take diverse forms, the main 
objectives often present similarities. Governments claim that the public 
can obtain information and use it to verify that they work in the citizens’ 
interests. From a philosophical point of view, Bentham directly connects 
secrecy with conspiracy and thus affirms that public officials will be less 
tempted to misuse power because of external monitoring (Hood 2006). 
Despite such support from both governments and citizens, it should be 
noted that, in some countries, there has been relatively low use of the new 
 COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPARENCY 
234 
legislative instruments so far. Although the capacity to obtain more infor-
mation about government through legal processes intuitively implies more 
transparency, two limitations remain. First, ATI requests in certain coun-
tries are mainly submitted by journalists, lawyers and interest groups. 
Second, low usage of ATI may reflect either a lack of interest or complex 
procedures for obtaining access. Consequently, greater access to govern-
mental and administrative information may create a more transparent 
environment, but a real increase of transparency would probably involve 
more citizen participation. Figure 13.1 shows how requests have evolved 
over the last few years.
The number of ATI requests depicted above excludes requests made by 
phone, email and so on and those submitted at subnational levels. In 
Switzerland, cantons adopted transparency laws at different times. Bern 
was the first to legislate on the matter (the law was adopted in 1995), fol-
lowed by 14 cantons between 2001 and 2011. A transparency law at the 
federal level (Ltrans) was voted in 2004 and enforced two years later.
Fig. 13.1 Changes in the number of requests since FOI legislation was intro-
duced in various countries (number of requests per one million inhabitants). (In 
Canada and India, requests are based on the fiscal year, running from April 1 to 
March 31, and in New Zealand and Australia, from July 1 to June 30. All other 
collected data are calendar year based)
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Explanations given for the low number of ATI requests vary. One issue 
is how much awareness is there of the right to information among the 
population and certain specific groups, such as journalists. Since the right 
was granted relatively recently in Switzerland, it appears not to be well 
known to the public.
The country’s communications policy, its ability and its willingness to 
disclose information proactively—mainly through making it available in a 
structured manner on websites—undoubtedly have a very great impact on 
the number of requests recorded. If information is freely accessible 
through directories, most people with access to a computer can easily 
download documents without the administration being able to count such 
downloads as access requests. One can assume, therefore, that a high 
number of officially filed requests correlate negatively with the possibility 
of accessing available information directly and freely.
Another reason often mentioned in the literature is the level of trust 
that citizens place in the government and authorities. The higher the trust, 
the lower the number of access requests should be, since one of the rea-
sons put forward to account for the development of ATI rights is the pos-
sibility of holding the administration accountable and establishing a 
relationship of trust. The level of trust in the government is higher in 
Switzerland than in any other European country. A low level of trust may 
therefore account for a high number of requests.
Because the countries being compared have very different political sys-
tems, the information needs of certain groups and of the population as a 
whole at a given time may vary considerably. In a system with a governing 
majority and a minority in opposition, numerous requests are made by the 
opposition parties. They ordinarily receive limited information and as oppo-
sition, seek to counter the plans of the party in power. But in a system where 
the main parties are in power and have direct ATI held by the administra-
tion, as is the case in Switzerland, this need is significantly reduced.
The last reason concerns the level of government in charge of public 
policies. Citizens need information that affects their daily lives (schools, 
roads, land use, health, various authorisations, etc.) and the corresponding 
public policies fall within the purview of different levels of government in 
different countries. In the United States, Canada and Switzerland, many 
requests are not addressed to the federal government because the matters 
at issue fall under the jurisdiction of a region or municipality. This being 
so, all requests filed at all levels of government would have to be recorded 
in order to establish an accurate picture of the use of the right of ATI.
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Naturally, the number of requests filed is not a sufficient indicator to 
determine the level of openness of any government but, combined with 
other indicators and interpreted in the light of the characteristics of the 
political system, it does provide evidence of citizens’ interest in informa-
tion held by the administration.
13.5  conclusIon
Public communication in Switzerland is characterised by two essential 
components of the country’s political system: federalism and popular 
rights.
With three levels of government (Confederation, cantons and com-
munes) and a large number of institutions working through networks 
(inter-cantonal conferences, urban areas, inter-communal organisations, 
etc.), the number of actors involved in communication is very high. In 
addition, most are very close to residents because public services are 
offered or managed by the lower levels of government (cantons and com-
munes). Communication is thus highly decentralised, with strong proxim-
ity between the transmitter (administration) and receiver (citizens).
The second important characteristic, which is very specific to 
Switzerland, is popular rights, particularly referenda and popular initia-
tives. Because laws enacted by parliaments may be subject to a referen-
dum, the way that information is managed by the administration and the 
needs of political parties differ from those in other countries. Often, it is 
not in the administration’s interest to conceal information when preparing 
a parliamentary debate, because doing so could rebound against the gov-
ernment when a referendum is held, which may be several years later. 
Conversely, political parties and lobbyists do not necessarily need to access 
information ahead of parliamentary proceedings, because they know that 
they still have the referendum as a means of getting their ideas across, 
which is clearly not the case in countries where a government can push a 
law through parliament in a matter of months, with no possibility of a 
referendum.
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CHAPTER 14
Financial Management System, Legislation 
and Stakeholders
Nils Soguel
14.1  IntroductIon
This chapter briefly depicts how financial management at the various 
Swiss government levels is governed by legislation and organized in 
practice. It presents the legal framework, the main institutional settings 
and the actors involved1. Within the Swiss federalist system, the cantons 
exercise considerable autonomy in financial management; each canton 
has designed its own way to manage its public finances. The ‘standard’ 
1 Here we use ‘government’ in the way it is used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 
2014): a unique legal entity established by political processes that has legislative, judicial or 
executive authority over other institutional units (households, corporations and non-profit 
institutions) within a given area (p. 14). Therefore, a government is an organization that 
includes several branches: a legislature (parliament), an executive branch with its administra-
tion and a judiciary, either at the federal, the cantonal or the municipal level.
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financial management both at the level of the Confederation (the upper 
tier) and at the cantonal level is summarized here, and while their finan-
cial system is similar, municipalities are not explicitly addressed.
The following section presents the legal foundations and guiding princi-
ples of financial management at the national and cantonal levels. Section 
14.3 addresses the implications the legal foundations have for preparing and 
implementing the budget, detailing the role the different bodies play at each 
stage of the process. Section 14.4 is dedicated to two specifically Swiss insti-
tutions meant to ensure the government’s fiscal sustainability, the fiscal 
rules2 and the financial referendum together with the right of initiative.
14.2  LegaL FoundatIons
The legal foundation governing financial management is provided by the 
Constitution and the Financial Management Act of Parliament (FMAP). 
The same legal architecture prevails at the level of the Confederation and 
in each of the 26 cantons. Each canton is free to decide upon the proce-
dures for managing its budget. Therefore, each canton also has its own 
FMAP. Cantonal FMAPs have similarities, as do their processes of financial 
management.
The legal foundation—Constitution and FMAP—generally governs 
the budgetary principles, the appropriations, the financial budgeting and 
reporting and the financial management at the operational level. It regu-
lates the parliament (either at the federal or at the cantonal level), the 
executive branch and the various public administration units. It also 
defines the financial management abilities of these bodies.
Most of the legally binding budgetary principles are standard. For 
instance, the principle of legality demands that there be a legal base for all 
expenditures and revenues. Expenditures and revenues must be balanced, 
at least in the long run. The principles of efficiency and effectiveness should 
guide spending behavior and contribute to balancing the budget. The prin-
ciple of urgency also helps to prioritize expenditures and guarantee project 
necessity and feasibility. Earmarking main taxes and pre- appropriating them 
for specific types of expenditures are in principle prohibited. The user-pays 
principle is relatively uncommon, though it is mentioned in the FMAP of 
several cantons. It postulates that, wherever possible, beneficiaries of public 
services must bear the costs of these services.
2 Fiscal rule is also often referred to as budget constraint or financial rule.
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In general, a typical cantonal FMAP is fairly detailed regarding the reg-
ulation of appropriations (i.e., the regulation of credits called Kreditrecht 
or droit des credits). Apart from complying with the principle of legality, 
every expenditure item must be based on a credit appropriated by the 
Parliament. An FMAP usually typically specifies four kinds of appropria-
tions: budgetary, supplementary, contingent and ancillary.
The budgetary appropriation (Budgetkredit, crédit budgétaire) is the 
most straightforward, since the budget formally approved by the 
Parliament for the next fiscal year (i.e., the beginning-of-the-year budget) 
is largely the sum of the budgetary appropriations requested by the execu-
tive branch. Once approved, the budgetary appropriation counts as an 
authorization to spend for the specific and corresponding purpose.
The supplementary appropriation (Nachtragskredit, crédit supplémen-
taire) is a further ‘authorization to spend’. This type of credit is requested 
by the executive branch during the fiscal year when the existing budgetary 
appropriation proves insufficient. Both budgetary and supplementary 
appropriations are valid only for the fiscal year at hand. Should these 
appropriations not be spent by the end of the year, the executive branch is 
not authorized to later spend what remains.
The two remaining kinds of appropriations are meant for projects lasting 
more than a fiscal year and that typically entail capital expenditures for infra-
structure such as school or hospital buildings. To commit itself to such proj-
ects, the council of the executive branch (hereafter the Executive Council) 
must be reasonably confident that once it requests funds from Parliament via 
a budget appropriation that Parliament will agree to appropriate the necessary 
amount. To obtain this assurance, the Executive Council submits a contin-
gent appropriation (Verpflichtungskredit, crédit d’engagement) for parliamen-
tary approval. The request may be submitted at any time during the year and, 
in principle, is outside of the usual procedure for drafting and adopting the 
budget. A contingent appropriation authorizes the Executive Council to 
make commitments to the various stakeholders in the corresponding project, 
but does not count as an authorization to spend. For that, the executive 
branch must ask Parliament to transform the contingent appropriation into a 
budgetary appropriation for the portion that corresponds to the work to be 
carried out during the coming fiscal year. In case the amount of a contingent 
appropriation is not enough to complete the project, the executive branch 
may request an ancillary appropriation (Zusatzkredit, crédit complémentaire), 
meaning a supplementary contingent appropriation. These four kinds of 
appropriations require majority approval by Parliament.
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14.3  FInancIaL Process and MaIn actors
The financial process may vary between cantons. Figure 14.1 shows the 
sequence of a typical process with its respective outcome documents: the 
mission statement, the financial plan, the contingent appropriations, the 
budget, the financial statements, the audit report and the financial statis-
tics. The fiscal year in question is designated as year t, and Fig. 14.1 shows 
when each step takes place relative to it. The Swiss fiscal year is the same 
as the calendar year, running from January 1 to December 31.
Figure 14.1 underscores the decision-making power of the different 
participating bodies: the Executive Council, the Parliament and, in some 
cases, the citizens. The process may appear to be like that in other coun-
tries, but there are Swiss particularities, including the instruments of direct 
democracy, the preeminence of legislative over the executive branch and 
the fact that citizens directly elect the members of Executive Councils 
(Regierungsrat, Conseil d’Etat). This last characteristic contrasts with 
other countries in which executive members are not elected but appointed 
by a prime minister or president. In Swiss cantons, the member of the 
executive responsible for financial management (the finance minister) and 
other members responsible for thematic issues like education or health 
(the spending ministers) have additional incentives to play their typical 
roles in the financial process if they intend to run for re-election and want 
to present a positive record of their accomplishments. This creates checks 
and balances between the ‘spending ministers’ on the one side and the 
finance minister on the other side.
14.3.1  Mission Statement and Financial Plan
The financial process begins before the debate about allocating financial 
resources commences. In fact, the FMAP requires a newly elected 
Executive Council to immediately draw up a joint mission statement for 
Parliament covering the four- to five-year electoral term (if the executive 
has a longer-term vision, this time horizon sometimes can be extended). 
To ensure that the mission statement remains specific, the departments 
(the cantonal equivalent of national-level ministries) are required to design 
and cost out the projects which will fulfill this vision of the executive. 
These projects are then collected and subsumed within a multi-year finan-
cial plan (Finanzplan; plan financier) accompanying the mission 
statement.
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14.3.2  Planning of Major Projects and Contingent 
Appropriation Requests
Careful planning is necessary if a mission statement, or existing legislation, 
calls for implementing major projects, because the FMAP lays out special 
features before any spending can occur. As already mentioned, a contin-
gent appropriation is necessary for multi-year projects. Additionally, 
should the amount requested exceed a predetermined amount (see below), 
the FMAP requires that a referendum be held on the contingent appro-
priation which has been approved by parliament.
To illustrate this process, consider a department with a project that requires 
a contingent appropriation. The department must prepare a report justifying 
the project and planning for its finances (expected capital expenditure and 
receipt and recurring expenses and revenues). The report is submitted to 
other departments which are potentially affected, inviting them to express 
their views. As most projects have financial consequences, the department of 
finance (DoF) also offers its comments. In its report, the DoF evaluates 
whether the project meets the budgetary principles (efficiently, effectively, 
etc.). Next, the Executive Council considers the comments and debates about 
the project. Provided the expenditure level does not exceed its financial man-
date, the Executive Council decides, definitively, whether to accept it or not. 
Otherwise it must pass the request on to the Parliament.
14.3.3  Decision over Contingent Appropriation Requests
Once the executive branch passes the request to Parliament, the relevant 
parliamentary commissions (financial or thematic) analyze the project and 
forward their opinion to the plenum. Depending on the amount involved, 
Parliament’s decision is enforceable or may be challenged by popular ref-
erendum. Once the project and the corresponding contingent appropria-
tion are accepted, be it by the Executive Council, the parliament or the 
citizens after a referendum, it must then be translated into annual install-
ments, in the form of budgetary appropriations in the next budget and 
beyond that in the annual forecasts of the multi-year financial plan.
14.3.4  Budget Preparation
In Switzerland, the budget reflects the existing legal foundations, includ-
ing the tax provisions. Due to time constraints associated with launching a 
referendum against a law, the possibilities of adapting laws when preparing 
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the budget are limited. In countries without this right, the government is 
freer to amend its laws, including tax laws, when creating its budget. In 
Switzerland, the decisions surrounding public policies and their execution 
therefore come into play well before the creation of the budget.
That being said, the annual budget (for year t) is prepared simultane-
ously with updating the financial plan for the following years. The usual 
time horizon for the plan is three years (t + 1 to t + 3). Accordingly, the 
previous plan is considered when elaborating a budget and updating the 
financial plan. However, this is not binding, and an Executive Council will 
issue fresh guidelines to the various departments which are based on the 
DoF forecasts of expected revenues and projected tax revenue.
The finance ministers, as heads of the respective DoFs, are usually very 
cautious in their tax revenue forecasts, often underestimating them in an 
attempt to rein in the appetite for budgetary appropriations before the fact 
(Chatagny and Soguel 2012). Once the DoF receives the various depart-
mental claims for budgetary appropriations and consolidates them, the 
total usually exceeds the guidelines or the expected revenues, or fails to 
meet the target imposed by a canton’s FMAP fiscal rule (see below). It 
typically takes several rounds of negotiations between the DoF and the 
spending departments (typically education, social welfare or health) to 
finalize the budget. The Executive Council intervenes when administra-
tive departments cannot agree. The budget is prepared according to the 
standards for presentation provided in the FMAP, standards which also 
apply to presenting the financial statements at year’s end.
The above depiction of executive-level budget preparation suggests 
that this preparation is a bottom-up and incremental process. It is certainly 
still so in many cantons where the budgetary appropriation claims for year 
t are based on budgetary appropriations approved by Parliament for the 
previous year (t − 1). Only large efficiency distortions, the need to finance 
new projects, or fiscal stress might force the government to systematically 
review existing programs. According to Aschwanden and Gerny (2013), 
this happened in 2013 when 16 cantons experienced unusual difficulties in 
balancing their budgets and had to adjust them.
With the onset of the New Public Management, performance-based 
budgeting has been implemented in some cantons. In this case, Parliament 
no longer governs the executive exclusively in an input-oriented manner 
but also specifies the expected qualitative or quantitative characteristics of 
the public service to be provided. Along with these specifications come the 
corresponding budgetary appropriations. This makes the budget process 
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more output-oriented. For instance, in the canton of Aargau, Parliament 
sets the health department goals for school-based immunization.
In line with strengthening the fiscal rules, many cantons have also 
adopted a more top-down budgeting process. Fiscal rules straitjacket the 
government’s budget and it becomes legally virtually impossible to run 
deficits. Therefore, the forecasts of expected revenues made by a DoF at 
the outset of the process are more binding than when the fiscal rules were 
softer. To make sure the fiscal rule requirement is fulfilled, the Executive 
Council, sometimes with the approval of the Parliament’s standing com-
mittee on finance, undertakes the initial budgetary appropriation and allo-
cates the forecasted revenues between the departments. This approach 
enables a better match between the council’s mission statement and the 
budget. Every department then is required to allocate the granted appro-
priation—but not more—to the various tasks it must carry out.
14.3.5  Budget Adoption
Most cantonal parliaments must only take note of the updated financial 
plan referred to it by the executive branch in early autumn. Parliamentary 
budget debate thus focuses on the budget for the next fiscal year, with 
preliminary discussions taking place in several parliamentary commissions. 
The financial commission usually takes a defensive position, trying to 
maintain the balance proposed by the Executive Council, while each the-
matic commission tries to expand its own public services by advocating for 
more expenditures, whether for education, health or culture. Eventually, 
the budget is accepted by Parliament in December.
In principle, Parliament has the final say in the budget, giving it more 
power than the Executive Council. However, the tight schedule prevents 
Parliament from initiating fundamental changes once the budget has been 
submitted to it (Pfäffli 2011), which means power actually resides in the 
Executive Council and the public administration. Nevertheless, when a tax 
law change is proposed while the budget is in preparation, the proposal 
can be subject either to a mandatory or optional referendum, giving the 
final say to the citizens.
For instance, in late 2016, voters in the canton of Lucerne rejected 
the tax rate increase proposed by Parliament and thus rejected the pro-
posed 2017 budget. Consequently, the government had to start the 
2017 fiscal year without a valid budget until the Parliament agreed over 
the necessary spending cuts that enabled compliance with the fiscal rule 
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without increasing the tax rate. The agreement was reached in mid-Sep-
tember 2017 only. In the meantime, the executive branch had to limit 
itself to necessary spending related to contracts already signed (von 
Däniken 2017).
The threat of a referendum gives both the Executive Council and 
the administration incentives to initially propose an acceptable budget. 
However, a power gap still exists between the government and the citi-
zens because the latter by and large face a tie-in sale as they cannot 
decide upon individual budgetary appropriations. Yet two mechanisms 
are available which allow citizens to directly influence the budget allo-
cation: (1) using a financial referendum to fight a contingent appro-
priation proposal or (2) launching a popular initiative (petition) 
requiring a change in legislation that would then increase or decrease 
expenditures (see below).
14.3.6  Budget Execution and Supplementary Appropriations
The executive branch executes the budget once it has been approved by 
Parliament. The executive branch applies the budget. Indeed, the budget 
appropriations give the executive branch the right to spend monies, up to 
the appropriated limit and for the prescribed purposes, between 1 January 
and 31 December of Year t.
Budget implementation usually does not go as planned. The cost of 
some inputs or the demand for certain public services may increase, and so 
initial budgetary appropriations may not suffice. The Executive Council 
has some leeway in reallocating initial appropriations, but the need may be 
greater than what has been already appropriated. In that case, the execu-
tive branch submits a request to Parliament for a supplementary 
appropriation.
14.3.7  Preparation of the Financial Statements
The fiscal year-end period rings in the preparation of the annual financial 
statements. The DoF prepares them under the accrual basis of accounting 
according to the FMAP. This involves the faithful representation of the 
effects of transactions, as well as other events and conditions, in accor-
dance with the definitions and recognition criteria for assets, liabilities, 
revenue and expenses. It also involves some book entries that satisfy sec-
ondary interests rather than present the financial situation as it is. Insofar 
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as these entries are within the limits of the FMAP, the literature calls them 
creative accounting or political finessing techniques (Clémenceau and 
Soguel 2018)3.
Indeed, the finance ministers have incentives to exploit the opportuni-
ties for political finessing provided by the FMAP. First, techniques can 
directly help fulfill the fiscal rule, especially if the rule is stringent. Second, 
an excessive deficit, but also a large surplus, may place the finance minister 
in an awkward position. In case of a deficit, citizens may judge that the 
minister has lost control of the public finances. In case of a surplus, they 
may feel they are paying too much in tax and demand either greater public 
spending or a reduction of the tax burden (e.g., using a popular initiative). 
If these claims are successful, the long-term fiscal balance is at risk, espe-
cially if the surplus was triggered by a favorable business cycle. The pros-
pect endangers compliance with existing fiscal rule as well as the finance 
minister’s re-election chances (Clémenceau and Soguel 2017).
14.3.8  Financial and Compliance Audit of the Financial 
Statements
The FMAP requires the auditing of the financial statements and sets the 
reference terms for the auditor. It explicitly requires a financial and com-
pliance audit, in order to investigate the legality of expenditures, the 
proper recording of receipts and the correct operation of receipts and 
expenditures controls. The auditor must certify the absence of fraud and 
whether reports follow the law. It is worth noting that in most cantons, 
this does not require the auditor to certify whether the reports actually 
provide a true and fair presentation. That paradox is worth mentioning, 
since the FMAP often allows the aforementioned political finessing. The 
auditor’s report is sent to Parliament together with the financial 
statements.
Each canton has an audit office (Finanzkontrolle; Contrôle des finances), 
governed by a cantonal law that is  usually distinct from the FMAP. 
Depending on the canton, the head of the audit office is appointed by the 
Executive Council or by Parliament. The audit office is usually administra-
3 The most common possibility—but not the obligation—offered by FMAPs for political 
finessing is to discretionarily inflate operating expenses with a book entry called ‘additional 
depreciation charges’. The aim is to accrually and artificially lower the reported surplus. This 
book entry must not be confused with the true depreciation charges representing actual wear 
and tear or the obsolescence of assets.
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tively attached to the finance minister. However, it is only in the law’s debt 
and is therefore functionally independent when it acts as external auditor of 
the financial statements for the benefit of Parliament. Aside from its func-
tion as external auditor, it supervises the entire government during the fiscal 
year with respect to the principles noted above (legality, urgency, economy, 
etc.). In this capacity, it acts as an internal auditor for the benefit of the 
Executive Council, in a manner like that found in the private sector4.
14.3.9  Approval of the Financial Statements
Once the financial statements are audited, the Executive Council submits 
them to the Parliament for approval, which is a mere formality.
14.3.10  Elaboration of the Financial Statistics
The last step of the financial process consists in making the information 
contained in the financial statements of the 26 cantons—but also of the 
municipalities and of the central government—comparable and available 
for further analysis. This takes place in the years that follow the presenta-
tion of the financial statements by the various governments at all three 
levels.
The presentation of the financial statements is supposed to be harmo-
nized between all these entities, but in reality, this is far from being the 
case. The central government’s DoF has the unenviable task of oversee-
ing financial statistics for the entire country, and along with the varia-
tion in what is reported. Notably, the scope of the financial statements 
must be harmonized, since some cantons, for instance, include hospitals 
in their accounts while others do not; the same prevails for universities 
or for job centers. Dealing with all these difficulties, ensuring that finan-
cial statistics satisfy quality requirements and comply with international 
guidelines (IMF Statistics Department 2014) thus takes a lot of effort 
and time. This is the price to be paid in a system as decentralized as the 
Swiss one.
4 Anachronistically, two cantons (Geneva and Vaud) have decided to install a court of audi-
tors (Rechnungshof; Cour des comptes) in addition to the audit office they already have. The 
idea was to have a more independent authority to supervise the government’s work. The 
members of this court are elected by direct universal suffrage in Geneva and by Parliament in 
Vaud. Strangely enough, in Vaud, the court of auditor’s main task is performance auditing 
rather than compliance auditing.
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14.4  two sPecIFIc InstItutIons constraInIng 
the PubLIc FInances
The economic literature gives various reasons for the existence of deficits 
or surpluses (Krishnakumar et al. 2010). When it comes to Switzerland, it 
is worth focusing on two institutions which are particularly significant for 
the management of the different tiers of Swiss government: the fiscal rules 
and the financial referendum.
Switzerland experienced an economic depression in the 1990s, with a 
resulting increase in its sovereign debt attributed to two asymmetries. 
First, governments behave asymmetrically by tolerating or engaging in 
deficit spending when the economy is in recession without securing sur-
pluses when the economy is booming. The second asymmetry is that 
decision- making competency for expenditures is not granted at the same 
institutional level as it is for receipts. Parliament can often decide autono-
mously to spend, but a tax increase proposal must be put to a popular 
referendum (Lienhard and Marti Locher 2015).
14.4.1  Fiscal Rules
Fiscal rules and financial referenda have long been implemented to miti-
gate both asymmetries: The canton of St. Gallen implemented a so-
called debt brake (debt containment rule) already in 1929. It was 
(anecdotally) reported that its debt level began decreasing two years 
after the debt brake was introduced, whereas it continued to rise in the 
other cantons. By now, all cantons but one (the small half-canton of 
Appenzell Innerrhoden) have introduced a fiscal rule, but the design and 
stringency of the fiscal rule varies widely. Some cantons anchored it in 
their constitution and others only in their FMAP, where it is easier to 
modify. The rule sometimes applies to the budget (beginning-of-the-
year), sometimes to the annual account (end-of-the-year) and sometimes 
to both. In general, rules require balancing the budget, but this may 
apply to all transactions or only those entered in the operating account 
(i.e., excluding capital expenditure and receipts). Sometimes, a time 
period by which a fiscal balance must be obtained is explicitly required, 
as well as a sanction mechanism in case of missed targets, for example, a 
compulsory tax increase (Yerly 2014). Empirical evidence shows that 
cantons with stricter rules have significantly lower budget deficits and 
debt (Feld and Kirchgässner 2008).
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As for the central government, 85% of Swiss voters supported the 
implementation of a debt brake. The mechanism is thus anchored in the 
Federal Constitution and has been applied since 2003. The rule requires 
balancing the budget over the course of a business cycle. To achieve that 
goal, expenditures are capped each year with a ceiling that depends on the 
annual receipts, adjusted for the economic situation. The adjustment is 
calculated using a cyclical factor—the ratio of potential gross domestic 
product (GDP) to actual GDP—with which the receipts are multiplied. 
When the economy is depressed and the output gap negative, the factor is 
greater than one. In this way, the ceiling for expenditures is higher than 
the actual receipts, allowing for a deficit. When the economy is booming 
and the output gap positive, the factor is less than one. The ceiling for 
expenditures is then lower than the actual receipts, requiring a surplus. In 
exceptional circumstances, a qualified majority in parliament can raise the 
expenditure ceiling. By considering the business cycle in a mechanical way, 
the federal fiscal rule offers the automatic stabilizers the room they need 
to function, and even offers the government some flexibility in taking 
counter-cyclical measures.
14.4.2  Financial Referendum and the Right of Initiative
The financial referendum is an instrument a majority of cantons have 
adopted; it can be optional or mandatory. It applies if a one-time or recur-
ring expenditure exceeds a defined threshold. The threshold varies signifi-
cantly among the cantons: between 250,000 and 25 million CHF for 
non-recurring expenditures and from 50,000 to 400,000 CHF for recur-
ring expenditures. When the possibility of an optional referendum exists, 
meaning that the population must petition to have an expenditure put to 
a popular vote, the required number of petitioners (i.e., the number of 
signatures to collect) also varies from 100 to 10,000 citizens, depending 
on the canton. Empirical evidence shows that where mandatory financial 
referenda exist, expenditures are significantly lower (Funk and Gathmann 
2011). For instance, in the alpine canton of Graubünden, the instrument 
was successfully used in 2017 to combat the Executive Council’s request 
for a contingent appropriation to organize the 2022 Olympic Winter 
Games.
The introduction of a financial referendum at the central level has been 
discussed for some time, but such proposals have never been able to appeal 
to a majority in Parliament. Opponents fear possible delays in the political 
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process. They also think it is useless, since a large portion of central gov-
ernment expenditures are annual transfer payments to other public enti-
ties, notably the cantons.
Swiss citizens also can make use of their right to launch popular initia-
tives to influence public finances; since government budgets as such are 
legally beyond the control of the referendum. A striking example was pro-
vided by the ‘redistribution initiative’ launched in 1997 by the Social 
Democratic party. It called for a popular vote on a proposal to amend the 
Federal Constitution and oblige the central government to cut military 
expenditures in half over ten years and invest one-third of the savings into 
international peace efforts. The initiative was rejected by 62% of the vot-
ers, although it was accepted in four French-speaking cantons.
14.5  concLusIon
The various Swiss financial management systems have some unique fea-
tures, both due to the interplay of the instruments for direct democracy 
and with Parliament not being under the Executive Council’s thumb. 
Considered together, these elements build systems of checks and balances 
that have led—particularly in the last two decades—to sound public bud-
gets with relatively low debt levels.
Having said that, the system could be improved, for as in almost every 
country, Parliament is granted only a limited time to scrutinize proposed 
budgets. The result is to have the approved budget that strongly resem-
bles the Executive Council’s proposed budget. Additionally, since the 
finance minister acts within the Executive Council as one among equals, 
there is an inherent risk of finding all the ‘spending ministers’ arrayed 
against the sole ‘budget minister’. Financial concerns become demoted 
through this situation, though thus far, the conservative stance of finance 
ministers has helped control this risk.
The finance minister sometimes also has recourse to political finess-
ing, for instance, by underestimating tax receivables when preparing the 
 budget or by artificially inflating some accrued expenses. This has proven 
useful for guaranteeing sound public financing—though it is detrimental 
to the fair view one expects from a governments’ financial statements. 
Accurately reporting the financial situation will not expose Swiss govern-
ments unduly, especially if the instruments of direct democracy are in 
place and working. In that respect, those cantons that do not have a 
financial referendum, or that have eliminated this possibility, might want 
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to reconsider. Cantons where the fiscal rule is not stringent enough 
should reinforce this constraint, as long as it is adjusted to the business 
cycle in the manner of the federal debt break.
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CHAPTER 15
The Swiss Way of Presenting 
the Governments’ Financial Statements
Nils Soguel
15.1  IntroductIon
The goal of this chapter is to give the reader the keys to understanding the 
financial statements and budget plans as they are prepared and presented 
by Swiss governments at the three different levels.1 This means presenting 
the main statements and their purpose, as well as how the statements are 
interrelated.
In Switzerland, as elsewhere, financial statements are a major element 
of governmental information systems and must be organized so as to 
respond to the various expectations interested parties have of the govern-
ment. These expectations have evolved over time as the country’s internal 
1 Here we use ‘government’ in the way it is used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 
2014): a unique legal entity established by political processes that has legislative, judicial, or 
executive authority over other institutional units (households, corporations, and non-profit 
institutions) within a given area (p. 14). Therefore, a government is an organization that 
includes several branches: a legislature (parliament), an executive branch with its administra-
tion, and a judiciary, either at the federal, the cantonal, or the municipal level.
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institutions have transformed, as well as due to technical, accounting and 
computing changes.
Therefore, the two following sections retrace the historical evolution of 
public accounting in Switzerland and the requirements for the accounting 
model. Section 15.4 presents the overarching structure of financial state-
ments, while Sect. 15.5 is dedicated to two specific features of financial 
reporting: internal service pricing (ISP) and political finessing.
15.2  the hIstory of swItzerland’s Governmental 
accountInG system
The history of governmental accounting in Switzerland is marked by 
repeated attempts to harmonize policies both horizontally—between can-
tons—and vertically—between municipalities, cantons and the 
Confederation. The first attempts at harmonization date from the nine-
teenth century.
The federalist organization of Switzerland for many years doomed these 
attempts to failure. Each canton sets out, in its own Financial Management 
Act of Parliament (FMAP), how it will organize itself financially, including 
what system it will use to prepare and present its financial statements. This 
explains why, until the mid-1960s, virtually every canton used a different 
system. Some cantons, like most Swiss municipalities, used a system 
inspired by the private sector, namely double-entry accounting with an 
income statement and a balance sheet. But other cantons used cash-basis 
accounting, like the central government.
Nonetheless, the modernization of the state slowly increased the need 
for harmonization of accounting systems. This came out of increased 
expectations in transparency, comparability and accountability. In a feder-
alist system like Switzerland’s, harmonization is particularly necessary to 
provide the consistent information required by the fiscal equalization sys-
tem. It is also necessary to guarantee fiscal policy coordination.
It still took until the late 1970s for movement toward harmonization 
both between the cantons and the municipalities to begin. This movement 
was initiated by the intercantonal Conference of the Cantonal Finance 
Ministers (CFM) (Konferenz der kantonalen Finanzdirektorinnen und 
Finanzdirektoren, Conférence des directrices et directeurs cantonaux des 
finances). This Conference brings ministers together with the goal of 
coordinating the cantonal policy in fiscal matters when cantons decide that 
coordination is necessary. Nevertheless, the CFM cannot force the can-
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tons to act; it can only formulate recommendations. Thus, it was only able 
to recommend the cantons to implement, for themselves and for their 
municipalities, the first Harmonized Accounting Model (HAM1) (see 
CFM 1981). The heart of HAM1 consisted of a detailed chart of accounts 
to be used both for the budget plan (beginning-of-the-year) and for the 
financial statements (end-of-the-year), but also for the multi-year financial 
plan. The chart of accounts is designed around a statement of financial 
performance, a statement of capital expenditure, a statement of financial 
position, and an embryonic cash flow statement.2
It would only be by the mid-1990s that most cantons and municipali-
ties took the first step toward harmonization. However, they applied the 
HAM1 in highly variable ways (and rigor), while the central government 
continued to use a cash-based accounting system.
Eventually the central government’s position became more and more 
untenable. Several factors finally forced it, in 2007, to switch to an accrual 
accounting system in order to provide a more faithful representation of its 
financial condition. This change came about partly in response to New 
Public Management (NPM) pressures, but it was also due to the develop-
ment of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSASs), 
to the need for more robust financial statistics at the national and interna-
tional levels, and for lenders to be more readily able to understand the 
central governments’ financial statements.
Certain cantons were also confronted with the same demands as the 
Confederation. This was particularly true for Geneva and Zurich, cantons 
frequently present on the capital market due to the size of their debt bur-
dens. In response to their particular needs, the CFM created a second- 
generation Harmonized Accounting Model (HAM2; see CFM 2008). 
The heart of HAM2 remained the chart of accounts, but in the modified 
or evolved form. The HAM2 also proposes 20 standards that are essen-
tially recommendations since the cantons remain free to include them or 
not into their FMAPs.
The HAM2 is an evolution of the HAM1 which is compatible with the 
2007 central government’s accounting system and with the IPSASs. It 
offers governments, in ten or so cases, alternative accounting policies (e.g. 
linear or degressive depreciation; the possibility but not the obligation to 
2 Note that the terminology used in the text is that provided by the IPSASs (International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards). When necessary the German and French equivalent, as 
used in the Swiss governments, is given.
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restate their administrative assets when introducing the HAM2; and the 
opportunity that their FMAP provides for the possibility of some forms of 
political finessing when preparing the financial statements). With these 
alternatives, all cantons found their way: both those that want their finan-
cial statements to provide a faithful representation of economic and other 
phenomena,3 and those cantons adept at a more political approach to pub-
lic finance which place a much greater emphasis on the prudence 
concept.
When it published its 2008 Manual, the CFM recommended the can-
tons implement the HAM2 within a maximum period of ten years. By 
2018, all cantons will have introduced this new model, and the munici-
palities, will do so by 2021 or 2022. So far, the proposed chart of accounts 
has been uniformly implemented. However, the cantons do take advan-
tage of the alternatives offered by HAM2. As a result, policies are becom-
ing harmonized, but remain far from uniform (Soguel and Munier 2017).
15.3  requIrements for the accountInG model 
and PrIncIPles for the recoGnItIon of transactIons
Both HAM1 (1981) and HAM2 (2008) were designed to serve various 
functions as follows:
• Make it possible to implement the legal framework for financial man-
agement (Finanzrecht, Droit budgétaire) and specifically to regulate 
appropriations and the granting of credits (Kreditrecht, Droit des 
crédits)
• Serve as the basis for financial management, notably to establish and 
control financial plans, service provision agreements, fiscal rules, or 
financial indicators
• Link performance-focused and fiscal management in order to stimu-
late the managerial conduct within and between the various govern-
mental units
3 As stated in the IPSASB Conceptual Framework (2015, p. 49), ‘faithful representation is 
attained when the depiction of the phenomenon is complete, neutral, and free from material 
error. Information that faithfully represents an economic or other phenomenon depicts the 
substance of the underlying transaction, other event, activity or circumstance―which is 
not necessarily always the same as its legal form’.
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• Enable macroeconomic analysis so as to be able to implement a sen-
sible fiscal policy
• Support the creation of financial statistics
• Facilitate the protection of creditor interests
To fulfill these functions and to ensure that the information pro-
vided in the financial statements are as faithful as possible, the HAM2 
explicitly outlines several basic rules:
• accrual principle (Periodenabgrenzung; Comptabilité d’exercice);
• going concern principle (Fortführung; Continuité);
• materiality principle (Wesentlichkeit; Importance);
• gross recognition principle (Bruttodarstellung; Produit brut);
• reliability principle (Zuverlässigkeit; Fiabilité);
• comparability and consistency principles (Vergleichbarkeit und 
Stetigkeit; Comparabilité et permanence des méthodes);
• understandability principle (Verständlichkeit; Clareté). This last prin-
ciple is particularly important in a system like Switzerland’s, in which 
parliamentarians are part-time, and in which direct democracy requires 
that citizens understand their governments’ financial condition.
15.4  overarchInG structure of the fInancIal 
statements
The financial statements give a structured representation of a govern-
ment’s financial condition. They provide information about revenue and 
expenses, current and capital expenditure and receipts, cash flow, and 
assets and liabilities. The set of financial statements recommended by the 
HAM2 comprises a statement of financial performance (SoPERF), of capi-
tal expenditure (SoCAPEX), of financial position (SoPOS), and of cash 
flow, along with notes providing additional financial and non-financial 
explanations.
Taken together, the SoPERF and the SoCAPEX form the ‘administra-
tive statement’ in HAM1. This designation demonstrates that all current 
or capital expenditure granted by a budgetary appropriation must be 
recorded in this dedicated group of statements. It also demonstrates that 
all spending items recorded in the ‘administrative statement’ are accord-
ingly submitted to the political supervision of the council of the executive 
branch and of the Parliament.
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15.4.1  Statement of Financial Performance
The SoPERF (i.e. income statement, Erfolgsrechnung, Compte de résultats) 
provides information about the government’s operating costs and the 
degree to which revenue covers the charges. It indicates whether reve-
nue—notably tax revenue—is sufficient to cover the costs of the services 
provided. Ideally, the income statement must be balanced, if not annually, 
then at least in the medium term.
The SoPERF also lists the budgetary appropriations for current expen-
ditures granted by a Parliament when it approves a budget plan. In the 
(end-of-the-year) financial statements, this makes it possible to control the 
level of use of these credits.
This makes the SoPERF a key element of the government’s financial 
management system. Indeed, its total is targeted by the fiscal rules in all 
cantons and in most municipalities, which is why SoPERF is usually 
located at the beginning of the report on the budget plan and the financial 
statements. Furthermore, in both documents most of the pages are dedi-
cated to the SoPERF.
The HAM2 introduced a three-level structure in the SoPERF, replac-
ing what had been only a single level statement (see Fig. 15.1).
The first level isolates operating revenue and operating expenses to show 
the operating result (Ergebnis aus betrieblicher Tätigkeit; Résultat 
d’exploitation). Operating revenue includes tax revenue, royalties and 
Fig. 15.1 The three-step statement of financial performance
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 concessions, revenue from exchange transactions, or transfer revenue. 
Operating expenses include notably personnel expenses, purchases of goods 
and services, depreciations of administrative assets, or transfer expenses.
The second level isolates financial revenue (e.g. interest income) and 
expenses (e.g. interest expense) to show the financial result (Ergebnis aus 
Finanzierung; Résultat financier). Together the operating result and the 
financial result form the ordinary result (Operatives Ergebnis; Résultat 
opérationnel).
The third level isolates extraordinary revenue and extraordinary 
expenses to show the extraordinary result (Ausserordentliches Ergebnis; 
Résultat extraordinaire). Extraordinary items correspond to unpredict-
able and beyond-anyone’s-control events, like natural catastrophes. They 
also include various political finessing operations (see below).
The overall result is obtained by summing the ordinary result and the 
extraordinary result, or in other words, shows the difference between all 
revenues and all expenses. A surplus increases the net worth in the SoPOS, 
while a deficit reduces the net worth. The ordinary result is that which 
best reflects financial performance since it excludes the extraordinary ele-
ments and those relevant to political finessing.4
Revenue and expenses must be registered and classified according to 
their nature, meaning following an economic classification. In addition, 
they must be classified by functional purpose, such as health, education or 
social protection. Both classifications are standardized in the HAM2 chart 
of accounts, easing inter-government comparisons. The functional classifi-
cation is compatible with the UN’s Classification of Functions of 
Government (COFOG). Governments may use a third classification 
reflecting how their organization is designed, which is essential for moni-
toring how budgetary appropriations are used by various ministries or 
departments. However, since governmental organizations differ, this clas-
sification cannot be standardized.
4 IPSAS do not explicitly preclude the presentation of items as extraordinary items (IPSASB 
2015, p. 206). However, given the IPSAS requirement for faithful representation, the IPSAS 
understanding of the concept of extraordinary expenses or revenues does not encompass 
political finessing.
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15.4.2  Statement of Capital Expenditure
The SoCAPEX (Investitionsrechnung, Compte des investissements) is a par-
ticular characteristic of the HAM. It comes in addition to the statement 
required by the IPSASs and is nonetheless compatible with them.
Any expenditure that creates an asset used by the government over 
several years in providing legally required public services must be recorded 
in the SoCAPEX, together with the corresponding receipts (e.g. capital 
grants). Such assets are labeled administrative assets (Verwaltungsvermögen, 
Patrimoine administratif).
Some expenditures do not create administrative assets. For instance, the 
government may use an asset as a yield-producing investment vehicle (e.g. 
by-to-let properties or securities; Geldanlage, Placements). Such yield-pro-
ducing expenditure creates non-administrative assets (Finanzvermögen, 
Patrimoine financier). These assets are directly recorded in the SoPOS. All 
other expenditures are current expenditures and do not create any assets. 
These latter are registered in the SoPERF instead.
The distinction between the three kinds of expenditures (current, capi-
tal, and yield-producing) is important from a legal perspective. Current 
and capital expenditures depend on budgetary appropriation and thus on 
parliamentary decisions. Yield-producing expenditures, on the other hand, 
are in principle the prerogative of the executive branch council and are 
exempt from parliamentary approval.
In this way, the SoCAPEX provides information on the government’s 
equipment and infrastructure efforts. On average, capital expenditures are 
equivalent to about 10% of current expenditures. The balance of the 
SoCAPEX shows net capital expenditures after deducting capital receipts. 
Expenditures are usually larger than receipts except when grants are not 
received in the same accounting period when expenditure are recognized. 
When closing the account, the administrative assets created are recognized 
as such in the SoPOS.
Capital expenditures can take various forms. They include expenditures 
to buy, build, or improve tangible and intangible fixed assets, like land, 
civil engineering work, building construction, plant and equipment, soft-
ware or patents. They also include contributions or loans provided to 
other entities or governments, which are meant to create assets for the 
provision of public services required by law.
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15.4.3  Statement of Financial Position
The SoPOS (Bilanz, Bilan) is less important in the financial statements of 
Swiss governments than it is in the statements of private companies. In the 
private sector it comes first, but in the public sector, it typically comes at 
the end of the financial statements. Nevertheless, the purpose is similar: 
the SoPOS offers an inventory of assets and shows to what extent they 
have been financed by borrowing (i.e. liabilities) or through equity (i.e. 
accumulated surpluses). The statement is a static picture of the financial 
condition, typically on 1 January or 31 December. It is thus unlike the 
other statements, which give information about flows throughout the year 
showing the flow of expenses and revenue, of capital expenditure and 
receipts, and of cash.
In the inventory, the HAM2 distinguishes between administrative 
assets stemming from capital expenditure and non-administrative assets 
stemming from yield-producing investment vehicles. The distinction is 
not required by the IPSASs nor is it encountered in the private sector. It is 
based upon the alienability principle, a notion introduced in HAM1 but 
no longer included in HAM2. Besides being justified by the regulation of 
appropriations, the distinction makes it possible to figure out which assets 
may not be sold (e.g. administrative assets without which a legally required 
public service could not be provided) and which assets can be sold without 
endangering existing public services (i.e. non-administrative assets).
Non-administrative assets are split between current and fixed assets 
(Fig. 15.2). The HAM2 requires that they be measured and reported at 
their fair value and, if available, at their market value. By providing govern-
ments with a common measurement basis and a unified principle to sepa-
rate them from administrative assets, the HAM2 dramatically increases the 
comparability of net debt between governments. The government’s net 
debt is defined as the difference between liabilities and non-administrative 
assets, since the latter can be sold freely and converted into cash to pay 
back the debt. Although a comparison of Swiss governments based on net 
debt is thereby made possible, this is not the case between countries, 
which is why international comparisons are almost always based on gross 
debt. This approach involves a risk of bias. Indeed, a variable part of the 
public debt can be contracted to finance yield-producing investment vehi-
cles. Yet contracting a debt for this reason should be analyzed from a 
fundamentally different perspective compared to when the debt is con-
tracted to finance administrative assets that the law forbids from selling.
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In terms of administrative assets, HAM2 stipulates that they should be 
measured and reported at their depreciated historical cost, meaning at the 
cost incurred upon their acquisition and subsequent enhancement less a 
reduction for depreciation to date. Year after year, over their useful life, 
their reported amount is gradually reduced by recognizing the deprecia-
tion that represents their wear and tear and obsolescence. For each 
accounting period, depreciation is recorded in the SoPERF.
The liability side is structured in the same way as in the private sector, 
with a subdivision between liabilities and net worth (Fig. 15.3). Liabilities 
are measured at their fair value and classified according to their nature and 
time period (short or long term). Net worth is split between various com-
ponents, including the accumulated annual surpluses and deficits and vari-
ous types of reserves (dedicated to the financing of future capital projects 
or future fiscal policy measures).
15.4.4  Interactions Between the Three Statements: Financial 
Performance, Capital Expenditure and Financial Position
The amounts presented in the SoPOS vary between the beginning and the 
end of the year because of transactions recognized in the SoCAPEX and in 
the SoPERF. As shown in Fig.  15.4, capital expenditures increase the 
Fig. 15.2 Assets in the statement of financial position
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overall amount of the administrative assets, while depreciations reduce this 
amount. The net worth increases or decreases depending on whether the 
SoPERF reports a surplus or a deficit.
Figure 15.4 also shows the embryonic cash flow statement introduced 
by the HAM1. Net capital expenditure, the cash drain from the difference 
between capital expenditure and receipts, may be financed either with the 
cash flow originating in the transactions recorded in the SoPERF, or by 
Fig. 15.3 Structure of the statement of financial position
Fig. 15.4 Interactions between the statements and the simplified cash flow 
statement
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issuing debt. To simplify, this cash flow is considered equal to the surplus 
(or the deficit) added to the depreciations, or in other words, to the dif-
ference between cash flow generated by revenue and cash drain generated 
by expense. It is the difference between current receipts and expenditures. 
A depreciation expense typically does not involve cash. Instead, it reduces 
the surplus without reducing the cash account in the SoPOS. Thus the 
difference between expense and current expenditure is mainly due to 
depreciation.
There are other scenarios. In case the cash flow is larger than net capital 
expenditure, the government pays back its debt (liabilities). In case the 
deficit is larger than the depreciations, the cash flow becomes negative and 
debt must be issued not only to finance capital expenditure but also to 
cover current expenditure.
15.4.5  Cash Flow Statement
The HAM2 introduced a fully fledged cash flow statement 
(Geldflussrechnung, Tableau des flux de trésorerie), providing information 
on how the government raises the cash required to finance its activities 
over the reporting period and how this cash was used. The information is 
classified according to the various activities, following the IPSASs, and 
thus listing operating, investing and financing activities. The only specifi-
cally Swiss element here is that within investment activities, a distinction is 
made between the activities triggered by capital expenditure and those 
triggered by yield-producing investments. In the end, the statement sheds 
light on the reasons for changes in cash (and cash equivalents) between 
the beginning and the end of the year, as shown in the SoPOS.
15.4.6  Notes to the Financial Statements
The notes (Anhang, Annexe) give information about the accounting pol-
icy. A government whose financial statements do not comply with all 
HAM2 requirements must explicitly mention in which manner they 
diverge. The notes must also provide additional information regarding 
changes in equity, provision, equity participation, guarantees, and tangible 
assets. Finally, the notes must include any additional information explain-
ing the development of net assets, financial position, and the result of 
operations. The requirements regarding the content of the notes are simi-
lar to those contained in the IPSASs.
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15.5  two sPecIfIc features
15.5.1  Internal Service Pricing
Internal service pricing (ISP) was heralded as an important feature of the 
HAM1. The aim was to explicitly promote a cost-based way of thinking. 
The equivalent of the service is credited as revenue in the department 
providing the service; it is debited as an expense in the department receiv-
ing the service. Such ISP entries are purely book entries and as such nei-
ther generate nor drain cash.
ISP was implicitly expected to raise the level of cost transparency in 
public management, in order to increase public managers’ accountability 
for the costs they incur and to enhance competition between internal sup-
pliers and external competitors. So far empirical evidence shows that the 
target was not met at the cantonal level: the volume of ISP does not sig-
nificantly and negatively correlate with that of government expenditure 
(Clémenceau and Soguel 2014).
This may have been because the ISP amounts were too small to influ-
ence management practices; on average among cantons, they amount to 
only 6% of total expenditures. The ISP is mainly used in areas where it is 
necessary to decide over the price to be paid by external users, meaning 
where the full cost must be charged to citizens (fees) or shared with other 
jurisdictions (transfers). One can also legitimately ask whether ISP reflects 
a faithful view of internally provided services. ISP is mainly the result of 
allocating centrally borne costs (depreciation, interest payments, informa-
tion technology (IT), etc.), and so most of the costs allocated as ISP are 
only marginally the result of a rational decision over the goods and ser-
vices to be internally purchased. As a result, they may not reflect a self- 
defined consumption, and public managers may even have less flexibility 
to cut internally charged services. This suggests that the lack of impact of 
the ISPs could mainly be due to how they are computed.
15.5.2  Political Finessing
Although the FMAP differs from canton to canton, all 26 FMAPs share a 
common and conservative fiscal stance. Thus, it does not come as a sur-
prise that the Conference of CFM explicitly embedded several modes of 
political finessing into the HAM2. Many cantons have decided to adopt 
one or more of these possibilities into their own FMAPs. These are 
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meant to artificially inflate expenses in the SoPERF, and include ‘cookie-
jar’ reserves, reporting capital expenditure as operating expenditures, 
pre- funding, and ‘additional depreciation charges’.
This last goes beyond depreciation charges that arise from actual wear 
and tear or the obsolescence of administrative assets. Depending on the 
canton and year, such ‘additional depreciation charges’ can amount to 
more than 2% of ‘true’ expenses. Managing depreciations seems to pro-
duce a significant and positive impact on a cantons’ future financial perfor-
mance (Clémenceau and Soguel 2018). Political finessing fosters the 
flexibility to ensure structural surpluses, prevent structural deficits, and 
facilitate meeting fiscal rule requirements. Admittedly, these operations 
must be reported as extraordinary expenses and thus do not impact the 
ordinary result. Nevertheless, they have an impact on the overall result and 
prevent ‘true’ performance from being reported with full transparency. 
Ultimately, when translating the HAM2 into their FMAP, cantons must 
make a tradeoff between conflicting wishes for fiscal soundness and faith-
ful financial reporting.
15.6  conclusIon
The downsides concerning the possibilities of political finessing and the 
fact that ISP is not better used should not make us forget that Swiss gov-
ernments have achieved a high standard of quality in their financial state-
ments. The central government is close to fulfilling all the requirements 
formulated in the IPSASs. This also holds for several cantons, including 
Basel-Stadt, Bern, Geneva, Lucerne, and Zurich. Other cantons and 
municipalities are gradually improving the quality of the information pro-
vided in their financial statements.
This is remarkable when considering the great autonomy the cantons 
have in this area and remarkable in the absence of legal strictures obligat-
ing cantonal governments to use the proposed harmonized accounting 
model. Improvements are also being made possible by the Swiss Public 
Sector Financial Reporting Advisory Committee, a committee established 
by the intercantonal Conference of the CFM. It has become a de facto 
standard-setter for how accounting is conducted in the three tiers of Swiss 
government.
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CHAPTER 16
Tax Power and Tax Competition
Nils Soguel
16.1  IntroductIon
There are few domains as suited as taxation at expressing the particularities 
of the Swiss system. Various elements combine here: the smallness of the 
country and of its states, thus their exposure to external political and eco-
nomic context, the federal system, the country’s decentralization, and the 
Swiss system of direct democracy. The current tax system is the result of a 
historical evolution, which is why it so often departs from being a rational, 
systematic, or even theoretical construction.
Swiss fiscality offers a diversity that likely does not exist anywhere 
else. Over time, each of Switzerland’s 26 cantons established its own tax 
laws and they then evolved in response to various global and local cir-
cumstances. This explains why tax bases like revenue, wealth, profit, 
capital, and even inheritances are taxed differently depending on the 
canton. In addition to this, the municipalities, like the cantons, can also 
choose the taxes they wish to levy and the tax rate. At the same time, the 
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Confederation (the federal level) also taxes income and profit, though a 
large part of the federal taxes are indirect.1
This chapter focuses on the essential characteristics of Swiss taxation. 
The following section discusses the legal foundation upon which taxes are 
based. Section 16.3 quantifies the importance of the various types of taxes 
for each institutional level (Confederation, cantons, and municipalities). 
Here the Swiss context is compared to that of the member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Section 16.4 offers an analysis of the tax burden on businesses and house-
holds, by comparing their situation in Switzerland to those of other 
OECD countries and by comparing the situation that exists in the differ-
ent cantons. Sections 16.5 and 16.6 are dedicated to two key elements of 
the Swiss tax system: tax competition and the particular balance between 
direct and indirect taxes.
16.2  the LegaL BasIs for taxes
The Swiss Constitution states that “The Cantons are sovereign except to 
the extent that their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution. 
They exercise all rights that are not vested in the Confederation” (Art. 3). 
This general provision also applies to taxation, and so cantons are in prin-
ciple free to select the taxes they intend to levy. However, the Constitution 
reserves certain indirect taxes (value added and certain consumption taxes, 
stamp duty, and withholding tax) to the Confederation and forbids the 
cantons or municipalities from raising such taxes (Art. 134). In fact, the 
Confederation can only levy taxes the Swiss Constitution permits it to levy, 
which is the case for the direct tax on the income of private individuals, 
and on the net profit of legal entities (Art. 128). However, the 
Confederation does not have an exclusive right to levy direct taxes, and as 
a result, the cantons levy direct taxes as well.
1 A tax is considered indirect when collected by an intermediary—rather than by the gov-
ernment—from the person (legal or natural) who bears the ultimate economic burden of the 
tax. Examples are value added tax (VAT), tobacco tax, or custom duties. The legal taxpayer 
pays the tax to the government, but the burden is eventually passed on to the taxbearer. Thus 
the legal and the economic taxpayer (the taxbearer) are not the same person. When the tax 
is a direct tax, both the legal and the economic taxpayer are the same person. Examples are 
personal income tax or profit tax, which are collected directly by the government from the 
person on whom they are imposed.
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In terms of indirect taxes, the Constitution gives the Confederation an 
exclusive right to levy a value added tax (VAT), as well as to tax tobacco, 
beer, distilled spirits, automobiles, and mineral oil taxes, as well as to levy 
stamp duties (on some commercial transactions), customs duties, and a 
withholding tax on capital assets, lottery winnings, and insurance benefits 
(Art. 130–133) The 1999 Constitution even stipulates a maximum VAT 
rate the Confederation may levy: 6.5%, with an additional 1.5% to contribute 
to financing social insurance and railway infrastructure (Art. 130 and Art. 
196). Thus, in 2017, Switzerland’s normal VAT was 8%. By way of compari-
son, the (unweighted) VAT average in OECD countries was 19.2%.
Each canton’s constitution determines if the canton’s municipalities 
have the right to levy taxes. Cantonal legislation, and thus the canton’s 
legislative body, guarantees this right. As a result, like the cantons, the 
municipalities also have genuine fiscal and tax autonomy, which goes 
hand-in-hand with their functional autonomy. In addition to taxes, the 
municipalities can or must finance their local public services (water, sew-
age, garbage collection, etc.) through user fees.
Switzerland uses a ‘piggy-back’ system for taxing income and profit, 
which means the same tax base is tapped by all three levels of government. 
In most cantons, the law on direct taxation establishes tax schedules, 
meaning the range of applicable tax rates depending on the level of taxable 
income or profit. In most cantons, as in the Confederation, the income tax 
schedule is progressive, but the degree of progressivity varies due to can-
tonal tax autonomy. It is for that reason that two small cantons, Uri and 
Obwalden, have nonetheless adopted a flat-rate tax system (based on a 
proportional tax scale; FTA 2017).
A given cantonal tax schedule applies both at the cantonal and at the 
municipal level; the canton and each municipality define a coefficient that 
multiplies the tax due by the legal tax scale.
To illustrate how this works, consider a single taxpayer who is with-
out dependents, lives in the city of Bern, and who has no religious affili-
ation (Switzerland has church taxes). In 2016, this taxpayer has an 
income, as a professional, of 70,000 CHF, and once all deductions have 
been taken, is left with a taxable income of 50,000 CHF. The tax scale 
in the tax law gives the tax as 1973 CHF, to which the canton of Bern 
applies a 3.06 coefficient. So the cantonal tax is 6038 CHF. The city of 
Bern, by contrast, uses a coefficient of 1.54, and so the local tax is 
3039 CHF. In addition, our taxpayer must pay 445 CHF in federal income 
tax. So together, on gross income of 70,000  CHF and net income of 
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50,000 CHF, our resident of Bern pays a total of 9522 CHF in local, can-
tonal, and federal tax—19.0% of net income (or 13.6% of gross income).
This freedom in selecting tax scales, rates, and allowances is protected 
by the Swiss Constitution—which explicitly says these are “matters 
excluded from harmonization” (Art. 129). The Confederation can only 
standardize the tax system in a formal way, inasmuch as it sets out tax lia-
bility and the object of a tax and its assessment. The only constitutional 
limitation to cantonal tax autonomy regarding the choice of tax scale is 
that the tax burden should be commensurate with the taxpayer’s ability to 
pay, provided the nature of the tax permits it (Art. 127). On this basis, the 
Federal Supreme Court in 2015 declared that a regressive personal income 
tax system with a decreasing tax scale, which one canton (Obwalden) 
attempted to implement, violated this basic redistributive principle.
The fact that legislation authorizes all three levels of government to 
decide over their own taxes is a distinctive feature of the Swiss tax system. 
Also distinctive is that Swiss citizens can decide whether they want the 
state to be able to levy a tax, and if so, at what rate. This is because the 
tools of direct democracy also function in the area of taxation. Any consti-
tutional amendment, including those related to taxation, is subject to a 
mandatory referendum at both federal and cantonal levels. Modifications 
of laws, no matter what the type, can trigger optional—and in some can-
tons, even mandatory—referendums. Citizens can also use their right to 
launch an initiative to request a modification of the (constitutional or 
legal) tax provisions. In other words, the tools of direct democracy give 
the citizens the opportunity and the means to oppose the introduction of 
a new tax or to suppress an existing tax.
16.3  the Importance of taxes
Looking at all three levels of government, in 2015, more than 80% of their 
revenue comes from taxes, with 59.0% from direct taxation and 22.4% 
from indirect taxation (Table 16.1). These proportions differ significantly 
between the levels of government. Because indirect taxes are nearly non- 
existent in the cantons and municipalities (accounting for only 2.4% and 
0.2%, respectively), direct taxes count for that much more. Revenue from 
exchange transactions and fiscal equalization are all the more significant. 
Fiscal equalization represents 30.6% of cantonal income (their second 
largest source of financing) and 11.9% of municipal income (their third 
largest source of financing). Given that most utilities are municipally 
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owned, municipalities also have wide discretion over fees and user charges, 
and thus revenue from exchange transactions are particularly high (18.9%).
The Confederation is almost wholly financed through taxes, 49.1% 
from indirect taxes among which 32.6% comes from VAT, and 43.9% from 
direct taxes. It is the Confederation which benefits from indirect taxes and 
from the withholding tax, not the other levels. Overall, its taxes are also the 
largest, at 64 billion CHF (10% of gross domestic product (GDP)), fol-
lowed by the cantons at 44 billion CHF (7% of GDP) and the  municipalities 
Table 16.1 Swiss government receipts, 2015
aAfter consolidation between government units
bProfit and capital
cProperty related, death and gift duties
dIncluding royalties, concessions and miscellaneous receipts
eExcluding extraordinary receipts
Source: Federal Finance Administration (2017). Switzerland’s Financial Statistics for 2015. FS Model. 
Berne. According to national consolidation based on the Swiss governments’ harmonized chart of 
accounts (FS Model)
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at 28 billion  CHF (4%). But because the Confederation redistributes a 
large part of its tax revenue through transfers to the cantons, this kind of 
comparison is a little misleading.
In terms of individual categories of direct tax, and regardless of the 
level, the tax on individual income is the largest, followed by the corporate 
tax. Together, these two taxes generate nearly half of all cantonal and 
municipal tax revenue.
Overall, the tax share at the sub-central level in Switzerland is close to 
52%, one of the highest degrees of tax decentralization among industrial-
ized democratic countries (OECD 2002). Canada is “the only country with 
a similarly high degree of tax decentralization” (Schmidheiny 2017, p. 74).
In Switzerland, the tax-to-GDP ratio is weak compared to the level 
recorded in other OECD countries (Fig. 16.1). In 2015, Swiss govern-
ment units collected taxes equal to 21% of GDP. Social security contribu-
tions (which include mandatory contributions for old-age and survivors’ 
insurance, disability insurance, compensation for loss of earnings and 
unemployment insurance, agriculture family allowances, and maternity 
insurance in the canton of Geneva) represent an additional 7%. Although 
mandatory, health insurance, accident insurance, and pension fund contri-
butions are not taken into account. According to the sectoring principles 
of the European System of Accounts, these go to enterprises (either public 
or private) and thus do not belong to the general government sector. 
Therefore, the Swiss tax-to-GDP ratio is not to be understood as the ratio 
of compulsory payments. Nevertheless, the 28% Swiss tax-to-GDP ratio 
can still be compared to the OECD (unweighted) average of 34%. It 
means that Tax Freedom Day was April 12¸ 2015, in Switzerland, com-
pared to May 4, 2015, on average in the OECD countries.
The OECD (2000) stresses that there are important limitations when 
using the tax-to-GDP ratio as a comparative measure of tax burdens. 
However, ranking seventh out of 35 OECD countries still indicates that 
comparatively speaking, the Swiss government overall uses a significantly 
lower proportion of GDP to finance its tasks using taxes and  contributions, 
than many other countries. This correlates with its comparatively low gov-
ernment expenditure-to-GDP ratio.
16.4  tax Burden LInked to dIrect tax
Measured by the tax-to-GDP ratio, the tax burden in Switzerland is thus 
lighter than elsewhere. The same conclusion can be reached when looking 
at households and companies.
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Figure 16.2, based on OECD (2017), presents the situation of a single 
taxpayer without dependents whose income is that of an average employee, 
defined as the average full-time adult gross wage earnings in each OECD 
economy (it corresponds to 86,000 CHF in the city of Zurich, the city 
used in OECD data for Switzerland). The figure indicates, with respect to 
Fig. 16.1 Comparative government tax-to-GDP ratios in the OECD countries, 
2015. (Source: OECD. Stat. Revenue Statistics. Revenue as % of GDP. * 2014 
figures)
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the labor costs to the employer, the corresponding net take-home pay of 
the employee. Differences stem from personal income tax, social security 
payments, other contributions, and payroll taxes (aggregated with 
employer social contributions), and correspond to how the OECD defines 
Fig. 16.2 Tax wedge as % of labor costs in the OECD countries, 2016. (Source: 
OECD. Stat. Tax wedge decomposition. Income tax plus employee and employer 
social security contributions (SSC) as % of labor costs. Single individual without 
children at the income level of the average worker)
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the ‘tax wedge’. Other taxes (corporate income, net wealth, and consump-
tion) are not taken into consideration.
Income tax cuts into a Swiss taxpayer’s income by 10%. Though this is 
higher than what prevails in about ten other OECD countries, it is less 
than what taxpayers face in France (11%), Germany, or Italy (16%), or the 
OECD average (13%). Including social security contributions into the 
comparison only reinforces these findings: in Switzerland, the tax wedge is 
one of the lowest, with 22% compared to an average of 36% in other 
OECD countries. This remains true even if we modify the composition of 
the household or the income level.
Figure 16.3 looks at the situation of companies and presents the statu-
tory corporate tax rate. In this way, it only offers a simplified vision of the 
reality given the fact that the effective situation of companies varies con-
siderably2 and that the tax rate can vary within a single country. Thus, for 
Switzerland, the table indicates that a company based in the city of Zurich 
can be subject to a rate of 21.15% (of which 8.5% goes to the Confederation). 
Even if this is one of the highest rates in Switzerland (see the following), 
this tax burden remains lower than what is seen in the majority of OECD 
countries.
These aggregated figures obscure the vast differences between cantons, 
a direct result of cantonal tax autonomy. Figure 16.4 presents the statu-
tory tax rate for companies operating in each of the principal cities of the 
26 Swiss cantons. A Zurich-based company is subject to a statutory rate of 
21.15%. This rate is one of the highest, though a company in Geneva is 
subject to the highest at over 24% while a Lucerne company pays only a 
little more than 12%.
The rates given in Fig. 16.4 do not even reflect the extremes, inasmuch 
as municipalities can impose lower or higher coefficients than the principal 
cities of the canton.
The strong tax autonomy Swiss municipalities have creases of significant 
differences in tax burdens from canton to canton as well as between munic-
ipalities in the same canton. The effects of municipal autonomy in the 
choice of a tax coefficient are well-illustrated in Fig. 16.5, in this case for 
personal income tax. As shown before, the case shown is of a single tax-
payer without children, with a gross income from labor of 80,000 CHF. The 
tax burden is the overall amount levied by all three levels of government.
2 We prefer to present here the statutory tax rate, that is, rates which are specified in law, 
since the estimation of effective tax rate is sensitive to several analytical choices.
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The cantons are listed in increasing order, based on the tax burden 
imposed by the median commune. To take the example of the canton of 
Zurich again, if the taxpayer lives in the city of Zurich, she pays an income 
tax equivalent to 10.7% of her gross income. This is more than if she lived 
Fig. 16.3 Switzerland statutory corporate tax rate compared to the other OECD 
countries, 2016. (Source: OECD. Stat. Statutory corporate income tax rate)
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in the cantonal municipality with the lowest burden (8.9%) or even the 
median burden (10.4%), but less than where the burden is the highest 
(11.5%). The Swiss municipality with the lowest burden (5.6%) is located 
in the canton of Zug, while the one with the highest (18.4%) is in the 
Fig. 16.4 Cantonal statutory corporate tax rate, January 2016. (Sources: PwC 
(June 2016). Corporate Tax Reform III)
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canton of Neuchatel. In other words, as for Tax Freedom Day, depending 
on whether a taxpayer lives in the most fiscally advantageous municipality 
or the most expensive, he will have fulfilled his income tax requirement 
either by January 20 or not until March 18, 2016.
Fig. 16.5 Tax burden by canton and variation between municipalities as % of 
gross labor income, 2016. (Source: Federal Tax Administration. Single individual 
with gross income of 80,000 CHF)
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16.5  tax competItIon
Tax competition can be defined as a public policy to attract a mobile tax 
base and companies to boost economic development, employment, and 
output growth within the jurisdiction implementing it. This can be done 
by setting tax rates at a relatively low level, by allowing more generous tax 
deductions, or by introducing tax breaks or tax holidays in order to 
enlarge the tax base at the expense of other jurisdictions. Tax competition 
between countries has long existed, and Switzerland clearly participates, 
as demonstrated.
Furthermore, and together with the United States and Canada, 
Switzerland is one of the rare countries in which subnational jurisdictions 
take advantage of a fiscal autonomy that is large enough to allow them to 
engage in tax competition (OECD 2002, p. 59). The small size of cantons 
and municipalities makes it possible for private and corporate taxpayers to 
move to areas with weaker tax burdens. Tax competition has increased 
because of the well-developed infrastructure in the country which allows 
for considerably labor mobility and commuting.
Schmidheiny (2017) demonstrates that taxes have been falling in most 
cantons since the mid-1980s. Of course, it is not enough to observe 
 differences or modifications of the tax burden to conclude that tax com-
petition exists. In order to conclude this, the targeted tax base must be 
mobile and react to tax incentives. Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) showed 
that competition is stronger between municipalities than between can-
tons, due to the lower transaction costs of moving between neighboring 
towns. For these two authors, corporate and personal income taxation are 
an important factor in understanding the regional distribution of compa-
nies and regional employment differences, even if location-based deci-
sions depend on many factors. A higher proportion of high taxable income 
is observed in cantons with a low tax burden than in cantons with a high 
tax burden.
Eugster and Parchet (2013) analyze the situation in bilingual cantons 
and show that the tax rates in French-speaking municipalities are higher 
than in German-speaking municipalities in the same bilingual canton. 
However, the difference vanishes in municipalities close or right on the 
language border. This spatial convergence of tax rates indicates the pres-
ence of tax competition, at least between neighboring jurisdictions. Feld 
and Reulier (2009) also find that cantons set their income tax rates strate-
gically, depending on the tax rates of other cantons.
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Other authors look at corporate fiscality. For example, Rossi and 
Dafflon (2004) show that tax competition between cantons which is 
meant to attract companies does not much occur at the level of the busi-
ness sector, taken as a whole, since all jurisdictions will lose part of their 
revenues from openly lowering taxation.
The competition takes place at a more micro-level, with particular com-
panies being granted ad hoc advantages (at the time of writing, such 
arrangements are still permitted although Switzerland is under interna-
tional pressure to limit or even to suppress them). A further micro-level 
for tax competition is when cantons or municipalities offer particular tax 
arrangements, not to corporate taxpayers but to a company’s managers—
in the form of a somewhat negotiable tax base.
Tax competition between cantons has intensified in the last 15 years. A 
favorable economic climate brought cyclical budget surpluses, and several 
cantons took advantage of this situation to reduce their tax rate in the 
hope of attracting high-income individuals and companies.
This raised fears of a ‘race to the bottom’, since it is legally possible for 
cantons and communes to fiscally compete with one another. Earlier, an 
analysis by Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) had concluded that tax 
competition between cantons had no harmful effects on the provision of 
public services. But the recent disappearance of cyclical budget surpluses 
make it no longer possible to compensate for the cyclical budget deficits 
brought on by lowered taxes, in particular when the new taxpayers are not 
as numerous as expected. Faced with this situation, the hard budget 
 constraints introduced make fiscal consolidation packages inevitable. 
Several cantons have been affected, at different levels, but the cantonal 
population frequently opposes, via referendum, an increase in the tax rate 
in order to balance the budget. The only solution remaining to the gov-
ernment is to reduce the provision of public services, that is, unless sub-
stantial efficiency gains can be achieved within the government.
These recent developments seem to support the idea that tax competi-
tion may be detrimental, at least in terms of public service provision. Tax 
competition is also seen as harmful by the OECD, since it leads to “fiscal 
externalities among subnational entities, to a distortion of corporate and 
residential location choices, to fiscal unfairness and to a race to the bottom 
with respect to social or environmental standards” (OECD 2002, p. 58).
Many years ago, Brennan and Buchanan (1977) used the ‘Leviathan 
argument’ to object: the state has a tendency to excessive taxation, and tax 
competition applies a downward pressure which enhances efficiency. From 
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this perspective, fiscal decentralization and the tax autonomy of Swiss 
municipalities, as well as the tax competition they allow, should be judged 
positively. That being said, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) or Krishnakumar 
et  al. (2010) demonstrated that direct democracy itself was probably a 
more effective restraint on ‘Leviathan’, because popular approval, by ref-
erendum, is needed to increase tax rates and in deciding to engage in large 
public expenditures.
The effects of tax competition should also be put in context. The 
research noted (Feld and Kirchgässner 2001; Eugster and Parchet 2013) 
certainly shows that competition exists, but it also shows that this compe-
tition is geographically limited. This explains that the differences in 
Figs.  16.4 and 16.5 persist despite the tendency of the tax burden to 
diminish. As the OECD suggested, “a tax equilibrium affecting location- 
based choices might have been achieved. One explanation could be that 
tax rates and public services are in line with the preferences of the popula-
tion […]. Another explanation could be that locational decisions may be 
affected by factors other than tax rate differentials. This might partially 
offset competition on tax rates…” (2002, p. 59).
16.6  the BaLance Between dIrect and IndIrect 
taxatIon
A repeated criticism of the Swiss tax system is that it uses direct taxation 
too much and indirect taxation too little, notably with the VAT.  The 
OECD (2012) thus recommends that Switzerland shift taxation from 
direct to indirect taxes to reduce economic distortion and boost economic 
activity. To do this, the OECD suggests reducing the personal income tax 
since this tax discourages entrepreneurial activity and investment. It sug-
gests instead that the base of the VAT be widened and the standard VAT 
rate be increased. It is true that the VAT represents 17% of the tax receipts 
of all Swiss government units (Table 16.1), while the average of the OECD 
countries is well above it (at 27% in 2014). While tax receipts from per-
sonal income tax are 41% of Swiss governmental tax receipts, this is rather 
lower (33%) in OECD countries.
If, in theory, VAT engenders fewer tax distortions compared to other 
taxes, it is also important to consider the institutional context. Studies like 
that of Keen and Lockwood (2010) show empirically that an increase in 
VAT receipts is not linked to a decrease in other tax receipts, and that as a 
result, the tax-to-GDP ratio increases.
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In Switzerland’s case, and no matter what the OECD says, the fact that 
personal income tax dominates compared to VAT should be seen posi-
tively. In Switzerland, personal income tax, unlike VAT, is a tax mostly 
levied by the cantons and the municipalities, making it one of the drivers 
of fiscal federalism and tax competition. To reduce its predominance 
would weaken both of these advantages of Swiss institutions.
Direct democracy is another advantage of the Swiss system, and its 
proper functioning is conditioned by the fact that voters pay more direct 
than indirect taxes. In essence, direct taxation requires taxpayers to fill out 
a self-assessed tax return, receive notification of tax assessment, and see to 
it that their tax bill gets paid. This process gives voters a better price signal 
regarding the cost of public services and the cost of their decision in a 
referendum or an initiative. The signal is more perceptible than the one 
indirect taxation sends: it affects, in an intransparent way and at homeo-
pathic dose levels, the many transactions in which a taxpayer participates.
Finally, one should not ignore the role progressive scales for personal 
income tax play in terms of redistribution and macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. Because of these tax scales, the tax system contributes to the state’s 
mission of redistribution, not only between individuals but also between 
cantons and different regions. This element of spatial and automatic redis-
tribution of wealth should not be underestimated in terms of its effect on 
the sustainability the Swiss federalist system. Progressive tax scales also 
contribute more effectively to macroeconomic stabilization, more than if 
the tax system relied more heavily on indirect taxation. Essentially, the 
effect of cyclical variations of the tax bases (contraction during economic 
downturns and expansion during economic boomtimes) on income tax is 
amplified when the tax scale is progressive. As a result, the effect on overall 
demand is also amplified. In other words, the more the tax system relies 
on direct taxation with progressive tax rates, the greater are the automatic 
stabilizers, thus facilitating the smoothing out of economic business cycles.
16.7  concLusIon
The Swiss tax system offers genuine advantages. Those advantages, how-
ever, are intricately linked to and dependent on the country’s institutional 
characteristics. Having said that, it remains perfectable, both in terms of its 
overall design and in the subtleties of its execution. We hope that there 
could soon be an end to the special cantonal tax regimes for companies that 
carry out limited commercial activities in the country and whose income 
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from foreign sources is taxed less than Swiss-source income. This would 
allow Switzerland to reduce the possibilities for corporate profit-shifting.
The OECD has also provided some recommendations regarding the 
Swiss tax system (2015). For instance, individual as opposed to family 
taxation should be introduced to promote women’s participation in the 
work force; the deductibility of mortgage interest and maintenance out-
lays for property owners should be limited so as not to exceed the amount 
of declared imputed rent.
Nonetheless, these changes will not help in reducing the differences in 
the cantonal and municipal tax burdens. Initiatives have been launched on 
several occasions to harmonize tax burden, either between cantons or 
between municipalities within the same canton. Each time, however, these 
initiatives were overruled through popular vote either nationally or can-
tonally. This demonstrates how important cantonal and municipal tax 
autonomy is to the Swiss population—or at least to those who vote. It also 
demonstrates the need for fiscal equalization to prevent tax burden differ-
ence between rich and poor jurisdictions from becoming too big. The 
next chapter will take up this issue.
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CHAPTER 17
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
and Equalization
Nils Soguel
17.1  IntroductIon
It is extremely rare for Swiss institutions to undergo a revolution. And yet 
for the last ten years, the fiscal transfer and equalization system 
(Finanzausgleich; péréquation financière) between the Confederation and 
the cantons have been reformed so much that it can rightly be considered 
a revolution. And even more so, because most cantons followed suit and 
transformed their own fiscal transfer and equalization systems with their 
municipalities based on the federal model.
These changes came about in a context in which certain elements of 
Swiss federalism were, and still are, being debated: the elements include 
the degree of decentralization that is desired, the prevention of negative 
incentives in economic development, and adverse selection phenomena in 
the jurisdictions where redistribution is the most generous.
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This chapter briefly surveys how the transfer systems are organized, and 
describes their benefits and shortcomings.1 Though fiscal transfer and 
equalization reform generally include revising the division of tasks between 
fiscal tiers, this will not be discussed here. The following sections first dis-
cuss the design of the national fiscal equalization (Sect. 17.2) and then 
discuss where it can be improved (Sect. 17.3). Section 17.4 focuses on the 
financial dependence of the Swiss cantons on transfers which largely come 
from the central government. Sections 17.5 and 17.6, respectively, briefly 
present the design of the different cantonal fiscal equalization systems, and 
where there is room for improvement.
17.2  desIgn of the natIonal fIscal transfers 
and equalIzatIon
The revised national fiscal transfer and equalization system, and the divi-
sion of tasks between the Confederation and the cantons, came into effect 
in 2008. To the extent that the revision necessitated modifying laws and 
the Constitution, Switzerland’s method of direct democracy required that 
these be approved by both the majority of Swiss citizens and by a majority 
of the cantons. The modifications were subjected to popular referendum 
on November 28, 2004, and were approved by nearly 65% of the voters 
and 23 of the 26 cantons. The three which rejected the project were all 
cantons which would become net payers (Nidwalden, Schwyz, Zug).
The new system corrects several weaknesses in the previous system. The 
previous system was designed to achieve two goals when the Confederation 
made a financial transfer to a canton. One goal was to at least partly com-
pensate a canton for the costs it had to bear when carrying out tasks that 
benefitted the Confederation (cost compensation; Lastenausgleich; com-
pensation des charges). But transfers were simultaneously also intended to 
make additional financial resources available to cantons considered finan-
cially weak (resource equalization; Ressourcenausgleich; péréquation des 
ressources).
1 Financial transfers between governments fit the more general definition of transfers: “a 
transaction in which one institutional unit provides a good, service, or asset to another unit 
without receiving from the latter any good, service, or asset in return as a direct counterpart. 
This kind of transaction is also referred to as being unrequited, a ‘something for nothing’ 
transaction, or a transaction without a quid pro quo. Transfers can also arise where the value 
provided in return for an item is not economically significant or is much below its value” 
(IMF 2014, p. 41).
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Transfers often were earmarked and came in the form of matching 
grants. For example, the Confederation gave grants to cantons for the 
construction and maintenance of highways. Financially stronger cantons 
were given grants at rates as low as 40% (of the corresponding costs), while 
the weakest cantons had rates of nearly 90%. Nevertheless, these kinds of 
equalizing supplements (which in this case could vary by as much as 50 % 
points) had not made it possible to reduce resource differences between 
the cantons. Additionally, in the previous system the cantonal tax burden 
was included in computing a cantons’ fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity was 
used to calibrate the equalizing supplement as well as federal revenue shar-
ing with the cantons (notably 13% of the federal income and profit tax). 
Given the cantons’ significant tax autonomy, it is not surprising that the 
cantons tried to manipulate their tax burden in order to maximize the 
grant they received from the central government.
The new scheme no longer attempts to kill two birds with one stone; 
one reason is that it is now based on two key pillars. In the first pillar, the 
main goal is to equalize financial resources across the cantons. The second 
pillar is meant to compensate cantons for the cost incurred in various 
areas.
The Federal Act on Fiscal Equalization and Cost Compensation 
(Bundesgesetz über den Finanz- und Lastenausgleich; Loi fédérale sur la 
péréquation financière et la compensation des charges) designates the rele-
vant constitutional provisions. Its Article 2 states that the goals of the 
equalization scheme are to “strengthen the financial autonomy of the can-
tons” and “decrease differences in terms of fiscal capacity and tax burden” 
between them. Indeed, the 26 cantonal governments are far from being 
on equal footing in providing their respective populations with public ser-
vices. They face quite different economic situations. As a result, the tax 
base differs substantially and obliges “poorer” cantons to place a higher 
tax burden on their citizens. Also, their respective population structures or 
geographic situation generates differing needs and costs in providing the 
requisite public services.
17.2.1  Resource Equalization
Resource equalization is the most important pillar of this scheme. It is 
specifically designed to help out the financially weaker cantons, that is, 
those that have a lower potential for fiscal resources stemming from their 
own local economy. Equalization relies on an estimate of the resource 
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potential (Ressourcenpotenzial; potentiel de ressources) per capita for each 
canton. The potential is determined by an aggregation of the tax bases of 
the different taxes levied by the cantons. Essentially, it means adding 
together the effective taxable resources, something which cannot be 
directly influenced by the cantons, at least in the short term.
Comparing the per capita cantonal potentials to the Swiss average cre-
ates a resource index (Ressourcenindex; indice de ressources). Cantons with 
a score higher than 100% of the average contribute to the equalization, 
while those with a score lower than 100% receive equalization funds. 
Figure 17.1 presents the index for 2018, which shows that three-fourths 
Fig. 17.1 Resource index, 2018. (Source: Federal Finance Administration)
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of all the cantons have a lower score than the average. The weakest canton 
(Jura) has only 66% of the average; the strongest (Zug), 244%.
Figure 17.2 illustrates the significance of the redistribution effects 
national financial equalization creates by showing the polar cases: one in 
which equalization would have no redistributive effect and one in which the 
effect would make resources completely uniform across all the cantons.
In the Fig. 17.2, the resource index before equalization (i.e., corre-
sponding to the canton’s own potential) is shown on the horizontal axis; 
the index after equalization is shown on the vertical axis. Imagine that the 
Fig. 17.2 National equalization scale, 2018. (Note: JU, Jura; BE, Bern; FR, 
Fribourg; LU, Lucerne; ZH, Zurich; GE, Geneva; and BS, Basel Stadt. In order to 
improve the readability of the chart, the values for the three financially richest 
cantons are not displayed: Nidwalden (Index was 160 before and 147 after equal-
ization), Schwyz (172 and 157), and Zug (244 and 214). Source: Federal Finance 
Administration)
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equalization scheme would be completely ineffective: the values would 
remain the same both before and after (gray line). No redistribution would 
take place, and the weaker cantons would remain weak (e.g., with an index 
of 80), whereas the “strong” would remain strong (e.g., at 120).
The opposite is depicted by the horizontal dotted line: a fully equaliz-
ing scheme where the resources of the strongest cantons are reduced to 
such an extent that after equalization, their resources would only amount 
to 100% of the national average. The weaker cantons would receive grants 
that would bring them up to the 100 mark after equalization. Regardless 
of the situation before equalization, all cantons would have the same 
resource levels per capita after equalization.
The national equalization system, represented by the dark solid curve, lies 
between these extremes: a few cantons are indicated for the sake of readabil-
ity. The scheme guarantees a minimum allocation of about 85% after equal-
ization (Mindestausstattung; dotation minimale), so that the canton with the 
lowest index (Jura, JU) before financial equalization receives enough transfer 
payments so that its index afterwards reaches 88%. Among cantons shown in 
the figure, the canton with the highest index before (Basel Stadt, BS), at 
147%, is still at 137% after equalization. (Not displayed are the cantons that 
have even a higher index values, namely ZuG, Schwyz, and Nidwalden, all 
three cantons which voted against the reform) The equalization rate is thus 
regressive for the weakest cantons (i.e., an increase in their own potential 
corresponds to a decrease in the amount of transfer they receive) and 
becomes proportional for the strongest cantons: the amount they have to 
pay is a fixed percentage of the difference between their index and 100.
Fiscal equalization is not only financed by the fiscally strongest cantons. 
It is also financed by the central government. In 2018, the Confederation 
paid in 2.42 billion CHF (0.36% of gross domestic product (GDP)) and 
the seven financially strong cantons paid in 1.65 billion CHF (0.24%); and 
the 19 weakest cantons received 4.07 billion CHF.
Compared to the former equalization scheme, the reformed system 
incorporates horizontal transfers, although the vertical transfers are still 
larger. Also, grants are no longer earmarked, and the receiving cantons can 
freely allocate them as if they were their own resources.
17.2.2  Cost Compensation
The cost compensation scheme is meant to help the most urbanized 
cantons as well as the mountain cantons; each face—if for quite different 
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reasons—structurally higher costs. Only costs necessary to provide the 
population with the public services for satisfying their basic needs are 
compensated, and in principle, only for the part of the cost that exceeds 
“normal” cost. Thus, public spending that goes beyond basic needs and 
reflects specific cantonal preferences are, in principle, not compensated. 
Spillover effects between jurisdictions also are not compensated within 
the national scheme.2
The compensation here involves two types of costs incurred by the 
cantons. Some cantons—especially the more urbanized—face higher 
needs, and thus costs, due to socio-demographic factors. Amounts 
allocated to these cantons are based on the incidence of poverty, age 
structure, integration of foreigners, and urbanization. Other cantons—
especially the more mountainous and rural ones—face higher costs due 
to geo- topographical factors. Amounts allocated here are based on alti-
tude, slope of the terrain, structure of the habitat, and population 
density.
This form of compensation is financed entirely by the central govern-
ment, and so these transfers are uniquely vertical. In 2018, the 
Confederation paid in 0.72 billion CHF (0.11% of GDP), with half going 
to the first group of cantons (for socio-demographic reasons) and half to 
the second group (for geo-topographical reasons).
17.2.3  Compensation for Hardship Cases
Compensation for hardship cases rounds out the two pillars of the 
scheme (Härteausgleich; compensation des cas de rigueur). This was 
introduced to alleviate the financial loss experienced by the financially 
weaker cantons when the former fiscal equalization scheme was 
reformed. The compensation declines by 5% per year and is expected to 
expire completely by 2036. It is allocated exclusively to financially weak 
cantons, and the need for it is reviewed at regular intervals. In 2018, 
only six cantons qualified and 0.30 billion CHF (0.04% of GDP) was 
transferred; two-thirds of the money comes from the Confederation 
and one-third from the cantons.
2 A canton that provides public services benefiting the population of other cantons can 
receive compensation for the corresponding costs in the specific context of an intercantonal 
collaboration and outside the national transfer system.
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17.3  room for Improvement In the natIonal 
equalIzatIon system
According to a recent evaluation by the Federal Council (2014), national 
fiscal equalization contributed to a notable reduction in intercantonal dis-
parity, and it exhibited no serious flaws. Furthermore, as the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015) pointed 
out, the established equalization system made it possible to significantly 
mitigate the effects of tax competition between the cantons.
But there is a downside. The current scheme reduces, or even obliterates, 
any incentive for the financially weakest cantons to develop their own resource 
potential. In essence, in the cantons in which the resource index is lower than 
85%, each ten-franc increase in resource potential per capita is, on average, 
compensated by a decrease of eight CHF in equalization transfers (Federal 
council 2014). One proposal would then be to reduce this marginal clipping 
rate (Grenzabschöpfungsquote; taux d’écrêtage marginaux) of 80%.
A second problem comes from how the tax bases of the different taxes 
are aggregated to estimate the resource potential. A simple addition is not 
possible since the wealth tax base is much larger than the income tax base, 
for example, and the tax rates are markedly different. This makes it neces-
sary to weight the tax bases to account for their respective contributions 
to the resource potential, but this involves an element of arbitrariness and 
reduces the transparency of the system. Additionally, it impacts the incen-
tive given to the cantons to attract new companies. Putting a smaller 
weight on company profits when calculating resource potential should 
solve this problem while limiting the rise in revenue potential.
Third, vertical equalization is always much larger than horizontal equal-
ization: 3.34 billion CHF currently, about two-thirds of the total. Yet ver-
tical equalization is less effective at correcting inequalities because it 
benefits the financially weaker cantons without much affecting those can-
tons which are financially strong. Put differently, horizontal equalization 
has a positive effect on the weak and a negative effect on the strong.
Finally, only a small number of cantons contribute to horizontal 
resource equalization. The numbers mean that cantons which benefit have 
more political power to defend their gains or to demand an increase in 
equalization transfers. This certainly made it easier for referendum on the 
reform to be passed (as a majority of the cantons had to be in favor), but 
the contributing cantons increasingly feel that they are being subjected to 
the tyranny of the majority.
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17.4  cantonal dependency on transfers
In 2018, the national system involves transfers amounting to 5.09 billion CHF 
(4.07 billion CHF in resource equalization + 0.72 billion CHF in cost com-
pensation  +  0.30  billion CHF in hardship compensation). Although this 
amount seems large, it is only 0.75% of GDP. We can thus conclude that the 
cantons are not very financially dependent on this type of transfer, as Fig. 17.3 
corroborates. Across all 26 cantons, equalization transfers are only 6% of all 
revenue. There is, however, a notable difference between cantons which 
receive next to nothing (e.g., Basel-Landschaft) and cantons in which the 
equalization transfers constitute more than 20% of their revenue (e.g., Uri).
The cantons can also count on transfers outside the national equaliza-
tion scheme, especially vertical ones. In essence, the Confederation sends 
cantons compensation (Entschädigungen; dédommagements) when they 
provide public services for which the Confederation is legally responsible. 
In this case, the cantons are considered to be implementing agencies. The 
Confederation also provides contributions to cantons (Beiträge; subven-
tions or contributions) to incentivize them to provide public services for 
which cantons are themselves responsible. Both compensations and con-
tributions are specific grants, since the purposes for which they may be 
used is defined by the central government. These specific vertical transfers 
on average amount to some 13% of the revenue of the 26 cantons. Though 
this is double the amount of the equalization transfers, and though it may 
approach or exceed 20% of the total revenue in some cantons, it is still very 
small in international terms (Dafflon 2012).
Together, equalization and specific transfers (compensation and contri-
butions) represent less than 20% of all cantonal revenue (6% and 13%). 
Indirectly, this demonstrates the cantons’ strong fiscal autonomy, because 
their tax revenue must, on average, cover up to 80% of the fiscal conse-
quences of their spending decisions. There are significant differences 
between cantons. Only two of them receive less than 10% from the 
Confederation (Geneva and Basel Stadt). At the other extreme, seven can-
tons exceed the 30% threshold.
The cantons also receive a share of federal tax revenue (Ertragsanteile; 
parts de revenus) amounting, in particular, to 17% of the income tax on 
private individuals and on the profit and capital of legal entities and 10% of 
withholding tax. This is only about 6% of the total revenue of the 26 can-
tons, and so cantons have limited dependency on these transfers. 
Furthermore, this dependency is financial rather than institutional. Indeed, 
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Fig. 17.3 Transfer dependency of Swiss cantons (transfers from the central gov-
ernment as a percentage of total cantonal revenue, 2015). (Note: Additional 
downloadable regular tables based on the Swiss governments’ harmonized chart of 
accounts (FS Model). Fiscal equalization including cost compensation (account 
number 4620); compensations (4610) and contributions from the Confederation 
(4630); share in the tax revenue of the Confederation (4600); and total revenue 
(4) excluding extraordinary revenue (48). Source: Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration (2017). Switzerland’s financial statistics for 2015. FS Model. Bern)
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the cantons obtained the right to these shares of federal tax revenue in 
return for the power they have given the central government to encroach 
upon their tax prerogatives. The Confederation is therefore obligated to 
provide these shares. Like the equalization transfers, these revenue shares 
are general grants since they may be spent at each canton’s discretion.
Figure 17.3 underscores the claim that all in all cantonal financial 
dependence on the Confederation is quite small. On average, only a quar-
ter of cantonal revenue comes from the central government and only a 
third of the cantons depend on the Confederation for more than a third of 
their revenue. Generally, the urban cantons (or those close to a large city) 
are the least dependent. The mountain cantons (Alps and Jura) are more 
strongly dependent, especially because of the larger equalization transfers 
they receive.
17.5  fIscal equalIzatIon at the cantonal level
Cantons have also introduced internal fiscal transfer and equalization sys-
tems in order to reduce the inequalities between municipalities within the 
cantons. A further goal has been to guarantee that even the smallest com-
munities are able to provide their citizens with at least a minimum level of 
public services. Here again, Swiss federalism and cantonal autonomy over 
finances means that cantons can themselves decide whether they want a 
system of fiscal equalization between their municipalities, and if so, how 
they want to design their system.
As a result, there are many different designs, although cantons all share 
the goal of reducing fiscal inequalities. Having said that, and inspired by 
the new national system, several cantons recently revised their fiscal equal-
ization systems, the canton of Valais even adopted the entire design of the 
national system.
Transfers to the municipalities tend to be less earmarked so that the 
municipalities may spend the funds at their discretion. Furthermore, the 
ability of municipalities to influence the amounts they receive or that they 
must pay has been reduced or eradicated. Indeed, what they could previ-
ously put into play, such as their tax rates, has been removed from the 
calculation formulas used in establishing the levels of the transfers. Most 
cantons have also introduced a clear separation between the equalization 
of resources and the cost compensation. Kübler and Rochat (2016) note 
that while these equalizing systems reduce inequalities that exist between 
Swiss municipalities, they do not eliminate them completely.
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This is because the equalization transfers are essentially horizontal 
(60% of the total). The amounts paid by the financially strong munici-
palities are redistributed to those which are financially weak, either 
directly or indirectly through a cantonal equalization fund. The cantons 
finance cost compensation for the benefit of those municipalities which 
face structurally higher costs than do other municipalities. The amounts 
redistributed each year from canton to municipality are quite large, 
reaching 5 billion CHF (0.8% of GDP) in 2013. The equalization effort 
is smaller in the French-speaking Swiss cantons than in the German-
speaking ones (Rühli et al. 2013).
17.6  room for Improvement In the cantonal 
equalIzatIon systems
Rühli et al. (2013) evaluated the cantonal equalization systems according 
to various criteria: basic structure, extent of the redistribution, and the 
incentives contained in the transfers. The authors found shortcomings in 
several cantons, but especially in Graubünden, Solothurn, St. Gallen, and 
Ticino. The best practices were in Glarus and Fribourg. In general, the 
shortcomings at the cantonal level are similar to those at the national level.
One shortcoming stems from the minimum allocation guaranteed to 
the financially weaker municipalities; it corresponds to the horizontal por-
tion to the left of the dark solid curve in Fig. 17.2. Basically, it involves a 
marginal clipping rate of 100% because in this zone, an increase in the 
resource potential of the municipalities is wholly canceled by the corre-
sponding decrease in the equalization transfers received. Under these con-
ditions, many financially weak municipalities have little incentive to 
improve their fiscal situation on their own. This is frequently also a reason 
municipalities do not merge, since even if they are financially weak, the 
equalization scheme provides them with enough resources to carry out 
their basic tasks. The largest problems arise in the German-speaking part 
of Switzerland where several cantons use high minimum allocations (e.g., 
the resource index after equalization is higher than 90).
A second shortcoming is that the tyranny of the majority is all the more 
nagging, as cantonal systems largely rely on solidarity between municipali-
ties when it comes to the horizontal transfers. Yet the municipalities which 
benefit from equalization are often more numerous than the contributing 
municipalities. This problem exists because cantons are not infrequently 
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made up of many rural municipalities with few resources and a handful of 
wealthy municipalities which inflate the resource indices. There is a result-
ing power imbalance: the larger group —the financially weak municipali-
ties —directs decision-making to their profit (by obtaining, e.g., increased 
equalization transfers).
A third shortcoming stems from the existence of a “neutral zone” in 
the cantonal equalization scale. To reduce the solidarity efforts of the 
financially well-off municipalities, cantons have often introduced an inter-
val in the resource index, usually between 80 and 100, and municipalities 
situated there no longer receive any equalization transfers. This neutral 
zone does not exist in the national equalization scale.
This zone, in Fig. 17.2, corresponds to a situation in which the dark solid 
curve of the equalization scale would merge with the line of the fully ineffec-
tive scheme. The effect of introducing this kind of zone is to reduce the num-
ber of municipalities benefitting from equalization transfers and re-calibrate 
the power balance. It also makes it possible to lower the total amount of the 
transfers, since municipalities located in the neutral zone do not receive equal-
ization transfers. Nevertheless, introducing this zone creates an inconvenient 
break in the equalization scale, making it less transparent and less intelligible. 
Because of this break in the slope, transfers to the municipalities with an index 
that is close or within the neutral zone may be unstable and change from one 
year to the next. Furthermore, the municipalities below the neutral zone may 
have an incentive to avoid carrying out reforms so as not to enter it.
17.7  conclusIon
Opportunities to improve both the national and the cantonal transfer and 
equalization systems exist, and efforts at improvement vary depending on 
the fiscal situation of the governments. Economic crises, international 
competition over business taxes, migration, and the aging of the popula-
tion are all factors which challenge the balance that, until now, has existed.
All the same, considerable progress has been made over the last decade. 
The contradictions between redistribution transfers and allocation trans-
fers have greatly decreased, and governments can no longer directly influ-
ence the amounts they receive or must pay by, for example, manipulating 
their tax rates. Reforms to the equalization systems have also made it 
 possible to decrease the effects of tax competition. They indirectly ensure 
that tax competition between both cantons and municipalities can con-
tinue to exist, but within acceptable and accepted limits.
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These successes demonstrate that in Switzerland, notwithstanding the 
existence and the power of the tools of direct democracy, ambitious struc-
tural reforms involving numerous stakeholders remain possible. This obvi-
ously involves political strategizing, that is reflected in the introduction 
into the federal system—for a limited time—of compensation for hardship 
cases. And one must regard the recourse to a tyranny of the majority by 
governments which benefit from the transfers over the governments which 
finance the transfers as a necessary evil.
Despite, or thanks to, this tyranny, Switzerland has established rules 
meant to ensure fiscal equalization between its governments at all levels. 
These rules guarantee a certain automatism and a regularity to equaliza-
tion flows, and by the same token, no discretionary decisions to give sub-
sidy grants to decentralized municipalities—and no way for the wealthiest 
communities or cantons to ignore those political entities which are worse 
off than them.
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CHAPTER 18
Social Security Policy
Giuliano Bonoli
18.1  Main Objectives and POlicy instruMents
As in other European countries, the social security system in Switzerland 
has a range of objectives1. These reflect the chronological and gradual 
development of the system. The system aims at providing a guaranteed 
minimum income for the entire resident population. The first schemes 
introduced at the national level, old age pensions in 1948 and disability 
insurance in 1960, clearly had this objective. They tried to achieve it by 
providing at least subsistence-level benefits to virtually all residents.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the rise of the middle classes 
prompted the adoption of a more ambitious objective: an income guaran-
tee aiming to give the recipients of benefits a standard of living close to the 
one they would have had—had they not been disabled, become unem-
ployed, and so forth. Existing programmes were revised accordingly, and 
a compulsory second pillar of old age pension provision was introduced. 
In disability insurance, a system of benefit increases was introduced, which 
1 This chapter is based on research carried out in the context of the European Social 
Protection Network. It draws heavily on Bonoli and Trein (2017).
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was meant to reflect the wage increases workers typically experience dur-
ing their careers. The new schemes, including unemployment insurance 
(introduced in 1978), had the goal of maintaining income levels from the 
start.
Towards the mid-1990s, with the rise in mass unemployment and per-
manent exclusion from the labour market for many, a new objective was 
added: activation. Over the last 20 years, the social security system has 
been gradually transformed, and the primary objective of all the relevant 
schemes is explicit to put “clients” back into the labour market. Several 
instruments are used to that effect: rehabilitation services for the disabled, 
active labour market policies for the long-term unemployed, vocational 
training, and wage subsidies.
In other words, over time, the Swiss welfare state has gone from being 
the provider of a minimum income to all to becoming an activation 
machine. Of course, this transformation concerns programmes providing 
coverage to working-age people. The old age pension system has not been 
affected by the “activation turn”, also because Switzerland never really 
developed large-scale early retirement schemes.
With regard to the specific institutional architecture of the social secu-
rity system for working-age individuals, there are three main schemes. 
First, Switzerland has a federal unemployment insurance programme. 
Contribution rates and benefit levels, as well as most other features, are set 
by the federal parliament, though the implementation is a cantonal respon-
sibility. While cantons must implement federal law and must organize a 
public employment service (PES), they have a large degree of autonomy 
in many areas, including activation, coordination with other schemes, and 
managing their own PES. The federal government monitors the imple-
mentation and the performance of the cantonal PES, using somewhat 
controversial indicators and a benchmarking system.
Disability insurance is also a federal scheme implemented by the can-
tons. Such insurance provides earnings replacement benefits for individu-
als who cannot work because of a long-term or permanent medical 
impairment, but it also provides substantial rehabilitation and other 
activation- related services. In this case, too, cantons are relatively free with 
regard to how they choose to implement the programme, again within the 
terms and conditions set by federal law.
Finally, social assistance is entirely regulated and financed at the can-
tonal level. Federal-level involvement in social assistance is limited to an 
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article in the federal constitution which entitles every resident to a 
 minimum subsistence income and de facto forces cantons to run social 
assistance schemes (Swiss Constitution, Art. 115). As cantons give munici-
palities leeway, there is some variety in the approaches adopted in the dif-
ferent parts of the country. We lack a precise view of what actually goes on 
in terms of benefits and services across the 26 cantons and about 2200 
municipalities that make up Switzerland.
Against the background of this high level of institutional fragmenta-
tion, a non-governmental body, the Swiss Conference for Social Welfare 
(CSIAS/SKOS), plays a very important role. CSIAS/SKOS is a private 
association with representatives of cantonal and municipal social ser-
vices as well as from the main anti-poverty organizations such as Caritas. 
It has about 1000 individual and collective members. CSIAS/SKOS 
issues guidelines concerning benefit levels as well as the design and 
implementation of social assistance; its guidelines encompass several 
hundred pages of text (SKOS 2015). These guidelines are very precise 
and most cantons use them in defining social assistance rules and prac-
tices; they help reduce what would otherwise be a very high degree of 
variation across cantons and municipalities in social assistance practices 
and policy.
For the non-working-age population, Switzerland has developed an old 
age pension system based on three pillars. The first pillar covers the basic 
needs of retirees. It is moderately earnings-related and includes a means- 
tested pension supplement (Ergänzungsleitungen/Prestations complémen-
taires, EL-PC). The second pillar tries to ensure that retirees enjoy a 
standard of living close to the one they experienced while last employed 
and consists of mandatory occupational pensions for salaried employees. 
The third pillar makes it possible to tailor pension coverage to individual 
needs through non-compulsory personal pension payments which receive 
favourable tax treatment.
The first pillar provides universal coverage and is fairly redistributive. 
There is no contribution ceiling, but the amount of the benefit can vary 
between a floor and a ceiling twice as high as the floor. In 2018, the limits 
were set at CHF 1175 (€ 950) and CHF 2350 (€1900) per month, 
respectively, corresponding to approximately 20% and 40% of the average 
wage. Benefits are adjusted every two years using a “mixed index” derived 
from the arithmetic average of inflation and wage increases. A full pension 
is paid at age 64 for women and 65 for men.
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The second pillar, occupational pensions, became compulsory in 
1985 for all employees earning at least twice the minimum “first pillar” 
pension (Bonoli 2007; Leimgruber 2008). Coverage is near-universal 
among  full- time employees, but some part-time and temporary workers 
are excluded. In fact, second pillar pensions are compulsory for workers 
earning more than 21,150 CHF per year (20,000 EUR). This threshold 
corresponds to about 30% of the average full-time wage. A full occupa-
tional pension is granted to employees who have contributed for 39 
(women) or 40 (men) years. The law provides for a compulsory mini-
mum level of provision (known as the Obligatorium) calculated on the 
basis of notional contributions. This gives existing pension funds a rela-
tively high degree of autonomy over how to deliver and finance that 
minimum level of provision. It must be fully funded for private sector 
employers. Many pension funds, especially in the public sector, or those 
sponsored by large employers, offer better conditions than the 
Obligatorium (Bonoli and Gay-des-Combes 2003; Vontobel 2000). 
The occupational pension law also prescribes a government-set mini-
mum nominal interest rate for second pillar pension funds covered by 
the Obligatorium. An important parameter defining second pillar pen-
sion benefits is the rate at which the accumulated capital is converted 
into an annuity (Umwandlungsatz/taux de conversion); that rate is set 
by law and currently stands at 6.8%.
The third pillar consists of voluntary private individual pensions which 
are tax-favoured. Employees can deduct payment into a third pillar pen-
sion account of up to CHF 6768 (€ 5547; figure for 2018) per year. The 
self-employed, who are not covered by compulsory occupational pensions, 
can deduct up to 20% of their earnings.
The Swiss multipillar pension scheme is seen as a rather successful 
example of a system that manages to address retirees’ financial needs ade-
quately without facing intractable financing problems. The division 
between the two main pillars, and the fact that the second pillar is fully 
funded, means that the ageing Swiss population will have less of an impact 
on the financing of pensions than countries in which the bulk of pension 
expenditure is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.2
2 In the literature on old age pensions, a distinction is made between pay-as-you-go 
schemes, in which current benefits are financed by current contributions, and funded 
schemes, in which current benefits are financed by past contribution. Funded systems are, in 
fact, compulsory savings schemes.
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18.2  Main actOrs and structures
The social security schemes presented above are large governmental pro-
grammes that rely on a range of actors and structures which are located at 
different levels of the Swiss federal state.
18.2.1  Unemployment Insurance
The federal State Secretariat for Economic Affairs is in charge of the 
unemployment insurance scheme. It oversees the implementation of 
unemployment insurance by the cantons, signs a performance agreement 
with them, and runs an indicator and benchmarking system. At the can-
tonal level, the key role is played by cantonal PESs, which are responsible 
for managing benefits and activation. They have substantial autonomy in 
implementation.
Intercantonal associations also play a large role, including the associa-
tion of cantonal PES. This association coordinates the implementation of 
unemployment insurance across cantons and represents their common 
interests at the federal level. Regional placement offices are key actors in 
implementation. They belong to the canton’s PES and provide monitor-
ing and activation services for job seekers. They have some autonomy in 
implementation, but it is limited by the given cantonal PES. There are 
some 100 such regional placement offices in the country.
The unemployment compensation funds are additional, significant, 
actors. They can be either cantonal or branch based, and administer con-
tributions and benefit payments. They have little autonomy and can be 
considered as purely administrative actors.
Finally, there are non-governmental organizations (mostly NGOs and 
more rarely, for-profit private companies) which provide the activation 
services needed by the PES.
18.2.2  Disability Insurance
The federal social insurance office is the key actor in disability insurance. 
It coordinates and oversees implementation by the cantons and, more 
importantly, takes the lead in proposing national legislation.
Implementation is the responsibility of cantonal disability insurance 
offices, which are responsible for managing both benefits and activation 
measures. They have substantial autonomy.
 SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY 
314 
As with unemployment insurance, intercantonal associations play a 
large role here. The most important one is arguably the intercantonal 
association of disability insurance agencies, which includes all cantonal dis-
ability insurance offices. It coordinates the implementation of unemploy-
ment insurance across cantons and represents their common interests at 
the federal level.
The regional medical services are another key actor; this provides the 
medical expertise needed in order to assess eligibility. There are ten 
regional medical services, each serving one or more cantonal disability 
offices.
In theory, they have little room for manoeuvre, as they have to strictly 
apply the law. In reality, medical assessments, especially of mental health, 
may fall into a grey area, giving a certain latitude to the regional medical 
services in how strictly they choose to implement the relevant laws. As 
with unemployment insurance, activation and rehabilitation services are 
provided mostly by non-state actors, including NGOs and for-profit 
private firms.
18.2.3  Social Assistance
Social assistance is a cantonal and municipal responsibility. As a result, 
there is no “social assistance office” or similar bureau at the federal level. 
As noted above, the only umbrella organization with a national scope is 
the Swiss Conference for Social Welfare, a private association.
Cantonal authorities (governments and parliaments), who are the most 
important actors, decide on cantonal social assistance laws. Given the 
absence of federal law in this area, they have substantial autonomy. Each 
canton has a social service, which is responsible for implementing social 
assistance laws, and regional or municipal social services deliver the bene-
fits to clients. They are also in charge of the activation services, though 
their autonomy is limited by cantonal law. While big cities like Zurich, 
Basel, or Geneva can set up their own activation programmes (Duell et al. 
2010, p.  101), smaller cities and municipalities lack the resources and 
capacities to do the same.
In some cantons, one still finds social commissions. These are made up 
of citizens designated by the municipal executive. They make formal deci-
sions concerning eligibility and access to activation services. This is a pre- 
modern institution with a strong social control function; it has survived 
mostly in the German-speaking part of the country but been largely 
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 abolished in French- and Italian-speaking cantons. As in other branches of 
the social security system, one finds NGOs, or more rarely, for-profit pri-
vate companies, which provide activation services needed by social assis-
tance offices.
18.2.4  Old Age Pensions
Old age pensions are a federal responsibility. They are overseen by the 
federal social insurance office. With regard to implementation, a distinc-
tion needs to be made between the first pillar, which is public, and the 
second pillar, which is company or branch based. The first pillar is carried 
out by some 100 “compensation funds”. Some are public (each canton 
has one) but most are branch-based. Some very large employers such as 
Coop, a large supermarket chain, have their own. Compensation funds 
collect contributions and distribute benefits, but they are all inter- 
connected and under the umbrella of a central compensation fund based 
in Geneva; it keeps the records of every insured person.
For the second pillar, the key actors are around 2000 occupational pen-
sion funds. Large companies generally have their own, while a number of 
branch-based funds exist which companies are free to join. Finally, most 
insurance companies and banks also provide second pillar coverage to 
employers who do not have their own fund.
18.3  POlicy iMPleMentatiOn and OutcOMes
Switzerland has long had a low unemployment rate and relatively few 
social problems. The Swiss labour market also has been doing relatively 
well during the last few years. These are all not necessarily a result of the 
welfare state.
The employment rate has remained above the European Union (EU) 
2020 target of 75% throughout the period covered in Table 18.1. It is 
intriguing to see that between 2010–2011 and 2014 both the employ-
ment and the unemployment rates increase. This may reflect an increasing 
level of competition in the labour market.
Against the background of this overall good labour market perfor-
mance, some groups are experiencing more difficulties, in particular 
younger workers who lack a completed vocational or academic education. 
As Table 18.2 shows, the unemployment rate for the 15–24 age group is 
considerably higher than the general one.
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Non-European migrants are another group that is relatively disadvan-
taged in the Swiss labour market, with an employment rate lower than that 
of Swiss nationals and EU/EFTA (European Free Trade Association) 
migrants. Partly this has to do with the channel through which different 
migrants arrive in Switzerland. EU/EFTA nationals come most often in 
order to take up employment, and since the adoption of the agreement on 
the free movement of workers, their employment rate has increased. It is 
interesting to note that over the same period of time, the employment rate 
of Swiss has also increased, though to a smaller extent. Non-European 
migrants instead come to Switzerland mostly from other channels, often as 
asylum seekers. This is related to the lower employment rate of this group. It 
should also be noted that non-European migrants are the only group which 
has not taken advantage of the expansion of employment since the early 
2000; Table 18.3 shows how invariant their employment rates have remained.
The overall poverty rate puts Switzerland in the same category as Germany, 
with AROP3 rates around 15%. The very high AROP rate reported for 
3 AROP, the “at risk of poverty” rate, refers to the percentage of the population living in 
households with income below 60% of equivalent disposable income. This definition is used 
by the EU Commission and has become relatively widely accepted among poverty 
researchers.
Table 18.2 Labour market position of younger people (aged 15–24 years)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Employment 62.5 62.9 61.7 61.9 61.6 61.0
Unemployment 7.2 5.9 6.1 7.0 7.7 6.4
Source: Employment, Eurostat; Unemployment, Swiss statistical office (2nd quarter)
Table 18.1 Key labour market indicators for the working-age (20–64) 
population
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Employment rate 81.1 81.8 82.0 82.1 82.3 82.8
Unemployment rate 4.2 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.5
Female employment rate 74.6 75.4 76.0 76.6 77.4 78.2
Source: Employment rates: Eurostat, unemployment rate, OECD
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older people by Eurostat is somewhat misleading, however. Swiss pensioners 
can choose to receive their second pillar pension as a lump sum, and many 
do because it is more convenient from a fiscal point of view. As a result, many 
income-poor seniors are in fact asset-rich. Swiss data therefore suggest that 
the actual economic situation of elderly people is not as unfavourable as sug-
gested by Eurostat figures. Swiss perceptions are also that the pension system 
is fairly successful in guaranteed a decent standard of living to retirees—a 
perception that is clearly at odds with the very high reported AROP rate 
shown in Table 18.4.
The incidence of poverty can also be evaluated with reference to the 
proportion of the population that must rely on social assistance. Over the 
last few years, that proportion has remained constant at around 3%, but 
this stability in the percentage is also misleading. In fact, as can be seen in 
Table  18.5, between 2009 and 2015, a period of good labour market 
performance, the absolute number of social assistance recipients consis-
tently increased, reflecting an increase in population size due to 
in-migration.
In fact, the increase in the number of social assistance recipients has 
been fairly constant since the early 1990s (Bonoli and Champion 2014), 
even during a recent period when employment was increasing. This indi-
cates that the labour market has become more competitive, possibly 
because of the free movement of labour agreement with the European 
Table 18.3 Employment rates by nationality (aged 15–64 years)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Swiss 82.5 82.9 82.6 83.3 83.7 83.7 84.9
EU or EFTA 84.7 85.7 86.0 86.0 86.7 86.5 87.2
Other country 74.4 73.2 74.0 73.7 74.7 73.4 74.8
Source: Bundesamt fuer Statistik, ESPA, data refer to second trimester
Table 18.4 Poverty statistics (percentages)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
At risk of poverty, total 15.0 15.0 15.9 14.5 13.8
At risk of poverty, aged 65 years and over 27.6 28.1 29.9 29.5 25.7a
Source: Eurostat (based on SILC data) Data not available for 2015
aChange in series
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Union, and less productive individuals are finding it more difficult to enter 
and remain in the labour market.
With regard to child poverty, a recent report by the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office found that overall, children in Switzerland fare relatively 
well, particularly in comparison with other European countries. Only the 
Nordic countries and the Netherlands have indicators of child welfare 
which are as good or slightly better (FSO 2016, p.  26). Nevertheless, 
there are some groups which remain of concern, including children living 
in single-parent households, children living in households with three or 
more children, and children of non-Swiss parents. In these groups, pov-
erty and deprivation rates are higher than the norm and more 
worrisome.
Overall, the Swiss social security system seems capable of delivering 
reasonably good levels of economic security to the resident population. 
However, the fact that social indicators remain rather favourable does not 
necessarily constitute proof that the Swiss welfare state is particularly well 
calibrated to the needs of society. It may well be that the good perfor-
mance is due more to the country’s overall economic competitiveness 
rather than to its welfare state schemes. In simpler terms, it is relatively 
easy to build an effective welfare state in a country with a buoyant labour 
market and a consistently low unemployment rate.
In reality, each of the four main schemes has strengths and weaknesses. 
In addition, the fragmentation of the system along federalist lines makes 
internal coordination of, and in, the Swiss social security system difficult.
The Swiss welfare state is a rather diverse construct with some pro-
grammes, such as the basic pension scheme, which are highly centralized, 
and others, such as social assistance, which are extremely decentralized. 
Between them, one finds schemes that rely on a division of labour between 
federal and cantonal levels. Unemployment and disability insurance are 
Table 18.5 Social assistance caseload
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total number of 
recipients
230,019 231,046 236,133 250,333 257,192 261,983 265,626
As a percentage of 
the resident 
population
3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office
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governed by the federal authorities but are implemented at the cantonal 
level, sometimes with substantial variations from canton to canton. This 
raises issues about the equality of treatment across cantons, creates diffi-
culties in coordination, and more abstractly, principal–agent problems.
The current trend is to increasingly use quantitative indicators and 
benchmarking to try to ensure some coherence in how policies are imple-
mented and to try to maximize their efficacy. Federal authorities also use 
benchmarking in an effort to “control” the cantons, as well as to avoid the 
potential problems of principal and agent that can emerge if financing and 
implementation are performed by two different levels of government.
Coordination strategies are pursued through intercantonal associations 
such as SKOS/CSIAS or other intercantonal bodies, which formally rep-
resent the relevant department and offices at the cantonal level. There 
seems to be an instinctive preference in Switzerland to resolve coordina-
tion problems through voluntary agreements between cantons rather than 
by centralizing systems.
Coordination problems are further compounded by the involvement of 
private actors in the system. This is most clearly the case in old age pen-
sions, where private occupational pensions have developed into an indus-
try, one with substantial interests at stake. The objectives of such private 
actors are not always compatible with the social policy goals set by the 
public authorities, so that substantial coordination work is needed on this 
front as well.
So though social indicators remain rather favourable, the institutional 
contours of the Swiss social security system also remain highly fragmented. 
The result is that public authorities need to invest substantial efforts in 
coordinating the welfare state system, and the fragmentation may prove a 
liability in the future.
18.4  PrOsPective thinking
The Swiss social security system faces challenges like those faced by other 
European countries. They include:
• Financing the pension system over the longer term
• Containing the rise in the number of benefit recipients
• Improving the effectiveness of re-employment services
• Facilitating the work–life balance particularly for parents of young 
children
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• Promoting the integration of migrants and their communities
• Enhancing social inclusion
Overall, the Swiss welfare state is relatively well equipped to deal with 
these challenges, and this task is facilitated by the overall favourable eco-
nomic situation. Nonetheless, some issues will need to be resolved if the 
challenges above are to be dealt effectively.
First, though the pension system is regarded as rather efficient, it needs 
to be made more financially viable for the next few decades. The first pillar 
pension scheme has been running small deficits for several years, and 
owing to an ageing population, its financial situation will begin to become 
critical by around 2030. If no measures are taken, its reserve fund will be 
used up even before then.
Second, the conversion rate (of 6.8%, see above) applied to the assets of 
occupational pensions is not sustainable in the current low interest rates/
low returns environment. The result is that a small proportion of current 
contributions are being used to pay for current benefits instead of being 
set aside for future pensions. Any extra returns obtained tend to be used 
to finance current pensions instead of being distributed across the whole 
pool of insured persons.
The long-term financing of the basic pension and the reduction of the 
conversion rate for second pillar pensions are thorny political issues. A 
high-profile reform which tried to deal with both problems without reduc-
ing the overall level of benefits was turned down by the voters in September 
2017. It is unclear how these issues will be resolved. Pension policy has 
clearly become an object of political competition among parties, and it is 
difficult to find a consensus over unpopular measures.
Third, the social security system has been modernized and it now ori-
ented towards the promotion of labour market re-entry. This reflects, at 
least in part, the “social investment approach” (Hemerijck 2017; Morel 
et  al. 2012). Unemployment and disability insurance provide extensive 
labour market and rehabilitation programmes for non-working “clients”.
However, the same is not true of social assistance. This “last resort” 
safety net is within the competence of the cantons, and in many cantons, 
of the municipalities. Here, the turn to activation or social investment has 
been much more uneven, with some cantons having clearly embraced the 
new paradigm while others lag behind. This may be one reason why social 
assistance caseloads keep increasing even in buoyant labour markets and 
an expanding economy. It will be a challenge in the next few years how the 
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activation dimension in social assistance can be reinforced—and how to 
caseloads from increasing.
Fourth, the Swiss welfare state is highly fragmented, a broad but also a 
quite specific problem. There is evidence, for example, that cantonal or 
municipal social assistance programmes and federal social insurance 
schemes shift “clients” to one another, because there are structural incen-
tives (including those associated with costs) to do so (Bonoli and 
Champion 2014; Bonoli and Trein 2016).
Finally, as in other countries, a major policy challenge for Switzerland 
remains improving the work–life balance, especially for families with young 
children. Switzerland provides only 14 weeks of maternity leave and has 
no parental leave. In addition, there are simply not enough childcare cen-
tres, as one can see from the long waiting lists in many urban areas. 
Furthermore, the cost of childcare for parents is among the highest of all 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries (OECD 2011, p.  150). This situation also results in a very 
strong social bias against certain migrant communities and low-income 
families; their access to childcare services is even more limited than for citi-
zens (Bonoli and Vuille 2013; Schlanser 2011). This is unfortunate, 
because Switzerland is missing out on an important opportunity to pro-
mote social inclusion and the integration of migrant families.
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CHAPTER 19
Health Policy
Philipp Trein
19.1  IntroductIon
Health policy entails the regulation, financing, and provision of a wide 
range of medical and non-medical services to prevent and cure diseases. 
This complex task makes it one of the most multifaceted and expensive 
fields of public policy. Strong professional interests and autonomies, 
expensive treatments, equity of access, quality concerns, and increasing 
costs render policymaking challenging. In Switzerland, health policymak-
ing occurs against the background of direct democracy, decentralized fed-
eralism, liberalism, consensual policymaking, and subsidiarity. This system 
grants subnational policymakers, voters, as well as private actors consider-
able access, voice, and influence on decisions in health policy.
In terms of macro-indicators related to health, Switzerland can only 
partly be considered a success story. The majority of the Swiss population 
is satisfied with the country’s health care system (FOPH 2016a). From a 
medical point of view, Switzerland has a high life expectancy rate at birth 
(83 as of 2015), median childhood mortality (3.9, 2015), low rates of 
preventable mortality (159 per 100,000 in 2013), and rather low cancer 
death rates (223.5 per 100,000 in 2013). However, it also has rather high 
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suicide rates (12.2 per 100,000 as of 2013, with a historically even higher 
rate) compared to other Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries (OECD 2016). The main challenge for 
Switzerland is rising costs for health and long-term care, as well as issues 
in the distribution of these costs. In 2015, Switzerland spent 11.5 percent 
of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health policy (the OECD average 
is 9 percent), and 3.7 percent of these expenditures were out-of-pocket 
contributions from patients, as compared to an average of 2.4 percent in 
the OECD (2016). Health insurance carriers pay for most health expendi-
tures, whereas cantons and municipalities cover the largest share of the 
health expenditures by the state (FOPH 2017a). The biggest challenge is 
the rising health care burden for the population, since health insurance 
premiums continually increase (FOPH 2017b) and a considerable share of 
the population relies on cantonal subsidies to pay their health insurance 
fees (FOPH 2014a).
The next section discusses the institutional foundations of Swiss health 
policy. Then, I present the constellations of the politico-administrative and 
private actors in Swiss health policy and discuss the resulting political con-
flicts. This chapter then turns to current challenges for health policymak-
ers in Switzerland.
19.2  InstItutIonal FoundatIons
National health policy is based on a health insurance law adopted in 1994 
and in force since 1996 (LAMal; ‘Loi fédérale sur l’assurance maladie’), 
which replaced the earlier law of 1911. The reform in 1994 signaled a 
change from a voluntary health insurance system to a universal and manda-
tory health insurance system. This switch came late in comparison to other 
European countries (Uhlmann and Braun 2011). The main responsibility 
for health policy rests with the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH), 
founded in 1893, and originally responsible mainly for public health, espe-
cially health promotion and illness prevention. Responsibility for health 
insurance would only be transferred to the FOPH in 2003 (Trein 2018).
A comparative assessment of health care systems suggests that Swiss 
health care policy follows a collective negotiation logic, in which subna-
tional public actors (such as cantons) as well as private actors (such as 
health insurance bodies, professional organizations, private hospitals, or 
the pharmaceutical industry) possess considerable influence and lobbying 
power. Hierarchy and market logics are less important, although the Swiss 
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system shares important similarities with the US health care system, one 
which emphasizes market elements in the financing and provision of health 
care (Böhm et al. 2013).
Historically, three organizational principles have shaped actor constel-
lations and the institutions of the Swiss health system: federalism, liberal-
ism, and subsidiarity (Sager et al. 2010; Vatter and Rüefli 2014, 828).
• Federalism: Switzerland is a ‘coming together’ federation, in which 
the subnational governmental units (cantons) formed the national 
government. Originally, the cantons had the power to make policy 
over health issues, and only gradually and selectively transferred 
health policymaking to the national level. In principle, Switzerland 
has 26 different health systems and health policies, and policies 
adopted at the cantonal level often preceded national regulations. 
This was true for health insurance itself (Uhlmann and Braun 2011), 
for the implementation of alcohol policy (Sager 2003, 2004) and 
tobacco control policy (Trein 2017). Cooperation between cantons 
always played an important role for national health policy as well, 
with the Conference of Cantonal Public Health Directors (CPHD) 
that has existed since 1919 (Trein 2018). Thus, the decentralized 
federal structure impeded the creation of national health legislation 
longer than in other countries where subnational governments had 
less policy competencies.
• Liberalism: Health policy in Switzerland has a strong liberal ele-
ment. This means that policies constraining the liberties of individu-
als and businesses are notoriously unpopular. Citizens and elites, 
particularly in the central and eastern part of the country, prefer a 
small but effective state instead of a large redistributive machinery. 
Support for a limited state also affected the creation of a national 
health insurance scheme. Since the early twentieth century, popula-
tion and elites have repeatedly opposed, and more significantly, voted 
against policy proposals that aimed at creating a national health 
insurance law or that called for creating a public health insurance 
organization operated by the state (Alber and Bernardi-Schenkluhn 
1992). In 2014, voters rejected a popular initiative demanding the 
establishment of a public health insurance organization1 (Trein 
1 The title of the popular initiative was Eidgenössische Volksinitiative ‘Für eine öffentliche 
Krankenkasse’: https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis401.html, accessed October 26, 
2017.
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2018). Liberalism also guided the design of the national health 
insurance law in 1994, which made health insurance coverage man-
datory but nevertheless had private providers offering the health 
insurance packages. Interestingly, insurers are not allowed to make 
profits with the basic insurance package, and, despite competition for 
insurance contracts, are required to accept all applications for basic 
health care coverage regardless of gender, age, or pre-existing medi-
cal conditions (Uhlmann and Braun 2011). The prevalence of liberal 
values also played a role in the failure of proposals aimed at introduc-
ing preventive health policies. In 1993, for example, voters and par-
liament rejected a popular initiative calling for a complete ban on 
alcohol and tobacco advertising (Cornuz et  al. 1996), and more 
recently, a national framework law to create a preventive health care 
policy failed after several rounds in the national parliament (APS 
2012; Fontana 2012).
• Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity means that social or political issues should 
be dealt with at the lowest possible level of government. This implies 
that local non-state actors should be brought in to deal with policy 
problems, and is a reason non-state actors play an important role in 
health policymaking and in local delivery of health or long-term care 
services. In Switzerland, for example, non-governmental organiza-
tions such as the Swiss Cancer League or the Swiss Lung League 
assist patients and create health promotion programs. Historically, 
health insurance was first provided, following the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, by local health insurance providers, but their numbers have 
dwindled and national companies offer contracts in many cantons 
(Trein 2018). Politically, subsidiarity also implies that the providers 
of health services, whether these are doctors or pharmaceutical com-
panies, also have an important role to play, and as a result they, too, 
are often consulted in the policymaking process.
19.3  competencIes oF actors
The main politico-administrative actors (Knoepfel et al. 2011) in the Swiss 
health care system include the national political executive and its associ-
ated administrative units, most notably the FOPH, the federal parliament, 
with its various political parties, the cantonal governments, and 
 administrative units, particularly the departments of health and the can-
tonal public health officers (Kantonsärzte), the cantonal parliaments and 
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parties, and the municipalities. In addition, private actors regulate impor-
tant areas in health policy and, thus, functionally occupy roles as politico- 
administrative actors.
19.3.1  Federal Government, Cantons, and Municipalities
The federal government is responsible for public health matters, in par-
ticular those related to infectious diseases and epidemics. It is thus respon-
sible for health protection, prevention, and cure, and in addition, more 
general health care policy. This includes passing framework legislation, 
setting out the catalog of benefits covered by health insurances, admitting 
drugs to the country and setting the prices of health care services, ensur-
ing health care quality, subsidizing health insurances, and providing over-
sight (Vatter and Rüefli 2014, 835).
The cantons are responsible for implementing federal health policies, 
including public health protection in cases of infectious diseases. 
Furthermore, they are in charge of implementing health insurance poli-
cies, providing health care infrastructure (e.g., the planning of hospitals, 
approving labor agreements in the health sector, and implementing health 
insurance subsidies). In addition, cantons also put their own health policy 
legislation into place, meaning they are responsible for the provision of 
health services, for planning and building public hospitals, and for regulat-
ing the providers of ambulant care (admitting into practice and control-
ling services provided). Furthermore, the cantons collaborate at the 
national and regional levels over health policy. At the national level, the 
cantons cooperate in the CPHD on a variety of topics, including health 
occupations or health insurance. There are also regional conferences (East, 
Central, Northwest, and West Switzerland) of cantonal health directors 
(Füglister 2012; Vatter and Rüefli 2014, 836).
The federal government and the cantons share a number of competen-
cies in health policy, particularly in promoting health, preventing non- 
communicable diseases, and in health education. Furthermore, both levels 
of government share responsibility for the education of health personnel, 
and in regulating and recognizing the various health professions.
The municipalities also have competencies in health policymaking, 
mostly in providing complementary health care services in long-term care. 
Compared to the national and cantonal levels, the scope of these 
 competencies is small. They may well become more important in the 
future, as expenditures for long-term care are very likely to increase (Trein 
2016; Vatter and Rüefli 2014, 835–836).
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19.3.2  Coordination Between Different Levels of Government
The mixture of shared and separated competencies in health policies 
creates coordination problems between levels of government. On the 
one hand, the national government has an incentive to shift policy com-
petencies and costs to the lower levels of government. On the other 
hand, cantons may implement national policies and use funds related to 
health care in ways other than those intended by the national govern-
ment, for example, when implementing policies in ways that fit the 
interests of a given cantonal government. Thus, federalism limits the 
ability of the national government to steer Swiss health policymaking 
(Vatter and Rüefli 2014, 845–846). Consequently, the federal govern-
ment needs to incentivize cantons to cooperate and to negotiate, if or 
when necessary. This happens indirectly through the CPHD, in which 
the national government participates, but also via regional health minis-
ters’ conferences. The national coordination platform Dialog Nationale 
Gesundheitspolitik serves, amongst other things, as a forum for exchang-
ing information and creating common national strategies (Füglister 
2012; FOPH 2017c).
19.3.3  Private Actors
Private actors play an important role in Swiss policymaking and implemen-
tation, owing to the principles of liberalism and subsidiarity noted previ-
ously. In principle, health service providers (e.g., doctors, health insurance 
bodies, or pharmacies) compete for patients. Compared to countries like 
the Netherlands or Germany, Switzerland has more competition in its 
health care market (Hammer et al. 2008; Blenk et al. 2016).
Private actors are collectively organized in several areas of health care 
policy. Health care providers have the right to organize into peak interest 
organizations, which in turn are entitled to negotiate collective agree-
ments about prices. Thus, sovereignty in wage bargaining is a key element 
of the Swiss health care system (Sager et al. 2010; Böhm et al. 2012, 64), 
though public authorities do control, and approve, the collective wage 
agreements reached.
Private providers of health care services include doctors, private hospi-
tals, and pharmaceutical companies, which all are well-connected in the 
national parliament. Together with public hospitals, they form a block of 
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interests often opposed to health insurance bodies when it comes to the 
pricing of health services (Vatter and Rüefli 2014, 839–840). On the 
other hand, other coalitions may form, such as when private providers and 
health insurance bodies make common cause in opposition to patients and 
their interest representatives, for example, with respect to introducing a 
national unified health insurance. In addition, private actors play an impor-
tant role in public health and prevention (Achtermann and Berset 2006). 
Interestingly, preventive health policies promulgated by the state are quite 
unpopular among citizens and elites alike.
19.3.4  Relationship Between Public and Private Actors
Private actors play a dual role both as rule-makers and as rule-takers in 
some parts of health policy, and one of the most important cleavages in 
Swiss health policy lies in the conflict between providers and financing 
agents. Private actors are important on both sides, whereas public actors 
take on the role of an arbitrator in the conflicts between health insurance 
bodies and health care providers. These disputes, for example, about 
changes to hospital financing or changes in the rules concerning the 
admissibility of drugs or adjustments in reimbursement stipulations in the 
national health insurance laws, turn into strong conflicts between private 
actors—rather than conflicts between private and public actors (Vatter and 
Rüefli 2014, 839–840).
The reclusive role of the state, especially of the federal government, in 
health care policy affects public action regarding preventive health issues. 
The Federal Office for Public Health pushes for encompassing preven-
tive health policies, but these measures are unpopular among center-
right and right-wing parties and lack substantial political support from 
powerful private health care actors, such as the medical profession or 
health insurance organizations. These private actors have especially a 
professional interest in preventative health policies but politically preven-
tative health policy is less important for the medical profession and other 
private actors of the health care sector. Since they enjoy a strongly insti-
tutionalized position in Swiss health policy, they do not need an addi-
tional clout and have no incentive to make encompassing non-medical 
preventive health policies, for example, tobacco control, a high political 
priority (Trein 2018).
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19.4  current polIcy challenges and related 
polItIcal conFlIcts
19.4.1  Health Care
In the health care literature, authors distinguish four different policy goals: 
cost containment, equity, liberty, and the quality of health care services. 
These four policy goals exist in every health system (Uhlmann and Braun 
2011, 23) and policymakers need to balance them, as they may be in con-
flict with one another. Establishing a national health insurance law created 
(relatively) equal access to health care services, and these have been sup-
ported by public subsidies for health insurance premiums for low-income 
individuals (Beck et  al. 2003). Nevertheless, the Swiss system remains 
highly regressive; low-income and middle-class households need to dedi-
cate a considerably larger share of their income to health care than rich 
ones do (De Pietro et al. 2015, 232, 237). Therefore, if health expendi-
tures continue to rise, this may disproportionately affect vulnerable groups 
such as the poor or low-income retirees.
In Switzerland, health insurance premiums have increased by a yearly 
average of 4.2 percent from 1996 to 2014. This is 40 percent every ten 
years, more than the average household income increase in this period 
(Vatter and Rüefli 2014, 846). General health expenditures increased 
from 5.3 to 7.5 percent of GDP from 1995 to 2015, according to the 
Swiss government (Fig. 19.1). These figures differ slightly from the num-
bers reported by the OECD, which uses a different basis for calculation, 
but they show the same trend. Thus, like elsewhere, cost control and 
financial sustainability are central problems for health policy in Switzerland.
To deal with increasing health care costs, left-leaning political actors 
have proposed a single public health insurance agency (Einheitskasse) with 
regional sub-agencies. Proponents argue that such a system would create 
a simpler, cost-effective, and more transparent health system (Forster 
2013). The national parliament (Sda 2013) objected to the proposal, and 
in September 2014, voters rejected a popular initiative on the subject. 
Nevertheless, the topic of public health insurance re-appeared on the 
political agenda in 2017, since politicians from the French-speaking can-
tons submitted a popular initiative proposing to give cantons the option to 
increase public control over health insurance premiums. They argued that 
the cantonal governments should have the competencies to set health 
insurance premiums and that this would help to keep cost under control 
(Kucera 2017).
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Cost containment also played an important role in other proposed 
reforms to health care, most notably in a proposal to change hospital 
funding and practices. The idea was to make prices more transparent 
across Switzerland and to reduce the overall length of treatment. This 
proposal resulted in tough conflicts between providers and health insurers, 
at the expense of the interests of patients and overall cost containment 
(FOPH 2014a, b; Kessler 2014; Weber 2015; Strupler 2018). Other ini-
tiatives, such as the proposal to increase the regulation of the managed 
care market,2 argued that they too would improve cost containment in the 
Swiss health system (Vatter and Rüefli 2014, 846). Furthermore, a 2012 
legislative proposal regarding managed care failed in a popular referendum 
(Schoch 2012).
2 Switzerland has a rather liberal market for managed care models. These have cheaper rates 
than the standard health insurance model but patients are limited to specific networks of 
doctors, Health Maintenance Organizations, and telemedicine. The share of patients using 
the (cheaper) non-standard model of health insurance has increased over the years (Forum 
Managed Care 2010).
Fig. 19.1 Swiss health expenditure in comparison with other policy sectors. 
(Source: Social Expenditure Statistics, Swiss Confederation)
 HEALTH POLICY 
332 
Against this background, (at least) four potentially overlapping reform 
strategies are possible, if not even probable. First, one could limit the 
increase of health expenditure by creating a (public) single payer system 
and by regulating prices. Due to the institutional path dependency in 
health policy, this is very unlikely to happen. Second, due to the aging 
population, health expenditures will naturally reduce. This, too, is very 
unlikely to happen any time soon. Third, health care coverage will pro-
gressively be reduced, and out-of-pocket co-payments will increase. This is 
likely to happen and is already taking place through rising health insurance 
premiums. Fourth, one could increase tax-financed subsidies for patients, 
resulting in an incremental transformation—by stealth—into a largely tax- 
financed health insurance system. This is very likely to happen and is 
already the case in the existing cantonal subsidies for insurance 
premiums.
19.4.2  Prevention and Public Health
The second major policy challenge in the field of health policy concerns 
preventive health policies, in particular, preventing complicated illnesses 
brought about through non-communicable diseases. The lack of coherent 
national preventive health policies and the lack of framework legislation at 
the national level are key problems in the Swiss health system.
A recent effort to create a national framework law for preventive health 
failed due to resistance from conservative and market-oriented parties. 
Certain economic groups also brought strong influence to bear on parlia-
ment, resulting in the upper chamber failing to approve the funding that 
would have been needed (APS 2012). This failure was all the more far- 
reaching, as the proposed law would have permitted a comprehensive pre-
ventive health policy to be created, which would have included other areas 
such as mental health. Such an action would be important since more than 
40 percent of the recipients of disability insurance suffer from psychologi-
cal illnesses (FOPH 2017d).
A better integration of preventive aspects into health policy formulation 
is now part of the federal government’s comprehensive national health 
strategy (Gesundheit 2020), which defines 12 priorities and 36 specific 
policy measures to be put into place after 2016 (FOPH 2016b). In 
 addition, the cantons have engaged in their own public health measures, 
for example concerning tobacco prevention (Trein 2017).
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19.4.3  Long-Term Care3
A third important challenge for Swiss health policy concerns long-term 
care. The main problem is that the number of individuals in need of such 
care is likely to increase sharply. Long-term care is a cantonal responsibil-
ity, and they can delegate these competencies to the municipalities or to 
private organizations—an option they use frequently (OECD 2016).
Health insurances, cantons, and municipalities share the costs for long- 
term care. The health insurances have to cover a ceiling amount for ambula-
tory and stationary long-term care, which is fixed by the federal government. 
Patients have to pay a maximum of 20 percent of the ceiling fixed by the 
federal government. The cantons (and municipalities) have to cover the rest 
(FOPH 2016c). Furthermore, measures to compensate individuals caring 
for their dependent relatives are limited, and so are policies to (re)integrate 
those who have cared for a dependent relative back into the labor market. 
Those who take care of dependent relatives—often women—typically 
reduce their working hours in order to provide this care, but do so without 
adequate financial compensation or guarantees that they will be reinte-
grated into the labor market after the period of caregiving is over. Currently, 
the federal government is developing policies to deal with this problem.
Against this background, long-term care poses a major policy challenge 
for Swiss health policy. Policymakers will need to deal with the demand for 
more long-term care in the Swiss context of decentralized federalism, sub-
sidiarity, and liberalism. These principles will make it difficult to formulate 
a national policy for long-term care, not least because private actors will 
certainly play an important role, and redistributive elements will need to 
be kept to a necessary minimum.
19.4.4  Actor Constellations in the Response to These Policy 
Challenges
In dealing with these policy challenges, the actor constellations and politi-
cal traditions of Switzerland are likely to result in the following pattern of 
health policymaking.
The federal government will continue to provide framework legislation 
and overall strategies. Due to cost pressures and rising health care costs, 
the national government might need to use decrees to reform health pol-
icy, as they did in the 1980s. Changes to paradigms, such as creating a 
3 This section is based on a report written by the author about support for people of work-
ing age who have dependent relatives (Trein 2016).
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national law for preventive health, are unlikely to occur due to resistance 
from the conservative/liberal majority in the national parliament. They 
are often unwilling to support large reforms that grant funds to the statist 
provision of health services, regardless of what kind they are. How national 
policymakers will address long-term care—whether through a new national 
law, cantonal solutions, or co-financing between health care funds and dis-
ability insurance—remains to be seen.
The cantons are likely to implement innovative health policies on their 
own, whether in preventive care or in terms of health insurance. A stron-
ger role for the state in health insurance matters is more popular in the 
French-speaking than in the German-speaking cantons, leading to diver-
gence between the different cantonal health systems. This also applies to 
the role that the state takes vis-à-vis private providers of health care financ-
ing and to what extent the state regulates potentially unhealthy individual 
behavior. On the other hand, if the cantons shared common interests, they 
are likely to work together and learn from one another in the various inter- 
cantonal conferences and, if necessary, to coordinate their opposition 
against the federal government.
Private actors, notably the providers of health and long-term care ser-
vices as well as health insurance bodies, are likely to retain a strong role in 
health policy and will try to pursue their interests. These might be regard-
ing cost containment measures or be in efforts to shift the costs for risks 
to the public sector. The self-organizing principle gives private actors and 
interest groups considerable influence, and their strong position in the 
national parliament ensures that these actors will continue to have signifi-
cant veto power in future proposed reforms of the health care system.
19.5  conclusIon
Historically, federalism, subsidiarity, liberalism, and direct democracy have 
shaped Swiss health policy, and are important organizational and institu-
tional pillars even now. This context means that policymakers, and voters, 
are suspicious about having a strong state determine health policy: various 
levels of government share policy competencies, and private actors, espe-
cially health insurance and health service providers but not patients, enjoy 
considerable influence.
This leads to coordination problems between different levels of govern-
ment. It also means strong lobbying by interest groups in the health sec-
tor, opposition against restricting individual liberties (however this notion 
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is interpreted), and an overall limited steering capacity on the part of the 
state in health policy. The main policy challenge for Swiss health policy-
makers concerns financial stability and rising costs. In the Swiss context, 
decision-makers need to pay particular attention to trying to contain 
increases in health care expenditures and to ensure that higher costs do 
not shift disproportionately and burden vulnerable groups such as the 
poor and the elderly.
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CHAPTER 20
Policy Networks and the Roles of Public 
Administrations
Frédéric Varone, Karin Ingold, and Manuel Fischer
20.1  IntroductIon
This chapter applies the methodological tools of formal social network 
analysis (SNA) to illustrate the multiple functions currently performed by 
public administration(s) in steering public policy. Public policy itself is 
defined as ‘a series of intentionally coherent decisions or activities taken or 
carried out by different public—and sometimes—private actors, whose 
resources, institutional links and interests vary, with a view to resolving in a 
targeted manner a problem that is politically defined as collective in nature’ 
(Knoepfel et al. 2011: 24). From this perspective, a public administration is 
a public actor that must unconditionally coordinate its own actions with 
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those of parliamentary and governmental officials, courts, interest groups, 
political parties and scientific experts in order to co- produce a policy for a 
sector or to resolve a collective problem. In fact, in current political sys-
tems, no actor alone (including a politico- administrative actor) controls all 
the resources needed to take unilateral action (Berardo and Scholz 2010).
The empirical examples discussed in this chapter illustrate how clas-
sical public administration (e.g., those following the Weberian ideal 
type of bureaucracy) has changed and takes on new roles nowadays. On 
the one hand, in the process of making decisions, an administration at 
times becomes a policy broker between advocacy coalitions. On the 
other hand, during the implementation phase, it often agrees to share 
its regulatory powers with other actors such as independent agencies. 
Empirical evidence tends to confirm the paradox that it is precisely by 
renouncing its classical role as the dominant actor in the hierarchy, and 
by sharing its competences and resources with other actors, that the 
administration is able to maintain its central role in steering public pol-
icy. This thesis is underscored in the literature on the meta-governance 
of networks or network management (e.g., Klijn 2005; Provan and 
Kenis 2007; Sørensen and Torfing 2009; Klijn et al. 2010). In fact, the 
social network analyses presented here demonstrate that public admin-
istration remains central and influential and at the heart of policy net-
works—as long as it can adapt itself to the current conditions influencing 
public policies and can fulfill new functions (see also Fischer 2017).
SNA describes the relations between actors who jointly develop and 
implement a public policy; it is also a way to study why and how an admin-
istration occupies several roles in succession in carrying out public actions. 
Different labels have been applied in the public policy and public adminis-
tration literature to describe the networks among actors. The first, ‘policy 
networks’, is more in line with political negotiation theories and theories of 
decision-making processes. Private and public actors exchange information 
and other resources relevant to taking action, in order to increase their 
influence on the final outcome of the decision-making process (Leifeld and 
Schneider 2012; Knoke et al. 1996). This exchange is organized within the 
policy networks and is often presented as a non- hierarchical approach to 
public sector decision-making (Kenis and Schneider 1991; Laumann and 
Knoke 1987). It highlights the horizontal relationships between different 
actors where no clear hierarchy between them exists, and it focuses on the 
influence administrative units exert in formulating public policies.
The second, ‘collaborative networks’, is derived more from the public 
management literature and focuses on the implementation of public policies. 
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It tries to explain the quality and efficiency of services provided by a public 
administration, often at the local or regional level (Shrestha 2013; Schalk 
et al. 2010; Provan and Kenis 2007). Linked to the theoretical discourse 
about network governance and collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 
2007), this approach emphasizes the self-organizing, non- hierarchical char-
acter of actors involved in policy implementation and the resolution of local 
collective action problems or natural resource management (Lubell et  al. 
2014). These two currents are perfectly complementary (Lecy et al. 2014) 
and make it possible to recognize, if not understand, the different facets of 
administrative work during the different stages of the public policy cycle. 
This chapter focuses on the policy formulation and policy implementation 
stages (for a discussion of ‘upstream’ agenda- setting and ‘downstream’ pol-
icy evaluation, see Varone et al. 2016).
The ‘formulation’ stage corresponds to the clarification and stabilization 
phases (at least temporarily) in the logic of intervention which underpins 
public policy. This process, which leads to adopting a legislative and regula-
tory framework, engenders specific choices of objectives, instruments (e.g., 
prescriptions, incentives or information), institutional arrangements and 
procedures to be followed to resolve the problem under consideration.
The ‘implementation’ stage corresponds to the application of the policy 
which has been legitimized, hence to the production of administrative 
outputs in specific situations (e.g., a building permit, a subsidy for solar 
panels or training in ecological farming practices). Most of the time, this 
phase is quite complex, because a variety of potential snares exist, includ-
ing the non-execution or very selective application of certain legislative or 
regulatory provisions by street-level bureaucrats with discretionary powers 
(Lipsky 1980). The territorial differentiation inherent to federalism also 
creates implementation issues, whether in a decentralized country or in a 
multilevel governance system of the kind found at the European level.
At each of these stages of the policy cycle, the administration can assert 
itself, which it may do either more or less proactively; it is central in the 
configuration of actors and influences the content of public policy. More 
generally, an SNA allows one to study the activity, centrality, and influence 
of an actor. This analysis is precisely aimed at providing theoretical and 
methodological tools for determining the real scope of an administrative 
unit with respect to the process and content of public policy, but also for 
determining the scope of other actors involved in the sectoral network.
The following sections summarize, for the policy formulation and policy 
implementation stages, the concepts reflecting the particular roles of an 
administration; it also discusses empirical measurements of that roles. This is 
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illustrated using case studies of policies to combat global warming as well as 
to liberalize the formerly government-controlled telecommunications sec-
tor. These two public policies are chosen because they have a number of 
interesting characteristics: strong internationalization (there are global 
debates both about climate and about ways to open the telecommunications 
sector in Europe to greater competition), a high degree of conflict (there are 
strong disagreements between state and private sector actors), and they are 
characterized by innovations with respect to the specific instruments (e.g., 
tradable certificates, licenses and market regulation) and actors (e.g., the 
creation of independent regulatory agencies) chosen. In a nutshell, global 
climate and telecommunications policies reflect, in an ideal-typical manner, 
the current changes to the framework conditions the state faces.
In these two case studies, we have recourse to some classic SNA indica-
tors (see Table 20.1) for quantifying the structure of a network and the 
significance of an administrative actor within it.
Table 20.1 Key variables in SNA
Variables Definition of the empirical measurement used
Density Network density corresponds to the proportion of observed ties as 
compared to all theoretically possible ties in the network.
Degree 
centrality
Centrality assesses the relational position of a given node in the overall 
network. Many different indicators of centrality exist. Degree centrality 
measures the number of incoming (in-degree) and outgoing ties 
(out-degree) of a node.
Betweenness 
centrality
Betweenness centrality is another popular measure of centrality. It takes 
into account the degree to which a node is located on the shortest path 
between any two other nodes in the network. Nodes with high 
betweenness centralities are potentially important bridging actors or 
brokers in the network.
Eigenvector 
centrality
Eigenvector centrality is based on degree centrality; it counts the number 
of other nodes a given node is connected to. It also takes into account 
the centrality of the nodes a given node is related to by giving more 
weight to more central nodes.
Clique analysis A clique is a set of nodes in which every node is connected to every other 
node. It is a subset of a network with maximum internal density.
Core–
periphery
A core–periphery structure is characterized by a set of nodes in the core 
of the network that are strongly inter-connected and a set of nodes in the 
periphery of the network that are weakly related to nodes of the core. 
This represents an ideal-typical structure to which empirically observed 
networks can be compared to.
Structural 
equivalence
Two nodes are structurally equivalent (or similar) if they have the same 
(or a similar) relational profile to the rest of the nodes in the network.
See also Wassermann and Faust (1994)
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20.2  PolIcy FormulatIon: BrokerIng 
and the choIce oF Instruments
The most studied aspect of public policy in political science is the design 
phase. Numerous theories of decision-making processes have tried to 
explain changes in the choice of objectives and the instruments used in 
public policy; these explanations cross administrative, governmental 
and parliamentary domains. In fact, the measures used to intervene, 
whose implementation is supposed to make it possible to achieve the 
objectives of the policy as well as contribute to resolving the collective 
problem, delineate the perimeter of the targeted groups. This is the 
point in time when public policy becomes concrete and directly tangible 
for all actors involved. Each private actor can then anticipate whether or 
not they are targeted by the measure (or instrument) and whether or 
not they should change their behavior. The calibration of policy instru-
ments is therefore one of the elements which best characterize the 
design or formulation of a public policy. The instruments selected 
determine the degree of state ‘interventionism’, but they also deter-
mine the rights directly granted to the various targeted actors or the 
obligations imposed on them. They also determine the nature and qual-
ity of the expected administrative outputs (e.g., authorizations to be 
granted, prohibitions or penalties to be imposed, subsidies to be allo-
cated, taxes to be levied and information campaigns to be carried out). 
It is therefore not surprising that the choice of instruments is fiercely 
contested in the political arena.
The relevant literature proposes various theoretical hypotheses about 
the links between the configuration of the actors on the one hand and the 
choice of instruments on the other. Bressers and O’Toole (1998), for 
example, suggest that the degree of connection between private and  public 
policy stakeholders (e.g., the density of relationships within the political 
network) as well as their degree of cohesion (e.g., shared political prefer-
ences) decisively determines the type of instrument introduced. They sug-
gest an elevated connection and a strong cohesion, resulting from a strong 
link between the government and the groups targeted by a public policy, 
which means that a wide variety of instruments can be introduced. This will 
tend to favor the target groups by granting subsidies and providing infor-
mation. By contrast, a network with weak cohesion and connections will 
likely lead to a politics influenced by abstract or normative values—and a 
 POLICY NETWORKS AND THE ROLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS 
344 
lack of room to maneuver in the target groups (Bressers and O’Toole 
1998: 230–32).
In a quite different vein, the Advocacy Coalition Framework developed 
by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) proposes that the choice of instru-
ments results from a conflict between different coalitions of actors. Each 
coalition, or each group of advocates for a cause (e.g., those who favor and 
those who oppose the use of nuclear energy), shares the same belief and 
value systems and coordinates their efforts. An SNA analysis can be useful 
for identifying the advocacy coalitions as well as understanding the rela-
tions between them (Ingold 2011; Fischer 2014). The work done inside a 
coalition results in a preference for one combination of instruments over 
another (e.g., the public licensing and financing of nuclear power plants 
versus prohibiting such plants and imposing obligation on the private 
plants’ owners to bear the dismantling costs). According to this theoretical 
model, different administrative units either can be members of different 
coalitions (competing to assert their value systems and their own instru-
ments) or may act as intermediaries between the coalitions. In this latter 
case, a public administration body aims above all to reduce the level of 
conflict between the coalitions and mediate between them so as to identify 
possible compromise solutions. As they are not part of any coalition advo-
cating a particular cause, these administrative bodies are referred to as ‘pol-
icy brokers’ in the literature (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Ingold and 
Varone 2012).
A specific example illustrates how such brokering works (Stovel and 
Shaw 2012), and beyond that, how SNA accounts for it empirically. The 
case in question was the political struggle over global warming measures 
to be taken in Switzerland between 1990 and 2010 (Ingold 2011; Ingold 
and Varone 2012). Following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol (adopted 
late in 1997 and in force as of early 2005), which set a 2012 target of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 8% relative to 1990 values, Swiss 
climate change policy was articulated in passing a first CO2 emissions law 
in 2000. This law called on the private market to take voluntary action to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 10% within two years. Should this 
prove insufficient, an incentive tax on CO2 emissions would be 
introduced.
This choice of instruments reflects the fact that two advocacy coali-
tions were bitterly opposed: one was pro-market (it included industry, 
transportation, the energy sector, and the right-wing parties) and only 
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supported voluntary measures, while the other was pro-environment (it 
included environmental associations, left-wing parties and the Federal 
Office for the Environment) and called for an immediate introduction of 
the CO2 tax. In the event, voluntary measures soon showed their limita-
tions, and the CO2 law was revised already in 2005. It seems logical to 
expect an automatic implementation of the CO2 incentive tax, but its 
revision led to a very different result. The second law combined a CO2 
tax on fuel, as the pro-environment had called for in the first law, with a 
‘climate penny’ tax levied on fuels, an instrument proposed by the pro-
market coalition. This unexpected solution was the result of a compro-
mise negotiated between the two coalitions, thanks to the subtle work 
and brokerage of a public administration body—in this case the Swiss 
Federal Office of Energy (SFOE), which intervened to find an amicable 
solution and prevent an escalation of the conflict between the two 
coalitions.
In this example, network analysis is a powerful tool for identifying the 
SFOE as a public policy broker. It shows first that the SFOE does not 
belong to either of the competing advocacy coalitions. Each coalition 
brings together actors with a similar profile in terms of conflict structures 
(vis-à-vis members of the opposing coalition) and cooperation (with 
members of their own coalition). The SFOE’s profile is quite distinct 
from that of the members of either (cause-driven) coalition. Second, the 
SFOE possesses a high ‘reputational power’, meaning the actors in con-
flict give it credence in its mediation work. No less than 83% of the stake-
holder actors declared the SFOE to be a very influential player in the 
decision-making process. Third—and this empirical observation is critical 
here—network analysis showed the SFOE to be often found at the inter-
face between the actors who belonged to the pro-environment versus 
those who belonged to the pro-market coalition. In other words, the 
actors in conflict only collaborated indirectly and through the intermedi-
ary SFOE.  This is indicated by the ‘betweenness centrality’ indicator, 
which measures the frequency with which the SFOE is found on the 
geodesic path between two actors who are otherwise not connected. By 
way of summary, Fig. 20.1 shows the morphology of the collaborative 
network in Swiss climate policy; the SFOE (the large gray node at the 
center) maintained collaborative relationships with a multitude of actors 
from the two camps.
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20.3  PolIcy ImPlementatIon: encouragIng 
a network and co-ProducIng servIces
The implementation phase puts public administrations in direct contact 
with representatives of civil society, including, first and foremost, the 
groups targeted by the policy instruments. To study the interdependencies 
and the strategic games played by these actors, one needs to identify the 
institutional arrangement employed in the implementation. One can also 
call this the structured set of administrative and parastatal organizations 
formally charged with implementing the relevant public policy. It is crucial 
that one understands the many dimensions of this inter-organizational 
network, as it allows one to comprehend the ability of the public adminis-
tration to implement the envisaged instruments. Or put differently, to 
understand its inability to overcome the resistance of the target groups or 
the problems in application it encounters.
An implementation arrangement involves diverse administrative entities 
whose numbers vary. Such an arrangement is characterized by a high level 
of coordination both horizontally (between units) and vertically (between 
municipal, regional, central, and international levels), but it can, on the 
contrary, also be characterized by considerable fragmentation. In addition, 
a low degree of openness to strictly political actors implies a degree of 
professionalism and neutrality in implementation decisions. Greater per-
meability, meaning more openness to interests and interference on the 
part of (e.g., local) politicians, can result in politicization and unpredict-
ability in the implementation. Finally, because public policy is often carried 
out by administrative units which have also participated in the formulation 
and execution of other sectoral policies, the question of coordination 
between sectors (e.g., those in which the state intervenes) is a further 
important issue. The evidence is that of numerous inter-ministerial con-
flicts; they become the subjects of administrative, political or even judicial 
arbitration.
Without going into all the facets of an inter-organizational network, the 
literature is in agreement on at least one point: a public administration nowa-
days often shares its regulatory powers and sees itself less a monopoly player 
than a co-producer of administrative outputs Moreover, an administration 
may be limited to encouraging (or invigorating) a network composed of para-
statal or private actors to whom it delegates regulatory tasks and competencies 
(Provan and Kenis 2007). This phenomenon is particularly evident in the wake 
of New Public Management (NPM)-inspired reforms which, for example, 
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lead to creating independent regulatory agencies. Many studies using a 
network perspective indicate that the efficiency and effectiveness of an 
administrative arrangement for delivering public services is highly depen-
dent on the context, available resources, and existing administrative con-
trol mechanisms (Provan and Milward 1995; Ingold and Fischer 2014).
To illustrate the significance of inter-organizational networks and to 
show how traditional administrative structures have to share their pre-
rogatives (in implementation contexts), the second example focuses on 
the emergence of independent regulatory agencies. In the wake of open-
ing certain public services previously regarded as state monopolies (e.g., 
telecommunications, electricity, postal services or railways) to competi-
tion, most industrialized democracies instituted national regulatory agen-
cies, also called sector-specific regulators. At least in theory, these new 
entities enjoyed broad independence vis-à-vis elected officials, as they were 
called upon to impartially manage the competition between operators, 
both public and private, and ensure universal service provision. Such regu-
latory agencies were added on to existing administrative entities, densify-
ing the implementation mechanisms introduced by policies to liberalize 
public service provision.
In the telecommunications sector in Switzerland, the Federal 
Communications Commission is the incarnation of a national regulatory 
agency, one which has intervened in the network of co-regulators, along-
side the Federal Office of Communication (a classical public administra-
tion body), the Competition Commission, the Swiss price regulator, and 
the courts charged with resolving the inevitable conflicts that arise between 
users, operators and/or co-regulators. Figure 20.2 outlines the relation-
ship between all the actors in the (now liberalized) sector, relations which 
can be studied in greater detail using network analysis tools.
A formal network analysis of the links between actors in this realm 
shows that the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal 
Office of Communication are the two main co-producers of regulations 
for this sector. They both have the highest ‘reputational power’ and are the 
most central in this network. The ‘classical’ administrative unit, the Federal 
Office of Communication, also has the highest level of ‘betweenness cen-
trality’ among all the actors. It can therefore exercise a great deal of control 
over the flow of information and benefits by having bargaining power rela-
tive to the other actors (Fischer et al. 2012; Ingold et al. 2013; Varone and 
Ingold 2011). In addition, the Communications Commission is strongly 
interlinked with the Office of Communication and other regulators, 
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though it appears much more independent vis-à-vis the elected authorities 
and other operators in this sector (Maggetti et al. 2013). Thus, the sector-
specific national regulatory agency (e.g., the Communications Commission) 
must deal with a ‘classical’ administrative unit in order to exercise its regu-
latory powers. This example reflects the major transformation co-regula-
tion has brought about in numerous sectors, and beyond that, the role 
co-production plays in the delivery of public services by ‘classical’ admin-
istrative bodies.
20.4  conclusIon
This chapter has shown how public administration(s), in order to maintain 
a decisive influence over the conduct of public policies, has been trans-
formed and assumes new roles, at least when compared to the tasks and 
sovereign competencies under an ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy. The 
two examples discussed above indicate that an administrative entity can cast 
itself in turn as a broker and mediator in political conflicts (formulation) 
and as a co-producer of administrative services and network facilitator 
(implementation). The results of a formal SNA also suggest that these new 
roles do not entail a loss of public administration influence. On the con-
trary: it is by adapting and also abandoning a state-centric vision and hier-
archical position, as well as finding a place within a policy network as a 
broker, facilitator, or co-producer, that public administration is able to 
maintain its ability to significantly influence the content of public policies.
This observation, perhaps a little paradoxical, is certainly valid beyond 
the politics of contestation around global warming or the liberalizing of 
telecommunications. Indeed, policy networks are an undeniable reality in 
many sectors where the state intervenes to solve collective problems. 
Political decision-makers, administrative elites, and academic researchers 
experience this on a daily basis, and it is therefore reasonable to devote 
more sustained attention to the SNA approach (see Kapucu et al. 2017; 
Lecy et al. 2014 or Fischer 2017 for an up-to-date overview of the state of 
empirical research), one which helps in identifying the new roles inhabited 
by public administration.
Of course the emergence and consolidation of policy networks are cer-
tainly not the only transformations public administration has undergone, 
including in the context of NPM-inspired reforms. However, by high-
lighting the interdependence of public administrative units and other 
actors (which include private actors) in public policy, the network approach 
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suggests that there are perhaps some intrinsic limitations inherent to cer-
tain other reforms which are underway, especially if they are confined to 
modifying the internal functioning of public administration and/or rein-
forcing institutional egoism. One can think here of contemporary perfor-
mance contracts and performance indicators, essential tools of the NPM 
approach, which have been negotiated under several governments, and 
which generally do not take into account that public action is developed 
and implemented in inter-organizational networks, not in isolated admin-
istrative units which are protected by ‘their’ respective service contracts.
At the same time, we make no claim that policy networks are a panacea, 
either in theory or in practice. There is no definitive answer for whether 
the participation of administrative organs in policy networks improves the 
relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of public policies or not. While some 
authors highlight how public administration could profit from network- 
based management (Klijn 2005), others remain cautious or even skeptical 
(McGuire and Agranoff 2011). A number of significant normative issues, 
including legitimacy, are also raised by the question of how democratically 
anchored policy networks are. Responsibility ultimately lies with elected 
decision-makers, even if delegating decision-making powers can benefit 
the work of public administration (Sørensen and Torfing 2005).
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CHAPTER 21
Factors Contributing to the Strong 
Institutionalization of Policy Evaluation 
in Switzerland
Katia Horber-Papazian and Marion Baud-Lavigne
21.1  IntroductIon
At the end of the 1980s, the evaluation of public policy in Switzerland 
was largely conducted by academics (Horber-Papazian and Thévoz 
1990); nowadays, it has gained international recognition. The most 
recent comparison (Jacob et al. 2015) places Switzerland among the top 
three countries, along with Canada and Finland, on the basis of the fol-
lowing criteria: the existence of evaluations in different policy domains, 
professional competency in evaluation, the presence of a national dis-
course about evaluation, the existence of a national evaluation society, the 
institutionalization of evaluation in government and parliament, the exis-
tence of evaluation in the highest auditing institution, that a plurality of 
institutions or evaluators conduct evaluations in different areas, and finally 
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that a certain proportion of evaluations focus on impact and outcome 
rather than output and process.
A finding of this kind justifies that one takes interest in examining 
factors which have favored this institutionalization. Our thesis is that 
the strong institutionalization of public policy evaluation since the 
1990s can be explained by a convergence of conducive factors. They 
include a context favorable to conducting evaluations, a variety of actors 
at the interface between differing universes, the incorporation and 
inclusion of an obligation to evaluate into the national Constitution, the 
emergence of political strategies which use evaluation to achieve politi-
cal goals (including using clauses in laws that call for evaluation), and 
the use of the results of evaluations both in politics and in public admin-
istration. As data on cantonal and communal evaluation practices are 
both poor and quite disparate, the following discussion focuses on the 
federal level.
21.2  A context FAvorAble to evAluAtIon
Many factors were responsible for putting questions about the effective-
ness of state action, the implementation of governmental decisions, and 
the auditing methods being used onto the political agenda in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. One of these was a crisis in public finance. 
Another was a larger debate about the role, or place, of the state in the 
context of the rise in ‘neoliberal’ ideology. Many public projects, partic-
ularly in the area of infrastructure, were called into question at the time, 
and there was also a loss of confidence in relations between the federal 
parliament and the executive. Deficits in public policy implementation 
had been identified by various national research programs. Finally, voters 
were calling for more efficiency and more transparency in actions under-
taken by the state.
The combination of these factors led numerous actors, especially those 
at the interface between social universes and in contact with one another, 
to engage in reflections which began to converge. Their discourse first 
sensitized the communities to which these actors belonged about the 
important space which evaluation could occupy in the public policy cycle 
and then led to them becoming active in the process of institutionalizing 
such evaluations.
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21.3  the Actors At the InterFAce 
between AcAdemIc, AdmInIstrAtIve, And PolItIcAl 
worlds
21.3.1  The Federal Department of Justice and Police
At the instigation of the author of the first thesis about legislative evaluation 
in Switzerland (Mader 1985), the Federal Department of Justice and Police 
created a working group in 1987 (the Arbeitsgruppe Gesetzesevaluation—
AGEVAL) whose goal was to analyze the utility and value of policy evalua-
tion in the Swiss federal government. The group brought federal and 
cantonal officials together with academic researchers. Following a proposal 
contained in the final report of this working group  (Arbeitsgruppe 
Gesetzesevaluation 1991), an ‘evaluation network in the federal administra-
tion’ was brought to life in 1995. This group is still active and allows partici-
pants, who may be officials, clients, or users, to share their knowledge about, 
and experiences with, the results of evaluations.
In 1987, the Federal Department of Justice and Police also suggested 
that a national research program be launched to study the ‘Efficiency of 
Governmental Actions’ (NRP 27). Its principal goal was to identify assess-
ment tools or methods most suited to the Swiss context. It was also an 
effort to increase knowledge about the effects different types of evalua-
tions had on state activity, one coordinated by an administrator in the 
Federal Office of Justice who would later become the first president of the 
Swiss Evaluation Society (SEVAL). Thus, this Federal Department played 
a central role in promoting the use of evaluation within the federal admin-
istration and gave impetus to conducting further research on evaluation.
21.3.2  The Federal Parliament and Parliamentary Control 
of the Administration
Since the 1980s, the Control Committees in both houses of parliament, 
oversight committees which review the work conducted by the Federal 
Council and the federal administration, have ‘worked to reinforce this 
supervision’ and have ‘demanded that, in addition to the criteria of legality, 
regularity and appropriateness in taking action on the part of government 
and administration, that the effectiveness of the measures taken by the state 
be controlled in a more systematic manner’ (Bättig and Schwab 2015, 2).
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In 1990, the parliament decided to set up a specialized evaluation body, 
the Parliamentary Control of the Administration (PCA). This body is 
responsible, in particular, for carrying out analyses of the effectiveness of 
public policies and public services on behalf of the Control Committees of 
the two houses. Today it has eight employees (six FTEs) specialized in 
evaluation, and it works completely independently; it can also call on 
external experts.
The work of the PCA serves as the basis for reports prepared by the 
Control Committees and recommendations they make to the executive, 
which is required to answer. If they are not satisfied with the response, the 
Committees can demand fuller answers. At the same time, if they believe 
that the results of the evaluation show important steps that need to be 
taken, the Committees can require the government to submit proposi-
tions for legislative revisions through a motion or propose those revisions 
themselves through a parliamentary initiative.
It is also the parliament, and more particularly the Committees, which 
requested including Article 170 into the new 1999 Constitution. It stipu-
lates that ‘the Federal Assembly shall ensure that federal measures are 
evaluated with regard to their effectiveness’. By including such a broad 
clause in the Constitution, the parliament was a pioneer (Bussmann 2007). 
One result is that evaluation has shifted from being a tool for parliamen-
tary oversight to being an instrument which covers all parliamentary activ-
ities, including legislative. The relevant literature thus widely accepts that 
Art. 170 sends or is a strong signal from parliament about the importance 
of the term ‘evaluation’ and about the importance of evaluation in legisla-
tive activity (Bussmann 2008; Horber-Papazian 2006, 135). Of all the 
parliaments considered in the aforementioned international comparison, 
the Swiss parliament has most institutionalized evaluation.
21.3.3  The Swiss Federal Audit Office
The revision of the Financial Control Act in 1994 extended the powers of 
the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) in line with the guidelines of the 
International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions; it also encour-
aged the use of evaluations. This means the SFAO needs to examine 
whether resources are being used in an economical fashion and if the cost–
benefit relationship is advantageous; it must also ensure that the budgeted 
expenditures are having the desired effect. In 2002, a new competency 
center focusing on performance audit and evaluation was created within 
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the SFAO. It has the power to examine the effects and implementation of 
high-expenditure federal policies, and it can propose ways action taken by 
the Confederation can be made more efficient. In exercising this over-
sight, it assists the joint finance delegation of both parliamentary cham-
bers, a body which, like the Federal Council, can entrust it with mandates 
to conduct summative and retrospective evaluations.
Like the PCA, the SFAO can approach topics in an intersectoral perspec-
tive. By contrast, it is the SFAO which formulates the recommendations 
which are given to the evaluated bodies—or more rarely, to political bodies 
like the Federal Council or parliaments (Crémieux and Sangra 2015). To 
avoid duplication, the SFAO and the PCA coordinate their activities in 
making their annual plans for conducting evaluations. Drafting such plans 
is required by the Financial Control Act. Helpfully, the evaluation criteria 
these actors focus on are not the same. The PCA focuses on the implemen-
tation of federal policies from a legal point of view, as well as with respect to 
appropriateness and effectiveness,1 while the SFAO concentrates on fiscal 
oversight with respect to (financial) regularity, legality, and profitability.2
Finally, following the federal model, it is worth noting that the cantons 
of Geneva and Vaud have each introduced their own Court of Auditors to 
serve their cantonal parliaments and cantonal executives.
21.3.4  The Administrative Units
Evaluation activity in various administrative units helped institutionalize 
it. However, there are notable differences between these units, the most 
active of which have been the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the 
Federal Office of Public Health, the Federal Office for Professional 
Education and Technology, the Federal Office for Education and Science, 
the Federal Social Insurance Office, and the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (Balthasar 2015). Balthasar and Strotz (2017) have 
noted an increase in the institutionalization of evaluation functions within 
the federal administration between 1999 and 2015, particularly in creat-
ing positions specifically devoted to evaluation. However, the total  number 
of evaluations carried out within, or on behalf of, the federal administra-
tion has remained stable during this period, at about 80 per year (Balthasar 
2015).
1 Art. 10 Order on the Parliament’s administration, in combination with Art. 52 
Parliamentary Act.
2 Art. 5 Financial Control Act.
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Data on evaluation practices at the cantonal level are too sparse to 
allow a similar inventory. However, as at the federal level, there appears to 
be a culture of evaluation in certain domains (e.g., training and health), 
where evaluations are more common than in others (Wirths and Horber-
Papazian 2016). The phenomenon of ‘implementing federalism’, where 
the Confederation calls on the cantons to carry out directives on fighting 
unemployment or controlling migration but then also requires them to 
report on their actions, appears to have an influence on cantonal evalua-
tion practices (Horber-Papazian and Rosser, forthcoming). At the munic-
ipal level, one can observe more and more towns evaluating measures 
taken in social policy, the planning of public space, policy toward youths, 
or sustainable development, all of which are in their sphere of compe-
tence. At both cantonal and municipal levels, evaluations are usually 
outsourced.
21.3.5  The Swiss Evaluation Society
SEVAL was created in 1996 with the aim of encouraging dialogue, 
exchanging information, and sharing evaluation experiences among politi-
cians, administrators, university researchers, and consulting firms. It also 
intended to promote the dissemination of evaluation practices and to 
encourage quality. It currently has more than 500 members and helps cre-
ate a favorable climate for evaluation in the country. SEVAL organizes an 
annual congress, holds brief courses, and supports the creation of working 
groups which focus on specific issues. It has also supported the develop-
ment of quality standards for Switzerland and contributed to disseminat-
ing them; these standards were most recently revised in 2016 by a SEVAL 
working group. The Swiss standards were based on the Program Evaluation 
Standards originally drafted in the USA by the Joint Committee on 
Standards for Educational Evaluation (Widmer and Neuenschwander 
2004). A debate has been underway in SEVAL for some time now about 
the professionalization of evaluators (Horber-Papazian 2015).
21.3.6  Universities and Higher Education Institutions
The earliest developments in the academic study of evaluation were made 
in French-speaking Switzerland. Centre d’étude, de technique et 
d’évaluation législatives (CETEL), the  Center for Legislative Study, 
Technique, and Evaluation at the University of Geneva, was a forerunner 
in research on the effect of laws (Delley et al. 1982). The first seminar 
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which brought together political leaders, administrative heads, and key 
researchers, however, was organized by the Urban and Regional Planning 
Community at Lausanne’s Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne 
(EPFL) in 1988; it gave rise to the first volume devoted to the evaluation 
of public policies in Switzerland (Horber- Papazian 1990).
In 1992, Institut de hautes études en administration publique 
(IDHEAP), the Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration, was the 
first to offer a 15-day postgraduate course devoted to public policy evalu-
ation (Bergman et  al. 1998). Since then, evaluation courses have been 
offered in various social science degree programs at Swiss universities and 
universities of applied sciences. A postgraduate degree and a master’s 
degree in evaluation are offered by the University of Bern, for example, 
and various other shorter courses are available, largely meant for political 
and administrative actors.
As far as research is concerned, it is regrettable that once the national 
research program ‘Efficiency of Governmental Actions’ (NRP 27) ended in 
1997, after ten years’ work, it took another 16 years for a successor project 
to emerge. In 2013, researchers from the Universities of Bern, Geneva, 
Lausanne (IDHEAP), Lucerne, and Zurich launched a new national project 
entitled ‘Policy Evaluation in the Swiss Political System—Roots and Fruits’. 
The conclusions from this research, some of which are included here, were 
published in a collective work edited by Fritz Sager, Thomas Widmer, and 
Andreas Balthasar (2017). Apart from their implication in teaching and 
research, academics employed at Swiss universities are quite active in pub-
lishing in the major international evaluation journals (Jacob 2015).
21.3.7  Evaluators
It is the evaluators themselves who are among the most important players 
in the development of evaluation in the country; the SEVAL website at 
present lists 202 evaluators and 28 institutions which give out mandates to 
conduct evaluations.3 The vast majority of these are in German-speaking 
Switzerland (only 33 are active in the French-speaking part of the coun-
try), and so it is also in the German-speaking area that one finds the most 
important evaluation offices. This can certainly be explained by their prox-
imity to federal institutions, the largest providers of evaluation mandates. 
The SEVAL list indicates that the largest numbers of active evaluators in 
French-speaking Switzerland are associated with university institutes. 
3 As of the beginning of February, 2018.
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Evaluators in Switzerland are generally very well trained and have exten-
sive professional experiences both in terms of how many evaluations they 
have completed and how many years’ practice they have (Pleger et  al. 
2017).
21.4  the AvAIlAble resources 
For constItutIonAlly mAndAted evAluAtIons
The resources available for evaluation in Switzerland are another aspect 
which helps explain its institutionalization. If one refers to resources, one 
means not just the demonstrated competence shown by evaluators and the 
structures and organizations, but also the consensus that there is a need 
for evaluation. As many of these were addressed already, the rest of this 
section looks at available financial and legal resources.
21.4.1  Financial Resources
No official data exist on the financial resources allocated to evaluations. 
However, all evaluations conducted at the federal level are included in  a 
national database (ARAMIS), and so Balthasar (2015) has used this database 
to calculate that in the 2009–2012 period: 31.6 million Swiss francs was 
spent at the federal level on evaluations, or around 8 million Swiss francs per 
year. This is equivalent to the annual amount spent between 1999 and 2002, 
he notes, and hence the absolute amount spent in the federal administration 
for evaluations has remained essentially unchanged from 1999 to 2012.
21.4.2  Legal Resources
21.4.2.1  Article 170 of the Federal Constitution
The incorporation of an obligation to evaluate the impact of measures 
taken by the state is one of the criteria for determining the degree to which 
evaluation is institutionalized (Jacob et al. 2015). As noted above, Art. 
170 of the Federal Constitution reflects the importance accorded to evalu-
ation in Switzerland. The report of the interdepartmental working group 
in the Swiss federal administration on the ‘evaluation of effectiveness’ 
(IDEKOWI 2004) underscores that this article refers to all forms of state 
action, regardless of juridical basis (e.g., whether in the constitution, or a 
law, federal decree, ordinance, or directive). It also applies to all organs—
parliament, executive, administration, courts, external bodies, and cantons 
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inasmuch as they implement measures of the Confederation—which origi-
nate such state action. The phrase dass die Massnahmen des Bundes auf ihre 
Wirksamkeit überprüft werden (‘that federal measures are evaluated with 
regard to their effectiveness’) meant, in the eyes of this working group, 
that the most open approach possible has been chosen, one that includes 
both prospective and retrospective evaluation, monitoring, controlling, 
and quality control (IDEKOWI 2004, 11).
21.4.2.2  Evaluation Clauses Incorporated into Legislation
Article 170 of the Federal Constitution played a catalyzing role, particu-
larly in defining ‘sectoral’ evaluation clauses (meaning in laws related to 
specific public policies) at the federal level, and in both general and sec-
toral clauses at the cantonal level. Among 262 evaluation clauses found 
at federal and cantonal levels in 2015 (Wirths and Horber-Papazian 
2016), 80% came into force after Art. 170 became part of the Federal 
Constitution. Today, 14 cantons have followed the Confederation and 
introduced general evaluation clauses into their own constitutions. With 
the exception of Nidwalden, all other cantons have integrated a general 
clause into their political practice; it is applicable to the entirety of their 
legislation. For both cantons and federal government, evaluation clauses 
appear in nine out of ten cases already at the point when laws are being 
drafted, and this is even more so at the federal than at the cantonal level 
(Wirths and Horber-Papazian 2016, 496). A comparison between the 
cantons and the Confederation also reveals an important detail: it is at 
the cantonal level that political actors introduce the most clauses, mainly 
in the committees.
This is particularly true in Geneva. On the one hand, this can be 
explained by the strong links between academic actors, active in working 
to increase awareness of the importance of legislative evaluation, and the 
political world. On the other hand, it is also the result of the creation, in 
Geneva, of an ‘External Commission for Public Policy Evaluation’ in 
1995. This permanent body, external to the administration and composed 
of actors from civil society, can be called upon by the government and 
parliament, and has the power to launch its own inquiries. Its activities 
were transferred to the Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes) in 2013. 
The strong presence of a culture of evaluation in Geneva is also reflected 
in the results of a recent survey of Swiss parliaments (Eberli et al. 2014). 
Elsewhere, 20% of the parliamentarians surveyed said that they had pro-
posed including an evaluation clause—but in Geneva it was 57%.
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21.4.2.3  Evaluation Clauses as a Strategic Resource in the Political 
Decision-Making Process
The possibility of using a tool such as evaluation clauses, or calling for an 
evaluation, evidently has an influence on parliamentary debates. An analy-
sis conducted in the Geneva parliament showed that, aside from reducing 
uncertainty in politically new domains or creating the possibility of con-
trolling the actions of the executive, parliamentarians who proposed add-
ing evaluation clauses could obtain a consensus. The prospect of a 
(subsequent) evaluation gave opponents a means to have their objections 
be taken into account and could lead, when necessary, to modifications, or 
even the cancelation of the legislation under consideration (Horber- 
Papazian and Rosser, forthcoming).
The survey conducted by Eberli et al. (2014) also reveals that parlia-
mentarians make more calls for evaluations than they use their results. This 
can certainly be explained by the fact that, in the great majority of cases, it 
is up to the administration to launch the evaluations called for in evalua-
tion clauses. When the evaluation clauses have a ‘low normative density’, 
that is, when they only define few elements like the object of or the criteria 
for evaluation (Wirths 2016), the administration’s resulting room for 
maneuver means it can define the evaluation questions of interest for it. 
The focus is therefore on managerial issues, and the results of such evalu-
ations are generally not discussed among parliamentarians: they tend to be 
more interested in questions of relevance and impact. 
21.4.2.4  The Freedom of Information Act
Since their introduction, the SEVAL standards have encouraged transpar-
ency in evaluations. The 2004 introduction of the Freedom of Information 
Act in the Administration (FoIA) at the national level (implemented at the 
cantonal level) has made it possible to significantly strengthen such trans-
parency, particularly because one can generalize access to the results of pub-
lic policy evaluations. This act ‘seeks to promote transparency with regard 
to the mandate, organization and activities of the administration’ and con-
tains an article specifically about evaluation: Access to reports on the evalu-
ation of the performance of the Federal Administration and the effectiveness 
of its measures is guaranteed’ (Art. 8(5), FoIA). This transparency can thus 
be active. Those who mandate an evaluation publicize the evaluations 
through various channels, including their websites, publications, or even 
press conferences. Yet it can also be passive, in which case the report must 
be communicated to the person (or agency) which requested it.
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21.5  utIlIzAtIon oF evAluAtIon results
Among the factors contributing to strong institutionalization is that the 
results of evaluations are actually used. An analysis conducted by the SFAO 
focused on the specific effects of 115 evaluation clauses introduced from 
2006 to 2009 (Swiss Federal Audit Office 2011); it showed that these 
resulted in 62 actual evaluations. In 45% of the cases, their purpose was to 
improve the implementation of the measures. In 35% of the cases, their 
main purpose was to provide information, in the accountability reports, 
on their implementation status, while 9% of the evaluations led to a modi-
fication of the law. The remaining cases served to justify the continuation 
and financing of programs and measures taken by the Confederation.
Other analyses examining the utilization of administration-initiated 
evaluations have also found that they have had effects. At the federal level, 
Balthasar (2015) notes that more than 65% of those responsible feel that 
among the evaluations that they have seen to completion, the use of the 
results has been high. This accords with the analysis of Bättig and Schwab 
(2015, 10), who find that ‘following nearly all PCA evaluations, corrective 
measures related to the recommendations of the Control Committees can 
be identified. In any case, the scope of these measures may differ’. The 
same is true for evaluations conducted within the audit and evaluation unit 
of the SFAO. One analysis of implementation found that among 15 
 evaluations containing 100 recommendations, 55% were applied, 24% 
were partly implemented, and 21% were not implemented at all (Crémieux 
and Sangra 2015).
If it is important that an evaluation allows for adjustments in imple-
menting a public policy, then it is essential that the results can also be used. 
Policymakers should be able to move from ‘single-loop’ learning, which 
involves the administration, to ‘double-loop’ learning, integrating politi-
cal decision-makers and giving them an opportunity to reconsider the 
objectives and formulation of a public policy (Leeuw et  al. 1994). An 
extract from a PCA annual report provides reassurance on this point: 
The results of the PCA’s work are taken into consideration in diverse ways 
in the parliamentary and executive decision-making process. The Control 
Committees made numerous recommendations to the Federal Council or 
initiated legislative revisions based on PCA evaluations. (…) Moreover, eval-
uation results are regularly mentioned in parliamentary interventions and 
debates, or mentioned by the Federal Council in its messages calling for 
revisions of the law (2014, 5).
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A similar analysis was conducted at the cantonal level by Geneva’s 
Court of Auditors. Its annual report indicated that of its seven published 
evaluations from 2014 to 2017, three led to modifications of the law that 
has either entered into force or are still under review by the cantonal leg-
islature (Court of Auditors 2017).
These various analyses indicate the importance of institutional legiti-
macy in order that evaluation results be taken into account. To reinforce 
the use of evaluation results, the external bodies which mandate evalua-
tions increasingly turn to advisory groups. These are often composed of 
those who are in some sense the ‘constituents’ of an evaluation, such as 
communal or cantonal politicians, or the representatives of groups the 
evaluations concern. Such advisory groups are kept informed about the 
different stages of the evaluation, the results of the analyses, and are con-
sulted about the clarity, feasibility, and acceptability of the recommenda-
tions. This facilitates the process of learning about the content of the 
evaluation, reduces apprehensions it may engender, and serves as a means 
to explain a not small part of the recommendations which are to be imple-
mented both at the political and administrative levels.
21.6  whAt cAn one leArn From the swIss exAmPle 
wIth resPect to the InstItutIonAlIzAtIon oF PublIc 
PolIcy evAluAtIon?
Diverse factors have contributed to the institutionalization of public policy 
evaluation in Switzerland, as this chapter has highlighted. What stands out 
most, in international comparison, is the place evaluation occupies in the 
functioning of the federal parliament. The Swiss parliament is composed of 
militia politicians concerned about their prerogatives in the area of execu-
tive oversight. They saw evaluation as an additional tool that could 
strengthen the means at their disposal to exert control, and thereby their 
power to intervene. By creating a structure, the PCA, composed of pro-
fessionals who carry out evaluations on topics chosen by its Control 
Committees, parliament has a powerful tool at its disposal which allows it 
to respond to questions of interest, and these are related to the appropri-
ateness, legality, and effectiveness of the measures taken and implemented. 
By reserving the right to make recommendations to the government, 
which must take a position on the subject, the parliament gives evaluations 
a strong political dimension. This is reinforced by the competence it has to 
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control the implementation of its recommendations. Indeed, it even has the 
power to replace executive decisions—on the basis of parliamentary initia-
tives—by its own proposals, which can include repealing or enacting laws 
should the government not propose amendments. This is certainly one 
explanation for why, at the federal level, evaluation not only has effects in 
terms of implementing public policies but also in terms of political 
decisions.
The (at times) close relations between the different actors involved in an 
evaluation, and especially between academics and administrative officials, 
which result from mutual learning and the links between theory and prac-
tice it permits, are another strong explanatory factor for the institutional-
ization of evaluation. It is, in fact, common in Switzerland that senior 
officials teach classes on evaluation practice at institutions of higher educa-
tion. Academics whose research focuses on evaluation may well also be 
contracted to conduct evaluations, enriching their teaching and strength-
ening their ties to other actors in this world. For their part, politicians 
increasingly have training in evaluation and are prepared to discuss the 
effects of their decisions not just in terms of political values or sensibilities, 
but relative to data collected and analyzed in a rigorous and independent 
manner.
The procedural institutionalization of evaluation brought about by 
introducing a general evaluation clause in the Federal Constitution, from 
which specific clauses have been derived and are now found in most legis-
lation, has had a significant effect on the dissemination of evaluation 
through various political policy domains. Anchoring evaluation in the 
juridical texts has also meant that the influence of evaluation has been 
extended to the cantonal level. With one exception, all the cantons have 
followed Art. 170  in the Federal Constitution and integrated a general 
evaluation clause into their own constitutions.
Moreover, the strategic utilization of evaluation clauses in political 
debates is an element which has strengthened parliamentarians’ control 
over actions taken by the state, particularly in terms of the relevance and 
effectiveness of the measures taken. This aspect might be even further 
increased should they understand the full interest they (potentially) have 
in proposing clauses with ‘high normative density’ of a kind which main-
tains control over the evaluation criteria.
The guarantee of access to evaluation reports which is given by the 
Freedom of Information Act is an important step, as it allows citizens who 
wish to inform themselves about the effectiveness of actions taken by public 
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administrations—notably bodies whose tasks citizens finance. A public 
administration thus then moves from seeming to be a mysterious, all- 
powerful ‘black box’ to become an institution that is accountable to the 
citizens.
Finally, the issue SEVAL recently raised about the accreditation of eval-
uators makes it possible to question the training which is currently avail-
able. It certainly reinforces the idea of providing short-term training to 
enable evaluators to keep abreast of developments, especially from the 
point of view of new evaluation methods.
These generally positive points should not obscure that financial 
resources allocated for evaluation at the federal level have stagnated for 
many years. It is also true that while one can say that evaluation is strongly 
institutionalized at the federal level, data on evaluation practices at levels 
below it are lacking; one thus cannot make a reliable diagnosis of where 
evaluation stands, say, at the cantonal level. Finally, even if the Freedom of 
Information Act requires that evaluations be made accessible, this does 
not mean they are known beyond the immediate circle of those they con-
cern. At present, the results of evaluations are not sufficiently disseminated 
to the general public; it is also rare to find them mentioned in the press 
(Stucki and Schlaufer 2017). If the press does report on them, then often 
in truncated or even biased ways (Horber-Papazian and Bützer 2008).
So in addition to maintaining its rank as the country in which evaluation 
is most highly institutionalized, Switzerland faces another challenge: finding 
a way to enable evaluation to promote an enlightened democratic debate.
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